(December, 1823.)
To the reader.—This article was written and printed before the author heard of the lamented1 death of Mr. Ricardo.
It is remarkable2 at first sight that Mr. Malthus, to whom Political Economy is so much indebted in one chapter (viz. the chapter of Population), should in every other chapter have stumbled at every step. On a nearer view, however, the wonder ceases. His failures and his errors have arisen in all cases from the illogical structure of his understanding; his success was in a path which required no logic3. What is the brief abstract of his success? It is this: he took an obvious and familiar truth, which until his time had been a barren truism, and showed that it teemed4 with consequences. Out of this position—That in the ground which limited human food lay the ground which limited human increase—united with this other position—That there is a perpetual nisus in the principle of population to pass that limit, he unfolded a body of most important corollaries. I have remarked in another article on this subject—how entirely5 these corollaries had escaped all Mr. Malthus’s2 predecessors6 in the same track. Perhaps the most striking instance of this, which I could have alleged8, is that of the celebrated9 French work—L’Ami des Hommes, ou Traité de la Population (written about the middle of the last century), which sets out deliberately10 from this principle, expressed almost in the very words of Mr. Malthus,—‘Que la mésure de la Subsistance est celle de la Population;’—beats the bushes in every direction about it; and yet (with the exception of one corollary on the supposed depopulating tendency of war and famine) deduces from it none but erroneous and Anti-Malthusian doctrines12. That from a truth apparently13 so barren any corollaries were deducible—was reserved for Mr. Malthus to show. As corollaries, it may be supposed that they imply a logical act of the understanding. In some small degree, no doubt; but no more than necessarily accompanies every exercise of reason. Though inferences, they are not remote inferences, but immediate14 and proximate; and not dependent upon each other, but collateral15. Not logic but a judicious16 choice of his ground placed Mr. Malthus at once in a station from which he commanded the whole truth at a glance—with a lucky dispensation from all necessity of continuous logical processes. But such a dispensation is a privilege indulged to few other parts of Political Economy, and least of all to that which is the foundation of all Political Economy, viz. the doctrine11 of value. Having therefore repeatedly chosen to tamper17 with this difficult subject, Mr. Malthus has just made so many exposures of his intellectual infirmities—which, but for this volunteer display, we might never have known. Of all the men of talents, whose writings I have read up to this hour, Mr. Malthus has the most perplexed18 understanding. He is not only confused himself, but is the cause that confusion is in other men. Logical perplexity is shockingly contagious19: and he, who takes Mr. Malthus for his guide through any tangled20 question, ought to be able to box the compass very well; or before he has read ten pages he will find himself (as the Westmorland guides express it) ‘maffled,’—and disposed to sit down and fall a crying with his guide at the sad bewilderment into which they have both strayed. It tends much to heighten the sense of Mr. Malthus’s helplessness in this particular point—that of late years he has given himself the air too much of teasing Mr. Ricardo, one of the ‘ugliest customers’ in point of logic that ever entered the ring. Mr. Ricardo is a most ‘dangerous’ man; and Mr. Malthus would do well not to meddle21 with so ‘vicious’ a subject, whose arm (like Neate’s) gives a blow like the kick of a horse. He has hitherto contented22 himself very good-naturedly with gently laying Mr. Malthus on his back; but, if he should once turn round with a serious determination to ‘take the conceit’ out of him, Mr. Malthus would assuredly be ‘put into chancery,’ and suffer a ‘punishment’ that must distress23 his friends.—Amongst those whom Mr. Malthus has perplexed by his logic, I am not one: in matter of logic, I hold myself impeccable; and, to say nothing of my sober days, I defy the devil and all the powers of darkness to get any advantage over me, even on those days when I am drunk, in relation to ‘Barbara, Celarent, Darii, or Ferio.’
‘Avoid, old Satanas!’ I exclaim, if any man attempts to fling dust in my eyes by false syllogism24, or any mode of dialectic sophism25. And in relation to this particular subject of value, I flatter myself that in a paper expressly applied26 to the exposure of Mr. Malthus’s blunders in his Political Economy, I have made it impossible for Mr. Malthus, even though he should take to his assistance seven worse logicians than himself, to put down my light with their darkness. Meantime, as a labour of shorter compass, I will call the reader’s attention to the following blunder, in a later work of Mr. Malthus’s—viz. a pamphlet of eighty pages, entitled, The Measure of Value, stated and applied (published in the spring of the present year). The question proposed in this work is the same as that already discussed in his Political Economy—viz. What is the measure of value? But the answer to it is different: in the Political Economy, the measure of value was determined27 to be a mean between corn and labour; in this pamphlet, Mr. Malthus retracts28 that opinion, and (finally, let us hope) settles it to his own satisfaction that the true measure is labour; not the quantity of labour, observe, which will produce X, but the quantity which X will command. Upon these two answers, and the delusions29 which lie at their root, I shall here forbear to comment; because I am now chasing Mr. Malthus’s logical blunders; and these delusions are not so much logical as economic: what I now wish the reader to attend to—is the blunder involved in the question itself; because that blunder is not economic, but logical. The question is—what is the measure of value? I say then that the phrase—‘measure of value’ is an equivocal phrase; and, in Mr. Malthus’s use of it, means indifferently that which determines value, in relation to the principium essendi, and that which determines value, in relation to the principium cognoscendi. Here, perhaps, the reader will exclaim—‘Avoid, Satanas!’ to me, falsely supposing that I have some design upon his eyes, and wish to blind them with learned dust. But, if he thinks that, he is in the wrong box: I must and will express scholastic30 phrases; but, having once done this, I am then ready to descend31 into the arena32 with no other weapons than plain English can furnish. Let us therefore translate ‘measure of value‘ into ‘that which determines value:’ and, in this shape, we shall detect the ambiguity33 of which I complain. For I say, that the word determines may be taken subjectively35 for what determines X in relation to our knowledge, or objectively for what determines X in relation to itself. Thus, if I were to ask—‘What determined the length of the racecourse?’ and the answer were—‘The convenience of the spectators who could not have seen the horses at a greater distance,’ or ‘The choice of the subscribers,’ then it is plain that by the word ‘determined,’ I was understood to mean ‘determined objectively,’ i. e. in relation to the existence of the object; in other words, what caused the racecourse to be this length rather than another length: but, if the answer were—‘An actual admeasurement,’ it would then be plain that by the word ‘determined,’ I had been understood to mean ‘determined subjectively,’ i. e. in relation to our knowledge;—what ascertained36 it?—Now, in the objective sense of the phrase, ‘determiner of value,’ the measure of value will mean the ground of value: in the subjective34 sense, it will mean the criterion of value. Mr. Malthus will allege7 that he is at liberty to use it in which sense he pleases. Grant that he is, but not therefore in both. Has he then used it in both? He will, perhaps, deny that he has, and will contend that he has used it in the latter sense as equivalent to the ascertainer or criterion of value. I answer—No: for, omitting a more particular examination of his use in this place, I say that his use of any word is peremptorily37 and in defiance38 of his private explanation to be extorted39 from the use of the corresponding term in him whom he is opposing. Now he is opposing Mr. Ricardo: his labour which X commands—is opposed to Mr. Ricardo’s quantity of labour which will produce X. Call the first A, the last B. Now, in making B the determiner of value, Mr. Ricardo means that B is the ground of value: i. e. that B is the answer to the question—what makes this hat of more value than this pair of shoes? But, if Mr. Malthus means by A the same thing, when by his own confession40 he has used the term measure of value in two senses: on the other hand, if he does not mean the same thing, but simply the criterion of value, then he has not used the word in my sense which opposes him to Mr. Ricardo. And yet he advances the whole on that footing. On either ground, therefore, he is guilty of a logical error, which implies that, so far from answering his own question, he did not know what his own question was.
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lamented
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adj.被哀悼的,令人遗憾的v.(为…)哀悼,痛哭,悲伤( lament的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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remarkable
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adj.显著的,异常的,非凡的,值得注意的 | |
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3
logic
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n.逻辑(学);逻辑性 | |
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4
teemed
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v.充满( teem的过去式和过去分词 );到处都是;(指水、雨等)暴降;倾注 | |
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5
entirely
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ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
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6
predecessors
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n.前任( predecessor的名词复数 );前辈;(被取代的)原有事物;前身 | |
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7
allege
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vt.宣称,申述,主张,断言 | |
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8
alleged
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a.被指控的,嫌疑的 | |
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9
celebrated
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adj.有名的,声誉卓著的 | |
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10
deliberately
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adv.审慎地;蓄意地;故意地 | |
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11
doctrine
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n.教义;主义;学说 | |
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doctrines
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n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 );教义;学说;(政府政策的)正式声明 | |
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13
apparently
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adv.显然地;表面上,似乎 | |
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14
immediate
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adj.立即的;直接的,最接近的;紧靠的 | |
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15
collateral
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adj.平行的;旁系的;n.担保品 | |
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16
judicious
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adj.明智的,明断的,能作出明智决定的 | |
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17
tamper
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v.干预,玩弄,贿赂,窜改,削弱,损害 | |
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18
perplexed
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adj.不知所措的 | |
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contagious
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adj.传染性的,有感染力的 | |
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20
tangled
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adj. 纠缠的,紊乱的 动词tangle的过去式和过去分词 | |
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21
meddle
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v.干预,干涉,插手 | |
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22
contented
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adj.满意的,安心的,知足的 | |
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23
distress
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n.苦恼,痛苦,不舒适;不幸;vt.使悲痛 | |
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24
syllogism
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n.演绎法,三段论法 | |
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25
sophism
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n.诡辩 | |
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26
applied
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adj.应用的;v.应用,适用 | |
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27
determined
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adj.坚定的;有决心的 | |
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28
retracts
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v.撤回或撤消( retract的第三人称单数 );拒绝执行或遵守;缩回;拉回 | |
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delusions
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n.欺骗( delusion的名词复数 );谬见;错觉;妄想 | |
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30
scholastic
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adj.学校的,学院的,学术上的 | |
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31
descend
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vt./vi.传下来,下来,下降 | |
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32
arena
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n.竞技场,运动场所;竞争场所,舞台 | |
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33
ambiguity
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n.模棱两可;意义不明确 | |
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34
subjective
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a.主观(上)的,个人的 | |
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35
subjectively
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主观地; 臆 | |
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36
ascertained
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v.弄清,确定,查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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peremptorily
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adv.紧急地,不容分说地,专横地 | |
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38
defiance
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n.挑战,挑衅,蔑视,违抗 | |
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39
extorted
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v.敲诈( extort的过去式和过去分词 );曲解 | |
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40
confession
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n.自白,供认,承认 | |
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