252 Again, for the first time we find the destroyers getting between the pursuing ships and the chase, and creating a smoke screen to embarrass the pursuers’ aiming and fire control. Finally, we find that Von Hipper9 has directed his flight to a prearranged point, where certainly submarines had been gathered and possibly mine-fields had been laid. This of course was a contingency10 that had always been foreseen. In an article published in the Westminster Gazette a week or two before the action, I dealt with Von Tirpitz’s remark, that “the German Fleet were perfectly11 willing to fight the English, if England would give them the opportunity,” and interpreted this to mean, that the Germans would be willing to fight if they had such a choice of ground and position as would give them some equivalent for their inferior numbers. And writing at that time, I naturally set out what may be called the general view of North Sea strategy. No good purpose would have been served by questioning it—even if such questioning had been permitted. Nor, in view of the very narrow margin12 of superiority that we possessed13 in capital ships, had I any wish to question it.
I began with the supposition that the enemy might attempt, on a big scale, exactly what, on a much smaller scale, we ourselves had attempted in the Bight of Heligoland five months before.
“Assuming,” I said, “that it is a professed14 German object to draw a portion of the English Fleet into a situation where it can be advantageously engaged, what would be the natural course for them to pursue? The first and perhaps the simplest form of ruse15 would be to dangle16 a squadron before the English Fleet, so that our fastest units should be drawn17 away from their supports, and enticed18 within reach of a superior German force.253 If we suppose the Scarborough raid to be carried out by a squadron used for this purpose, we must look upon that episode not merely as an example of Germany practising its much-loved frightfulness19, but as an exercise in wiliness as well. That the Admiralty had taken every step it could think of to catch and destroy this squadron, we may safely infer from the character of the communications made to us. The measures adopted were, we also know, frustrated20 by the thick weather, so that no engagement actually took place. Is it not highly probable that the Germans, not knowing the character of the English counter-stroke, may have concluded that our failure to bring their squadron to action was brought about quite as much by prudence21 as by ill-luck? At any rate, it is rather a curious phenomenon that the German papers during the last two weeks have been filled with the most furious articles descanting upon the pusillanimity22 of the British Fleet. To our eyes such charges, of course, seem absurd, nor when we know how welcome the appearance of the German Fleet in force would be to Admiral Jellicoe and his gallant23 comrades can we conceive any sane24 man using such language; but if we interpret this as the expression of disappointed hopes, as evidence of the failure of a plan to catch a portion of our Fleet, a reasonable explanation of what is otherwise merely nonsense is afforded.
“The average layman26 probably supposes that a fleet action between the English Grand Fleet and the German High Seas Fleet would be fought through on the lines of previous engagements in this war, and of the two naval27 battles of the Russo-Japanese war. They would expect the contest to be an artillery28 fight in which superior skill in the use of guns, if such superiority existed on either254 side, would be decisive; and if equality of skill existed, that victory would go to the side possessing a superior number of guns of superior power. But other naval weapons have advanced enormously in the last eight years. We not only have torpedoes that can run five and six miles with far greater accuracy and certainty than the old torpedo could go a third of this distance, but we know that Germany—almost alone amongst nations—has carried the art and practice of sowing mines to a point hitherto not dreamt of. When the first raid was made on Yarmouth, it will be remembered that the German ships retreated from a British submarine, and that the submarine ran into and was blown up and sunk by a mine left by the German ship in its wake. Again, after the North-Eastern raid, many ships—some authorities say over a dozen—were blown up by running into German mines left in the waters which the raiders had been through. The German naval leaders are perfectly aware that in modern capital ships they have an inferiority of numbers, and that gun for gun their artillery force is inferior to ours in an even greater degree. It is certain, therefore, that in thinking out the conditions in which they would have to fight an English fleet they are fully29 determined30 to use all other means that can possibly turn the scale of superiority to their side. Just as they have relied on the torpedo and the mine to diminish the general strength of the English Fleet, while it was engaged in the watch and ward31 of the North Sea, so as to redress32 the balance before the time for a naval action arrived; so, too, they have counted, when actually in action, on crippling and destroying English ships by mines and torpedoes, so that the artillery preponderance may finally be theirs. If we suppose that the German admirals have255 really thought out this problem, and we must suppose this, it is not difficult to see that with a fast advance battle-cruiser squadron engaged in mine laying, the problem of so handling a fleet as to pursue and cut off this squadron without crossing its wake must be extremely intricate and difficult. If further we imagine that this fast squadron has drawn the hostile squadron towards its own waters, where mine-fields unknown to us have been laid, we have not only the problem of the mines left in the wake of the enemy, but the further difficulty of there being prepared traps, so to speak, lying across the path which the attacking squadron would most naturally take. If we imagine the problem still further complicated by an attack on a battleship line by flotillas of fast destroyers firing high-speed, long-range torpedoes, to intersect the course that that squadron is taking, we have the third element of confusion. It does not need much imagination then to see that with mines actually dropped during the man?uvres that lead up to or form part of the battle, with mine-fields scattered33 over the chosen battlefield, and with the possibility of a battle fleet being rendered liable at the shortest notice to a massed attack of long-range torpedo fire, a naval battle will be a totally different affair from the comparatively simple operations that took place in the engagement of August 10, or at the battle of Tsushima.
“Such conditions as these demand extraordinary sagacity on the part not only of the Commander-in-chief, but of all the squadron commanders under him. It requires insistent34 vigilance; but then, for that matter, such vigilance is the daily routine of the Navy always. Finally, it makes demands on the art of gunnery of which we have hitherto had no practical experience at all. For256 reasons that hardly need discussion, all practice gunnery is carried out in conditions almost ludicrously unlike war, and quite absurdly unlike the kind of naval engagement that seems to me probable. The principal difference between the two is that it is impossible to practise with the big guns at a fast target. There is no way of man?uvring and running a target at high speed unless it is propelled by its own power, and that power is kept supplied and is got by human agents, and obviously you cannot fire at a ship which is full of people. And when you fire at a towed target the differences are, first, that no target can be towed beyond perhaps a third of a battleship’s speed, and next, that it cannot be man?uvred as a ship can. Lastly, the firing ship, so far as I am aware, is never called upon to fire while executing the kind of man?uvres, or subject to the kind of limitations, that would be incident to a modern battle.
“To sum up my argument. The present indications are that Germany, carrying out its previously35 expressed intentions, has made a first, and is now aiming at getting the information for a second, attempt to draw the English Fleet into fighting on ground which she can mine before we are drawn on to it, and to fight in conditions in which she can use a fast advance squadron to compel our ships to adopt certain man?uvres, and to turn that advance squadron into mine-layers, so as to limit our movements or make them exceedingly perilous37. She will try to make the battlefields as close as she can to her own ports, both so as to facilitate the preliminary preparation by mines and to surprise us with unexpected torpedo attacks. I interpret the fulminations of Captain Persius and others as expressions of their anger at the failure of their first257 attempt, and I interpret the air raids as attempts to get information for making a second.
“We can, I am sure, rely upon Sir John Jellicoe being at no point inferior to his enemy, either in wiliness or in resources. It is to be remembered that, so far as we are concerned, much as we should like to have all anxiety settled by hearing of the definite destruction of the German Fleet, its continued existence is nevertheless perfectly innocuous, so long as it is unable to affect the transporting of our troops or the conduct of our trade.”
The foregoing article, I think, fairly represents what the Spectator, in referring to it, called the case for “naval patience.” But it did not mean, nor was it intended to mean, that it would be improper38 in any circumstances for a British ship to face any risks from torpedoes and mines, nor that to fight the Germans in their own waters was necessarily the same thing as fighting them on their own terms. It is indeed clear that I expected the British commanders to be more their equal to circumventing39 the enemy’s ingenuity40. But no resource can rob war of risk—and if it were made a working principle that risks from torpedoes and mines were never to be faced, then the clearing of the British Fleet out of the North Sea would be a very simple process. It would only be necessary for the enemy to send out a score or so of submarines to advance in line abreast41 when, ex hypothesi, the Fleet would have no choice but incontinent flight.
My object was first to show the public that the problem of the naval engagement was far more complicated than was generally supposed, and that the ingenuity, resource, and vigilance of the Admiral in command would be taxed. It seemed to me important that a sympathetic understanding of these anxieties should be created in the public mind.258 Next, however, it was not less important to discount any extravagant42 expectation in the matter of naval gunnery. We had not at that time any full accounts of the Battle of the Falkland Islands; but it seemed clear that, in this respect, the performance of the two battle-cruisers had been disappointing. If in the North Sea an action was to be fought in poor light, with the ships made to man?uvre by torpedo attack and the enemy from time to time veiled in smoke screens, it seemed quite certain that a task would be set to the service fire-control with which it would be quite unable to deal.
And if these were the weaknesses of our fire-control, it was further highly desirable to keep before our eyes the certainty that, if the opportunity arose and a fleet action, intended to be decisive and pushed to a decision, took place, we were almost bound to lose ships by torpedoes and mines. At any rate, it seemed as if such a risk must be run if our own gunfire was to be made effective. And for such losses the public should be prepared.
This being the situation, it seems to me most unfortunate that the Admiralty followed the course they did in communicating their various accounts of this action to us. For there were three accounts given, and no two of the three agreed as to the reason why the pursuit was broken off! For two days we were not told that Lion was injured, and for four days were ignorant of the fact that the control of the British Fleet had passed out of Sir David Beatty’s hands some time before the action was ended. It was not till March 3—that is, five weeks after the action—that we were told the name of the officer on whom command had devolved when Lion fell out of line! This suppression was really extraordinary. To be mentioned in despatches259 had always been an acknowledged honour. To be ignored was a new form of distinction. How was the public to take so singular an omission44? Had it ever happened before that an officer had been in command of a fleet at so grave a crisis and the fact of his being in command suppressed in announcing the fact of the engagement? No one quite knew how to take it. The discrepancies45 in the communiqués are worth noting. In the first, of January 25, was this curiously46 worded paragraph:
“A well-contested running fight ensued. Shortly after one o’clock Bluecher, which had previously fallen out of the line, capsized and sank. Admiral Beatty reports that two other German battle-cruisers were seriously damaged. They were, however, able to continue their flight, and reached an area where dangers from German submarines and mines prevented further pursuit.”
Did whoever drafted this statement suppose that the Bluecher was a battle-cruiser? We are now, however, more concerned with the reasons given for breaking off the action. An area was reached where “dangers from German submarines and mines prevented further pursuit.” The communiqué of January 27 was silent on this point. On the 28th was published what purported47 to be “a preliminary telegraphic report received from the Vice-Admiral.” The paragraph dealing48 with this matter is as follows:
“Through the damage to Lion’s feed-tank by an unfortunate chance shot, we were undoubtedly49 deprived of a greater victory. The presence of the enemy’s submarines subsequently necessitated50 the action being broken off.”
In this statement the excuse of mines is dropped.260 In the despatch43 published on March 3 the end of the action is treated by the Vice-Admiral as follows:
“At 11:20 I called the Attack alongside, shifted my flag to her at about 11:35. I proceeded at the utmost speed to rejoin the squadron, and met them at noon retiring north-northwest. I boarded and hoisted51 my flag in Princess Royal at about 12:20, when Captain Brock acquainted me with what had occurred since Lion fell out of line, namely, that Bluecher had sunk, and that the enemy battle-cruisers had continued their course to eastward52 in a considerably53 damaged condition.”
Here observe no mention was made of submarines necessitating54 the action being broken off, nor of an area being reached where dangers from submarines and mines prevented further pursuit. The whole incident is passed by the Vice-Admiral without comment, unless indeed the phrase about the accident to the Lion, in the telegraphic report, is a comment. Did the Vice-Admiral imply that had he remained in command he would have seen to it that his specific orders—viz. that Indomitable should settle Bluecher and the other ships pursue the battle-cruisers—were carried out?
A very unfortunate situation resulted from these reticences and contradictions. Naval writers in America were naturally enough amazed by the statement attributed to Admiral Beatty in the telegraphic report, for, if the presence of submarines could stop pursuit, could not submarines drive the British Fleet off the sea? These authors naturally expressed extreme astonishment55 that an admiral capable of breaking off action in these conditions, and publicly acknowledging so egregious56 a blunder, was not at once brought to court-martial. No one in his senses could have supposed that Sir David Beatty, who261 dealt with submarines without the least concern in the affair of Heligoland and earlier in the day on January 28, could possibly have accepted the dictum that the presence of a German submarine would justify57 pursuit having been broken off. It was then quite evident that the quotation58 from the Vice-Admiral’s telegraphic report could not have represented the Vice-Admiral’s opinion on a point of warlike doctrine59. What the actual facts of the case were, we do not to this day know. Rear-Admiral Moore did not continue long in Sir David Beatty’s squadron after this, but there was no court-martial nor any public expression of the Admiralty’s opinion by way of approval or disapproval60 of his proceedings61. In a speech made a month after the action in the House of Commons, Mr. Churchill passed over the fact that the action had not been fought out, as if such a thing was of no exceptional importance or interest whatever. Soon afterward62 it became known that the Rear-Admiral in question had got another and very important command elsewhere, so that it became plain that his conduct had not met with their Lordships’ reprobation63.
War in modern conditions undoubtedly makes it exceedingly important to keep the enemy as far as possible in ignorance of a great many things. It imposes too a continuous strain upon practically the whole personnel of the Navy, and these two things taken together have been quoted to explain why the old rule of holding a public court-martial on the captain of every ship that was lost, or on every individual officer whose action in battle gave rise to uncertainty64 or question, has virtually been abrogated65. But it is doubtful whether the Navy has not lost more by the abandonment of this wholesome66 practice than the enemy could have gained by its Spartan67 application.
262 This point came in for a good deal of public discussion at the beginning of 1915, and I venture to quote a contribution to it. Looking back upon this controversy68, it is easy enough to see now wherein lay the chief disadvantage of the suppression of courts-martial. There was no general staff at the Admiralty, representative of the best Service opinion, and, deprived of court-martial, the Navy had no means of expressing a corporate69 judgment70 on the vital issues as they arose. The doctrine with regard to torpedo risk, which seems to have been acted on at the close of this action, was evidently one which either the Admiralty had laid down, or at least accepted as correct. Could it have been referred to the corporate judgment of the Service and had that judgment not endorsed71 it, the history of the war might have been altogether different.
Mr. Churchill’s speech in the official reports is entitled ‘British Command of the Sea: Admiralty Organization.’ It would have been as well if this description had been given out before the speech was made, for, as it happened, many thought it was intended as a survey of the first epoch72 of the war and were disappointed that, in so eloquent73 and forceful a review, there was hardly a word of tribute to the incomparable services of our officers and men. There was lavish74 praise of the generosity75 of the House of Commons; of the foresight76 of Lord Fisher; of the excellence77 of the Admiralty’s preparedness at every point; of the amazing scale and success of the provisioning with coal and supplies of a vast fleet always at sea; of the astonishing perfection of the work of the engineering branch. But there was singularly little of the work of the fighting men. The officers were dismissed simply as ‘painstaking.’ No doubt the tribute will be made at another time. Is there263 any time, however, which is not the right time for acknowledging these services? On Tuesday we learned that between 300 and 400 officers have died for us—and over 6,000 men. Is it gracious to postpone78 their eulogy79? And the absence of eulogy was emphasized by the forceful manner in which the First Lord asked that he and his colleagues should be entrusted80 with the most absolute and dictatorial81 powers. Indeed, he excused the departure from the Service custom of holding courts-martial whenever a ship was lost on the ground that modern conditions called for instant action, with which courts-martial were incompatible82. But the court-martial, as I have before pointed25 out, is the palladium of the Navy’s liberties. To abolish it is like suspending the Habeas Corpus. It is so extreme a measure because it ignores the great unwritten law of the Navy, which is that, in spite of the authority of Whitehall over the Navy, of an admiral over a fleet, and of a captain over a ship’s company, being necessarily and in each case absolute, yet there must always be an appeal from authority to the profession itself. If this is necessary for the protection of subordinate officers and men against arbitrary action by a captain, against arbitrary and prejudiced action by an admiral in a fleet, how much more necessary is it as a protection of naval standards and traditions against arbitrary action by the Board? For a captain is at any rate an entirely83 naval authority; an admiral is certainly an officer of large naval experience, acting84 generally with at least one other admiral. But the Board is largely a lay body. Indeed, it is now by a majority a lay body. And like all boards, it is liable to be the mouthpiece of its strongest personality. If this, as sometimes happens, is a seaman85, he may be a partisan—I say it in no invidious sense—of certain policies and so264 prejudiced against brother officers who differ. If the stronger character is a layman, he may be ignorant of, or see no danger in waiving86, naval traditions that are embodied87 in no statute88 or regulation, but are not embodied simply because their cogency89 has never been questioned. In other words, the autocracy90 of the Admiralty is a necessity of executive administration, but can only be exercised safely if its enforcement is continuously tested by professional opinion.
How many people, I often wonder, really appreciate how singular a body is that which is made up of admirals, captains, commanders, and lieutenants91 of the Royal Navy? The accomplishments92 that make the seaman confuse the landsman by their strangeness and intricacy. Indeed, if one wishes to express the extremity93 of bewilderment, he does so best by the metaphor94 which describes the sailor’s normal environment. When we say we are “at sea,” we do so because language expresses no greater helplessness. To master these conditions calls for forms of knowledge and proficiency95 that are only acquired by a lifetime’s familiarity. But these conditions are not only baffling, they are incredibly dangerous. If steam has done much to lessen96 the perils97 of the sea, speed, the product of steam, has added to them. The sailor then, even in times of peace, passes his days, and still more his nights, encompassed98 by the threat of irreparable disaster. An oversight99 that may take thirty seconds to commit—and a hundred deaths, a wrecked100 ship, and a shattered reputation reward thirty years of constant and unblemished devotion to duty. To face a life and responsibilities like these calls for more than great mental and physical skill, though nowhere will you find these in a higher degree or more widely diffused101 than in the Fleet. It calls for moral265 and spiritual qualities, for a development of character in patience, unselfishness, and courage which few landsmen have any inducement to cultivate. A life lived daily in the presence of death must be a unique life, and it is not surprising that men bred to these conditions—always as hard and ascetic102 as they are uncertain and unsafe—grow to be a body quite unlike other men, with standards and traditions of their own, and a corporate spirit and capacity that are unique, wonderful, and to most landsmen incomprehensible.
Their standards and traditions can only be maintained and can only be enforced by themselves. And the great peril36 that follows from excluding all reference to them of the accidents and failures of war is that, failing this reference, we have no security that naval action will be judged as it should be, solely103 by the highest naval standard.
Much was said in the House of Commons about the loss of ships. Mr. Churchill assumed that the only motive104 for asking for courts-martial was to find a scapegoat105. Lord Charles Beresford only made clear that a court-martial was as much for clearing the character as for finding criminals. There was a significant phrase in Mr. Churchill’s speech that raises, it seems to me, a point in this connection of far greater importance. The battle of the Dogger Bank, he said, was “not fought out because the enemy made good their escape into waters infested106 by submarines and mines.” The officer who had to call off a fleet in these circumstances was necessarily faced by a grave and almost terrifying responsibility. To be too bold was to risk everything, to be too cautious was to throw away a victory. Can any tribunal, except the Navy, judge whether this responsibility was rightly266 exercised? When we remember that in our greatest days hardly a naval battle took place that was not followed by courts-martial, it seems to me a most perilous thing to allow these tremendous issues to go by the board because unless they are adjudicated upon by the profession itself they are not adjudicated upon at all.
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noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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torpedo
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| n.水雷，地雷；v.用鱼雷破坏 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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torpedoes
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| 鱼雷( torpedo的名词复数 )； 油井爆破筒； 刺客； 掼炮 | |
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compulsory
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| n.强制的，必修的；规定的，义务的 | |
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respite
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| n.休息，中止，暂缓 | |
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appreciable
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| adj.明显的，可见的，可估量的，可觉察的 | |
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hipper
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| hip（（衣服、音乐等方面）时髦的，赶时髦的）的比较级形式 | |
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contingency
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| n.意外事件，可能性 | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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margin
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| n.页边空白；差额；余地，余裕；边，边缘 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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professed
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| 公开声称的，伪称的，已立誓信教的 | |
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ruse
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| n.诡计，计策；诡计 | |
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dangle
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| v.(使)悬荡，(使)悬垂 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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enticed
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| 诱惑，怂恿( entice的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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frightfulness
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| 可怕； 丑恶； 讨厌； 恐怖政策 | |
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frustrated
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| adj.挫败的，失意的，泄气的v.使不成功( frustrate的过去式和过去分词 )；挫败；使受挫折；令人沮丧 | |
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prudence
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| n.谨慎，精明，节俭 | |
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pusillanimity
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| n.无气力，胆怯 | |
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gallant
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| adj.英勇的，豪侠的；(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
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sane
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| adj.心智健全的，神志清醒的，明智的，稳健的 | |
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pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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layman
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| n.俗人，门外汉，凡人 | |
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naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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ward
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| n.守卫，监护，病房，行政区，由监护人或法院保护的人（尤指儿童）；vt.守护，躲开 | |
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redress
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| n.赔偿，救济，矫正；v.纠正，匡正，革除 | |
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scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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insistent
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| adj.迫切的，坚持的 | |
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previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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peril
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| n.(严重的)危险；危险的事物 | |
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perilous
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| adj.危险的，冒险的 | |
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improper
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| adj.不适当的，不合适的，不正确的，不合礼仪的 | |
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circumventing
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| v.设法克服或避免（某事物），回避( circumvent的现在分词 )；绕过，绕行，绕道旅行 | |
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ingenuity
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| n.别出心裁；善于发明创造 | |
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abreast
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| adv.并排地；跟上(时代)的步伐，与…并进地 | |
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extravagant
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| adj.奢侈的；过分的；(言行等)放肆的 | |
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despatch
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| n./v.(dispatch)派遣；发送；n.急件；新闻报道 | |
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omission
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| n.省略，删节；遗漏或省略的事物，冗长 | |
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discrepancies
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| n.差异，不符合（之处），不一致（之处）( discrepancy的名词复数 ) | |
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curiously
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| adv.有求知欲地；好问地；奇特地 | |
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purported
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| adj.传说的，谣传的v.声称是…，（装得）像是…的样子( purport的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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48
dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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necessitated
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| 使…成为必要，需要( necessitate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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51
hoisted
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| 把…吊起，升起( hoist的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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52
eastward
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| adv.向东；adj.向东的；n.东方，东部 | |
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considerably
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| adv.极大地；相当大地；在很大程度上 | |
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54
necessitating
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| 使…成为必要，需要( necessitate的现在分词 ) | |
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55
astonishment
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| n.惊奇，惊异 | |
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56
egregious
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| adj.非常的，过分的 | |
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57
justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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58
quotation
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| n.引文，引语，语录；报价，牌价，行情 | |
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59
doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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disapproval
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| n.反对，不赞成 | |
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proceedings
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| n.进程，过程，议程；诉讼(程序)；公报 | |
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afterward
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| adv.后来；以后 | |
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reprobation
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| n.斥责 | |
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64
uncertainty
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| n.易变，靠不住，不确知，不确定的事物 | |
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abrogated
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| 废除（法律等）( abrogate的过去式和过去分词 )； 取消； 去掉； 抛开 | |
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wholesome
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| adj.适合；卫生的；有益健康的；显示身心健康的 | |
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spartan
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| adj.简朴的，刻苦的；n.斯巴达；斯巴达式的人 | |
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controversy
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| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
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corporate
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| adj.共同的，全体的；公司的，企业的 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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endorsed
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| vt.& vi.endorse的过去式或过去分词形式v.赞同( endorse的过去式和过去分词 )；在（尤指支票的）背面签字；在（文件的）背面写评论；在广告上说本人使用并赞同某产品 | |
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epoch
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| n.(新)时代；历元 | |
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eloquent
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| adj.雄辩的，口才流利的；明白显示出的 | |
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lavish
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| adj.无节制的；浪费的；vt.慷慨地给予，挥霍 | |
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generosity
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| n.大度，慷慨，慷慨的行为 | |
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foresight
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| n.先见之明，深谋远虑 | |
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excellence
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| n.优秀，杰出，(pl.)优点，美德 | |
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postpone
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| v.延期，推迟 | |
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eulogy
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| n.颂词；颂扬 | |
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entrusted
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| v.委托，托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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dictatorial
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| adj. 独裁的，专断的 | |
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82
incompatible
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| adj.不相容的，不协调的，不相配的 | |
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83
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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84
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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seaman
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| n.海员，水手，水兵 | |
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waiving
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| v.宣布放弃( waive的现在分词 )；搁置；推迟；放弃（权利、要求等） | |
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embodied
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| v.表现( embody的过去式和过去分词 )；象征；包括；包含 | |
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statute
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| n.成文法，法令，法规；章程，规则，条例 | |
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cogency
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| n.说服力；adj.有说服力的 | |
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90
autocracy
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| n.独裁政治，独裁政府 | |
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lieutenants
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| n.陆军中尉( lieutenant的名词复数 )；副职官员；空军；仅低于…官阶的官员 | |
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accomplishments
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| n.造诣；完成( accomplishment的名词复数 )；技能；成绩；成就 | |
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extremity
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| n.末端，尽头；尽力；终极；极度 | |
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metaphor
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| n.隐喻，暗喻 | |
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95
proficiency
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| n.精通，熟练，精练 | |
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96
lessen
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| vt.减少，减轻；缩小 | |
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97
perils
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| 极大危险( peril的名词复数 )； 危险的事（或环境） | |
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98
encompassed
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| v.围绕( encompass的过去式和过去分词 )；包围；包含；包括 | |
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99
oversight
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| n.勘漏，失察，疏忽 | |
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100
wrecked
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| adj.失事的，遇难的 | |
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101
diffused
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| 散布的，普及的，扩散的 | |
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102
ascetic
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| adj.禁欲的；严肃的 | |
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103
solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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104
motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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105
scapegoat
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| n.替罪的羔羊，替人顶罪者；v.使…成为替罪羊 | |
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106
infested
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| adj.为患的，大批滋生的（常与with搭配）v.害虫、野兽大批出没于( infest的过去式和过去分词 )；遍布于 | |
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