IT WOULD be out of place, in this treatise1, to discuss the question into what departments or branches the executive business of government may most conveniently be divided. In this respect the exigencies2 of different governments are different; and there is little probability that any great mistake will be made in the classification of the duties when men are willing to begin at the beginning, and do not hold themselves bound by the series of accidents which, in an old government like ours, has produced the existing division of the public business. It may be sufficient to say that the classification of functionaries3 should correspond to that of subjects, and that there should not be several departments independent of one another to superintend different parts of the same natural whole; as in our own military administration down to a recent period, and in a less degree even at present. Where the object to be attained4 is single (such as that of having an efficient army), the authority commissioned to attend to it should be single likewise. The entire aggregate6 of means provided for one end should be under one and the same control and responsibility. If they are divided among independent authorities, the means, with each of those authorities, become ends, and it is the business of nobody except the head of the Government, who is probably without the appropriate departmental experience, to take care of the real end. The different classes of means are not combined and adapted to one another under the guidance of any leading idea; and while every department pushes forward its own requirements, regardless of those of the rest, the purpose of the work is perpetually sacrificed to the work itself.
As a general rule, every executive function, whether superior or subordinate, should be the appointed duty of some given individual. It should be apparent to all the world who did everything, and through whose default anything was left undone7. Responsibility is null when nobody knows who is responsible. Nor, even when real, can it be divided without being weakened. To maintain it at its highest there must be one person who receives the whole praise of what is well done, the whole blame of what is ill. There are, however, two modes of sharing responsibility: by one it is only enfeebled, by the other, absolutely destroyed. It is enfeebled when the concurrence8 of more than one functionary9 is required to the same act. Each one among them has still a real responsibility; if a wrong has been done, none of them can say he did not do it; he is as much a participant as an accomplice10 is in an offence: if there has been legal criminality they may all be punished legally, and their punishment needs not be less severe than if there had been only one person concerned. But it is not so with the penalties, any more than with the rewards, of opinion: these are always diminished by being shared. Where there has been no definite legal offence, no corruption11 or malversation, only an error or an imprudence, or what may pass for such, every participator has an excuse to himself and to the world, in the fact that other persons are jointly12 involved with him. There is hardly anything, even to pecuniary13 dishonesty, for which men will not feel themselves almost absolved14, if those whose duty it was to resist and remonstrate15 have failed to do it, still more if they have given a formal assent16.
In this case, however, though responsibility is weakened, there still is responsibility: every one of those implicated17 has in his individual capacity assented18 to, and joined in, the act. Things are much worse when the act itself is only that of a majority — a Board, deliberating with closed doors, nobody knowing, or, except in some extreme case, being ever likely to know, whether an individual member voted for the act or against it. Responsibility in this case is a mere19 name. "Boards," it is happily said by Bentham, "are screens." What "the Board" does is the act of nobody; and nobody can be made to answer for it. The Board suffers, even in reputation, only in its collective character; and no individual member feels this further than his disposition20 leads him to identify his own estimation with that of the body — a feeling often very strong when the body is a permanent one, and he is wedded21 to it for better for worse; but the fluctuations22 of a modern official career give no time for the formation of such an esprit de corps23; which if it exists at all, exists only in the obscure ranks of the permanent subordinates. Boards, therefore, are not a fit instrument for executive business; and are only admissible in it when, for other reasons, to give full discretionary power to a single minister would be worse.
On the other hand, it is also a maxim25 of experience that in the multitude of counsellors there is wisdom; and that a man seldom judges right, even in his own concerns, still less in those of the public, when he makes habitual26 use of no knowledge but his own, or that of some single adviser27. There is no necessary incompatibility28 between this principle and the other. It is easy to give the effective power, and the full responsibility, to one, providing him when necessary with advisers29, each of whom is responsible only for the opinion he gives.
In general, the head of a department of the executive government is a mere politician. He may be a good politician, and a man of merit; and unless this is usually the case, the government is bad. But his general capacity, and the knowledge he ought to possess of the general interests of the country, will not, unless by occasional accident, be accompanied by adequate, and what may be called professional, knowledge of the department over which he is called to preside. Professional advisers must therefore be provided for him. Wherever mere experience and attainments30 are sufficient wherever the qualities required in a professional adviser may possibly be united in a single well-selected individual (as in the case, for example, of a law officer), one such person for general purposes, and a staff of clerks to supply knowledge of details, meet the demands of the case. But, more frequently, it is not sufficient that the minister should consult some one competent person, and, when himself not conversant32 with the subject, act implicitly33 on that person's advice. It is often necessary that he should, not only occasionally but habitually34, listen to a variety of opinions, and inform his judgment35 by the discussions among a body of advisers. This, for example, is emphatically necessary in military and naval36 affairs. The military and naval ministers, therefore, and probably several others, should be provided with a Council, composed, at least in those two departments, of able and experienced professional men. As a means of obtaining the best men for the purpose under every change of administration, they ought to be permanent: by which I mean, that they ought not, like the Lords of the Admiralty, to be expected to resign with the ministry37 by whom they were appointed: but it is a good rule that all who hold high appointments to which they have risen by selection, and not by the ordinary course of promotion38, should retain their office only for a fixed39 term, unless reappointed; as is now the rule with Staff appointments in the British army. This rule renders appointments somewhat less likely to be jobbed, not being a provision for life, and the same time affords a means, without affront40 to any one, of getting rid of those who are least worth keeping, and bringing in highly qualified41 persons of younger standing42, for whom there might never be room if death vacancies43, or voluntary resignations, were waited for.
The Councils should be consultative merely, in this sense, that the ultimate decision should rest undividedly with the minister himself: but neither ought they to be looked upon, or to look upon themselves, as ciphers44, or as capable of being reduced to such at his pleasure. The advisers attached to a powerful and perhaps self-willed man ought to be placed under conditions which make it impossible for them, without discredit45, not to express an opinion, and impossible for him not to listen to and consider their recommendations, whether he adopts them or not. The relation which ought to exist between a chief and this description of advisers is very accurately46 hit by the constitution of the Council of the Governor-General and those of the different Presidencies47 in India. These Councils are composed of persons who have professional knowledge of Indian affairs, which the Governor-General and Governors usually lack, and which it would not be desirable to require of them. As a rule, every member of Council is expected to give an opinion, which is of course very often a simple acquiescence48: but if there is a difference of sentiment, it is at the option of every member, and is the invariable practice, to record the reasons of his opinion: the Governor-General, or Governor, doing the same. In ordinary cases the decision is according to the sense of the majority; the Council, therefore, has a substantial part in the government: but if the Governor-General, or Governor, thinks fit, he may set aside even their unanimous opinion, recording49 his reasons. The result is, that the chief is individually and effectively responsible for every act of the Government. The members of Council have only the responsibility of advisers; but it is always known, from documents capable of being produced, and which if called for by Parliament or public opinion always are produced, what each has advised, and what reasons he gave for his advice: while, from their dignified50 position, and ostensible51 participation52 in all acts of government, they have nearly as strong motives53 to apply themselves to the public business, and to form and express a well-considered opinion on every part of it, as if the whole responsibility rested with themselves.
This mode of conducting the highest class of administrative55 business is one of the most successful instances of the adaptation of means to ends which political history, not hitherto very prolific56 in works of skill and contrivance, has yet to show. It is one of the acquisitions with which the art of politics has been enriched by the experience of the East India Company's rule; and, like most of the other wise contrivances by which India has been preserved to this country, and an amount of good government produced which is truly wonderful considering the circumstances and the materials, it is probably destined57 to perish in the general holocaust58 which the traditions of Indian government seem fated to undergo, since they have been placed at the mercy of public ignorance, and the presumptuous59 vanity of political men. Already an outcry is raised for abolishing the Councils, as a superfluous60 and expensive clog61 on the wheels of government: while the clamour has long been urgent, and is daily obtaining more countenance62 in the highest quarters, for the abrogation63 of the professional civil service which breeds the men that compose the Councils, and the existence of which is the sole guarantee for their being of any value.
A most important principle of good government in a popular constitution is that no executive functionaries should be appointed by popular election: neither by the votes of the people themselves, nor by those of their representatives. The entire business of government is skilled employment; the qualifications for the discharge of it are of that special and professional kind which cannot be properly judged of except by persons who have themselves some share of those qualifications, or some practical experience of them. The business of finding the fittest persons to fill public employments — not merely selecting the best who offer, but looking out for the absolutely best, and taking note of all fit persons who are met with, that they may be found when wanted — is very laborious64, and requires a delicate as well as highly conscientious65 discernment; and as there is no public duty which is in general so badly performed, so there is none for which it is of greater importance to enforce the utmost practicable amount of personal responsibility, by imposing66 it as a special obligation on high functionaries in the several departments. All subordinate public officers who are not appointed by some mode of public competition should be selected on the direct responsibility of the minister under whom they serve. The ministers, all but the chief, will naturally be selected by the chief; and the chief himself, though really designated by Parliament, should be, in a regal government, officially appointed by the Crown. The functionary who appoints should be the sole person empowered to remove any subordinate officer who is liable to removal; which the far greater number ought not to be, except for personal misconduct; since it would be vain to expect that the body of persons by whom the whole detail of the public business is transacted67, and whose qualifications are generally of much more importance to the public than those of the minister himself, will devote themselves to their profession, and acquire the knowledge and skill on which the minister must often place entire dependence68, if they are liable at any moment to be turned adrift for no fault, that the minister may gratify himself, or promote his political interest, by appointing somebody else.
To the principle which condemns69 the appointment of executive officers by popular suffrage70, ought the chief of the executive, in a republican government, to be an exception? Is it a good rule, which, in the American Constitution, provides for the election of the President once in every four years by the entire people? The question is not free from difficulty. There is unquestionably some advantage, in a country like America, where no apprehension71 needs be entertained of a coup72 d'etat, in making the chief minister constitutionally independent of the legislative73 body, and rendering74 the two great branches of the government, while equally popular both in their origin and in their responsibility, an effective check on one another. The plan is in accordance with that sedulous75 avoidance of the concentration of great masses of power in the same hands, which is a marked characteristic of the American Federal Constitution. But the advantage, in this instance, is purchased at a price above all reasonable estimates of its value. It seems far better that the chief magistrate76 in a republic should be appointed avowedly77, as the chief minister in a constitutional monarchy78 is virtually, by the representative body. In the first place, he is certain, when thus appointed, to be a more eminent79 man. The party which has the majority in Parliament would then, as a rule, appoint its own leader; who is always one of the foremost, and often the very foremost person in political life: while the President of the United States, since the last survivor80 of the founders81 of the republic disappeared from the scene, is almost always either an obscure man, or one who has gained any reputation he may possess in some other field than politics. And this, as I have before observed, is no accident, but the natural effect of the situation. The eminent men of a party, in an election extending to the whole country, are never its most available candidates. All eminent men have made personal enemies, or have done something, or at the lowest professed82 some opinion, obnoxious83 to some local or other considerable division of the community, and likely to tell with fatal effect upon the number of votes; whereas a man without antecedents, of whom nothing is known but that he professes84 the creed85 of the party, is readily voted for by its entire strength. Another important consideration is the great mischief86 of unintermitted electioneering. When the highest dignity in the State is to be conferred by popular election once in every few years, the whole intervening time is spent in what is virtually a canvass87. President, ministers, chiefs of parties, and their followers88, are all electioneerers: the whole community is kept intent on the mere personalities89 of politics, and every public question is discussed and decided90 with less reference to its merits than to its expected bearing on the presidential election. If a system had been devised to make party spirit the ruling principle of action in all public affairs, and create an inducement not only to make every question a party question, but to raise questions for the purpose of founding parties upon them, it would have been difficult to contrive91 any means better adapted to the purpose.
I will not affirm that it would at all times and places be desirable that the head of the executive should be so completely dependent upon the votes of a representative assembly as the Prime Minister is in England, and is without inconvenience. If it were thought best to avoid this, he might, though appointed by Parliament, hold his office for a fixed period, independent of a parliamentary vote: which would be the American system, minus the popular election and its evils. There is another mode of giving the head of the administration as much independence of the legislature as is at all compatible with the essentials of free government. He never could be unduly92 dependent on a vote of Parliament, if he had, as the British Prime Minister practically has, the power to dissolve the House and appeal to the people: if instead of being turned out of office by a hostile vote, he could only be reduced by it to the alternative of resignation or dissolution. The power of dissolving Parliament is one which I think it desirable he should possess, even under the system by which his own tenure93 of office is secured to him for a fixed period. There ought not to be any possibility of that deadlock94 in politics which would ensue on a quarrel breaking out between a President and an Assembly, neither of whom, during an interval95 which might amount to years, would have any legal means of ridding itself of the other. To get through such a period without a coup d'etat being attempted, on either side or on both, requires such a combination of the love of liberty and the habit of self-restraint as very few nations have yet shown themselves capable of: and though this extremity96 were avoided, to expect that the two authorities would not paralyse each other's operations is to suppose that the political life of the country will always be pervaded97 by a spirit of mutual98 forbearance and compromise, imperturbable99 by the passions and excitements of the keenest party struggles. Such a spirit may exist, but even where it does there is imprudence in trying it too far.
Other reasons make it desirable that some power in the state (which can only be the executive) should have the liberty of at any time, and at discretion24, calling a new Parliament. When there is a real doubt which of two contending parties has the strongest following, it is important that there should exist a constitutional means of immediately testing the point, and setting it at rest. No other political topic has a chance of being properly attended to while this is undecided: and such an interval is mostly an interregnum for purposes of legislative or administrative improvement; neither party having sufficient confidence in its strength to attempt things likely to promote opposition100 in any quarter that has either direct or indirect influence in the pending101 struggle.
I have not taken account of the case in which the vast power centralised in the chief magistrate, and the insufficient102 attachment103 of the mass of the people to free institutions, give him a chance of success in an attempt to subvert104 the Constitution, and usurp105 sovereign power. Where such peril106 exists, no first magistrate is admissible whom the Parliament cannot, by a single vote, reduce to a private station. In a state of things holding out any encouragement to that most audacious and profligate107 of all breaches108 of trust, even this entireness of constitutional dependence is but a weak protection.
Of all officers of government, those in whose appointment any participation of popular suffrage is the most objectionable are judicial110 officers. While there are no functionaries whose special and professional qualifications the popular judgment is less fitted to estimate, there are none in whose case absolute impartiality111, and freedom from connection with politicians or sections of politicians, are of anything like equal importance. Some thinkers, among others Mr. Bentham, have been of opinion that, although it is better that judges should not be appointed by popular election, the people of their district ought to have the power, after sufficient experience, of removing them from their trust. It cannot be denied that the irremovability of any public officer, to whom great interests are entrusted112, is in itself an evil. It is far from desirable that there should be no means of getting rid of a bad or incompetent113 judge, unless for such misconduct as he can be made to answer for in a criminal court; and that a functionary on whom so much depends should have the feeling of being free from responsibility except to opinion and his own conscience. The question however is, whether in the peculiar114 position of a judge, and supposing that all practicable securities have been taken for an honest appointment, irresponsibility, except to his own and the public conscience, has not on the whole less tendency to pervert115 his conduct than responsibility to the government, or to a popular vote. Experience has long decided this point in the affirmative as regards responsibility to the executive; and the case is quite equally strong when the responsibility sought to be enforced is to the suffrages116 of electors. Among the good qualities of a popular constituency, those peculiarly incumbent117 upon a judge, calmness and impartiality, are not numbered. Happily, in that intervention118 of popular suffrage which is essential to freedom they are not the qualities required. Even the quality of justice, though necessary to all human beings, and therefore to all electors, is not the inducement which decides any popular election. Justice and impartiality are as little wanted for electing a member of Parliament as they can be in any transaction of men. The electors have not to award something which either candidate has a right to, nor to pass judgment on the general merits of the competitors, but to declare which of them has most of their personal confidence, or best represents their political convictions. A judge is bound to treat his political friend, or the person best known to him, exactly as he treats other people; but it would be a breach109 of duty as well as an absurdity119 if an elector did so. No argument can be grounded on the beneficial effect produced on judges, as on all other functionaries, by the moral jurisdiction120 of opinion; for even in this respect, that which really exercises a useful control over the proceedings121 of a judge, when fit for the judicial office, is not (except sometimes in political cases) the opinion of the community generally, but that of the only public by whom his conduct or qualifications can be duly estimated, the bar of his own court.
I must not be understood to say that the participation of the general public in the administration of justice is of no importance; it is of the greatest: but in what manner? By the actual discharge of a part of the judicial office, in the capacity of jurymen. This is one of the few cases in politics in which it is better that the people should act directly and personally than through their representatives; being almost the only case in which the errors that a person exercising authority may commit can be better borne than the consequences of making him responsible for them. If a judge could be removed from office by a popular vote, whoever was desirous of supplanting122 him would make capital for that purpose out of all his judicial decisions; would carry all of them, as far as he found practicable, by irregular appeal before a public opinion wholly incompetent, for want of having heard the case, or from having heard it without either the precautions or the impartiality belonging to a judicial hearing; would play upon popular passion and prejudice where they existed, and take pains to arouse them where they did not. And in this, if the case were interesting, and he took sufficient trouble, he would infallibly be successful, unless the judge or his friends descended123 into the arena124, and made equally powerful appeals on the other side. Judges would end by feeling that they risked their office upon every decision they gave in a case susceptible125 of general interest, and that it was less essential for them to consider what decision was just than what would be most applauded by the public, or would least admit of insidious126 misrepresentation. The practice introduced by some of the new or revised State Constitutions in America, of submitting judicial officers to periodical popular re-election, will be found, I apprehend127, to be one of the most dangerous errors ever yet committed by democracy: and, were it not that the practical good sense which never totally deserts the people of the United States is said to be producing a reaction, likely in no long time to lead to the retraction128 of the error, it might with reason be regarded as the first great downward step in the degeneration of modern democratic government.12
12 I have been informed, however, that in the States which have made their judges elective, the choice is not really made by the people, but by the leaders of parties; no elector ever thinking of voting for any one but the party candidate: and that, in consequence, the person elected is usually in effect the same who would have been appointed to the office by the President or by the Governor of the State. Thus one bad practice limits and corrects another; and the habit of voting en masse under a party banner, which is so full of evil in all cases in which the function of electing is rightly vested in the people, tends to alleviate129 a still greater mischief in a case where the officer to be elected is one who ought to be chosen not by the people but for them.
With regard to that large and important body which constitutes the permanent strength of the public service, those who do not change with changes of politics, but remain to aid every minister by their experience and traditions, inform him by their knowledge of business, and conduct official details under his general control; those, in short, who form the class of professional public servants, entering their profession as others do while young, in the hope of rising progressively to its higher grades as they advance in life; it is evidently inadmissible that these should be liable to be turned out, and deprived of the whole benefit of their previous service, except for positive, proved, and serious misconduct. Not, of course, such delinquency only as makes them amenable130 to the law; but voluntary neglect of duty, or conduct implying untrustworthiness for the purposes for which their trust is given them. Since, therefore, unless in case of personal culpability131, there is no way of getting rid of them except by quartering them on the public as pensioners132, it is of the greatest importance that the appointments should be well made in the first instance; and it remains133 to be considered by what mode of appointment this purpose can best be attained.
In making first appointments, little danger is to be apprehended134 from want of special skill and knowledge in the choosers, but much from partiality, and private or political interest. Being, as a rule, appointed at the commencement of manhood, not as having learnt, but in order that they may learn, their profession, the only thing by which the best candidates can be discriminated135 is proficiency136 in the ordinary branches of liberal education: and this can be ascertained137 without difficulty, provided there be the requisite139 pains and the requisite impartiality in those who are appointed to inquire into it. Neither the one nor the other can reasonably be expected from a minister; who must rely wholly on recommendations, and however disinterested140 as to his personal wishes, never will be proof against the solicitations of persons who have the power of influencing his own election, or whose political adherence141 is important to the ministry to which he belongs. These considerations have introduced the practice of submitting all candidates for first appointments to a public examination, conducted by persons not engaged in politics, and of the same class and quality with the examiners for honours at the Universities. This would probably be the best plan under any system; and under our parliamentary government it is the only one which affords a chance, I do not say of honest appointment, but even of abstinence from such as are manifestly and flagrantly profligate.
It is also absolutely necessary that the examinations should be competitive, and the appointments given to those who are most successful. A mere pass examination never, in the long run, does more than exclude absolute dunces. When the question, in the mind of an examiner, lies between blighting142 the prospects143 of an individual, and neglecting a duty to the public which, in the particular instance, seldom appears of first rate importance; and when he is sure to be bitterly reproached for doing the first, while in general no one will either know or care whether he has done the latter; the balance, unless he is a man of very unusual stamp, inclines to the side of good nature. A relaxation144 in one instance establishes a claim to it in others, which every repetition of indulgence makes it more difficult to resist; each of these in succession becomes a precedent145 for more, until the standard of proficiency sinks gradually to something almost contemptible146. Examinations for degrees at the two great Universities have generally been as slender in their requirements as those for honours are trying and serious. Where there is no inducement to exceed a certain minimum, the minimum comes to be the maximum: it becomes the general practice not to aim at more, and as in everything there are some who do not attain5 all they aim at, however low the standard may be pitched, there are always several who fall short of it. When, on the contrary, the appointments are given to those, among a great number of candidates, who most distinguish themselves, and where the successful competitors are classed in order of merit, not only each is stimulated147 to do his very utmost, but the influence is felt in every place of liberal education throughout the country. It becomes with every schoolmaster an object of ambition, and an avenue to success, to have furnished pupils who have gained a high place in these competitions; and there is hardly any other mode in which the State can do so much to raise the quality of educational institutions throughout the country.
Though the principle of competitive examinations for public employment is of such recent introduction in this country, and is still so imperfectly carried out, the Indian service being as yet nearly the only case in which it exists in its completeness, a sensible effect has already begun to be produced on the places of middle-class education; notwithstanding the difficulties which the principle has encountered from the disgracefully low existing state of education in the country, which these very examinations have brought into strong light. So contemptible has the standard of acquirement been found to be among the youths who obtain the nomination148 from the minister which entitles them to offer themselves as candidates, that the competition of such candidates produces almost a poorer result than would be obtained from a mere pass examination; for no one would think of fixing the conditions of a pass examination so low as is actually found sufficient to enable a young man to surpass his fellow-candidates. Accordingly, it is said that successive years show on the whole a decline of attainments, less effort being made because the results of former examinations have proved that the exertions149 then used were greater than would have been sufficient to attain the object. Partly from this decrease of effort, and partly because, even at the examinations which do not require a previous nomination, conscious ignorance reduces the number of competitors to a mere handful, it has so happened that though there have always been a few instances of great proficiency, the lower part of the list of successful candidates represents but a very moderate amount of acquirement; and we have it on the word of the Commissioners150 that nearly all who have been unsuccessful have owed their failure to ignorance not of the higher branches of instruction, but of its very humblest elements — spelling and arithmetic.
The outcries which continue to be made against these examinations by some of the organs of opinion, are often, I regret to say, as little creditable to the good faith as to the good sense of the assailants. They proceed partly by misrepresentation of the kind of ignorance which, as a matter of fact, actually leads to failure in the examinations. They quote with emphasis the most recondite151 questions13 which can be shown to have been ever asked, and make it appear as if unexceptionable answers to all these were made the sine qua non of success. Yet it has been repeated to satiety152 that such questions are not put because it is expected of every one that he should answer them, but in order that whoever is able to do so may have the means of proving and availing himself of that portion of his knowledge. It is not as a ground of rejection153, but as an additional means of success, that this opportunity is given. We are then asked whether the kind of knowledge supposed in this, that, or the other question is calculated to be of any use to the candidate after he has attained his object. People differ greatly in opinion as to what knowledge is useful. There are persons in existence, and a late Foreign Secretary of State is one of them, who think English spelling a useless accomplishment154 in a diplomatic attache, or a clerk in a government office. About one thing the objectors seem to be unanimous, that general mental cultivation155 is not useful in these employments, whatever else may be so. If, however (as I presume to think), it is useful, or if any education at all is useful, it must be tested by the tests most likely to show whether the candidate possesses it or not. To ascertain138 whether he has been well educated, he must be interrogated156 in the things which he is likely to know if he has been well educated, even though not directly pertinent157 to the work to which he is to be appointed. Will those who object to his being questioned in classics and mathematics, in a country where the only things regularly taught are classics and mathematics, tell us what they would have him questioned in? There seems, however, to be equal objection to examining him in these, and to examining him in anything but these. If the Commissioners — anxious to open a door of admission to those who have not gone through the routine of a grammar school, or who make up for the smallness of their knowledge of what is there taught by greater knowledge of something else — allow marks to be gained by proficiency in any other subject of real utility, they are reproached for that too. Nothing will satisfy the objectors but free admission of total ignorance.
13 Not always, however, the most recondite; for a late denouncer of competitive examination in the House of Commons had the naivete to produce a set of almost elementary questions in algebra158, history, and geography, as a proof of the exorbitant159 amount of high scientific attainment31 which the Commissioners were so wild as to exact.
We are triumphantly160 told that neither Clive nor Wellington could have passed the test which is prescribed for an aspirant161 to an engineer cadetship. As if, because Clive and Wellington did not do what was not required of them, they could not have done it if it had been required. If it be only meant to inform us that it is possible to be a great general without these things, so it is without many other things which are very useful to great generals. Alexander the Great had never heard of Vauban's rules, nor could Julius Caesar speak French. We are next informed that bookworms, a term which seems to be held applicable to whoever has the smallest tincture of book — knowledge, may not be good at bodily exercises, or have the habits of gentlemen. This is a very common line of remark with dunces of condition; but whatever the dunces may think, they have no monopoly of either gentlemanly habits or bodily activity. Wherever these are needed, let them be inquired into and separately provided for, not to the exclusion162 of mental qualifications, but in addition. Meanwhile, I am credibly163 informed, that in the Military Academy at Woolwich the competition cadets are as superior to those admitted on the old system of nomination in these respects as in all others; that they learn even their drill more quickly; as indeed might be expected, for an intelligent person learns all things sooner than a stupid one: and that in general demeanour they contrast so favourably164 with their predecessors165, that the authorities of the institutions are impatient for the day to arrive when the last remains of the old leaven166 shall have disappeared from the place. If this be so, and it is easy to ascertain whether it is so, it is to be hoped we shall soon have heard for the last time that ignorance is a better qualification than knowledge for the military and a fortiori for every other, profession; or that any one good quality, however little apparently167 connected with liberal education, is at all likely to be promoted by going without it.
Though the first admission to government employment be decided by competitive examination, it would in most cases be impossible that subsequent promotion should be so decided: and it seems proper that this should take place, as it usually does at present, on a mixed system of seniority and selection. Those whose duties are of a routine character should rise by seniority to the highest point to which duties merely of that description can carry them; while those to whom functions of particular trust, and requiring special capacity, are confided168, should be selected from the body on the discretion of the chief of the office. And this selection will generally be made honestly by him if the original appointments take place by open competition: for under that system his establishment will generally consist of individuals to whom, but for the official connection, he would have been a stranger. If among them there be any in whom he, or his political friends and supporters, take an interest, it will be but occasionally, and only when, to this advantage of connection, is added, as far as the initiatory169 examination could test it, at least equality of real merit. And, except when there is a very strong motive54 to job these appointments, there is always a strong one to appoint the fittest person; being the one who gives to his chief the most useful assistance, saves him most trouble, and helps most to build up that reputation for good management of public business which necessarily and properly redounds170 to the credit of the minister, however much the qualities to which it is immediately owing may be those of his subordinates.
点击
收听单词发音
收听单词发音 |
1
treatise
|
|
| n.专著；(专题)论文 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
2
exigencies
|
|
| n.急切需要 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
3
functionaries
|
|
| n.公职人员，官员( functionary的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
4
attained
|
|
| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
5
attain
|
|
| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
6
aggregate
|
|
| adj.总计的，集合的；n.总数；v.合计；集合 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
7
undone
|
|
| a.未做完的，未完成的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
8
concurrence
|
|
| n.同意；并发 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
9
functionary
|
|
| n.官员；公职人员 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
10
accomplice
|
|
| n.从犯，帮凶，同谋 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
11
corruption
|
|
| n.腐败，堕落，贪污 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
12
jointly
|
|
| ad.联合地，共同地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
13
pecuniary
|
|
| adj.金钱的；金钱上的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
14
absolved
|
|
| 宣告…无罪，赦免…的罪行，宽恕…的罪行( absolve的过去式和过去分词 )； 不受责难，免除责任 [义务] ,开脱（罪责） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
15
remonstrate
|
|
| v.抗议，规劝 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
16
assent
|
|
| v.批准，认可；n.批准，认可 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
17
implicated
|
|
| adj.密切关联的；牵涉其中的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
18
assented
|
|
| 同意，赞成( assent的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
19
mere
|
|
| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
20
disposition
|
|
| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
21
wedded
|
|
| adj.正式结婚的；渴望…的，执著于…的v.嫁，娶，（与…）结婚( wed的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
22
fluctuations
|
|
| 波动，涨落，起伏( fluctuation的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
23
corps
|
|
| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
24
discretion
|
|
| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
25
maxim
|
|
| n.格言，箴言 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
26
habitual
|
|
| adj.习惯性的；通常的，惯常的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
27
adviser
|
|
| n.劝告者，顾问 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
28
incompatibility
|
|
| n.不兼容 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
29
advisers
|
|
| 顾问，劝告者( adviser的名词复数 )； （指导大学新生学科问题等的）指导教授 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
30
attainments
|
|
| 成就，造诣； 获得( attainment的名词复数 )； 达到； 造诣； 成就 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
31
attainment
|
|
| n.达到，到达；［常pl.］成就，造诣 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
32
conversant
|
|
| adj.亲近的，有交情的，熟悉的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
33
implicitly
|
|
| adv. 含蓄地, 暗中地, 毫不保留地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
34
habitually
|
|
| ad.习惯地，通常地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
35
judgment
|
|
| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
36
naval
|
|
| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
37
ministry
|
|
| n.(政府的)部；牧师 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
38
promotion
|
|
| n.提升，晋级；促销，宣传 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
39
fixed
|
|
| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
40
affront
|
|
| n./v.侮辱，触怒 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
41
qualified
|
|
| adj.合格的，有资格的，胜任的，有限制的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
42
standing
|
|
| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
43
vacancies
|
|
| n.空房间( vacancy的名词复数 )；空虚；空白；空缺 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
44
ciphers
|
|
| n.密码( cipher的名词复数 )；零；不重要的人；无价值的东西 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
45
discredit
|
|
| vt.使不可置信；n.丧失信义；不信，怀疑 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
46
accurately
|
|
| adv.准确地，精确地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
47
presidencies
|
|
| n.总统的职位( presidency的名词复数 )；总统的任期 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
48
acquiescence
|
|
| n.默许；顺从 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
49
recording
|
|
| n.录音，记录 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
50
dignified
|
|
| a.可敬的，高贵的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
51
ostensible
|
|
| adj.(指理由)表面的，假装的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
52
participation
|
|
| n.参与，参加，分享 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
53
motives
|
|
| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
54
motive
|
|
| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
55
administrative
|
|
| adj.行政的，管理的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
56
prolific
|
|
| adj.丰富的，大量的；多产的，富有创造力的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
57
destined
|
|
| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
58
holocaust
|
|
| n.大破坏；大屠杀 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
59
presumptuous
|
|
| adj.胆大妄为的，放肆的，冒昧的，冒失的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
60
superfluous
|
|
| adj.过多的，过剩的，多余的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
61
clog
|
|
| vt.塞满，阻塞；n.[常pl.]木屐 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
62
countenance
|
|
| n.脸色，面容；面部表情；vt.支持，赞同 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
63
abrogation
|
|
| n.取消，废除 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
64
laborious
|
|
| adj.吃力的，努力的，不流畅 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
65
conscientious
|
|
| adj.审慎正直的，认真的，本着良心的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
66
imposing
|
|
| adj.使人难忘的，壮丽的，堂皇的，雄伟的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
67
transacted
|
|
| v.办理（业务等）( transact的过去式和过去分词 )；交易，谈判 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
68
dependence
|
|
| n.依靠，依赖；信任，信赖；隶属 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
69
condemns
|
|
| v.（通常因道义上的原因而）谴责( condemn的第三人称单数 )；宣判；宣布…不能使用；迫使…陷于不幸的境地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
70
suffrage
|
|
| n.投票，选举权，参政权 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
71
apprehension
|
|
| n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
72
coup
|
|
| n.政变；突然而成功的行动 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
73
legislative
|
|
| n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
74
rendering
|
|
| n.表现，描写 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
75
sedulous
|
|
| adj.勤勉的，努力的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
76
magistrate
|
|
| n.地方行政官，地方法官，治安官 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
77
avowedly
|
|
| adv.公然地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
78
monarchy
|
|
| n.君主，最高统治者；君主政体，君主国 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
79
eminent
|
|
| adj.显赫的，杰出的，有名的，优良的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
80
survivor
|
|
| n.生存者，残存者，幸存者 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
81
founders
|
|
| n.创始人( founder的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
82
professed
|
|
| 公开声称的，伪称的，已立誓信教的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
83
obnoxious
|
|
| adj.极恼人的，讨人厌的，可憎的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
84
professes
|
|
| 声称( profess的第三人称单数 )； 宣称； 公开表明； 信奉 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
85
creed
|
|
| n.信条；信念，纲领 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
86
mischief
|
|
| n.损害，伤害，危害；恶作剧，捣蛋，胡闹 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
87
canvass
|
|
| v.招徕顾客，兜售；游说；详细检查，讨论 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
88
followers
|
|
| 追随者( follower的名词复数 )； 用户； 契据的附面； 从动件 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
89
personalities
|
|
| n. 诽谤，（对某人容貌、性格等所进行的）人身攻击； 人身攻击；人格, 个性, 名人( personality的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
90
decided
|
|
| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
91
contrive
|
|
| vt.谋划，策划；设法做到；设计，想出 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
92
unduly
|
|
| adv.过度地，不适当地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
93
tenure
|
|
| n.终身职位；任期；(土地)保有权，保有期 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
94
deadlock
|
|
| n.僵局，僵持 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
95
interval
|
|
| n.间隔，间距；幕间休息，中场休息 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
96
extremity
|
|
| n.末端，尽头；尽力；终极；极度 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
97
pervaded
|
|
| v.遍及，弥漫( pervade的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
98
mutual
|
|
| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
99
imperturbable
|
|
| adj.镇静的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
100
opposition
|
|
| n.反对，敌对 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
101
pending
|
|
| prep.直到，等待…期间；adj.待定的；迫近的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
102
insufficient
|
|
| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
103
attachment
|
|
| n.附属物，附件；依恋；依附 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
104
subvert
|
|
| v.推翻；暗中破坏；搅乱 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
105
usurp
|
|
| vt.篡夺，霸占；vi.篡位 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
106
peril
|
|
| n.(严重的)危险；危险的事物 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
107
profligate
|
|
| adj.行为不检的；n.放荡的人，浪子，肆意挥霍者 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
108
breaches
|
|
| 破坏( breach的名词复数 )； 破裂； 缺口； 违背 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
109
breach
|
|
| n.违反，不履行；破裂；vt.冲破，攻破 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
110
judicial
|
|
| adj.司法的，法庭的，审判的，明断的，公正的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
111
impartiality
|
|
| n. 公平, 无私, 不偏 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
112
entrusted
|
|
| v.委托，托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
113
incompetent
|
|
| adj.无能力的，不能胜任的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
114
peculiar
|
|
| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
115
pervert
|
|
| n.堕落者，反常者；vt.误用，滥用；使人堕落，使入邪路 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
116
suffrages
|
|
| （政治性选举的）选举权，投票权( suffrage的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
|
117
incumbent
|
|
| adj.成为责任的，有义务的；现任的，在职的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
118
intervention
|
|
| n.介入，干涉，干预 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
119
absurdity
|
|
| n.荒谬，愚蠢；谬论 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
120
jurisdiction
|
|
| n.司法权，审判权，管辖权，控制权 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
121
proceedings
|
|
| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
122
supplanting
|
|
| 把…排挤掉，取代( supplant的现在分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
|
123
descended
|
|
| a.为...后裔的，出身于...的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
124
arena
|
|
| n.竞技场，运动场所；竞争场所，舞台 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
125
susceptible
|
|
| adj.过敏的，敏感的；易动感情的，易受感动的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
126
insidious
|
|
| adj.阴险的，隐匿的，暗中为害的，（疾病）不知不觉之间加剧 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
127
apprehend
|
|
| vt.理解，领悟，逮捕，拘捕，忧虑 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
128
retraction
|
|
| n.撤消；收回 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
129
alleviate
|
|
| v.减轻，缓和，缓解(痛苦等) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
130
amenable
|
|
| adj.经得起检验的；顺从的；对负有义务的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
131
culpability
|
|
| n.苛责，有罪 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
132
pensioners
|
|
| n.领取退休、养老金或抚恤金的人( pensioner的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
133
remains
|
|
| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
134
apprehended
|
|
| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 )； 理解 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
135
discriminated
|
|
| 分别，辨别，区分( discriminate的过去式和过去分词 )； 歧视，有差别地对待 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
136
proficiency
|
|
| n.精通，熟练，精练 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
137
ascertained
|
|
| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
138
ascertain
|
|
| vt.发现，确定，查明，弄清 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
139
requisite
|
|
| adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
140
disinterested
|
|
| adj.不关心的，不感兴趣的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
141
adherence
|
|
| n.信奉，依附，坚持，固着 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
142
blighting
|
|
| 使凋萎( blight的现在分词 )； 使颓丧； 损害； 妨害 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
143
prospects
|
|
| n.希望，前途(恒为复数) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
144
relaxation
|
|
| n.松弛，放松；休息；消遣；娱乐 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
145
precedent
|
|
| n.先例，前例；惯例；adj.在前的，在先的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
146
contemptible
|
|
| adj.可鄙的，可轻视的，卑劣的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
147
stimulated
|
|
| a.刺激的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
148
nomination
|
|
| n.提名，任命，提名权 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
149
exertions
|
|
| n.努力( exertion的名词复数 )；费力；（能力、权力等的）运用；行使 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
150
commissioners
|
|
| n.专员( commissioner的名词复数 )；长官；委员；政府部门的长官 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
151
recondite
|
|
| adj.深奥的，难解的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
152
satiety
|
|
| n.饱和；(市场的)充分供应 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
153
rejection
|
|
| n.拒绝，被拒，抛弃，被弃 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
154
accomplishment
|
|
| n.完成，成就，（pl.）造诣，技能 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
155
cultivation
|
|
| n.耕作，培养，栽培（法），养成 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
156
interrogated
|
|
| v.询问( interrogate的过去式和过去分词 )；审问；（在计算机或其他机器上）查询 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
157
pertinent
|
|
| adj.恰当的；贴切的；中肯的；有关的；相干的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
158
algebra
|
|
| n.代数学 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
159
exorbitant
|
|
| adj.过分的；过度的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
160
triumphantly
|
|
| ad.得意洋洋地；得胜地；成功地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
161
aspirant
|
|
| n.热望者；adj.渴望的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
162
exclusion
|
|
| n.拒绝，排除，排斥，远足，远途旅行 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
163
credibly
|
|
| ad.可信地；可靠地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
164
favourably
|
|
| adv. 善意地，赞成地 =favorably | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
165
predecessors
|
|
| n.前任( predecessor的名词复数 )；前辈；（被取代的）原有事物；前身 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
166
leaven
|
|
| v.使发酵；n.酵母；影响 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
167
apparently
|
|
| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
168
confided
|
|
| v.吐露（秘密，心事等）( confide的过去式和过去分词 )；（向某人）吐露（隐私、秘密等） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
169
initiatory
|
|
| adj.开始的；创始的；入会的；入社的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
170
redounds
|
|
| v.有助益( redound的第三人称单数 )；及于；报偿；报应 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
| 欢迎访问英文小说网 |