Force is exerted by armies on land and naval1 fleets at sea. It is the primary business of the armed force in each element to defeat that of the enemy in battle, and so disintegrate2 and destroy it. The beaten nation’s power to fight is thus brought to naught3. Its resolution to renew the attack or to continue resistance is broken down. If defeat throws it open to invasion without power of stopping the invader4, its national life, internal and external, is paralyzed and it is compelled to bow to the will of the conqueror5. In its simplest conception, then, war is a struggle between nations in which the opposing sides pit their armed forces against each other and have to abide6 by the issue of that combat.
It is rarely, however, that a single battle between armies has decided7 the issue of a war. The campaigns of Jena and Sadowa are indeed instances in point. But they are in their way as exceptional as is the Boer War—decided without a pitched battle being fought at all. These may be regarded as the extremes. Normally, war may end victoriously8 for one side without the other having been deprived of the means of continuing even effective resistance. In such cases it is some moderation in the victor’s terms, some change in the ambition of the partially10 defeated49 side, or, at least, a sense that no adequate results can be expected from further fighting, that has brought about the cessation of hostilities11.
But, again, there are wars in which the issues can admit of no compromise at all. The invasions of Tamerlane, Attila, and the Mohammedan conquerors12 were not wars but campaigns of extermination13. It is in such a war that we are engaged to-day. The stake for every country is of a vital character, so that compromise is indistinguishable from defeat, and defeat must carry with it the negation14 of everything which makes national life tolerable. The Germans have convinced themselves that there is no alternative to world dominion15 but downfall, and the civilized16 world is determined17 that there shall be no German world dominion. Such a struggle by its nature permits of no end by arrangement or negotiation18. It must go forward until either one side or the other is either militarily defeated or until the economic strain disintegrates19 the state. In such conditions a secondary form of military pressure may be of paramount20 importance.
Now if we go back to our first definition of war, as a struggle in which the opposing sides pit their armed forces against each other and abide by the issue of the combat, we must remember that, just as it is rare for a war to be decided by a single combat, so is it rare for a single combat to dissipate and destroy an army. Ordinary prudence21 dictates22 that there shall be protected lines or some strong place into which it can retreat in the event of defeat. And when it is thus compelled to abandon open fighting and seek a position of natural or artificial strength, it becomes the business of the stronger to complete the business by destroying and penetrating23 the defences. But if this is too costly24 a proceeding25, the stronger tries to contain the50 force so protected and passes on, if possible, to investment and siege. The simplest case of this is the complete encirclement and siege of the great city or camp, of which the war of 1870 gave two such striking examples in Metz and Paris.
When war calls out the whole manhood of many nations and turns them into fighting forces, it is obvious that there cannot be equality of force in all the theatres. Where either side is weaker, it is compelled locally to adopt the same tactics that a defeated force adopts. It must, that is to say, go upon the defensive26. It entrenches27 and fortifies28 itself. Thus, as military operations, the attack and defence of fortifications may become general, and this without either side being necessarily able to inflict29 the pressure of siege upon its opponent, siege being understood to mean severing30 of communications with the outside world. But, clearly, where siege is possible, as was the case with Metz and Paris, the attacking force becomes also the investing force. It can rely upon the straits to which it can reduce the besieged31 to bring about that surrender which, ex hypothesi, would have been the result of the battle had the weaker not declined it.
Battle and siege are thus in essence complementary modes of war and all military action may roughly be defined as fighting, or some method of postponing32 fighting, or steps or preparations towards fighting.
SEA WAR
War at sea is carried on, as we have seen, by naval fleets. The immediate33 object of a fleet is to find, defeat, and destroy the enemy’s fleet. The ultimate or further objective which is gained by such destruction is to monopolize34 the use of the sea, as the master highway, by retaining51 freedom for the passage of the victor’s ships while denying such passage to those of the defeated. The power to insist on this exclusive control of sea communications is called “command of the sea.”
If the war is a purely35 naval war, that is, limited to the use of naval forces and hence directed solely36 to naval ends—as was the war between England and France, in the course of which the United States gained their independence—the command of the sea can theoretically be won by a single victorious9 battle. For if the main force of one side is destroyed, that belligerent37 becomes incapable38 of questioning the supremacy39 of the enemy, and hence must limit his sea action to sporadic40 attempts on communications. These can never be maintained to a degree that can be decisive, simply because a power greater than can be brought to the attack can be employed for their defence. Success in such a war, then, can simply be measured in terms of trade or of sea supply; defeat by the economic loss that its cessation must cause. There have been purely naval wars in the past and, could a combination be formed of countries whose aggregate41 sea-power was greater than that of Great Britain, a purely naval war might occur again. But it could only be brought about by such a conjuncture for the reason that Great Britain is the only country to which a purely naval defeat would mean such utter and immediate ruin, that her surrender to her sea conqueror would follow inevitably42 and promptly43. This is so because, whereas almost every country is to some extent dependent upon sea supplies, Great Britain exists only in virtue44 of them.
To us, therefore, the advantages that derive45 from possession of command of the sea are overwhelming; and our possession of it adversely46 to any other country must be52 disadvantageous, exactly in proportion as that country is dependent upon sea supplies.
In a war which is both naval and continental47, as in the present war, command of the sea means much more than the power to deny the gain and comfort of sea supplies. The side that is defeated at sea, or avoids fighting for fear of defeat, may lose not only everything which can come to it directly or indirectly48 from the use of ships, but will suffer from the added disadvantage that a military use can be made of sea communications in the enemy’s possession. The side that commands the sea can carry on its ocean traffic, and supply not only its civil population but its armies and its fleets from abroad. It can ally itself with continental nations and send its military forces away in ships and land them in friendly ports. It can prevent the sea invasion of its own, of its allies’ territory, and of its colonial possessions. It can stop not only the enemy’s own sea trade, but all neutral sea trade that directly or indirectly can benefit him, so that he is cut off from all supplies, whether raw material, food, or manufacture, not produced in his own territories or in those with which he has land communications. If the sea force of the side possessing command includes means of engaging stationary49 defences with success, and removing passive sea defences from the approaches to the enemy’s coast and harbours, then it can even beat down the enemy’s coast protection and invade him directly. The nation with sea command, then, threatens its opponents with attack by land at every point and, pending50 its development, can to the extent to which the enemy is dependent on overseas traffic for the necessaries of life, or for the maintenance of his armies at full fighting strength, subject him to all the rigour of siege.
The command of the sea which makes the exercise of53 these menaces possible, is, as we have seen, the fruit of victory over the enemy’s armed forces. But if that enemy is weaker and follows at sea the course which, as we have seen, an army inferior on land must adopt, viz., declines battle and withdraws his fleet behind defences to postpone51 it, he thereby52 to a great extent surrenders the sea command to the stronger. And if the stronger knows his business, he at once uses this command to subject his opponent to the economic disadvantages set out above. Siege by sea, then, like siege on land, may be the consequence of, but is always the alternative to, victorious battle in bringing about a decision. For while victorious battle robs the defeated nation of any possibility of warding53 off further attack by force, siege undermines the will and resolution of the civil population to endure, and thus calls forces into existence which will compel the enemy’s government to surrender.
The command of the ocean ways are, then, of tremendous consequences in war—so great, indeed, that the control of sea communications has often been put forth54 as the primary object to be aimed at by sea-power. That it is the object of sea-power victoriously used we have already seen. But so long as the enemy possesses forces that actually disturb the tranquil55 enjoyment56 of sea communications, command is certainly qualified57, and if he have in reserve unused and unimpaired forces for attacking and defeating the fleet which secures command, the command of the sea cannot be said to be unconditionally58 possessed59. Consequently, if destruction of the enemy’s armed forces is a necessary condition to real—because indisputable—sea command, it is for victorious battle and for nothing else that fleets exist.
These propositions are not only obviously true; they54 seem to be truly obvious. But in recent history we have witnessed the curious spectacle that an inversion60 of the order of these two statements did actually create two different and opposed schools of naval thought. The first school saw in victory the first and constant preoccupation of the fleet. It concerned itself, therefore, chiefly with the essentials to victory, and as victory can only come from fighting, it was at the elements of fighting that it worked. It sought to find the most perfect methods of using weapons, because it realized that it was only from the evolution of these that right tactics could be deduced. It studied the campaigns of the past to discover the two great groups of doctrine61 that our fighting ancestors have bequeathed to us, the first dealing62 with the science of strategy, the second with the principles of command. They realized that weapons and the ships that carry them do not fight themselves, but must be fought by men; and they wished those men rightly educated and trained in the subtle and complex science of their high calling. To them, in short, sea war was an affair of knowledge applied63 by men trained both in the wisdom and in the lofty spirit of those that had excelled in naval war before. And, faithful to the traditions of the past, no less than eager for research into all the undeveloped potentialities of the products of modern progress, they pinned their faith on ability to force the enemy to battle, and to beat him there when battle came.
The other school went for a short cut to naval triumph. If only they could get a fleet of ships so big, so fabulously64 armed, so numerous as to make it seem to the enemy that his fleet was too feeble to attack, why then battle would be made altogether superfluous65, and no further worry over so unlikely a contingency66 was necessary. They did not,55 therefore, trouble to inquire either into the processes needed for bringing battle about, or into what was necessary for success when battle came. They passed on to the contemplation of what can only be the fruit of victory—as if victory were not a condition precedent67!
It was, unfortunately, this group, hypnotized by a theory it did not understand, which controlled naval policy in Great Britain for the ten years preceding the war, and for the first three and a half years of it. Their error lay, of course, in supposing that a fleet, so materially strong and numerous that its defeat was unimaginable because no attack on it could be conceived, must—so long as any serious lowering of its force by attrition was avoided—be the military equivalent to one which had already defeated the enemy; that “invincible” and “victorious” were, in short, interchangeable terms. So masterful was this obsession68 that their apologists—shutting their eyes to the obvious and appalling69 consequences of this creed70 in action—two years after the event, still regarded the only encounter between the main fleets in this war as a great victory, because the larger, by avoiding the risk of close contact with the lesser71, came out of the conflict with forces as substantially superior to the enemy’s as they were before the opportunity of a decisive battle had been offered.
The group in question had, indeed, become possessed of one truth. It was simply that preponderant force is a vital element. But by holding it to the exclusion72 of all other truths they were blinded not only to the crucial business of studying the intellectual and technical essentials to fighting, but even to the orthodox meaning of the communication theory of sea war, on which they had so eagerly, but ignorantly, seized. For the true doctrine is, as we have already seen, just this, that when an enemy refuses56 battle, the stronger navy’s sole remaining offensive is to cut him off from communication with the sea. It must do this, as we have seen, to restrict his supplies, to weaken his armed forces, to strike at his prosperity and the comfort of his civil population, and thus obtain that partial paralysis73 of his national life, the completion of which can only be got by a victory that disarms74 him. And these things, which are the results of blockade, are also the intended results. But they are not intended for their own sake only, nor, primarily, to make the enemy surrender to avoid them. They are inflicted75 to force the enemy to the battle which he has refused, because it is only by battle that he can relieve himself from them. A stringent76 blockade, then, is the primary means of inducing a fleet action, and hence we see that siege, while truly the only alternative to battle, is something much more.
Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that, viewed in its right relation to the true theory of war—a state of things in which a conflict of wills between nations is settled by a conflict of their armed forces—it is almost the primary object of siege to bring this conflict about and so to hasten the issue. From the definition the aim of war is the enemy’s defeat and not merely his surrender. And battle is necessary to defeat.
The failure to realize this elementary truth was the cause of much more than an omission78 to fathom79 the technique of fighting, the fruits of which we shall find, when we come to the consideration of the naval actions of the last three years and note the curious result of the Jutland deployment80 and the inconclusive character of so many of the artillery81 encounters which have occurred, and the extraordinary prolongation of those which were not inconclusive. It brought about what is, at first sight, something57 even more astonishing, viz., an actual indisposition by those in control of the British Navy, to adopt, when the enemy refused battle, the only course that could compel him to it, though it was actually the first article of their creed to gain the power to do this very thing.
Great Britain went to war at midnight August 4, 1914. The Grand Fleet went to its war stations. The High Seas Fleet withdrew to the security of the Kiel Canal. Within a day no enemy trading ships dared put to sea. Within a week, transports were carrying a British army to France. Our merchantmen continued their sea trading almost as if nothing had happened. But, though the German flag vanished from the seas, neutral vessels82 were free to use the German ports until the following March, and for another six months the enemy was free to import, in almost any quantities that he liked, certain forms of food, cotton, fats, and many of the ores and chemicals which were the indispensable raw material of the propellants and explosives vitally necessary to him in a prolonged war.
By permitting this, we showed that our policy, in other words, was not to attack but to wait attack, and then not to do anything to compel the enemy to attack. Our sea statesmen had not indoctrinated the civil government with a clearly defined policy that it was prepared to enforce at the opening of hostilities. Yet in a matter of this kind it was exactly at the opening of hostilities that a stringent blockade, accompanied by a generous rationing83 of sea supplies to the neutrals bordering on Germany, could have been proclaimed and enforced with the least friction84. For, in the first place, Germany’s declaration of war was so entirely85 unprovoked and sudden, and her first measure of war, the invasion of Belgium—when her soldiery became58 at once outrageous—combined the world over to create a neutral opinion strongly in favour of the Allies. Next, the fact that Great Britain’s participation86 in the war was both professedly and actually in loyalty89 to the identical obligation to Belgium which Germany had violated, predisposed America, for the first time since the colonies proclaimed their independence, to an active sympathy with the British ideal, perhaps because for the first time that ideal appeared to them to be one that was purely chivalrous90. It was then everything that the psychological moment should have been seized. Nor could it have been difficult to see that, if the opportunity was allowed to slip by, the mere77 fact that a half measure—to wit, the suspense91 of German shipping—had been enforced, must lead to a new condition, namely, a hugely magnified trade through the neutral ports. This trade, it is true, was nominally92 confined to goods that were not contraband93 of war. But contraband is an elastic94 term, and, to make things worse, the British Government proclaimed its intention—so little had war-trained thought prepared its policy—of accepting the provisions of the unexecuted Declaration of London as defining what contraband was to be. This gave the enemy the liberty to import materials indispensable to his manufacture of munitions95 and of armament, was one of which full advantage was taken. It was bad enough that cotton, indispensable ores, the raw materials of glycerine as well as the finished product, were poured into the laboratories, the factories, and the arsenals96 of Germany without stint97 or limit. It was, if possible, worse that this traffic created gigantic exporting interests in America which, once vested, made the restriction98 of them wear the appearance of an intolerable hardship when, many months too late, more stringent measures were59 taken. So powerful indeed had these interests become, that the real and rigid99 blockade which, under the doctrines100 of the “continuous voyage” and the “ultimate destination” would from the first have been fully101 consonant102 with international law, was actually never attempted at all until the United States themselves became belligerents103.
For fourteen months, then, we witnessed a state of things so paradoxical as to be without parallel in history. It was our professed87 creed that the fleet existed to seize and control sea communications. The enemy conceded us this control and, so far from using it to straiten him so relentlessly106 that he would have no choice but to fight for relief from it, we actually permitted him to draw, through sources absolutely under our control, for essentials in the form of overseas supplies that he needed in a war which all the world realized must now be a prolonged one. The traditional naval policy of the country was thus not reflected in the action of the country’s government, because that policy had no representation in the Navy’s counsels. There is, perhaps, no single heresy107 for which so high and disastrous108 a price has been paid.
It would appear, then, that our pre-war naval policy did not contemplate109 that immediate and stringent sea pressure that would compel the enemy to action, nor yet the closest and most vigilant110 kind of watch that would have brought him to action in the promptest and most fatal manner when circumstances compelled him to come out. Nor is it difficult to see why this was so. To profess88 the communication theory of sea war without realizing that the control of communications is the result of victory, that is, setting up a consequence as an aim while ignoring its cause, inevitably led to the inverted111 error, an unwillingness112 so to employ the control of communications, when60 the enemy ceded105 them without victory, as to force the enemy into battle as the only hope of escaping an intolerable condition. Not having contemplated113 and prepared for battle as the first aim of naval policy, they left an instinctive114 disinclination to force on an affair which they suddenly realized would be as critical as it was certainly unanticipated. It is this which explains possibly the greatest paradox104 in history, viz., that Germany proclaimed a strict blockade of Great Britain before Great Britain proclaimed such a blockade of Germany.
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1
naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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disintegrate
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| v.瓦解，解体，（使）碎裂，（使）粉碎 | |
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naught
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| n.无，零 [=nought] | |
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invader
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| n.侵略者，侵犯者，入侵者 | |
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conqueror
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| n.征服者，胜利者 | |
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abide
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| vi.遵守；坚持；vt.忍受 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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victoriously
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| adv.获胜地，胜利地 | |
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victorious
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| adj.胜利的，得胜的 | |
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partially
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| adv.部分地，从某些方面讲 | |
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hostilities
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| n.战争；敌意(hostility的复数)；敌对状态；战事 | |
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conquerors
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| 征服者，占领者( conqueror的名词复数 ) | |
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extermination
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| n.消灭，根绝 | |
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negation
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| n.否定；否认 | |
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dominion
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| n.统治，管辖，支配权；领土，版图 | |
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civilized
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| a.有教养的，文雅的 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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negotiation
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| n.谈判，协商 | |
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disintegrates
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| n.（使）破裂[分裂，粉碎]，（使）崩溃( disintegrate的名词复数 )v.（使）破裂[分裂，粉碎]，（使）崩溃( disintegrate的第三人称单数 ) | |
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paramount
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| a.最重要的，最高权力的 | |
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prudence
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| n.谨慎，精明，节俭 | |
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dictates
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| n.命令，规定，要求( dictate的名词复数 )v.大声讲或读( dictate的第三人称单数 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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penetrating
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| adj.（声音）响亮的，尖锐的adj.（气味）刺激的adj.（思想）敏锐的，有洞察力的 | |
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costly
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| adj.昂贵的，价值高的，豪华的 | |
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proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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entrenches
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| v.用壕沟围绕或保护…( entrench的第三人称单数 )；牢固地确立… | |
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fortifies
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| 筑防御工事于( fortify的第三人称单数 )； 筑堡于； 增强； 强化（食品） | |
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inflict
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| vt.(on)把…强加给，使遭受，使承担 | |
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severing
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| v.切断，断绝( sever的现在分词 )；断，裂 | |
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besieged
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| 包围，围困，围攻( besiege的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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postponing
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| v.延期，推迟( postpone的现在分词 ) | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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monopolize
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| v.垄断，独占，专营 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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belligerent
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| adj.好战的，挑起战争的；n.交战国，交战者 | |
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incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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supremacy
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| n.至上；至高权力 | |
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sporadic
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| adj.偶尔发生的 [反]regular；分散的 | |
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aggregate
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| adj.总计的，集合的；n.总数；v.合计；集合 | |
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inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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derive
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| v.取得；导出；引申；来自；源自；出自 | |
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adversely
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| ad.有害地 | |
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continental
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| adj.大陆的，大陆性的，欧洲大陆的 | |
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indirectly
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| adv.间接地，不直接了当地 | |
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stationary
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| adj.固定的，静止不动的 | |
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pending
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| prep.直到，等待…期间；adj.待定的；迫近的 | |
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postpone
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| v.延期，推迟 | |
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thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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warding
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| 监护，守护（ward的现在分词形式） | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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tranquil
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| adj. 安静的, 宁静的, 稳定的, 不变的 | |
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enjoyment
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| n.乐趣；享有；享用 | |
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qualified
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| adj.合格的，有资格的，胜任的，有限制的 | |
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unconditionally
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| adv.无条件地 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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inversion
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| n.反向，倒转，倒置 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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fabulously
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| 难以置信地，惊人地 | |
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superfluous
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| adj.过多的，过剩的，多余的 | |
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contingency
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| n.意外事件，可能性 | |
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precedent
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| n.先例，前例；惯例；adj.在前的，在先的 | |
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obsession
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| n.困扰，无法摆脱的思想(或情感) | |
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appalling
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| adj.骇人听闻的，令人震惊的，可怕的 | |
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creed
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| n.信条；信念，纲领 | |
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lesser
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| adj.次要的，较小的；adv.较小地，较少地 | |
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exclusion
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| n.拒绝，排除，排斥，远足，远途旅行 | |
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paralysis
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| n.麻痹(症)；瘫痪(症) | |
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disarms
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| v.裁军( disarm的第三人称单数 )；使息怒 | |
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inflicted
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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stringent
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| adj.严厉的；令人信服的；银根紧的 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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omission
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| n.省略，删节；遗漏或省略的事物，冗长 | |
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fathom
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| v.领悟，彻底了解 | |
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deployment
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| n. 部署,展开 | |
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artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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vessels
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| n.血管( vessel的名词复数 )；船；容器；（具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的）人 | |
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rationing
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| n.定量供应 | |
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friction
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| n.摩擦，摩擦力 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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participation
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| n.参与，参加，分享 | |
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professed
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| 公开声称的，伪称的，已立誓信教的 | |
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profess
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| v.声称，冒称，以...为业，正式接受入教，表明信仰 | |
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loyalty
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| n.忠诚，忠心 | |
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chivalrous
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| adj.武士精神的；对女人彬彬有礼的 | |
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suspense
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| n.（对可能发生的事）紧张感，担心，挂虑 | |
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nominally
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| 在名义上，表面地； 应名儿 | |
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contraband
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| n.违禁品，走私品 | |
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elastic
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| n.橡皮圈，松紧带；adj.有弹性的；灵活的 | |
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munitions
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| n.军火，弹药；v.供应…军需品 | |
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arsenals
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| n.兵工厂，军火库( arsenal的名词复数 )；任何事物的集成 | |
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stint
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| v.节省，限制，停止；n.舍不得化，节约，限制；连续不断的一段时间从事某件事 | |
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restriction
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| n.限制，约束 | |
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rigid
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| adj.严格的，死板的；刚硬的，僵硬的 | |
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doctrines
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| n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 )；教义；学说；（政府政策的）正式声明 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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consonant
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| n.辅音；adj.[音]符合的 | |
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belligerents
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| n.交战的一方（指国家、集团或个人）( belligerent的名词复数 ) | |
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paradox
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| n.似乎矛盾却正确的说法；自相矛盾的人(物) | |
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ceded
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| v.让给，割让，放弃( cede的过去式 ) | |
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relentlessly
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| adv.不屈不挠地；残酷地；不间断 | |
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heresy
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| n.异端邪说；异教 | |
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disastrous
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| adj.灾难性的，造成灾害的；极坏的，很糟的 | |
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contemplate
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| vt.盘算，计议；周密考虑；注视，凝视 | |
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vigilant
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| adj.警觉的，警戒的，警惕的 | |
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inverted
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| adj.反向的，倒转的v.使倒置，使反转( invert的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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unwillingness
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| n. 不愿意，不情愿 | |
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contemplated
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| adj. 预期的 动词contemplate的过去分词形式 | |
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instinctive
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| adj.(出于)本能的；直觉的；(出于)天性的 | |
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