‘To do injustice is said to be a good; to suffer injustice an evil. As the evil is discovered by experience to be greater than the good, the sufferers, who cannot also be doers, make a compact that they will have neither, and this compact or mean is called justice, but is really the impossibility of doing injustice. No one would observe such a compact if he were not obliged. Let us suppose that the just and unjust have two rings, like that of Gyges in the well-known story, which make them invisible, and then no difference will appear in them, for every one will do evil if he can. And he who abstains7 will be regarded by the world as a fool for his pains. Men may praise him in public out of fear for themselves, but they will laugh at him in their hearts (Cp. Gorgias.)
‘And now let us frame an ideal of the just and unjust. Imagine the unjust man to be master of his craft, seldom making mistakes and easily correcting them; having gifts of money, speech, strength — the greatest villain8 bearing the highest character: and at his side let us place the just in his nobleness and simplicity9 — being, not seeming — without name or reward — clothed in his justice only — the best of men who is thought to be the worst, and let him die as he has lived. I might add (but I would rather put the rest into the mouth of the panegyrists of injustice — they will tell you) that the just man will be scourged10, racked, bound, will have his eyes put out, and will at last be crucified (literally impaled)— and all this because he ought to have preferred seeming to being. How different is the case of the unjust who clings to appearance as the true reality! His high character makes him a ruler; he can marry where he likes, trade where he likes, help his friends and hurt his enemies; having got rich by dishonesty he can worship the gods better, and will therefore be more loved by them than the just.’
I was thinking what to answer, when Adeimantus joined in the already unequal fray11. He considered that the most important point of all had been omitted:—‘Men are taught to be just for the sake of rewards; parents and guardians12 make reputation the incentive14 to virtue15. And other advantages are promised by them of a more solid kind, such as wealthy marriages and high offices. There are the pictures in Homer and Hesiod of fat sheep and heavy fleeces, rich corn-fields and trees toppling with fruit, which the gods provide in this life for the just. And the Orphic poets add a similar picture of another. The heroes of Musaeus and Eumolpus lie on couches at a festival, with garlands on their heads, enjoying as the meed of virtue a paradise of immortal16 drunkenness. Some go further, and speak of a fair posterity17 in the third and fourth generation. But the wicked they bury in a slough18 and make them carry water in a sieve19: and in this life they attribute to them the infamy20 which Glaucon was assuming to be the lot of the just who are supposed to be unjust.
‘Take another kind of argument which is found both in poetry and prose:— “Virtue,” as Hesiod says, “is honourable21 but difficult, vice22 is easy and profitable.” You may often see the wicked in great prosperity and the righteous afflicted23 by the will of heaven. And mendicant24 prophets knock at rich men’s doors, promising25 to atone26 for the sins of themselves or their fathers in an easy fashion with sacrifices and festive27 games, or with charms and invocations to get rid of an enemy good or bad by divine help and at a small charge; — they appeal to books professing28 to be written by Musaeus and Orpheus, and carry away the minds of whole cities, and promise to “get souls out of purgatory;” and if we refuse to listen to them, no one knows what will happen to us.
‘When a lively-minded ingenuous29 youth hears all this, what will be his conclusion? “Will he,” in the language of Pindar, “make justice his high tower, or fortify30 himself with crooked31 deceit?” Justice, he reflects, without the appearance of justice, is misery32 and ruin; injustice has the promise of a glorious life. Appearance is master of truth and lord of happiness. To appearance then I will turn — I will put on the show of virtue and trail behind me the fox of Archilochus. I hear some one saying that “wickedness is not easily concealed,” to which I reply that “nothing great is easy.” union and force and rhetoric33 will do much; and if men say that they cannot prevail over the gods, still how do we know that there are gods? Only from the poets, who acknowledge that they may be appeased34 by sacrifices. Then why not sin and pay for indulgences out of your sin? For if the righteous are only unpunished, still they have no further reward, while the wicked may be unpunished and have the pleasure of sinning too. But what of the world below? Nay35, says the argument, there are atoning36 powers who will set that matter right, as the poets, who are the sons of the gods, tell us; and this is confirmed by the authority of the State.
‘How can we resist such arguments in favour of injustice? Add good manners, and, as the wise tell us, we shall make the best of both worlds. Who that is not a miserable37 caitiff will refrain from smiling at the praises of justice? Even if a man knows the better part he will not be angry with others; for he knows also that more than human virtue is needed to save a man, and that he only praises justice who is incapable38 of injustice.
‘The origin of the evil is that all men from the beginning, heroes, poets, instructors39 of youth, have always asserted “the temporal dispensation,” the honours and profits of justice. Had we been taught in early youth the power of justice and injustice inherent in the soul, and unseen by any human or divine eye, we should not have needed others to be our guardians, but every one would have been the guardian13 of himself. This is what I want you to show, Socrates; — other men use arguments which rather tend to strengthen the position of Thrasymachus that “might is right;” but from you I expect better things. And please, as Glaucon said, to exclude reputation; let the just be thought unjust and the unjust just, and do you still prove to us the superiority of justice’ . . .
The thesis, which for the sake of argument has been maintained by Glaucon, is the converse40 of that of Thrasymachus — not right is the interest of the stronger, but right is the necessity of the weaker. Starting from the same premises41 he carries the analysis of society a step further back; — might is still right, but the might is the weakness of the many combined against the strength of the few.
There have been theories in modern as well as in ancient times which have a family likeness42 to the speculations43 of Glaucon; e.g. that power is the foundation of right; or that a monarch45 has a divine right to govern well or ill; or that virtue is self-love or the love of power; or that war is the natural state of man; or that private vices46 are public benefits. All such theories have a kind of plausibility47 from their partial agreement with experience. For human nature oscillates between good and evil, and the motives49 of actions and the origin of institutions may be explained to a certain extent on either hypothesis according to the character or point of view of a particular thinker. The obligation of maintaining authority under all circumstances and sometimes by rather questionable50 means is felt strongly and has become a sort of instinct among civilized51 men. The divine right of kings, or more generally of governments, is one of the forms under which this natural feeling is expressed. Nor again is there any evil which has not some accompaniment of good or pleasure; nor any good which is free from some alloy52 of evil; nor any noble or generous thought which may not be attended by a shadow or the ghost of a shadow of self-interest or of self-love. We know that all human actions are imperfect; but we do not therefore attribute them to the worse rather than to the better motive48 or principle. Such a philosophy is both foolish and false, like that opinion of the clever rogue53 who assumes all other men to be like himself. And theories of this sort do not represent the real nature of the State, which is based on a vague sense of right gradually corrected and enlarged by custom and law (although capable also of perversion), any more than they describe the origin of society, which is to be sought in the family and in the social and religious feelings of man. Nor do they represent the average character of individuals, which cannot be explained simply on a theory of evil, but has always a counteracting54 element of good. And as men become better such theories appear more and more untruthful to them, because they are more conscious of their own disinterestedness56. A little experience may make a man a cynic; a great deal will bring him back to a truer and kindlier view of the mixed nature of himself and his fellow men.
The two brothers ask Socrates to prove to them that the just is happy when they have taken from him all that in which happiness is ordinarily supposed to consist. Not that there is (1) any absurdity57 in the attempt to frame a notion of justice apart from circumstances. For the ideal must always be a paradox58 when compared with the ordinary conditions of human life. Neither the Stoical ideal nor the Christian59 ideal is true as a fact, but they may serve as a basis of education, and may exercise an ennobling influence. An ideal is none the worse because ‘some one has made the discovery’ that no such ideal was ever realized. And in a few exceptional individuals who are raised above the ordinary level of humanity, the ideal of happiness may be realized in death and misery. This may be the state which the reason deliberately60 approves, and which the utilitarian61 as well as every other moralist may be bound in certain cases to prefer.
Nor again, (2) must we forget that Plato, though he agrees generally with the view implied in the argument of the two brothers, is not expressing his own final conclusion, but rather seeking to dramatize one of the aspects of ethical62 truth. He is developing his idea gradually in a series of positions or situations. He is exhibiting Socrates for the first time undergoing the Socratic interrogation. Lastly, (3) the word ‘happiness’ involves some degree of confusion because associated in the language of modern philosophy with conscious pleasure or satisfaction, which was not equally present to his mind.
Glaucon has been drawing a picture of the misery of the just and the happiness of the unjust, to which the misery of the tyrant63 in Book IX is the answer and parallel. And still the unjust must appear just; that is ‘the homage64 which vice pays to virtue.’ But now Adeimantus, taking up the hint which had been already given by Glaucon, proceeds to show that in the opinion of mankind justice is regarded only for the sake of rewards and reputation, and points out the advantage which is given to such arguments as those of Thrasymachus and Glaucon by the conventional morality of mankind. He seems to feel the difficulty of ‘justifying the ways of God to man.’ Both the brothers touch upon the question, whether the morality of actions is determined65 by their consequences; and both of them go beyond the position of Socrates, that justice belongs to the class of goods not desirable for themselves only, but desirable for themselves and for their results, to which he recalls them. In their attempt to view justice as an internal principle, and in their condemnation66 of the poets, they anticipate him. The common life of Greece is not enough for them; they must penetrate68 deeper into the nature of things.
It has been objected that justice is honesty in the sense of Glaucon and Adeimantus, but is taken by Socrates to mean all virtue. May we not more truly say that the old-fashioned notion of justice is enlarged by Socrates, and becomes equivalent to universal order or well-being69, first in the State, and secondly in the individual? He has found a new answer to his old question (Protag.), ‘whether the virtues70 are one or many,’ viz. that one is the ordering principle of the three others. In seeking to establish the purely71 internal nature of justice, he is met by the fact that man is a social being, and he tries to harmonise the two opposite theses as well as he can. There is no more inconsistency in this than was inevitable72 in his age and country; there is no use in turning upon him the cross lights of modern philosophy, which, from some other point of view, would appear equally inconsistent. Plato does not give the final solution of philosophical73 questions for us; nor can he be judged of by our standard.
The remainder of the Republic is developed out of the question of the sons of Ariston. Three points are deserving of remark in what immediately follows:— First, that the answer of Socrates is altogether indirect. He does not say that happiness consists in the contemplation of the idea of justice, and still less will he be tempted74 to affirm the Stoical paradox that the just man can be happy on the rack. But first he dwells on the difficulty of the problem and insists on restoring man to his natural condition, before he will answer the question at all. He too will frame an ideal, but his ideal comprehends not only abstract justice, but the whole relations of man. Under the fanciful illustration of the large letters he implies that he will only look for justice in society, and that from the State he will proceed to the individual. His answer in substance amounts to this — that under favourable75 conditions, i.e. in the perfect State, justice and happiness will coincide, and that when justice has been once found, happiness may be left to take care of itself. That he falls into some degree of inconsistency, when in the tenth book he claims to have got rid of the rewards and honours of justice, may be admitted; for he has left those which exist in the perfect State. And the philosopher ‘who retires under the shelter of a wall’ can hardly have been esteemed76 happy by him, at least not in this world. Still he maintains the true attitude of moral action. Let a man do his duty first, without asking whether he will be happy or not, and happiness will be the inseparable accident which attends him. ‘Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you.’
Secondly, it may be remarked that Plato preserves the genuine character of Greek thought in beginning with the State and in going on to the individual. First ethics78, then politics — this is the order of ideas to us; the reverse is the order of history. Only after many struggles of thought does the individual assert his right as a moral being. In early ages he is not ONE, but one of many, the citizen of a State which is prior to him; and he has no notion of good or evil apart from the law of his country or the creed79 of his church. And to this type he is constantly tending to revert80, whenever the influence of custom, or of party spirit, or the recollection of the past becomes too strong for him.
Thirdly, we may observe the confusion or identification of the individual and the State, of ethics and politics, which pervades81 early Greek speculation44, and even in modern times retains a certain degree of influence. The subtle difference between the collective and individual action of mankind seems to have escaped early thinkers, and we too are sometimes in danger of forgetting the conditions of united human action, whenever we either elevate politics into ethics, or lower ethics to the standard of politics. The good man and the good citizen only coincide in the perfect State; and this perfection cannot be attained82 by legislation acting55 upon them from without, but, if at all, by education fashioning them from within.
. . . Socrates praises the sons of Ariston, ‘inspired offspring of the renowned83 hero,’ as the elegiac poet terms them; but he does not understand how they can argue so eloquently84 on behalf of injustice while their character shows that they are uninfluenced by their own arguments. He knows not how to answer them, although he is afraid of deserting justice in the hour of need. He therefore makes a condition, that having weak eyes he shall be allowed to read the large letters first and then go on to the smaller, that is, he must look for justice in the State first, and will then proceed to the individual. Accordingly he begins to construct the State.
Society arises out of the wants of man. His first want is food; his second a house; his third a coat. The sense of these needs and the possibility of satisfying them by exchange, draw individuals together on the same spot; and this is the beginning of a State, which we take the liberty to invent, although necessity is the real inventor. There must be first a husbandman, secondly a builder, thirdly a weaver85, to which may be added a cobbler. Four or five citizens at least are required to make a city. Now men have different natures, and one man will do one thing better than many; and business waits for no man. Hence there must be a division of labour into different employments; into wholesale86 and retail87 trade; into workers, and makers88 of workmen’s tools; into shepherds and husbandmen. A city which includes all this will have far exceeded the limit of four or five, and yet not be very large. But then again imports will be required, and imports necessitate89 exports, and this implies variety of produce in order to attract the taste of purchasers; also merchants and ships. In the city too we must have a market and money and retail trades; otherwise buyers and sellers will never meet, and the valuable time of the producers will be wasted in vain efforts at exchange. If we add hired servants the State will be complete. And we may guess that somewhere in the intercourse90 of the citizens with one another justice and injustice will appear.
Here follows a rustic91 picture of their way of life. They spend their days in houses which they have built for themselves; they make their own clothes and produce their own corn and wine. Their principal food is meal and flour, and they drink in moderation. They live on the best of terms with each other, and take care not to have too many children. ‘But,’ said Glaucon, interposing, ‘are they not to have a relish92?’ Certainly; they will have salt and olives and cheese, vegetables and fruits, and chestnuts93 to roast at the fire. ‘’Tis a city of pigs, Socrates.’ Why, I replied, what do you want more? ‘Only the comforts of life — sofas and tables, also sauces and sweets.’ I see; you want not only a State, but a luxurious94 State; and possibly in the more complex frame we may sooner find justice and injustice. Then the fine arts must go to work — every conceivable instrument and ornament95 of luxury will be wanted. There will be dancers, painters, sculptors96, musicians, cooks, barbers, tire-women, nurses, artists; swineherds and neatherds too for the animals, and physicians to cure the disorders97 of which luxury is the source. To feed all these superfluous98 mouths we shall need a part of our neighbour’s land, and they will want a part of ours. And this is the origin of war, which may be traced to the same causes as other political evils. Our city will now require the slight addition of a camp, and the citizen will be converted into a soldier. But then again our old doctrine of the division of labour must not be forgotten. The art of war cannot be learned in a day, and there must be a natural aptitude99 for military duties. There will be some warlike natures who have this aptitude — dogs keen of scent100, swift of foot to pursue, and strong of limb to fight. And as spirit is the foundation of courage, such natures, whether of men or animals, will be full of spirit. But these spirited natures are apt to bite and devour101 one another; the union of gentleness to friends and fierceness against enemies appears to be an impossibility, and the guardian of a State requires both qualities. Who then can be a guardian? The image of the dog suggests an answer. For dogs are gentle to friends and fierce to strangers. Your dog is a philosopher who judges by the rule of knowing or not knowing; and philosophy, whether in man or beast, is the parent of gentleness. The human watchdogs must be philosophers or lovers of learning which will make them gentle. And how are they to be learned without education?
But what shall their education be? Is any better than the old-fashioned sort which is comprehended under the name of music and gymnastic? Music includes literature, and literature is of two kinds, true and false. ‘What do you mean?’ he said. I mean that children hear stories before they learn gymnastics, and that the stories are either untrue, or have at most one or two grains of truth in a bushel of falsehood. Now early life is very impressible, and children ought not to learn what they will have to unlearn when they grow up; we must therefore have a censorship of nursery tales, banishing102 some and keeping others. Some of them are very improper103, as we may see in the great instances of Homer and Hesiod, who not only tell lies but bad lies; stories about Uranus104 and Saturn105, which are immoral106 as well as false, and which should never be spoken of to young persons, or indeed at all; or, if at all, then in a mystery, after the sacrifice, not of an Eleusinian pig, but of some unprocurable animal. Shall our youth be encouraged to beat their fathers by the example of Zeus, or our citizens be incited107 to quarrel by hearing or seeing representations of strife108 among the gods? Shall they listen to the narrative109 of Hephaestus binding110 his mother, and of Zeus sending him flying for helping111 her when she was beaten? Such tales may possibly have a mystical interpretation112, but the young are incapable of understanding allegory. If any one asks what tales are to be allowed, we will answer that we are legislators and not book-makers; we only lay down the principles according to which books are to be written; to write them is the duty of others.
And our first principle is, that God must be represented as he is; not as the author of all things, but of good only. We will not suffer the poets to say that he is the steward113 of good and evil, or that he has two casks full of destinies; — or that Athene and Zeus incited Pandarus to break the treaty; or that God caused the sufferings of Niobe, or of Pelops, or the Trojan war; or that he makes men sin when he wishes to destroy them. Either these were not the actions of the gods, or God was just, and men were the better for being punished. But that the deed was evil, and God the author, is a wicked, suicidal fiction which we will allow no one, old or young, to utter. This is our first and great principle — God is the author of good only.
And the second principle is like unto it:— With God is no variableness or change of form. Reason teaches us this; for if we suppose a change in God, he must be changed either by another or by himself. By another? — but the best works of nature and art and the noblest qualities of mind are least liable to be changed by any external force. By himself? — but he cannot change for the better; he will hardly change for the worse. He remains114 for ever fairest and best in his own image. Therefore we refuse to listen to the poets who tell us of Here begging in the likeness of a priestess or of other deities115 who prowl about at night in strange disguises; all that blasphemous116 nonsense with which mothers fool the manhood out of their children must be suppressed. But some one will say that God, who is himself unchangeable, may take a form in relation to us. Why should he? For gods as well as men hate the lie in the soul, or principle of falsehood; and as for any other form of lying which is used for a purpose and is regarded as innocent in certain exceptional cases — what need have the gods of this? For they are not ignorant of antiquity117 like the poets, nor are they afraid of their enemies, nor is any madman a friend of theirs. God then is true, he is absolutely true; he changes not, he deceives not, by day or night, by word or sign. This is our second great principle — God is true. Away with the lying dream of Agamemnon in Homer, and the accusation118 of Thetis against Apollo in Aeschylus . . .
In order to give clearness to his conception of the State, Plato proceeds to trace the first principles of mutual119 need and of division of labour in an imaginary community of four or five citizens. Gradually this community increases; the division of labour extends to countries; imports necessitate exports; a medium of exchange is required, and retailers120 sit in the market-place to save the time of the producers. These are the steps by which Plato constructs the first or primitive121 State, introducing the elements of political economy by the way. As he is going to frame a second or civilized State, the simple naturally comes before the complex. He indulges, like Rousseau, in a picture of primitive life — an idea which has indeed often had a powerful influence on the imagination of mankind, but he does not seriously mean to say that one is better than the other (Politicus); nor can any inference be drawn122 from the description of the first state taken apart from the second, such as Aristotle appears to draw in the Politics. We should not interpret a Platonic123 dialogue any more than a poem or a parable77 in too literal or matter-of-fact a style. On the other hand, when we compare the lively fancy of Plato with the dried-up abstractions of modern treatises124 on philosophy, we are compelled to say with Protagoras, that the ‘mythus is more interesting’ (Protag.)
Several interesting remarks which in modern times would have a place in a treatise125 on Political Economy are scattered126 up and down the writings of Plato: especially Laws, Population; Free Trade; Adulteration; Wills and Bequests127; Begging; Eryxias, (though not Plato’s), Value and Demand; Republic, Division of Labour. The last subject, and also the origin of Retail Trade, is treated with admirable lucidity128 in the second book of the Republic. But Plato never combined his economic ideas into a system, and never seems to have recognized that Trade is one of the great motive powers of the State and of the world. He would make retail traders only of the inferior sort of citizens (Rep., Laws), though he remarks, quaintly129 enough (Laws), that ‘if only the best men and the best women everywhere were compelled to keep taverns130 for a time or to carry on retail trade, etc., then we should knew how pleasant and agreeable all these things are.’
The disappointment of Glaucon at the ‘city of pigs,’ the ludicrous description of the ministers of luxury in the more refined State, and the afterthought of the necessity of doctors, the illustration of the nature of the guardian taken from the dog, the desirableness of offering some almost unprocurable victim when impure131 mysteries are to be celebrated132, the behaviour of Zeus to his father and of Hephaestus to his mother, are touches of humour which have also a serious meaning. In speaking of education Plato rather startles us by affirming that a child must be trained in falsehood first and in truth afterwards. Yet this is not very different from saying that children must be taught through the medium of imagination as well as reason; that their minds can only develope gradually, and that there is much which they must learn without understanding. This is also the substance of Plato’s view, though he must be acknowledged to have drawn the line somewhat differently from modern ethical writers, respecting truth and falsehood. To us, economies or accommodations would not be allowable unless they were required by the human faculties133 or necessary for the communication of knowledge to the simple and ignorant. We should insist that the word was inseparable from the intention, and that we must not be ‘falsely true,’ i.e. speak or act falsely in support of what was right or true. But Plato would limit the use of fictions only by requiring that they should have a good moral effect, and that such a dangerous weapon as falsehood should be employed by the rulers alone and for great objects.
A Greek in the age of Plato attached no importance to the question whether his religion was an historical fact. He was just beginning to be conscious that the past had a history; but he could see nothing beyond Homer and Hesiod. Whether their narratives134 were true or false did not seriously affect the political or social life of Hellas. Men only began to suspect that they were fictions when they recognised them to be immoral. And so in all religions: the consideration of their morality comes first, afterwards the truth of the documents in which they are recorded, or of the events natural or supernatural which are told of them. But in modern times, and in Protestant countries perhaps more than in Catholic, we have been too much inclined to identify the historical with the moral; and some have refused to believe in religion at all, unless a superhuman accuracy was discernible in every part of the record. The facts of an ancient or religious history are amongst the most important of all facts; but they are frequently uncertain, and we only learn the true lesson which is to be gathered from them when we place ourselves above them. These reflections tend to show that the difference between Plato and ourselves, though not unimportant, is not so great as might at first sight appear. For we should agree with him in placing the moral before the historical truth of religion; and, generally, in disregarding those errors or misstatements of fact which necessarily occur in the early stages of all religions. We know also that changes in the traditions of a country cannot be made in a day; and are therefore tolerant of many things which science and criticism would condemn67.
We note in passing that the allegorical interpretation of mythology135, said to have been first introduced as early as the sixth century before Christ by Theagenes of Rhegium, was well established in the age of Plato, and here, as in the Phaedrus, though for a different reason, was rejected by him. That anachronisms whether of religion or law, when men have reached another stage of civilization, should be got rid of by fictions is in accordance with universal experience. Great is the art of interpretation; and by a natural process, which when once discovered was always going on, what could not be altered was explained away. And so without any palpable inconsistency there existed side by side two forms of religion, the tradition inherited or invented by the poets and the customary worship of the temple; on the other hand, there was the religion of the philosopher, who was dwelling136 in the heaven of ideas, but did not therefore refuse to offer a cock to Aesculapius, or to be seen saying his prayers at the rising of the sun. At length the antagonism137 between the popular and philosophical religion, never so great among the Greeks as in our own age, disappeared, and was only felt like the difference between the religion of the educated and uneducated among ourselves. The Zeus of Homer and Hesiod easily passed into the ‘royal mind’ of Plato (Philebus); the giant Heracles became the knight-errant and benefactor138 of mankind. These and still more wonderful transformations139 were readily effected by the ingenuity140 of Stoics141 and neo-Platonists in the two or three centuries before and after Christ. The Greek and Roman religions were gradually permeated142 by the spirit of philosophy; having lost their ancient meaning, they were resolved into poetry and morality; and probably were never purer than at the time of their decay, when their influence over the world was waning143.
A singular conception which occurs towards the end of the book is the lie in the soul; this is connected with the Platonic and Socratic doctrine that involuntary ignorance is worse than voluntary. The lie in the soul is a true lie, the corruption144 of the highest truth, the deception145 of the highest part of the soul, from which he who is deceived has no power of delivering himself. For example, to represent God as false or immoral, or, according to Plato, as deluding146 men with appearances or as the author of evil; or again, to affirm with Protagoras that ‘knowledge is sensation,’ or that ‘being is becoming,’ or with Thrasymachus ‘that might is right,’ would have been regarded by Plato as a lie of this hateful sort. The greatest unconsciousness of the greatest untruth, e.g. if, in the language of the Gospels (John), ‘he who was blind’ were to say ‘I see,’ is another aspect of the state of mind which Plato is describing. The lie in the soul may be further compared with the sin against the Holy Ghost (Luke), allowing for the difference between Greek and Christian modes of speaking. To this is opposed the lie in words, which is only such a deception as may occur in a play or poem, or allegory or figure of speech, or in any sort of accommodation — which though useless to the gods may be useful to men in certain cases. Socrates is here answering the question which he had himself raised about the propriety147 of deceiving a madman; and he is also contrasting the nature of God and man. For God is Truth, but mankind can only be true by appearing sometimes to be partial, or false. Reserving for another place the greater questions of religion or education, we may note further, (1) the approval of the old traditional education of Greece; (2) the preparation which Plato is making for the attack on Homer and the poets; (3) the preparation which he is also making for the use of economies in the State; (4) the contemptuous and at the same time euphemistic manner in which here as below he alludes148 to the ‘Chronique Scandaleuse’ of the gods.
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pacified
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| 使（某人）安静( pacify的过去式和过去分词 )； 息怒； 抚慰； 在（有战争的地区、国家等）实现和平 | |
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intrepid
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| adj.无畏的，刚毅的 | |
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secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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injustice
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| n.非正义，不公正，不公平，侵犯（别人的）权利 | |
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dinning
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| vt.喧闹（din的现在分词形式） | |
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abstains
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| 戒（尤指酒），戒除( abstain的第三人称单数 )； 弃权（不投票） | |
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villain
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| n.反派演员，反面人物；恶棍；问题的起因 | |
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simplicity
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| n.简单，简易；朴素；直率，单纯 | |
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scourged
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| 鞭打( scourge的过去式和过去分词 )； 惩罚，压迫 | |
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fray
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| v.争吵；打斗；磨损，磨破；n.吵架；打斗 | |
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12
guardians
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| 监护人( guardian的名词复数 )； 保护者，维护者 | |
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13
guardian
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| n.监护人；守卫者，保护者 | |
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14
incentive
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| n.刺激；动力；鼓励；诱因；动机 | |
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15
virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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16
immortal
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| adj.不朽的；永生的，不死的；神的 | |
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17
posterity
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| n.后裔，子孙，后代 | |
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18
slough
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| v.蜕皮，脱落，抛弃 | |
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19
sieve
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| n.筛，滤器，漏勺 | |
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20
infamy
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| n.声名狼藉，出丑，恶行 | |
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21
honourable
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| adj.可敬的；荣誉的，光荣的 | |
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22
vice
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| n.坏事；恶习；[pl.]台钳，老虎钳；adj.副的 | |
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23
afflicted
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| 使受痛苦，折磨( afflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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24
mendicant
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| n.乞丐；adj.行乞的 | |
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25
promising
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| adj.有希望的，有前途的 | |
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26
atone
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| v.赎罪，补偿 | |
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27
festive
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| adj.欢宴的，节日的 | |
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28
professing
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| 声称( profess的现在分词 )； 宣称； 公开表明； 信奉 | |
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29
ingenuous
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| adj.纯朴的，单纯的；天真的；坦率的 | |
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30
fortify
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| v.强化防御，为…设防；加强，强化 | |
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31
crooked
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| adj.弯曲的；不诚实的，狡猾的，不正当的 | |
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32
misery
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| n.痛苦，苦恼，苦难；悲惨的境遇，贫苦 | |
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33
rhetoric
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| n.修辞学，浮夸之言语 | |
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34
appeased
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| 安抚，抚慰( appease的过去式和过去分词 )； 绥靖（满足另一国的要求以避免战争） | |
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35
nay
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| adv.不；n.反对票，投反对票者 | |
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36
atoning
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| v.补偿，赎（罪）( atone的现在分词 )；补偿，弥补，赎回 | |
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37
miserable
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|
| adj.悲惨的，痛苦的；可怜的，糟糕的 | |
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38
incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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39
instructors
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| 指导者，教师( instructor的名词复数 ) | |
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40
converse
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|
| vi.谈话，谈天，闲聊；adv.相反的，相反 | |
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41
premises
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| n.建筑物，房屋 | |
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42
likeness
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| n.相像，相似（之处） | |
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43
speculations
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| n.投机买卖( speculation的名词复数 )；思考；投机活动；推断 | |
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44
speculation
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| n.思索，沉思；猜测；投机 | |
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45
monarch
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| n.帝王，君主，最高统治者 | |
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46
vices
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| 缺陷( vice的名词复数 )； 恶习； 不道德行为； 台钳 | |
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47
plausibility
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| n. 似有道理, 能言善辩 | |
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48
motive
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|
| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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49
motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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50
questionable
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|
| adj.可疑的，有问题的 | |
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51
civilized
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| a.有教养的，文雅的 | |
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52
alloy
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| n.合金，(金属的)成色 | |
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53
rogue
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| n.流氓；v.游手好闲 | |
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54
counteracting
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| 对抗，抵消( counteract的现在分词 ) | |
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55
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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56
disinterestedness
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57
absurdity
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| n.荒谬，愚蠢；谬论 | |
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58
paradox
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| n.似乎矛盾却正确的说法；自相矛盾的人(物) | |
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59
Christian
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| adj.基督教徒的；n.基督教徒 | |
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60
deliberately
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| adv.审慎地；蓄意地；故意地 | |
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61
utilitarian
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| adj.实用的，功利的 | |
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62
ethical
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| adj.伦理的，道德的，合乎道德的 | |
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63
tyrant
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| n.暴君，专制的君主，残暴的人 | |
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64
homage
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| n.尊敬，敬意，崇敬 | |
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65
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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66
condemnation
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| n.谴责; 定罪 | |
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67
condemn
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| vt.谴责，指责；宣判(罪犯)，判刑 | |
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68
penetrate
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| v.透(渗)入；刺入，刺穿；洞察，了解 | |
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69
well-being
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| n.安康，安乐，幸福 | |
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70
virtues
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| 美德( virtue的名词复数 )； 德行； 优点； 长处 | |
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71
purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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72
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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73
philosophical
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|
| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
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74
tempted
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| v.怂恿（某人）干不正当的事；冒…的险（tempt的过去分词） | |
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75
favourable
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|
| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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76
esteemed
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|
| adj.受人尊敬的v.尊敬( esteem的过去式和过去分词 )；敬重；认为；以为 | |
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77
parable
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|
| n.寓言，比喻 | |
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78
ethics
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| n.伦理学；伦理观，道德标准 | |
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79
creed
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| n.信条；信念，纲领 | |
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80
revert
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| v.恢复，复归，回到 | |
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81
pervades
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| v.遍及，弥漫( pervade的第三人称单数 ) | |
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82
attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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83
renowned
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|
| adj.著名的，有名望的，声誉鹊起的 | |
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84
eloquently
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|
| adv. 雄辩地(有口才地, 富于表情地) | |
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85
weaver
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| n.织布工；编织者 | |
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86
wholesale
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|
| n.批发；adv.以批发方式；vt.批发，成批出售 | |
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87
retail
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| v./n.零售；adv.以零售价格 | |
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88
makers
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| n.制造者，制造商（maker的复数形式） | |
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89
necessitate
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| v.使成为必要，需要 | |
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90
intercourse
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|
| n.性交；交流，交往，交际 | |
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91
rustic
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| adj.乡村的，有乡村特色的；n.乡下人，乡巴佬 | |
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92
relish
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|
| n.滋味，享受，爱好，调味品；vt.加调味料，享受，品味；vi.有滋味 | |
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93
chestnuts
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| n.栗子( chestnut的名词复数 )；栗色；栗树；栗色马 | |
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94
luxurious
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|
| adj.精美而昂贵的；豪华的 | |
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95
ornament
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|
| v.装饰，美化；n.装饰，装饰物 | |
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96
sculptors
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| 雕刻家，雕塑家( sculptor的名词复数 )； [天]玉夫座 | |
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97
disorders
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|
| n.混乱( disorder的名词复数 )；凌乱；骚乱；（身心、机能）失调 | |
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98
superfluous
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|
| adj.过多的，过剩的，多余的 | |
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99
aptitude
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| n.(学习方面的)才能，资质，天资 | |
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100
scent
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| n.气味，香味，香水，线索，嗅觉；v.嗅，发觉 | |
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101
devour
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| v.吞没；贪婪地注视或谛听，贪读；使着迷 | |
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102
banishing
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| v.放逐，驱逐( banish的现在分词 ) | |
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103
improper
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| adj.不适当的，不合适的，不正确的，不合礼仪的 | |
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104
Uranus
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| n.天王星 | |
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105
Saturn
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| n.农神，土星 | |
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106
immoral
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| adj.不道德的，淫荡的，荒淫的，有伤风化的 | |
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107
incited
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| 刺激，激励，煽动( incite的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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108
strife
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| n.争吵，冲突，倾轧，竞争 | |
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109
narrative
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| n.叙述，故事；adj.叙事的，故事体的 | |
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110
binding
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| 有约束力的，有效的，应遵守的 | |
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111
helping
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| n.食物的一份&adj.帮助人的，辅助的 | |
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112
interpretation
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| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
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113
steward
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| n.乘务员，服务员；看管人；膳食管理员 | |
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114
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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115
deities
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| n.神，女神( deity的名词复数 )；神祗；神灵；神明 | |
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116
blasphemous
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| adj.亵渎神明的，不敬神的 | |
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117
antiquity
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| n.古老；高龄；古物，古迹 | |
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118
accusation
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| n.控告，指责，谴责 | |
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119
mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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120
retailers
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| 零售商，零售店( retailer的名词复数 ) | |
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121
primitive
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| adj.原始的；简单的；n.原(始)人，原始事物 | |
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122
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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123
platonic
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| adj.精神的；柏拉图（哲学）的 | |
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124
treatises
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| n.专题著作，专题论文，专著( treatise的名词复数 ) | |
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125
treatise
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| n.专著；(专题)论文 | |
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126
scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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127
bequests
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| n.遗赠( bequest的名词复数 )；遗产，遗赠物 | |
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128
lucidity
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| n.明朗，清晰，透明 | |
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129
quaintly
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| adv.古怪离奇地 | |
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130
taverns
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| n.小旅馆，客栈，酒馆( tavern的名词复数 ) | |
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131
impure
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| adj.不纯净的，不洁的；不道德的，下流的 | |
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132
celebrated
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| adj.有名的，声誉卓著的 | |
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133
faculties
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| n.能力( faculty的名词复数 )；全体教职员；技巧；院 | |
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134
narratives
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| 记叙文( narrative的名词复数 )； 故事； 叙述； 叙述部分 | |
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135
mythology
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| n.神话，神话学，神话集 | |
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136
dwelling
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| n.住宅，住所，寓所 | |
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137
antagonism
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| n.对抗，敌对，对立 | |
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138
benefactor
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| n. 恩人，行善的人，捐助人 | |
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139
transformations
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| n.变化( transformation的名词复数 )；转换；转换；变换 | |
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140
ingenuity
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| n.别出心裁；善于发明创造 | |
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141
stoics
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| 禁欲主义者，恬淡寡欲的人，不以苦乐为意的人( stoic的名词复数 ) | |
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142
permeated
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| 弥漫( permeate的过去式和过去分词 )； 遍布； 渗入； 渗透 | |
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143
waning
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| adj.（月亮）渐亏的，逐渐减弱或变小的n.月亏v.衰落( wane的现在分词 )；（月）亏；变小；变暗淡 | |
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144
corruption
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| n.腐败，堕落，贪污 | |
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145
deception
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| n.欺骗，欺诈；骗局，诡计 | |
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146
deluding
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| v.欺骗，哄骗( delude的现在分词 ) | |
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147
propriety
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| n.正当行为；正当；适当 | |
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148
alludes
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| 提及，暗指( allude的第三人称单数 ) | |
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