In the afternoon of May 31 the main sea forces of Great Britain and Germany were all in the North Sea. The Grand Fleet, under the command of Sir John Jellicoe, accompanied by a squadron of battle-cruisers, two of light cruisers, and three flotillas of destroyers, were to the north; the Battle Cruiser Fleet—of two squadrons—three squadrons of light cruisers, and four destroyer flotillas, supported by the Fifth Battle Squadron, all under the command of Sir David Beatty, were scouting1 to the southward.
The British Fleet was out “in pursuance of the general policy of periodical sweeps through the North Sea.” The disposition2 of the forces and the plan of operations were the Commander-in-Chief’s own. Neither was dictated3 from Whitehall. The despatches describing the operation do not—as some of those relating to the events off Heligoland in August, 1914—say that the ships were following Admiralty instructions. The fact has considerable importance in view of the fears expressed earlier in the spring that Whitehall was interfering5 with the Commander-in-Chief’s dispositions6. Note also that the fleet was here in pursuit of the general policy followed since the early days of the war. This hunting for the enemy is not described as taking place at regular intervals7, but as “periodic.” These searching movements would be made at295 the times when there was a greater likelihood of there being an enemy to find.
(LARGER)
The official plan of the Battle of Jutland. Note that the course of the Grand Fleet is not shown to be “astern” of the battle-cruisers, but parallel to their track
There was a considerable interval8 between the forces—just how great we do not exactly know. But at the point at which the story in the despatches opens, Sir David Beatty’s force was steering9 northward10, that is, toward the Grand Fleet. At 2:20 Galatea, the flagship of Commodore Alexander Sinclair, reported the presence of enemy vessels11. The light cruisers were spread out on a line east and west, ahead of the battle-cruisers. When Sir David Beatty got news that the enemy had been sighted on the extreme right of his line of cruisers, he at once altered course from north to S.S.E., that is, rather more of a right angle and a half, steering for the Horn Reefs, so as to place his force between the enemy and his base. It is to be noted12 that the Vice-Admiral at once adopted not the movement that would soonest bring the enemy to action, but that which would compel him to action whether he wished it or not. Observe he does not wait to do this till he has ascertained14 the enemy’s strength. A quarter of an hour later smoke was seen to the eastward15—that would be on the port bow—which would confirm the Galatea’s account that the enemy was still to the north of the line that Sir David Beatty was steering. The distance of the battle-cruisers from the Horn Reefs was such that the enemy’s escape from action would still be impossible, even if he altered course to cut him off sooner. This, accordingly, he did, steering first due east and then northeast and, in less than an hour, sighted Von Hipper16’s force of five battle-cruisers, probably almost straight ahead. When, at 2:20, the battle-cruisers headed for the Horn Reefs, the First and Third Light Cruiser Squadrons changed their direction also without waiting for orders,297 and swept to the eastward, screening the battle-cruisers. The Fifth Battle Squadron, which we must suppose originally to have been on Sir David Beatty’s left, was coming up behind the battle-cruisers as fast as possible. The Second Light Cruiser Squadron, leaving the screening functions to the First and Third, made full speed to take station ahead of the battle-cruisers, where two flotillas of destroyers were already. While these movements were proceeding17, a seaplane was sent up from Engadine which, having to fly low on account of clouds, pushed to within 3,000 yards of the four light cruisers of Von Hipper’s advance force. Full and accurate reports were thus received just before the enemy was sighted in the distance.
At 2:20, when the enemy’s scouting advanced craft were first seen by Galatea, Von Hipper was seemingly to the south of them, and according to the German account went north and east to investigate. While then Sir David Beatty was travelling southeast, east, and then northeast, we shall probably be right in supposing that Von Hipper was executing an approximately parallel series of movements out of sight to the northeast of him. Both advance forces were increasing their distance from their main forces. At any rate, neither was approaching his main force when they came into sight at 3:30, Von Hipper a few miles north of Sir David Beatty.
What was the distance at this period that separated the battle-cruisers of each side from their supporting battle-fleets? At 3:30 the German battle-cruisers headed straight for their main fleet at full speed, and met them an hour and a quarter afterward18. If Von Hipper’s speed was 26 knots and Admiral Scheer’s 18—he had pre-Dreadnoughts with him, and it was not likely to have been greater—there would have been fifty-five sea miles298 separating the German forces. According to the despatch4, Sir John Jellicoe at 3:30 headed his fleet toward Sir David Beatty, and came down at full speed. He came into contact with the battle-cruisers on their return from their excursion to the south at 5:45. Sir David Beatty would by this time have returned approximately to the same latitude19 he was on at 3:30. Had he then at 3:30 closed Sir John Jellicoe at full speed, he would have come in contact with him in, say, fifty minutes. The British fleets at 3:30, then, may have been between forty and forty-five sea miles apart, against the German fifty-five.
POSITION OF THE OPPOSING FLEETS AT 3.30 P.M.
299 It has been said that both sides fell into a strategical error in dividing their forces. This criticism has been prominent in the neutral Press; but it arises from a confusion of thought. On neither side were the battle-cruisers considered as anything but scouting forces, which in all sea campaigns have been, because it is a necessity of the case, maintained at suitable distances from the main force. The only division of forces proper on the British side was the presence of four battleships with Sir David Beatty. But as we see from the despatch, for some reason a squadron of three of Sir David’s battle-cruisers was with the main fleet, and the Fifth Battle Squadron seems to have been taking its place.
The only evidences of a strategical blunder in the disposition would be, first, a failure of the chosen plan to bring the Germans to action, next a failure to defeat them when brought to action, because of inability to concentrate the requisite20 strength for the purpose at the critical point. It is surely a sufficient reply to say that the German Fleet was brought to action, and that any incompleteness in the victory arose, not from there being insufficient21 forces present, but owing to circumstances making it impossible to employ them to the greatest advantage.
THE ACTION: FIRST PHASE
When the enemy was sighted at 3:30, Sir David formed his ships for action in a line of bearing, so that, in the northeasterly wind, the smoke of one ship should not interfere22 with the fire of the rest. His course was east-southeast, and he was converging23 on that of the enemy, who was steering rather more directly south. By the time the line was formed the range was about 23,000300 yards, and at twelve minutes to four had been closed to 18,500, when both sides opened fire simultaneously24. When the range had closed to about 14,000 yards or less, parallel courses were steered25 and kept until the end of this phase of the engagement. The Fifth Battle Squadron, consisting of four ships of the Queen Elizabeth class, under the command of Admiral Evan-Thomas, at the time when Sir David formed his battle-line, was about 10,000 yards off—not straight astern of the battle-cruisers, but bearing about half a right angle to port. The course that would bring them immediately into the line of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, then, was not parallel to that steered by Sir David Beatty, but a course converging on to it. It was this that enabled them, with their inferior speed, to come into action at eight minutes past four, though only then at the very long range of 20,000 yards.
The interval had been singularly unfortunate for the British side. Indefatigable27 (Captain Sowerby) had the misfortune to be hit by a shell in a vulnerable spot. The destruction of the ship was instantaneous, and almost the entire personnel, including the ship’s very gallant28 Captain, was lost. An exactly similar misfortune later befell Queen Mary. Neither ship had, in any sense of the word, been overwhelmed by the gunfire of the enemy. Indeed, when Queen Mary went down, the enemy’s fire, which had been singularly accurate and intense in the first phase of the action had, as the Vice-Admiral says in his despatch, slackened. The superior skill, due chiefly to the wider experience of the British fire-control organizations, had already begun to tell—the enemy’s fire-control being evidently unable to survive the damage, and losses of action.
(LARGER)
The first phase; from Von Hipper’s coming into view, until his juncture29 with Admiral Scheer
Sir David Beatty’s main force was thus reduced first301 by one-sixth, and then by one-fifth of its number, so that he was now left with four ships against the German five. But three of these ships disposed of broadsides of 13.4’s, the fourth employing a gun equal to the most powerful in the German armament. In weight and power of broadside the British cruisers still had the advantage, and it is clear that their rate of fire was faster, and their aiming and range-keeping more effective.
Just as the Fifth Battle Squadron came into action at ten minutes past four, a brisk and dramatic encounter took place between the light craft of the two sides. Two flotillas of destroyers and one squadron of light cruisers, it will be remembered, were stationed well ahead of the British flagship. Eight units of the Thirteenth Flotilla, together with two of the Tenth and two of the Ninth, had been designated for making an attack on the enemy’s line as soon as an opportunity offered. The opportunity came at 4:15. A destroyer attack is of course a torpedo30 attack, and is delivered by the flotilla engaged in steering a course converging toward that of the enemy. The destroyers must be well ahead of their targets if the attack is to be effective, so that the torpedo and the ship attacked shall be steering toward each other. These boats proceeded then, at 4:15, to initiate31 this man?uvre toward the enemy. It was almost simultaneously countered by an identical movement by the enemy, who had a considerable preponderance of force—fifteen destroyers and a cruiser against the British twelve destroyers. These two forces met before either had reached a position for effecting its main purpose, viz., the torpedo attack on the capital ships. A very spirited engagement followed. It was a close-quarters affair, and was carried through by the British destroyers in the most gallant manner and with great303 determination. Two of the enemy’s destroyers were sunk, and what was far more important, it was made quite impossible for him to carry through a torpedo attack. None of our boats went down. But just as the enemy’s boats had been unable to get a favourable32 position for attacking our battle-cruisers, so, too, the English boats, delayed by this engagement, were unable to get the desired position on the enemy’s bow for employing their torpedoes33 to the best advantage. Three of them, however, though unable to attack from ahead, pressed forward for a broadside attack on Von Hipper’s ships, and naturally came under a fierce fire from the secondary armament of these vessels. One of them, Nomad34, was badly hit, and had to stop between the lines. She was ultimately lost. Nestor and Nicator held on between the lines until the German Battle Fleet was met.
For a full half hour these two boats had been either fighting an almost hand-to-hand action with the enemy’s boats, or had been under the close-range fire of Von Hipper’s battle-cruisers. They now found themselves faced by the German Battle Fleet. But they were at last in the right position for an attack. Both closed, in spite of the fire, to 3,000 yards and fired their torpedoes. It is believed that one hit was made. Nicator escaped and rejoined the Thirteenth Flotilla, but Nestor, though not sunk, was stopped, and had to be numbered amongst the losses when the action was over.
While this had been going forward, the artillery35 action between the two squadrons of battle-cruisers continued fierce and resolute36. Sir Evan-Thomas’s battleships did their best with the rear of the enemy’s line, but were unable to reduce the range below 20,000 yards, if, indeed, they were unable to prevent the enemy increasing it. At 4:18304 a second palpable evidence that the British fire was taking effect was afforded by the third of Von Hipper’s ships bursting into flames. The first evidence was, of course, the falling off in the rate of the enemy’s fire, and the still more marked deterioration37 in its accuracy.
It will be remembered that the Second Light Cruiser Squadron, under Commodore Goodenough, had got to its action station ahead of Sir David Beatty’s line a little while before the engagement opened with Von Hipper at half-past three. This squadron maintained its position well ahead, and at 4:38 reported the advent38 of Scheer with a German battle squadron from the south. They would then be from 20,000 to 24,000 yards off. Until Southampton sent in her message at 4:38, the British Admiral had no reason for knowing that the enemy Battle Fleet was out. Not that the knowledge would have affected39 the plan he actually carried out, for the immediate26 attack on Von Hipper was right in either event. But it was obvious that, with only four battle-cruisers, it was out of the question continuing the action as if the forces were equal. The Fifth Battle Squadron was out of range, and the Vice-Admiral’s first business was to concentrate his force, and then to judge how to impose his will upon the enemy in the matter of forcing him up to action with the Grand Fleet. The junction40 with Admiral Evan-Thomas could obviously not be delayed; as obviously the man?uvre was a dangerous one, for as each ship turned it would be exposed to the enemy’s fire without being able to reply. Had only speed of junction to be considered, the battle-cruisers could have been turned together when the rear ship on the old course would have become the leading ship on the new. The turn could probably be accomplished41 in less than three minutes. But305 seriously as the German fire had depreciated42, it was not a thing with which liberties could be taken. Sir David Beatty, therefore, turned his ships one by one, thus keeping three in action while the first was turning; two while the second was turning—the first and second coming into action on a reverse course as the third and fourth turned from the old. At no time, then, was the fire of the British squadron reduced below that of two ships.
No sooner had Sir David turned than Von Hipper followed his example, and as the Vice-Admiral led up on the new course, he met Evan-Thomas with his four battleships directing a fierce fire on Von Hipper. These two squadrons were on opposite courses, and the change of range was rapid. The conditions for hitting were extremely difficult. Evan-Thomas was not yet in sight of the German Battle Fleet, and the Vice-Admiral told him to turn, as he had done, and to form up behind him. By the time this man?uvre was completed—that is, within a quarter of an hour of Sir David Beatty having begun his own turn—the head of Admiral Scheer’s line had got within range, and a brisk action opened between the leading German ships and the rear ships on the British side.
During this quarter of an hour, Commodore Goodenough in Southampton pushed south to ascertain13 the precise numbers and composition of the German force. It was of course of great moment, not only to the Vice-Admiral but to the Commander-in-Chief that the enemy’s strength should be ascertained as accurately43 and as soon as possible. But to do this the Commodore had to take his squadron under the massed fire of the German Dreadnoughts. He held on until a range of about 13,000 yards was reached and, having got the information he306 wanted, returned to form up with the Cruiser Fleet on its northerly course. His squadron was hardly hit: for though the fire was intense, here, too, the change of range was rapid, and far too difficult for the German fire-control to surmount44.
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1
scouting
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| 守候活动，童子军的活动 | |
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2
disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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3
dictated
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| v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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4
despatch
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| n./v.(dispatch)派遣；发送；n.急件；新闻报道 | |
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5
interfering
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| adj. 妨碍的 动词interfere的现在分词 | |
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6
dispositions
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| 安排( disposition的名词复数 )； 倾向； （财产、金钱的）处置； 气质 | |
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7
intervals
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| n.[军事]间隔( interval的名词复数 )；间隔时间；[数学]区间；（戏剧、电影或音乐会的）幕间休息 | |
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8
interval
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| n.间隔，间距；幕间休息，中场休息 | |
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9
steering
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| n.操舵装置 | |
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10
northward
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| adv.向北；n.北方的地区 | |
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11
vessels
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| n.血管( vessel的名词复数 )；船；容器；（具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的）人 | |
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12
noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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13
ascertain
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| vt.发现，确定，查明，弄清 | |
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14
ascertained
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| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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15
eastward
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| adv.向东；adj.向东的；n.东方，东部 | |
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16
hipper
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| hip（（衣服、音乐等方面）时髦的，赶时髦的）的比较级形式 | |
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17
proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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18
afterward
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| adv.后来；以后 | |
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19
latitude
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| n.纬度，行动或言论的自由(范围)，(pl.)地区 | |
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20
requisite
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| adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品 | |
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21
insufficient
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| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
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22
interfere
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| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
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23
converging
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| adj.收敛[缩]的，会聚的，趋同的v.（线条、运动的物体等）会于一点( converge的现在分词 )；（趋于）相似或相同；人或车辆汇集；聚集 | |
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24
simultaneously
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| adv.同时发生地，同时进行地 | |
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25
steered
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| v.驾驶( steer的过去式和过去分词 )；操纵；控制；引导 | |
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26
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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27
indefatigable
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| adj.不知疲倦的，不屈不挠的 | |
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28
gallant
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| adj.英勇的，豪侠的；(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
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29
juncture
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| n.时刻，关键时刻，紧要关头 | |
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30
torpedo
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| n.水雷，地雷；v.用鱼雷破坏 | |
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31
initiate
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| vt.开始，创始，发动；启蒙，使入门；引入 | |
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32
favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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33
torpedoes
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| 鱼雷( torpedo的名词复数 )； 油井爆破筒； 刺客； 掼炮 | |
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34
nomad
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| n.游牧部落的人，流浪者，游牧民 | |
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35
artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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36
resolute
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| adj.坚决的，果敢的 | |
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37
deterioration
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| n.退化；恶化；变坏 | |
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38
advent
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| n.(重要事件等的)到来，来临 | |
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39
affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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40
junction
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| n.连接，接合；交叉点，接合处，枢纽站 | |
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41
accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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42
depreciated
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| v.贬值，跌价，减价( depreciate的过去式和过去分词 )；贬低，蔑视，轻视 | |
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43
accurately
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| adv.准确地，精确地 | |
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44
surmount
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| vt.克服；置于…顶上 | |
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