The flotillas and light cruiser squadrons were now regrouped—some ahead, some alongside of the battle-cruiser and battleship squadrons, and the whole steered1 to the northward2, keeping approximately parallel to and well ahead of the German line. From the time when Scheer came into action at 4:57 until six o’clock, Sir David Beatty kept the range at about 14,000 yards. Both sides must have had some anxious moments during this critical hour. Sir David Beatty knew what Admiral Scheer did not—for the weather was too thick for the Zeppelins to give him the much-needed information—that he was falling back on Sir John Jellicoe, when of course overwhelming force could be brought to bear. His business was to keep Admiral Scheer in play, while exposing his ships, especially his battle-cruisers, as little as possible, consistent with their maintaining an efficient attack upon the enemy. Sir David was criticized for exposing his ships imprudently. Is this criticism well founded? Von Hipper3’s battle-cruisers were at the head of the German line, but one had certainly fallen out of action by five o’clock, and one more was to leave the line in the course of this holding action. The battle-cruisers, however, did not affect the situation, for the German Fleet’s speed was that of the pre-Dreadnoughts in the rear, and this308 could not have exceeded 18 knots and was probably less. But the slowest ship in Sir David Beatty’s squadron could make at least 24. Nothing, therefore, could have been simpler than to have taken the whole force out of reach of Scheer’s guns whenever he chose. Had there at any stage been the remotest chance of the lightly armoured battle-cruisers being exposed to smothering4 fire from the German battleships, the danger could have been averted5 by the expedient6 of putting on more speed. Beatty’s main preoccupation, however, was not this. It was undoubtedly7 the fear that Scheer might retreat before the Grand Fleet could get up. He had, therefore, first to act as if he were a promising8 target, next to be ready with a counter-stroke if the Germans showed any sign of flight. How did he meet the first necessity of the position?
By keeping the range at 14,000 yards, at which the heavier projectile9 guns of the British artillery10 would have a distinct advantage over the German batteries, and by keeping so far ahead that it was impossible for Admiral Scheer to bring the fire of concentrated broadsides to bear, not only was an absolute inequality of gunnery conditions avoided, but it is probable that, so far as tactical disposition11 went, Sir David Beatty, as throughout the action, had so handled his ships as to be actually superior in fighting power over the forces he was engaging. I say “so far as tactical disposition was concerned,” advisedly, because a new element came into action at this point which favoured first one and then the other, and was ultimately to make long-range gunfire altogether nugatory12.
(LARGER)
The second phase; Beatty engages the combined German Fleet, and draws it toward the Grand Fleet
Already between a quarter past four and half past, light mists had been driving down, and even before a quarter to five the outlines of Von Hipper’s squadron309 were becoming vague and shadowy to the British gun-layers. Between half-past five and six these conditions got very much worse. It handicapped the fire-control severely13, and already they were beginning to feel, what the Commander-in-Chief says was a characteristic of the whole period during which the Grand Fleet was intermittently14 in action, viz., the extreme difficulty of using rangefinders in the shifting and indifferent light. How local and variable the mist was may be judged from the fact that the British line was not only free from mist, but was outlined sharply against the setting sun—thus giving a great advantage to the German rangefinders. It was this that largely neutralized15 the advantage which Sir David Beatty had so skilfully16 derived17 from the superior speed of his ships. No ships were lost on the British side during this part of the action. But it can hardly be doubted that had the conditions of visibility been the same for both sides, the head of the German line would have suffered more severely than it did from the Fifth Battle Squadron’s 15-inch guns. But, as we have seen, one of the battle-cruisers had to haul out severely damaged, and certain others showed unmistakable evidence of having suffered severely.
In this phase of the action, as in the first, the British destroyers made attacks on the German line, and it is believed that one ship, seen to be hopelessly on fire and emitting huge clouds of smoke and steam, owed her injuries to a torpedo18 fired by Moresby.
What was Admiral Scheer’s idea in following up the British squadron as he did? He knew that he had not the speed which would enable him to catch it. It was almost impossible—for he was now the pursuing squadron—to hope for any success from a destroyer attack. There311 was a risk that he might be caught and forced to engage by the Grand Fleet. There are, it seems, two explanations of his action. In the first place, he knew that Von Hipper had already sunk two of the British vessels19. It was worth a considerable effort to try and get more, and in face of these losses Sir David Beatty’s movements may have looked so extremely like flight as to make him think that he had, to this extent, the upper hand, and that the British Admiral would be unlikely to risk his force again by seeking a close action. Apart from the risk of the Grand Fleet being out, then, there seemed to be everything to gain and nothing to lose by carrying on the chase.
But is it quite certain that his action was altogether voluntary? What would Sir David Beatty’s action have been had Scheer attempted to renounce20 the fight? There can be no hesitation21 in answering this question, for we only have to look at what Sir David actually did at six o’clock, when the Germans got news of the Grand Fleet’s approach and had to change tactics immediately. We shall find in this the clue to what would have happened had Scheer attempted to change course and withdraw earlier in the action.
The governing factors of the situation were, first, Beatty’s superior speed; secondly22, his superior concentration of gun power, and, lastly, the greater efficacy of his guns at long range. The difference between the speed of the slowest ships in the British fast division, say 24? knots, and that of the slowest in the German main squadron, say 18, was 6? knots at least.
If Scheer had attempted simply to withdraw, he must have reversed the course of his fleet, either by turning his ships together or in succession. In the first case, the simplest of man?uvres would have brought the British312 Fleet into the T position across the German rear. And with a six-knot advantage in speed, Sir David could even have attempted the final tactics of Admiral Sturdee at the Falkland Islands, and pursued the flying force with his four battle-cruisers, engaging them from one side, and the Fifth Battle Squadron attacking them from the other. So disastrous23, indeed, must this man?uvre have been to the Germans that it need not be considered as thinkable. The alternative was to lead round from the head of the line, when the choice would have arisen between a gradual change of course and a reverse of course, viz., a sixteen-point turn. The objections to the sixteen-point turn were precisely24 similar to those to turning the fleet together, with, perhaps, the added objection that the British would have had two lines of ships to fire into instead of only one—an advantage which would not have been counterbalanced by the enemy keeping one or two broadsides bearing, for they would be the broadsides of ships under full helm, and it is highly improbable that their fire would have been effective. When Scheer actually did break off battle, we shall find that he turned his fleet in succession through an angle of 135°. There were special reasons that made it obligatory25 he should do this, and special conditions which made it possible. Until he met the Grand Fleet, there was nothing to force him to turn, and the counter-stroke on which he relied to rob the turn of its chief dangers would not have been operative against the two squadrons of fast ships under Sir David Beatty’s command.
Had Scheer attempted such a turn as he actually made at 6:45, or had he initiated26 and continued such a man?uvre as he began at six o’clock, Beatty’s speed advantage would have enabled him to maintain his dominating313 position ahead of the German line. He could either have man?uvred to get round between Scheer and his bases, with a view to heading him north again, or, if he judged it hopeless to expect the Grand Fleet to reach the scene in daylight, could himself have reversed course and pounded the weak ships at the end of the German line unmercifully.
In any event, while it would be an exaggeration to say that he had the whip-hand of the enemy, it is no exaggeration to say that his force was so formidable and so fast as to make escape from it anything but a safe or a simple problem. The utmost Scheer could have hoped for would have been a long defensive27 action until darkness made attack impossible, or winning the mine-fields made pursuit too dangerous.
These considerations cannot be ignored in asking why it was that Scheer followed the British Admiral so obediently in the hour and a quarter between 4:57 and 6 P.M. But still less must we forget that had Scheer known earlier that the Grand Fleet was out, he would certainly have preferred the risk of a pursuit by Beatty to the chance of having to take on the whole of Sir John Jellicoe’s battle fleet.
At twenty-five minutes to six Admiral Scheer began hauling round to the east, changing his course, that is to say, gradually away from the British line. Sir David supposes that he had by this time received information of the approach of the Grand Fleet. This information might have come from Zeppelins, though in the weather conditions this would seem to have been improbable; or it might have come from some of his cruisers, which were well ahead, and had made contact with Hood28’s scouts29. But is this quite consistent with what Admiral Jellicoe says of Hood’s movements?
314 “At 5:30 this squadron observed flashes of gun-fire and heard the sound of guns to the southwestward. Rear-Admiral Hood sent Chester to investigate, and this ship engaged three or four enemy light cruisers at about 5:45.”
It is not stated that Rear-Admiral Hood saw the German light cruisers, and it seems improbable, then, that they saw him. Admiral Scheer could not have changed course at 5:35, because of the action of his scouts with Chester at 5:45. But her presence may have been signalled to him as soon as she was seen, and he may have concluded that the news could have but one significance, viz., that the Grand Fleet was coming down from the north. But is it altogether impossible that Scheer began his gradual easterly turn before suspecting that the Grand Fleet was out? Was he not, perhaps, already aware of the dangers of getting too far afield, and beginning that gradual turn which might keep Sir David Beatty’s ships in play as long as daylight lasted, without giving the openings which a direct attempt at flight would offer? Whatever the explanation of the movements, the enemy began this gradual turn and Sir David turned with him, increasing speed, so as to maintain his general relation to the head of the German line. At ten minutes to six some of the Grand Fleet’s cruisers were observed ahead, and six minutes later the leading battleships came into view. The moment for which every movement since 2:20 had been a preparation had now arrived—the Grand Fleet and the German Fleet were to meet.
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1
steered
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| v.驾驶( steer的过去式和过去分词 )；操纵；控制；引导 | |
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2
northward
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| adv.向北；n.北方的地区 | |
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3
hipper
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| hip（（衣服、音乐等方面）时髦的，赶时髦的）的比较级形式 | |
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4
smothering
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| （使）窒息， （使）透不过气( smother的现在分词 )； 覆盖； 忍住； 抑制 | |
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5
averted
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| 防止，避免( avert的过去式和过去分词 )； 转移 | |
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6
expedient
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| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
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7
undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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8
promising
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| adj.有希望的，有前途的 | |
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9
projectile
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| n.投射物，发射体；adj.向前开进的；推进的；抛掷的 | |
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10
artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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11
disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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12
nugatory
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| adj.琐碎的，无价值的 | |
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13
severely
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| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
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14
intermittently
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| adv.间歇地；断断续续 | |
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15
neutralized
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| v.使失效( neutralize的过去式和过去分词 )；抵消；中和；使（一个国家）中立化 | |
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16
skilfully
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| adv. (美skillfully)熟练地 | |
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17
derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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18
torpedo
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| n.水雷，地雷；v.用鱼雷破坏 | |
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19
vessels
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| n.血管( vessel的名词复数 )；船；容器；（具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的）人 | |
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20
renounce
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| v.放弃；拒绝承认，宣布与…断绝关系 | |
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21
hesitation
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| n.犹豫，踌躇 | |
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22
secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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23
disastrous
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| adj.灾难性的，造成灾害的；极坏的，很糟的 | |
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24
precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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25
obligatory
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| adj.强制性的，义务的，必须的 | |
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26
initiated
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| n. 创始人 adj. 新加入的 vt. 开始，创始，启蒙，介绍加入 | |
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27
defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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28
hood
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| n.头巾，兜帽，覆盖；v.罩上，以头巾覆盖 | |
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29
scouts
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| 侦察员[机，舰]( scout的名词复数 )； 童子军； 搜索； 童子军成员 | |
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