To the size of the state there is no limit but the necessity of unity17; it must be neither too large nor too small to be one. This is a matter of secondary importance, like the principle of transposition which was intimated in the parable18 of the earthborn men. The meaning there implied was that every man should do that for which he was fitted, and be at one with himself, and then the whole city would be united. But all these things are secondary, if education, which is the great matter, be duly regarded. When the wheel has once been set in motion, the speed is always increasing; and each generation improves upon the preceding, both in physical and moral qualities. The care of the governors should be directed to preserve music and gymnastic from innovation; alter the songs of a country, Damon says, and you will soon end by altering its laws. The change appears innocent at first, and begins in play; but the evil soon becomes serious, working secretly upon the characters of individuals, then upon social and commercial relations, and lastly upon the institutions of a state; and there is ruin and confusion everywhere. But if education remains in the established form, there will be no danger. A restorative process will be always going on; the spirit of law and order will raise up what has fallen down. Nor will any regulations be needed for the lesser19 matters of life — rules of deportment or fashions of dress. Like invites like for good or for evil. Education will correct deficiencies and supply the power of self-government. Far be it from us to enter into the particulars of legislation; let the guardians take care of education, and education will take care of all other things.
But without education they may patch and mend as they please; they will make no progress, any more than a patient who thinks to cure himself by some favourite remedy and will not give up his luxurious mode of living. If you tell such persons that they must first alter their habits, then they grow angry; they are charming people. ‘Charming — nay20, the very reverse.’ Evidently these gentlemen are not in your good graces, nor the state which is like them. And such states there are which first ordain21 under penalty of death that no one shall alter the constitution, and then suffer themselves to be flattered into and out of anything; and he who indulges them and fawns22 upon them, is their leader and saviour23. ‘Yes, the men are as bad as the states.’ But do you not admire their cleverness? ‘Nay, some of them are stupid enough to believe what the people tell them.’ And when all the world is telling a man that he is six feet high, and he has no measure, how can he believe anything else? But don’t get into a passion: to see our statesmen trying their nostrums24, and fancying that they can cut off at a blow the Hydra-like rogueries of mankind, is as good as a play. Minute enactments25 are superfluous26 in good states, and are useless in bad ones.
And now what remains of the work of legislation? Nothing for us; but to Apollo the god of Delphi we leave the ordering of the greatest of all things — that is to say, religion. Only our ancestral deity27 sitting upon the centre and navel of the earth will be trusted by us if we have any sense, in an affair of such magnitude. No foreign god shall be supreme28 in our realms . . .
Here, as Socrates would say, let us ‘reflect on’ (Greek) what has preceded: thus far we have spoken not of the happiness of the citizens, but only of the well-being30 of the State. They may be the happiest of men, but our principal aim in founding the State was not to make them happy. They were to be guardians, not holiday-makers. In this pleasant manner is presented to us the famous question both of ancient and modern philosophy, touching31 the relation of duty to happiness, of right to utility.
First duty, then happiness, is the natural order of our moral ideas. The utilitarian32 principle is valuable as a corrective of error, and shows to us a side of ethics33 which is apt to be neglected. It may be admitted further that right and utility are co-extensive, and that he who makes the happiness of mankind his object has one of the highest and noblest motives34 of human action. But utility is not the historical basis of morality; nor the aspect in which moral and religious ideas commonly occur to the mind. The greatest happiness of all is, as we believe, the far-off result of the divine government of the universe. The greatest happiness of the individual is certainly to be found in a life of virtue35 and goodness. But we seem to be more assured of a law of right than we can be of a divine purpose, that ‘all mankind should be saved;’ and we infer the one from the other. And the greatest happiness of the individual may be the reverse of the greatest happiness in the ordinary sense of the term, and may be realised in a life of pain, or in a voluntary death. Further, the word ‘happiness’ has several ambiguities36; it may mean either pleasure or an ideal life, happiness subjective37 or objective, in this world or in another, of ourselves only or of our neighbours and of all men everywhere. By the modern founder38 of Utilitarianism the self-regarding and disinterested39 motives of action are included under the same term, although they are commonly opposed by us as benevolence40 and self-love. The word happiness has not the definiteness or the sacredness of ‘truth’ and ‘right’; it does not equally appeal to our higher nature, and has not sunk into the conscience of mankind. It is associated too much with the comforts and conveniences of life; too little with ‘the goods of the soul which we desire for their own sake.’ In a great trial, or danger, or temptation, or in any great and heroic action, it is scarcely thought of. For these reasons ‘the greatest happiness’ principle is not the true foundation of ethics. But though not the first principle, it is the second, which is like unto it, and is often of easier application. For the larger part of human actions are neither right nor wrong, except in so far as they tend to the happiness of mankind (Introd. to Gorgias and Philebus).
The same question reappears in politics, where the useful or expedient42 seems to claim a larger sphere and to have a greater authority. For concerning political measures, we chiefly ask: How will they affect the happiness of mankind? Yet here too we may observe that what we term expediency43 is merely the law of right limited by the conditions of human society. Right and truth are the highest aims of government as well as of individuals; and we ought not to lose sight of them because we cannot directly enforce them. They appeal to the better mind of nations; and sometimes they are too much for merely temporal interests to resist. They are the watchwords which all men use in matters of public policy, as well as in their private dealings; the peace of Europe may be said to depend upon them. In the most commercial and utilitarian states of society the power of ideas remains. And all the higher class of statesmen have in them something of that idealism which Pericles is said to have gathered from the teaching of Anaxagoras. They recognise that the true leader of men must be above the motives of ambition, and that national character is of greater value than material comfort and prosperity. And this is the order of thought in Plato; first, he expects his citizens to do their duty, and then under favourable45 circumstances, that is to say, in a well-ordered State, their happiness is assured. That he was far from excluding the modern principle of utility in politics is sufficiently46 evident from other passages; in which ‘the most beneficial is affirmed to be the most honourable’, and also ‘the most sacred’.
We may note
(1) The manner in which the objection of Adeimantus here, is designed to draw out and deepen the argument of Socrates.
(2) The conception of a whole as lying at the foundation both of politics and of art, in the latter supplying the only principle of criticism, which, under the various names of harmony, symmetry, measure, proportion, unity, the Greek seems to have applied47 to works of art.
(3) The requirement that the State should be limited in size, after the traditional model of a Greek state; as in the Politics of Aristotle, the fact that the cities of Hellas were small is converted into a principle.
(4) The humorous pictures of the lean dogs and the fatted sheep, of the light active boxer48 upsetting two stout gentlemen at least, of the ‘charming’ patients who are always making themselves worse; or again, the playful assumption that there is no State but our own; or the grave irony50 with which the statesman is excused who believes that he is six feet high because he is told so, and having nothing to measure with is to be pardoned for his ignorance — he is too amusing for us to be seriously angry with him.
(5) The light and superficial manner in which religion is passed over when provision has been made for two great principles — first, that religion shall be based on the highest conception of the gods, secondly51, that the true national or Hellenic type shall be maintained . . .
Socrates proceeds: But where amid all this is justice? Son of Ariston, tell me where. Light a candle and search the city, and get your brother and the rest of our friends to help in seeking for her. ‘That won’t do,’ replied Glaucon, ‘you yourself promised to make the search and talked about the impiety52 of deserting justice.’ Well, I said, I will lead the way, but do you follow. My notion is, that our State being perfect will contain all the four virtues53 — wisdom, courage, temperance, justice. If we eliminate the three first, the unknown remainder will be justice.
First then, of wisdom: the State which we have called into being will be wise because politic41. And policy is one among many kinds of skill — not the skill of the carpenter, or of the worker in metal, or of the husbandman, but the skill of him who advises about the interests of the whole State. Of such a kind is the skill of the guardians, who are a small class in number, far smaller than the blacksmiths; but in them is concentrated the wisdom of the State. And if this small ruling class have wisdom, then the whole State will be wise.
Our second virtue is courage, which we have no difficulty in finding in another class — that of soldiers. Courage may be defined as a sort of salvation54 — the never-failing salvation of the opinions which law and education have prescribed concerning dangers. You know the way in which dyers first prepare the white ground and then lay on the dye of purple or of any other colour. Colours dyed in this way become fixed55, and no soap or lye will ever wash them out. Now the ground is education, and the laws are the colours; and if the ground is properly laid, neither the soap of pleasure nor the lye of pain or fear will ever wash them out. This power which preserves right opinion about danger I would ask you to call ‘courage,’ adding the epithet56 ‘political’ or ‘civilized’ in order to distinguish it from mere44 animal courage and from a higher courage which may hereafter be discussed.
Two virtues remain; temperance and justice. More than the preceding virtues temperance suggests the idea of harmony. Some light is thrown upon the nature of this virtue by the popular description of a man as ‘master of himself’— which has an absurd sound, because the master is also the servant. The expression really means that the better principle in a man masters the worse. There are in cities whole classes — women, slaves and the like — who correspond to the worse, and a few only to the better; and in our State the former class are held under control by the latter. Now to which of these classes does temperance belong? ‘To both of them.’ And our State if any will be the abode57 of temperance; and we were right in describing this virtue as a harmony which is diffused58 through the whole, making the dwellers59 in the city to be of one mind, and attuning60 the upper and middle and lower classes like the strings61 of an instrument, whether you suppose them to differ in wisdom, strength or wealth.
And now we are near the spot; let us draw in and surround the cover and watch with all our eyes, lest justice should slip away and escape. Tell me, if you see the thicket62 move first. ‘Nay, I would have you lead.’ Well then, offer up a prayer and follow. The way is dark and difficult; but we must push on. I begin to see a track. ‘Good news.’ Why, Glaucon, our dulness of scent63 is quite ludicrous! While we are straining our eyes into the distance, justice is tumbling out at our feet. We are as bad as people looking for a thing which they have in their hands. Have you forgotten our old principle of the division of labour, or of every man doing his own business, concerning which we spoke29 at the foundation of the State — what but this was justice? Is there any other virtue remaining which can compete with wisdom and temperance and courage in the scale of political virtue? For ‘every one having his own’ is the great object of government; and the great object of trade is that every man should do his own business. Not that there is much harm in a carpenter trying to be a cobbler, or a cobbler transforming himself into a carpenter; but great evil may arise from the cobbler leaving his last and turning into a guardian3 or legislator, or when a single individual is trainer, warrior12, legislator, all in one. And this evil is injustice64, or every man doing another’s business. I do not say that as yet we are in a condition to arrive at a final conclusion. For the definition which we believe to hold good in states has still to be tested by the individual. Having read the large letters we will now come back to the small. From the two together a brilliant light may be struck out . . .
Socrates proceeds to discover the nature of justice by a method of residues65. Each of the first three virtues corresponds to one of the three parts of the soul and one of the three classes in the State, although the third, temperance, has more of the nature of a harmony than the first two. If there be a fourth virtue, that can only be sought for in the relation of the three parts in the soul or classes in the State to one another. It is obvious and simple, and for that very reason has not been found out. The modern logician67 will be inclined to object that ideas cannot be separated like chemical substances, but that they run into one another and may be only different aspects or names of the same thing, and such in this instance appears to be the case. For the definition here given of justice is verbally the same as one of the definitions of temperance given by Socrates in the Charmides, which however is only provisional, and is afterwards rejected. And so far from justice remaining over when the other virtues are eliminated, the justice and temperance of the Republic can with difficulty be distinguished68. Temperance appears to be the virtue of a part only, and one of three, whereas justice is a universal virtue of the whole soul. Yet on the other hand temperance is also described as a sort of harmony, and in this respect is akin49 to justice. Justice seems to differ from temperance in degree rather than in kind; whereas temperance is the harmony of discordant69 elements, justice is the perfect order by which all natures and classes do their own business, the right man in the right place, the division and co-operation of all the citizens. Justice, again, is a more abstract notion than the other virtues, and therefore, from Plato’s point of view, the foundation of them, to which they are referred and which in idea precedes them. The proposal to omit temperance is a mere trick of style intended to avoid monotony.
There is a famous question discussed in one of the earlier Dialogues of Plato (Protagoras; Arist. Nic. Ethics), ‘Whether the virtues are one or many?’ This receives an answer which is to the effect that there are four cardinal70 virtues (now for the first time brought together in ethical71 philosophy), and one supreme over the rest, which is not like Aristotle’s conception of universal justice, virtue relative to others, but the whole of virtue relative to the parts. To this universal conception of justice or order in the first education and in the moral nature of man, the still more universal conception of the good in the second education and in the sphere of speculative72 knowledge seems to succeed. Both might be equally described by the terms ‘law,’ ‘order,’ ‘harmony;’ but while the idea of good embraces ‘all time and all existence,’ the conception of justice is not extended beyond man.
. . . Socrates is now going to identify the individual and the State. But first he must prove that there are three parts of the individual soul. His argument is as follows:— Quantity makes no difference in quality. The word ‘just,’ whether applied to the individual or to the State, has the same meaning. And the term ‘justice’ implied that the same three principles in the State and in the individual were doing their own business. But are they really three or one? The question is difficult, and one which can hardly be solved by the methods which we are now using; but the truer and longer way would take up too much of our time. ‘The shorter will satisfy me.’ Well then, you would admit that the qualities of states mean the qualities of the individuals who compose them? The Scythians and Thracians are passionate73, our own race intellectual, and the Egyptians and Phoenicians covetous74, because the individual members of each have such and such a character; the difficulty is to determine whether the several principles are one or three; whether, that is to say, we reason with one part of our nature, desire with another, are angry with another, or whether the whole soul comes into play in each sort of action. This enquiry, however, requires a very exact definition of terms. The same thing in the same relation cannot be affected75 in two opposite ways. But there is no impossibility in a man standing76 still, yet moving his arms, or in a top which is fixed on one spot going round upon its axis77. There is no necessity to mention all the possible exceptions; let us provisionally assume that opposites cannot do or be or suffer opposites in the same relation. And to the class of opposites belong assent78 and dissent79, desire and avoidance. And one form of desire is thirst and hunger: and here arises a new point — thirst is thirst of drink, hunger is hunger of food; not of warm drink or of a particular kind of food, with the single exception of course that the very fact of our desiring anything implies that it is good. When relative terms have no attributes, their correlatives have no attributes; when they have attributes, their correlatives also have them. For example, the term ‘greater’ is simply relative to ‘less,’ and knowledge refers to a subject of knowledge. But on the other hand, a particular knowledge is of a particular subject. Again, every science has a distinct character, which is defined by an object; medicine, for example, is the science of health, although not to be confounded with health. Having cleared our ideas thus far, let us return to the original instance of thirst, which has a definite object — drink. Now the thirsty soul may feel two distinct impulses; the animal one saying ‘Drink;’ the rational one, which says ‘Do not drink.’ The two impulses are contradictory80; and therefore we may assume that they spring from distinct principles in the soul. But is passion a third principle, or akin to desire? There is a story of a certain Leontius which throws some light on this question. He was coming up from the Piraeus outside the north wall, and he passed a spot where there were dead bodies lying by the executioner. He felt a longing81 desire to see them and also an abhorrence82 of them; at first he turned away and shut his eyes, then, suddenly tearing them open, he said — ‘Take your fill, ye wretches83, of the fair sight.’ Now is there not here a third principle which is often found to come to the assistance of reason against desire, but never of desire against reason? This is passion or spirit, of the separate existence of which we may further convince ourselves by putting the following case:— When a man suffers justly, if he be of a generous nature he is not indignant at the hardships which he undergoes: but when he suffers unjustly, his indignation is his great support; hunger and thirst cannot tame him; the spirit within him must do or die, until the voice of the shepherd, that is, of reason, bidding his dog bark no more, is heard within. This shows that passion is the ally of reason. Is passion then the same with reason? No, for the former exists in children and brutes84; and Homer affords a proof of the distinction between them when he says, ‘He smote85 his breast, and thus rebuked86 his soul.’
And now, at last, we have reached firm ground, and are able to infer that the virtues of the State and of the individual are the same. For wisdom and courage and justice in the State are severally the wisdom and courage and justice in the individuals who form the State. Each of the three classes will do the work of its own class in the State, and each part in the individual soul; reason, the superior, and passion, the inferior, will be harmonized by the influence of music and gymnastic. The counsellor and the warrior, the head and the arm, will act together in the town of Mansoul, and keep the desires in proper subjection. The courage of the warrior is that quality which preserves a right opinion about dangers in spite of pleasures and pains. The wisdom of the counsellor is that small part of the soul which has authority and reason. The virtue of temperance is the friendship of the ruling and the subject principles, both in the State and in the individual. Of justice we have already spoken; and the notion already given of it may be confirmed by common instances. Will the just state or the just individual steal, lie, commit adultery, or be guilty of impiety to gods and men? ‘No.’ And is not the reason of this that the several principles, whether in the state or in the individual, do their own business? And justice is the quality which makes just men and just states. Moreover, our old division of labour, which required that there should be one man for one use, was a dream or anticipation87 of what was to follow; and that dream has now been realized in justice, which begins by binding88 together the three chords of the soul, and then acts harmoniously89 in every relation of life. And injustice, which is the insubordination and disobedience of the inferior elements in the soul, is the opposite of justice, and is inharmonious and unnatural90, being to the soul what disease is to the body; for in the soul as well as in the body, good or bad actions produce good or bad habits. And virtue is the health and beauty and well-being of the soul, and vice91 is the disease and weakness and deformity of the soul.
Again the old question returns upon us: Is justice or injustice the more profitable? The question has become ridiculous. For injustice, like mortal disease, makes life not worth having. Come up with me to the hill which overhangs the city and look down upon the single form of virtue, and the infinite forms of vice, among which are four special ones, characteristic both of states and of individuals. And the state which corresponds to the single form of virtue is that which we have been describing, wherein reason rules under one of two names — monarchy92 and aristocracy. Thus there are five forms in all, both of states and of souls . . .
In attempting to prove that the soul has three separate faculties93, Plato takes occasion to discuss what makes difference of faculties. And the criterion which he proposes is difference in the working of the faculties. The same faculty94 cannot produce contradictory effects. But the path of early reasoners is beset95 by thorny96 entanglements97, and he will not proceed a step without first clearing the ground. This leads him into a tiresome98 digression, which is intended to explain the nature of contradiction. First, the contradiction must be at the same time and in the same relation. Secondly, no extraneous99 word must be introduced into either of the terms in which the contradictory proposition is expressed: for example, thirst is of drink, not of warm drink. He implies, what he does not say, that if, by the advice of reason, or by the impulse of anger, a man is restrained from drinking, this proves that thirst, or desire under which thirst is included, is distinct from anger and reason. But suppose that we allow the term ‘thirst’ or ‘desire’ to be modified, and say an ‘angry thirst,’ or a ‘revengeful desire,’ then the two spheres of desire and anger overlap100 and become confused. This case therefore has to be excluded. And still there remains an exception to the rule in the use of the term ‘good,’ which is always implied in the object of desire. These are the discussions of an age before logic66; and any one who is wearied by them should remember that they are necessary to the clearing up of ideas in the first development of the human faculties.
The psychology101 of Plato extends no further than the division of the soul into the rational, irascible, and concupiscent elements, which, as far as we know, was first made by him, and has been retained by Aristotle and succeeding ethical writers. The chief difficulty in this early analysis of the mind is to define exactly the place of the irascible faculty (Greek), which may be variously described under the terms righteous indignation, spirit, passion. It is the foundation of courage, which includes in Plato moral courage, the courage of enduring pain, and of surmounting102 intellectual difficulties, as well as of meeting dangers in war. Though irrational103, it inclines to side with the rational: it cannot be aroused by punishment when justly inflicted104: it sometimes takes the form of an enthusiasm which sustains a man in the performance of great actions. It is the ‘lion heart’ with which the reason makes a treaty. On the other hand it is negative rather than positive; it is indignant at wrong or falsehood, but does not, like Love in the Symposium105 and Phaedrus, aspire106 to the vision of Truth or Good. It is the peremptory107 military spirit which prevails in the government of honour. It differs from anger (Greek), this latter term having no accessory notion of righteous indignation. Although Aristotle has retained the word, yet we may observe that ‘passion’ (Greek) has with him lost its affinity108 to the rational and has become indistinguishable from ‘anger’ (Greek). And to this vernacular109 use Plato himself in the Laws seems to revert110, though not always. By modern philosophy too, as well as in our ordinary conversation, the words anger or passion are employed almost exclusively in a bad sense; there is no connotation of a just or reasonable cause by which they are aroused. The feeling of ‘righteous indignation’ is too partial and accidental to admit of our regarding it as a separate virtue or habit. We are tempted111 also to doubt whether Plato is right in supposing that an offender112, however justly condemned113, could be expected to acknowledge the justice of his sentence; this is the spirit of a philosopher or martyr114 rather than of a criminal.
We may observe how nearly Plato approaches Aristotle’s famous thesis, that ‘good actions produce good habits.’ The words ‘as healthy practices (Greek) produce health, so do just practices produce justice,’ have a sound very like the Nicomachean Ethics. But we note also that an incidental remark in Plato has become a far-reaching principle in Aristotle, and an inseparable part of a great Ethical system.
There is a difficulty in understanding what Plato meant by ‘the longer way’: he seems to intimate some metaphysic of the future which will not be satisfied with arguing from the principle of contradiction. In the sixth and seventh books (compare Sophist and Parmenides) he has given us a sketch115 of such a metaphysic; but when Glaucon asks for the final revelation of the idea of good, he is put off with the declaration that he has not yet studied the preliminary sciences. How he would have filled up the sketch, or argued about such questions from a higher point of view, we can only conjecture116. Perhaps he hoped to find some a priori method of developing the parts out of the whole; or he might have asked which of the ideas contains the other ideas, and possibly have stumbled on the Hegelian identity of the ‘ego’ and the ‘universal.’ Or he may have imagined that ideas might be constructed in some manner analogous117 to the construction of figures and numbers in the mathematical sciences. The most certain and necessary truth was to Plato the universal; and to this he was always seeking to refer all knowledge or opinion, just as in modern times we seek to rest them on the opposite pole of induction118 and experience. The aspirations119 of metaphysicians have always tended to pass beyond the limits of human thought and language: they seem to have reached a height at which they are ‘moving about in worlds unrealized,’ and their conceptions, although profoundly affecting their own minds, become invisible or unintelligible120 to others. We are not therefore surprized to find that Plato himself has nowhere clearly explained his doctrine121 of ideas; or that his school in a later generation, like his contemporaries Glaucon and Adeimantus, were unable to follow him in this region of speculation122. In the Sophist, where he is refuting the scepticism which maintained either that there was no such thing as predication, or that all might be predicated of all, he arrives at the conclusion that some ideas combine with some, but not all with all. But he makes only one or two steps forward on this path; he nowhere attains123 to any connected system of ideas, or even to a knowledge of the most elementary relations of the sciences to one another.
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miserable
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| adj.悲惨的，痛苦的；可怜的，糟糕的 | |
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guardians
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| 监护人( guardian的名词复数 )； 保护者，维护者 | |
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guardian
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| n.监护人；守卫者，保护者 | |
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sculptor
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| n.雕刻家，雕刻家 | |
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linen
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| n.亚麻布，亚麻线，亚麻制品；adj.亚麻布制的，亚麻的 | |
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distinctive
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| adj.特别的，有特色的，与众不同的 | |
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degenerate
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| v.退步，堕落；adj.退步的，堕落的；n.堕落者 | |
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boon
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| n.恩赐，恩物，恩惠 | |
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luxurious
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| adj.精美而昂贵的；豪华的 | |
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contented
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| adj.满意的，安心的，知足的 | |
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warriors
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| 武士，勇士，战士( warrior的名词复数 ) | |
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warrior
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| n.勇士，武士，斗士 | |
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preying
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| v.掠食( prey的现在分词 )；掠食；折磨；（人）靠欺诈为生 | |
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remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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mightiest
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| adj.趾高气扬( mighty的最高级 )；巨大的；强有力的；浩瀚的 | |
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unity
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| n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调 | |
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parable
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| n.寓言，比喻 | |
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lesser
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| adj.次要的，较小的；adv.较小地，较少地 | |
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nay
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| adv.不；n.反对票，投反对票者 | |
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ordain
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| vi.颁发命令；vt.命令，授以圣职，注定，任命 | |
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fawns
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| n.（未满一岁的）幼鹿( fawn的名词复数 )；浅黄褐色；乞怜者；奉承者v.（尤指狗等）跳过来往人身上蹭以示亲热( fawn的第三人称单数 )；巴结；讨好 | |
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saviour
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| n.拯救者，救星 | |
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nostrums
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| n.骗人的疗法，有专利权的药品( nostrum的名词复数 )；妙策 | |
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enactments
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| n.演出( enactment的名词复数 )；展现；规定；通过 | |
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superfluous
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| adj.过多的，过剩的，多余的 | |
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deity
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| n.神，神性；被奉若神明的人(或物) | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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well-being
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| n.安康，安乐，幸福 | |
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touching
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| adj.动人的，使人感伤的 | |
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utilitarian
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| adj.实用的，功利的 | |
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33
ethics
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| n.伦理学；伦理观，道德标准 | |
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34
motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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ambiguities
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| n.歧义( ambiguity的名词复数 )；意义不明确；模棱两可的意思；模棱两可的话 | |
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subjective
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| a.主观(上)的，个人的 | |
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38
Founder
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| n.创始者，缔造者 | |
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disinterested
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| adj.不关心的，不感兴趣的 | |
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benevolence
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| n.慈悲，捐助 | |
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41
politic
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| adj.有智虑的；精明的；v.从政 | |
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42
expedient
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| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
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43
expediency
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| n.适宜；方便；合算；利己 | |
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44
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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47
applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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48
boxer
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| n.制箱者，拳击手 | |
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49
akin
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| adj.同族的，类似的 | |
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50
irony
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| n.反语，冷嘲；具有讽刺意味的事，嘲弄 | |
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secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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52
impiety
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| n.不敬；不孝 | |
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53
virtues
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| 美德( virtue的名词复数 )； 德行； 优点； 长处 | |
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salvation
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| n.（尤指基督）救世，超度，拯救，解困 | |
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fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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epithet
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| n.（用于褒贬人物等的）表述形容词，修饰语 | |
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abode
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| n.住处，住所 | |
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diffused
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| 散布的，普及的，扩散的 | |
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dwellers
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| n.居民，居住者( dweller的名词复数 ) | |
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attuning
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| v.使协调( attune的现在分词 )；调音 | |
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strings
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| n.弦 | |
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thicket
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| n.灌木丛，树林 | |
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scent
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| n.气味，香味，香水，线索，嗅觉；v.嗅，发觉 | |
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injustice
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| n.非正义，不公正，不公平，侵犯（别人的）权利 | |
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residues
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| n.剩余，余渣( residue的名词复数 )；剩余财产；剩数 | |
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logic
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| n.逻辑(学)；逻辑性 | |
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logician
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| n.逻辑学家 | |
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68
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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discordant
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| adj.不调和的 | |
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cardinal
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| n.(天主教的)红衣主教；adj.首要的，基本的 | |
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71
ethical
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| adj.伦理的，道德的，合乎道德的 | |
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speculative
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| adj.思索性的，暝想性的，推理的 | |
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passionate
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| adj.热情的，热烈的，激昂的，易动情的，易怒的，性情暴躁的 | |
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covetous
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| adj.贪婪的，贪心的 | |
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75
affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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axis
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| n.轴，轴线，中心线；坐标轴，基准线 | |
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assent
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| v.批准，认可；n.批准，认可 | |
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dissent
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| n./v.不同意，持异议 | |
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80
contradictory
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| adj.反驳的，反对的，抗辩的；n.正反对，矛盾对立 | |
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81
longing
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| n.（for）渴望 | |
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82
abhorrence
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| n.憎恶；可憎恶的事 | |
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83
wretches
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| n.不幸的人( wretch的名词复数 )；可怜的人；恶棍；坏蛋 | |
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brutes
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| 兽( brute的名词复数 )； 畜生； 残酷无情的人； 兽性 | |
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85
smote
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| v.猛打，重击，打击( smite的过去式 ) | |
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86
rebuked
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| 责难或指责( rebuke的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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87
anticipation
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| n.预期，预料，期望 | |
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88
binding
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| 有约束力的，有效的，应遵守的 | |
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89
harmoniously
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| 和谐地，调和地 | |
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90
unnatural
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| adj.不自然的；反常的 | |
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91
vice
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| n.坏事；恶习；[pl.]台钳，老虎钳；adj.副的 | |
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92
monarchy
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| n.君主，最高统治者；君主政体，君主国 | |
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93
faculties
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| n.能力( faculty的名词复数 )；全体教职员；技巧；院 | |
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faculty
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| n.才能；学院，系；(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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beset
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| v.镶嵌；困扰，包围 | |
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thorny
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| adj.多刺的，棘手的 | |
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97
entanglements
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| n.瓜葛( entanglement的名词复数 )；牵连；纠缠；缠住 | |
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98
tiresome
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| adj.令人疲劳的，令人厌倦的 | |
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99
extraneous
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| adj.体外的；外来的；外部的 | |
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100
overlap
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| v.重叠，与…交叠；n.重叠 | |
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101
psychology
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| n.心理，心理学，心理状态 | |
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102
surmounting
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| 战胜( surmount的现在分词 )； 克服（困难）； 居于…之上； 在…顶上 | |
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103
irrational
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| adj.无理性的，失去理性的 | |
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104
inflicted
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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105
symposium
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| n.讨论会，专题报告会；专题论文集 | |
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106
aspire
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| vi.(to，after)渴望，追求，有志于 | |
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107
peremptory
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| adj.紧急的，专横的，断然的 | |
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108
affinity
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| n.亲和力，密切关系 | |
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109
vernacular
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| adj.地方的，用地方语写成的；n.白话；行话；本国语；动植物的俗名 | |
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110
revert
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| v.恢复，复归，回到 | |
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111
tempted
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| v.怂恿（某人）干不正当的事；冒…的险（tempt的过去分词） | |
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112
offender
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| n.冒犯者，违反者，犯罪者 | |
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113
condemned
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| adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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114
martyr
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| n.烈士，殉难者；vt.杀害，折磨，牺牲 | |
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115
sketch
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| n.草图；梗概；素描；v.素描；概述 | |
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116
conjecture
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| n./v.推测，猜测 | |
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117
analogous
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| adj.相似的；类似的 | |
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118
induction
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| n.感应，感应现象 | |
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119
aspirations
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| 强烈的愿望( aspiration的名词复数 )； 志向； 发送气音； 发 h 音 | |
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120
unintelligible
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| adj.无法了解的，难解的，莫明其妙的 | |
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121
doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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122
speculation
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| n.思索，沉思；猜测；投机 | |
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123
attains
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的第三人称单数 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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