THE LION’S HEAD.1
To the Editor of the London Magazine.
Westmoreland, November 4, 1823.
My dear Sir,—This morning I received your parcel, containing amongst other inclosures, the two last numbers of your journal. In the first of these is printed a little paper of mine on Mr. Malthus; and in the second I observe a letter from Mr. Hazlitt—alleging two passages from the 403rd and 421st pages of his Political Essays as substantially anticipating all that I had said. I believe that he has anticipated me: in the passage relating to the geometric and arithmetic ratios, it is clear that he has: in the other passage, which objects to Mr. Malthus’s use of the term perfection, that he has represented it under contradictory2 predicates, it is not equally clear; for I do not find my own meaning so rigorously expressed as to exclude another2 interpretation3 even now when I know what to look for; and, without knowing what to look for, I should certainly not have found it: on the whole, however, I am disposed to think that Mr. Hazlitt’s meaning is the same as my own. So much for the matter of Mr. Hazlitt’s communication: as to the manner, I am sorry that it is liable to a construction which perhaps was not intended. Mr. Hazlitt says—‘I do not wish to bring any charge of plagiarism4 in this case;’ words which are better fitted to express his own forbearance, than to exonerate5 me from the dishonour6 of such an act. But I am unwilling7 to suppose that Mr. Hazlitt has designedly given this negative form to his words. He says also—‘as I have been a good deal abused for my scepticism on that subject, I do not feel quite disposed that any one else should run away with the credit of it.’ Here again I cannot allow myself to think that Mr. Hazlitt meant deliberately8 to bring me before the reader’s mind under the odious9 image of a person who was ‘running away’ with the credit of another. As to ‘credit,’ Mr. Hazlitt must permit me to smile when I read that word used in that sense: I can assure him that not any abstract consideration of credit, but the abstract idea of a creditor10 (often putting on a concrete shape, and sometimes the odious concrete of a dun) has for some time past been the animating11 principle of my labours. Credit therefore, except in the sense of twelve months’ credit where now alas12! I have only six, is no object of my search: in fact I abhor13 it: for to be a ‘noted’ man is the next bad thing to being a ‘protested’ man. Seriously, however, I sent you this as the first of four notes which I had written on the logical blunders of Mr. Malthus (the other three being taken not from his Essay on Population, but from works more expressly within the field of Political Economy): not having met with it elsewhere, I supposed it my own and sent it to complete the series: but the very first sentence, which parodies15 the words of Chancellor16 Oxenstiern—(‘Go and see—how little logic14 is required,’ &c.), sufficiently17 shows that, so far from arrogating18 any great merit to myself for this discovery, I thought it next to miraculous19 that it should have escaped any previous reviewer of Mr. Malthus.—I must doubt, by the way, whether Mr. Hazlitt has been ‘a good deal abused’ for these specific arguments against Mr. Malthus; and my reason for doubting is this: about ten or twelve years ago, happening to be on a visit to Mr. Southey, I remember to have met with a work of Mr. Hazlitt’s on this subject—not that which he quotes, but another (Reply to Malthus) which he refers to as containing the same opinions (either totidem verbis, or in substance). In Mr. Southey’s library, and in competition with Mr. Southey’s conversation, a man may be pardoned for not studying any one book exclusively: consequently, though I read a good deal of Mr. Hazlitt’s Reply, I read it cursorily20: but, in all that I did read, I remember that the arguments were very different from those which he now alleges21; indeed it must be evident that the two logical objections in question are by no means fitted to fill an octavo volume. My inference therefore is—that any ‘abuse,’ which Mr. Hazlitt may have met with, must have been directed to something else in his Reply; and in fact it has happened to myself on several occasions to hear this book of Mr. Hazlitt’s treated as unworthy of his talents; but never on account of the two arguments which he now claims. I would not be supposed, in saying this, to insinuate22 any doubt that these arguments are really to be found in the Reply; but simply to suggest that they do not come forward prominently or constitute the main argument of that book: and consequently, instead of being opposed, have been overlooked by those who have opposed him as much as they were by myself.
Finally, Mr. Hazlitt calls the coincidence of my objections with his own ‘striking:’ and thus (though unintentionally, I dare say) throws the reader’s attention upon it as a very surprising case. Now in this there is a misconception which, apart from any personal question between Mr. Hazlitt and myself, is worth a few words on its own account for the sake of placing it in a proper light. I affirm then that, considering its nature, the coincidence is not a striking one, if by ‘striking’ be meant surprising: and I affirm also that it would not have been the more striking if, instead of two, it had extended to two hundred similar cases. Supposing that a thousand persons were required severally to propose a riddle23, no conditions or limitations being expressed as to the terms of the riddle, it would be surprising if any two in the whole thousand should agree: suppose again that the same thousand persons were required to solve a riddle, it would now be surprising if any two in the whole thousand should differ. Why? Because, in the first case, the act of the mind is an act of synthesis; and there we may readily conceive a thousand different roads for any one mind; but, in the second case, it is an analytic24 act; and there we cannot conceive of more than one road for a thousand minds. In the case between Mr. Hazlitt and myself there was a double ground of coincidence for any possible number of writers: first the object was given; i. e. we were not left to an unlimited25 choice of the propositions we were to attack; but Mr. Malthus had himself, by insisting on two in particular (however erroneously) as the capital propositions of his system, determined26 our attention to these two as the assailable27 points: secondly28, not only was the object given—i. e. not only was it predetermined for us where3 the error must lie, if there were an error; but the nature of that error, which happened to be logical, predetermined for us the nature of the solution. Errors which are such materialiter, i. e. which offend against our knowing, may admit of many answers—involving more and less of truth. But errors, which are such logically, i. e. which offend against the form (or internal law) of our thinking, admit of only one answer. Except by failing of any answer at all, Mr. Hazlitt and I could not but coincide: as long as we had the same propositions to examine (which were not of our own choice, but pointed29 out to us ab extra), and as long as we understood those propositions in the same sense, no variety was possible except in the expression and manner of our answers; and to that extent a variety exists. Any other must have arisen from our understanding that proposition in a different sense.
My answer to Mr. Hazlitt therefore is—that in substance I think his claim valid30; and though it is most true that I was not aware of any claim prior to my own, I now formally forego any claim on my own part to the credit of whatsoever31 kind which shall ever arise from the two objections to Mr. Malthus’s logic in his Essay on Population. In saying this, however, and acknowledging therefore a coincidence with Mr. Hazlitt in those two arguments, I must be understood to mean a coincidence only in what really belongs to them; meantime Mr. Hazlitt has used two expressions in his letter to yourself which seem to connect with those propositions other opinions from which I dissent32: that I may not therefore be supposed to extend my acquiescence33 in Mr. Hazlitt’s views to these points, I add two short notes upon them: which however I have detached from this letter—as forming no proper part of its business.—Believe me, my dear Sir, your faithful humble34 servant. X.Y.Z.
1. Mr. Hazlitt represents Mr. Malthus’s error in regard to the different ratios of progression as a mathematical error; but the other error he calls logical. This may seem to lead to nothing important: it is however not for any purpose of verbal cavil35 that I object to this distinction, and contend that both errors are logical. For a little consideration will convince the reader that he, who thinks the first error mathematical, will inevitably36 miss the true point where the error of Mr. Malthus arises; and the consequence of that will be—that he will never understand the Malthusians, nor ever make himself understood by them. Mr. Hazlitt says, ‘a bushel of wheat will sow a whole field: the produce of that will sow twenty fields.’ Yes: but this is not the point which Mr. Malthus denies: this he will willingly grant: neither will he deny that such a progression goes on by geometrical ratios. If he did, then it is true that his error would be a mathematical one. But all this he will concede. Where then lies his error? Simply in this—that he assumes (I do not mean in words, but it is manifestly latent in all that he says) that the wheat shall be continually resown on the same area of land: he will not allow of Mr. Hazlitt’s ‘twenty fields:’ keep to your original field, he will say. In this lies his error: and the nature of that error is—that he insists upon shaping the case for the wheat in a way which makes it no fair analogy to the case which he has shaped for man. That it is unfair is evident: for Mr. Malthus does not mean to contend that his men will go on by geometrical progression; or even by arithmetical, upon the same quantity of food: no! he will himself say the positive principle of increase must concur37 with the same sort of increase in the external (negative) condition, which is food. Upon what sort of logic therefore does he demand that his wheat shall be thrown upon the naked power of its positive principle, not concurring38 with the same sort of increase in the negative condition, which in this case is land? It is true that at length we shall come to the end of the land, because that is limited: but this has nothing to do with the race between man and his food, so long as the race is possible. The race is imagined for the sake of trying their several powers: and the terms of the match must be made equal. But there is no equality in the terms as they are supposed by Mr. Malthus. The amount therefore is—that the case which Mr. Malthus everywhere supposes and reasons upon, is a case of false analogy: that is, it is a logical error. But, setting aside the unfairness of the case, Mr. Malthus is perfectly39 right in his mathematics. If it were fair to demand that the wheat should be constantly confined to the same space of land, it is undeniable that it could never yield a produce advancing by a geometrical progression, but at the utmost by a very slow arithmetical progression. Consequently, taking the case as Mr. Malthus puts it, he is right in calling it a case of arithmetical progression: and his error is in putting that case as a logical counterpart to his other case.
2. Mr. Hazlitt says—‘This, Mr. Editor, is the writer whom “our full senate call all-in-all sufficient.”’—And why not? I ask. Mr. Hazlitt’s inference is—that, because two propositions in Mr. Malthus’s Essay are overthrown40, and because these two are propositions to which Mr. Malthus ascribes a false importance, in relation to his theory, therefore that theory is overthrown. But, if an architect, under some fancied weakness of a bridge which is really strong and self-supported, chooses to apply needless props41, I shall not injure the bridge by showing these to be rotten props and knocking them away. What is the real strength and the real use of Mr. Malthus’s theory of population, cannot well be shown, except in treating of Political Economy. But as to the influence of his logical errors upon that theory, I contend that it is none at all. It is one error to affirm a different law of increase for man and for his food: it is a second error to affirm of a perfect state an attribute of imperfection: but in my judgment42 it is a third error, as great as either of the others, to suppose that these two errors can at all affect the Malthusian doctrine of Population. Let Mr. Malthus say what he will, the first of those errors is not the true foundation of that doctrine; the second of those errors does not contain its true application.
Two private communications on the paper which refuted Mr. Malthus, both expressed in terms of personal courtesy, for which I am bound to make my best acknowledgments, have reached me through the Editor of the London Magazine. One of them refers me ‘to the number of the New Monthly Magazine for March or April, 1821, for an article on Malthus, in which the view’ taken by myself ‘of his doctrine, as an answer to Godwin, seems to have been anticipated.’ In reply to this I have only to express my regret that my present situation, which is at a great distance from any town, has not yet allowed me an opportunity for making the reference pointed out.—The other letter disputes the soundness of my arguments—not so much in themselves, as in their application to Mr. Malthus: ‘I know not that I am authorised to speak of the author by name: his arguments I presume that I am at liberty to publish: they are as follows:—The first objection appears untenable for this reason: Mr. Malthus treats of the abstract tendency to increase in Man, and in the Food of Man, relatively43. Whereas you do not discuss the abstract tendency to increase, but only the measure of that increase, which is food. To the second objection I thus answer: Mr. Godwin contends not (I presume) for abstract, essential perfection; but for perfection relating to, and commensurate with, the capabilities44 of an earthly nature and habitation. All this Mr. Malthus admits argumenti gratiâ: and at the same time asserts that Mr. Godwin’s estimate in his own terms is incompatible45 with our state. 8th October, 1823.’—To these answers my rejoinder is this:—The first argument I am not sure that I perfectly understand; and therefore I will not perplex myself or its author by discussing it. To the second argument I reply thus: I am aware that whatsoever Mr. Malthus admits from Mr. Godwin, he admits only argumenti gratiâ. But for whatsoever purpose he admits it, he is bound to remember, that he has admitted it. Now what is it that he has admitted? A state of perfection. This term, under any explanation of it, betrays him into the following dilemma46: Either he means absolute perfection, perfection which allows of no degrees; or he means (in the sense which my friendly antagonist47 has supposed) relative perfection, quoad our present state—i. e. a continual approximation to the ideal of absolute perfection, without ever reaching it. If he means the first, then he is exposed to the objection (which I have already insisted on sufficiently) of bringing the idea of perfection under an inconsistent and destructory predicate. If he means the second, then how has he overthrown the doctrine of human perfectibility as he professes48 to have done? At this moment, though the earth is far from exhausted49 (and still less its powers), many countries are, according to Mr. Malthus, suffering all the evils which they could suffer if population had reached its maximum: innumerable children are born which the poverty of their parents (no less fatal to them than the limitation of the earth) causes to be thrown back prematurely50 into the grave. Now this is the precise kind of evil which Mr. Malthus anticipates for the human species when it shall have reached its numerical maximum. But in degree the evil may then be much less—even upon Mr. Malthus’s own showing: for he does not fix any limit to the increase of moral restraint, but only denies that it will ever become absolute and universal. When the principle of population therefore has done its worst, we may be suffering the same kind of evil—but, in proportion to an indefinitely increasing moral restraint, an indefinitely decreasing degree of that evil: i. e. we may continually approximate to the ideal of perfection: i. e. if the second sense of perfection be Mr. Godwin’s sense, then Mr. Malthus has not overthrown Mr. Godwin.
X. Y. Z.
The following admirable letter4 seems to refer to the observations on Kant, contained in the Opium51 Eater’s Letters. Perhaps that acute logician52 may be able to discover its meaning: or if not, he may think it worth preserving as an illustration of Shakspeare’s profound knowledge of character displayed in Ancient Pistol.
Can Neptune53 sleep?—Is Willich dead?—Him who wielded54 the trident of Albion! Is it thus you trample55 on the ashes of my friend? All the dreadful energies of thought—all the sophistry56 of fiction and the triumphs of the human intellect are waving o’er his peaceful grave. ‘He understood not Kant.’ Peace then to the harmless invincible57. I have long been thinking of presenting the world with a Metaphysical Dictionary—of elucidating58 Locke’s romance.—I await with impatience59 Kant in English. Give me that! Your letter has awakened60 me to a sense of your merits. Beware of squabbles; I know the literary infirmities of man. Scott rammed61 his nose against mortals—he grasped at death for fame to chaunt the victory.
Thine.
How is the Opium Eater?
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1
doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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contradictory
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| adj.反驳的，反对的，抗辩的；n.正反对，矛盾对立 | |
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interpretation
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| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
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plagiarism
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| n.剽窃，抄袭 | |
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exonerate
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| v.免除责任，确定无罪 | |
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dishonour
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| n./vt.拒付（支票、汇票、票据等）；vt.凌辱，使丢脸；n.不名誉，耻辱，不光彩 | |
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unwilling
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| adj.不情愿的 | |
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deliberately
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| adv.审慎地；蓄意地；故意地 | |
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odious
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| adj.可憎的，讨厌的 | |
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creditor
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| n.债仅人，债主，贷方 | |
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animating
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| v.使有生气( animate的现在分词 )；驱动；使栩栩如生地动作；赋予…以生命 | |
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alas
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| int.唉(表示悲伤、忧愁、恐惧等) | |
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abhor
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| v.憎恶；痛恨 | |
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logic
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| n.逻辑(学)；逻辑性 | |
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parodies
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| n.拙劣的模仿( parody的名词复数 )；恶搞；滑稽的模仿诗文；表面上模仿得笨拙但充满了机智用来嘲弄别人作品的作品v.滑稽地模仿，拙劣地模仿( parody的第三人称单数 ) | |
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chancellor
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| n.(英)大臣；法官；(德、奥)总理；大学校长 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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arrogating
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| v.冒称，妄取( arrogate的现在分词 )；没来由地把…归属（于） | |
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miraculous
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cursorily
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| adv.粗糙地，疏忽地，马虎地 | |
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alleges
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| 断言，宣称，辩解( allege的第三人称单数 ) | |
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insinuate
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| vt.含沙射影地说，暗示 | |
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riddle
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| n.谜，谜语，粗筛；vt.解谜，给…出谜，筛，检查，鉴定，非难，充满于；vi.出谜 | |
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analytic
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| adj.分析的，用分析方法的 | |
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unlimited
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| adj.无限的，不受控制的，无条件的 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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assailable
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| adj.可攻击的，易攻击的 | |
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secondly
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pointed
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valid
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| adj.有确实根据的；有效的；正当的，合法的 | |
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whatsoever
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| adv.（用于否定句中以加强语气）任何；pron.无论什么 | |
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dissent
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| n./v.不同意，持异议 | |
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acquiescence
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| n.默许；顺从 | |
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humble
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cavil
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inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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concur
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| v.同意，意见一致，互助，同时发生 | |
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concurring
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| 同时发生的，并发的 | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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overthrown
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| adj. 打翻的，推倒的，倾覆的 动词overthrow的过去分词 | |
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props
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| 小道具； 支柱( prop的名词复数 )； 支持者； 道具； （橄榄球中的）支柱前锋 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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relatively
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| adv.比较...地，相对地 | |
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capabilities
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| n.能力( capability的名词复数 )；可能；容量；[复数]潜在能力 | |
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incompatible
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| adj.不相容的，不协调的，不相配的 | |
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dilemma
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| n.困境，进退两难的局面 | |
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antagonist
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| n.敌人，对抗者，对手 | |
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professes
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| 声称( profess的第三人称单数 )； 宣称； 公开表明； 信奉 | |
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exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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prematurely
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| adv.过早地，贸然地 | |
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opium
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| n.鸦片；adj.鸦片的 | |
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logician
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| n.逻辑学家 | |
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Neptune
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| n.海王星 | |
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wielded
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| 手持着使用（武器、工具等）( wield的过去式和过去分词 )； 具有； 运用（权力）； 施加（影响） | |
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trample
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| vt.踩，践踏；无视，伤害，侵犯 | |
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sophistry
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| n.诡辩 | |
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invincible
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| adj.不可征服的，难以制服的 | |
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elucidating
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| v.阐明，解释( elucidate的现在分词 ) | |
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impatience
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| n.不耐烦，急躁 | |
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awakened
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| v.（使）醒( awaken的过去式和过去分词 )；（使）觉醒；弄醒；（使）意识到 | |
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rammed
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| v.夯实（土等）( ram的过去式和过去分词 )；猛撞；猛压；反复灌输 | |
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