Doubtless the autonomy thus attained5 is a great advantage; but at first sight it is not free from a grave objection. When all the fallacious distinctions formerly6 believed in have been cancelled, it seems that nothing remains7 for history as an act of thought but the immediate8 consciousness of the individual-universal, in which all distinctions are submerged and lost. And this is mysticism, which is admirably adapted for feeling oneself at unity9 with God, but is not adapted for thinking the world nor for acting10 in the world.
Nor does it seem useful to add that unity with God does not exclude consciousness of diversity, of change, of becoming. For it can be objected that consciousness[Pg 118] of diversity either derives11 from the individual and intuitive element, and in this case it is incomprehensible how such an element can subsist12 in its proper form of intuition, in thought, which always universalizes; or if it is said to be the result of the act of thought itself, then the distinction, believed to have been abolished, reappears in a strengthened form, and the asserted indistinct simplicity13 of thought remains shaken. A mysticism which should insist upon particularity and diversity, a historical mysticism, in fact, would be a contradiction in terms, for mysticism is unhistorical and anti-historical by its very nature.
But these objections retain their validity precisely14 when the act of thought is conceived in the mystical manner—that is to say, not as an act of thought, but as something negative, the simple result of the negation15 by reason of empirical distinctions, which certainly leaves thought free of illusions, but not yet truly full of itself. To sum up, mysticism, which is a violent reaction from naturalism and transcendency, yet retains traces of what it has denied, because it is incapable16 of substituting anything for it, and thus maintains its presence, in however negative a manner. But the really efficacious negation of empiricism and transcendency, their positive negation, is brought about not by means of mysticism, but of idealism; not in the immediate, but in the mediated18 consciousness; not in indistinct unity, but in the unity that is distinction, and as such truly thought.
The act of thought is the consciousness of the spirit that is consciousness; and therefore that act is auto-consciousness. And auto-consciousness implies distinction in unity, distinction between subject and object, theory and practice, thought and will, universal and[Pg 119] particular, imagination and intellect, utility and morality, or however these distinctions of and in unity are formulated19, and whatever may be the historical forms and denominations20 which the eternal system of distinctions, perennis philosophia, may assume. To think is to judge, and to judge is to distinguish while unifying21, in which the distinguishing is not less real than the unifying, and the unifying than the distinguishing—that is to say, they are real, not as two diverse realities, but as one reality, which is dialectical unity (whether it be called unity or distinction).
The first consequence to be drawn22 from this conception of the spirit and of thought is that when empirical distinctions have been overthrown23 history does not fall into the indistinct; when the will-o'-the-wisps have been extinguished, darkness does not supervene, because the light of the distinction is to be found in history itself. History is thought by judging it, with that judgment24 which is not, as we have shown, the evaluation25 of sentiments, but the intrinsic knowledge of facts. And here its unity with philosophy is all the more evident, because the better philosophy penetrates26 and refines its distinctions, the better it penetrates the particular; and the closer its embrace of the particular, the closer its possession of its own proper conceptions. Philosophy and historiography progress together, indissolubly united.
Another consequence to be deduced from the above, and one which will perhaps seem to be more clearly connected with the practice of historiography, is the refutation of the false idea of a general history, superior to special histories. This has been called a history of histories, and is supposed to be true and proper history, having beneath it political, economic, and institutional[Pg 120] histories, moral history or the history of the sentiments and ethical27 ideals, the history of poetry and art, the history of thought and of philosophy. But were this so, a dualism would arise, with the usual result of every dualism, that each one of the two terms, having been ill distinguished28, reveals itself as empty. In this case, either general history shows itself to be empty, having nothing to do when the special histories have accomplished29 their work, or particular histories do so, when they fail even to pick up the crumbs30 of the banquet, all of which has been voraciously31 devoured32 by the other. Sometimes recourse is had to a feeble expedient33, and to general history is accorded the treatment of one of the subjects of the special histories, the latter being then grouped apart from that. Of this arrangement the best that can be said is that it is purely34 verbal and does not designate a logical distinction and opposition35, and the worst that can happen is that a real value should be attributed to it, because in this case a fantastic hierarchy36 is established, which makes it impossible to understand the genuine development of the facts. And there is practically no special history that has not been promoted to be a general history, now as political or social history, to which those of literature, art, philosophy, religion, and the lesser37 sides of life should supply an appendix; now as history of the ideas or progress of the mind, where social history and all the others are placed in the second line; now as economic history, where all the others are looked upon as histories or chronicles of 'superstructures' derived38 from economic development in an illusory manner, while the former is held to have developed in some mysterious way by means of unknown powers, without thought and will, or producing thought and will, in fancies and velleities, like so many bubbles[Pg 121] on the surface of its course. We must be firm in maintaining against the theory of general history that there does not exist anything real but special histories, because thought thinks facts to the extent that it discerns a special aspect of them, and only and always constructs histories of ideas, of imaginations, of political actions, of apostolates, and the like.
But it is equally just and advantageous39 to maintain the opposite thesis: that nothing exists but general history. In this way is refuted the false notion of the speciality of histories, understood as a juxtaposition40 of specialities. This fallacy is correctly noted41 by the critics in all histories which expose the various orders of facts one after the other as so many strata42 and (to employ the critics' word) compartments43 or little boxes, containing political history, industrial and commercial history, history of customs, religious history, history of literature and of art, and so on, under so many separate headings. These divisions are merely literary, they may possess some utility as such, but in the case under consideration they do not fulfil merely a literary function, but attempt that of historical understanding, and thereby44 give evidence of their defect, in thus presenting these histories as without relation between one another, not dialecticized, but aggregated45. It is quite clear that history remains to be written after the writing of those histories in this disjointed manner. Abstract distinction and abstract unity are both equally misunderstandings of concrete distinction and concrete unity, which is relation.
And when the relation is not broken and history is thought in the concrete, it is seen that to think one aspect is to think all the others at the same time. Thus it is impossible to understand completely the doctrine46, say, of a philosopher, without having to some extent recourse[Pg 122] to the personality of the man himself, and, by distinguishing the philosopher from the man, at the same time qualifying not only the philosopher but the man, and uniting these two distinct characteristics as a relation of life and philosophy. The same is to be said of the distinction between the philosopher as philosopher and as orator47 or artist, as subject to his private passions or as rising to the execution of his duty, and so on. This means that we cannot think the history of philosophy save as at the same time social, political, literary, religious, and ethical history, and so on. This is the source of the illusion that one in particular of these histories is the whole of them, or that that one from which a start is made, and which answers to the predilections48 and to the competence49 of the writer, is the foundation of all the others. It also explains why it is sometimes said that the 'history of philosophy' is also the 'philosophy of history,' or that 'social history' is the true 'history of philosophy,' and so on. A history of philosophy thoroughly50 thought out is truly the whole of history (and in like manner a history of literature or of any other form of the spirit), not because it annuls51 the other in itself, but because all the others are present in it. Hence the demand that historians shall acquire universal minds and a doctrine that shall also be in a way universal, and the hatred52 of specialist historians, pure philosophers, pure men of letters, pure politicians, or pure economists53, who, owing precisely to their one-sidedness, fail even to understand the speciality that they claim to know in its purity, but possess only in skeleton form that is to say, in its abstractness.
And here a distinction becomes clear to us, with which it is impossible to dispense54 in thinking history: the distinction between form and matter, owing to which,[Pg 123] for example, we understand art by referring it to matter (emotions, sentiments, passions, etc.) to which the artist has given form; or philosophy by referring it to the facts which gave rise to the problems that the thinker formulated and solved, or the action of the politician by referring it to the aspirations55 and ideas with which he was faced, and which supplied the material he has shaped with genius, as an artist of practical life—that is to say, we understand these things by always distinguishing an external from an internal history, or an external history that is made into an internal history. This distinction of matter and form, of external and internal, would give rise again to the worst sort of dualism, would lead us to think of the pragmatical imagination of man who strives against his enemy nature, if it did not assume an altogether internal and dialectical meaning in its true conception. Because from what has been said it is easy to see that external and internal are not two realities or two forms of reality, but that external and internal, matter and form, both appear in turn as form in respect to one another, and this materialization of each to idealize itself in the other is the perpetual movement of the spirit as relation and circle: a circle that is progress just because neither of these forms has the privilege of functioning solely56 as form, and neither has the misfortune of functioning solely as matter. What is the matter of artistic57 and philosophical58 history? What is called social and moral history? And what is the matter of this history? Artistic and philosophical history. From this clearing up of the relation between matter and form, that false mode of history is refuted which sets facts on one side and ideas on the other, as two rival elements, and is therefore never able to pay its debt and show how ideas[Pg 124] are generated from facts and facts from ideas, because that generation must be conceived in its truth as a perpetually rendering59 vain of one of the elements in the unity of the other.
If history is based upon distinction (unity) and coincides with philosophy, the high importance that research into the autonomy of one or the other special history attains60 in historiographical development is perfectly61 comprehensible, but this is merely the reflection of philosophical research, and is often troubled and lacking in precision. All know what a powerful stimulus62 the new conception of imagination and art gave to the conception of history, and therefore also to mythology63 and religion, which were being developed with slowness and difficulty during the eighteenth to triumph at the beginning of the nineteenth century. This is set down to the creation of the history of poetry and myth in the works of Vico in the first place and then of Herder and others, and of the history of the figurative arts in the works of Winckelmann and others. And to the clearer conception of philosophy, law, customs, and language is due their renewal64 in the respective historiographical fields, at the hands of Hegel, Savigny, and Humboldt, and other creators and improvers of history, celebrated65 on this account. This also explains why there has been so much dispute as to whether history should be described as history of the state or as history of culture, and as to whether the history of culture represents an original aspect beyond that of the state or greater than it, as to whether the progress narrated66 in history is only intellectual or also practical and moral, and so on. These discussions must be referred to the fundamental philosophical inquiry67 into the forms of the spirit, their distinction and relation,[Pg 125] and to the precise mode of relation of each one to the other.[1]
But although history distinguishes and unifies68, it never divides—that is to say, separates; and the divisions of history which have been and are made do not originate otherwise than as the result of the same practical and abstractive process that we have seen break up the actuality of living history to collect and arrange the inert69 materials in the temporal scheme, rendered extrinsic70. Histories already produced, and as such past, receive in this way titles (every thought is 'without title' in its actuality—that is to say, it has only itself for title), and each one is separated from the other, and all of them, thus separated, are classified under more or less general empirical conceptions, by means of classifications that more or less cross one another. We may admire copious71 lists of this sort in the books of methodologists, all of them proceeding72, as is inevitable73, according to one or the other of these general criteria74: the criterion of the quality of the objects (histories of religions, customs, ideas, institutions, etc., etc.), and that of temporal-spatial arrangement (European, Asiatic, American, ancient, medieval, of modern times, of ancient Greece, of ancient Rome, of modern Greece, of the Rome of the Middle Ages, etc.); in conformity75 with the abstract procedure which, when dividing the concept, is led to posit17 on the one hand abstract forms of the spirit (objects) and on the other abstract intuitions (space and time). I shall not say that those titles and divisions are useless, nor even those tables, but shall limit myself to the' remark that the history of philosophy, of art, or of any other ideally distinct history, when understood as a definite book or discourse76, becomes empirical for[Pg 126] the reason already given, that true distinction is ideal, and a discourse or a book in its concreteness contains not only distinction but unity and totality, and to look upon either as incorporating only one side of the real is arbitrary. And I shall also observe that as there are histories of philosophy and of art in the empirical sense, so also nothing forbids our talking in the same sense of a general history, separate from special histories, indeed even of a history of progress and one of decadence77, of good and evil, of truth and error.
The confusion between division and distinction—that is to say, between the empirical consideration that breaks up history into special histories and the philosophical consideration which always unifies and distinguishes as it unifies—is the cause of errors analogous78 to those that we have seen to result from such a process. To this are due above all the many disquisitions on the 'problem' and on the 'limits' of this or that history or group of special histories empirically constituted. The problem does not exist, and the limits are impossible to assign because they are conventional, as is finally recognized with much trouble, and as could be recognized with much less trouble if a start were made, not from the periphery79, but from the centre—that is to say, from gnoseological analysis. A graver error is the creation of an infinity80 of entia imaginationis, taken for metaphysical entities81 and forms of the spirit, and the pretension82 that arises from this of developing the history of abstractions as though they were so many forms of the spirit with independent lives of their own, whereas the spirit is one. Hence the innumerable otiose83 problems with fantastic solutions met with in historical books, which it is here unnecessary to record. Every one is now able to draw these obvious consequences for himself[Pg 127] and to make appropriate reflections concerning them. It is further obvious that the entia imaginations, in the same way as the 'choice' of facts, and the chronological84 schematization or dating of them, enter as a subsidiary element into any concrete exposition of historical thought, because the distinction of thinking and abstraction is an ideal distinction, which operates only in the unity of the spirit.
[1] See Appendix II.
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1
props
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| 小道具； 支柱( prop的名词复数 )； 支持者； 道具； （橄榄球中的）支柱前锋 | |
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applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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invalid
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| n.病人，伤残人；adj.有病的，伤残的；无效的 | |
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insistence
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| n.坚持；强调；坚决主张 | |
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attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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formerly
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| adv.从前，以前 | |
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remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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unity
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| n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调 | |
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acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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derives
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| v.得到( derive的第三人称单数 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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subsist
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| vi.生存，存在，供养 | |
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simplicity
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| n.简单，简易；朴素；直率，单纯 | |
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precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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negation
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| n.否定；否认 | |
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incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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posit
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| v.假定，认为 | |
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mediated
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| 调停，调解，斡旋( mediate的过去式和过去分词 )； 居间促成； 影响…的发生； 使…可能发生 | |
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formulated
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| v.构想出( formulate的过去式和过去分词 )；规划；确切地阐述；用公式表示 | |
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denominations
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| n.宗派( denomination的名词复数 )；教派；面额；名称 | |
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unifying
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| 使联合( unify的现在分词 )； 使相同； 使一致； 统一 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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overthrown
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| adj. 打翻的，推倒的，倾覆的 动词overthrow的过去分词 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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evaluation
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| n.估价，评价；赋值 | |
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penetrates
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| v.穿过( penetrate的第三人称单数 )；刺入；了解；渗透 | |
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ethical
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| adj.伦理的，道德的，合乎道德的 | |
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distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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crumbs
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| int. (表示惊讶)哎呀 n. 碎屑 名词crumb的复数形式 | |
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voraciously
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| adv.贪婪地 | |
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devoured
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| 吞没( devour的过去式和过去分词 )； 耗尽； 津津有味地看； 狼吞虎咽地吃光 | |
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expedient
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| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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hierarchy
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| n.等级制度；统治集团，领导层 | |
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lesser
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| adj.次要的，较小的；adv.较小地，较少地 | |
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derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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advantageous
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| adj.有利的；有帮助的 | |
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juxtaposition
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| n.毗邻，并置，并列 | |
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noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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strata
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| n.地层（复数）；社会阶层 | |
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compartments
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| n.间隔( compartment的名词复数 )；（列车车厢的）隔间；（家具或设备等的）分隔间；隔层 | |
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thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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aggregated
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| a.聚合的，合计的 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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orator
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| n.演说者，演讲者，雄辩家 | |
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predilections
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| n.偏爱，偏好，嗜好( predilection的名词复数 ) | |
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competence
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| n.能力，胜任，称职 | |
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thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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51
annuls
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| v.宣告无效( annul的第三人称单数 )；取消；使消失；抹去 | |
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hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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economists
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| n.经济学家，经济专家( economist的名词复数 ) | |
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dispense
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| vt.分配，分发；配(药)，发(药)；实施 | |
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aspirations
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| 强烈的愿望( aspiration的名词复数 )； 志向； 发送气音； 发 h 音 | |
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solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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artistic
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| adj.艺术(家)的，美术(家)的；善于艺术创作的 | |
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philosophical
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| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
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rendering
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| n.表现，描写 | |
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attains
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的第三人称单数 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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stimulus
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| n.刺激，刺激物，促进因素，引起兴奋的事物 | |
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mythology
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| n.神话，神话学，神话集 | |
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renewal
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| adj.(契约)延期，续订，更新，复活，重来 | |
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celebrated
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| adj.有名的，声誉卓著的 | |
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narrated
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| v.故事( narrate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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inquiry
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| n.打听，询问，调查，查问 | |
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unifies
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| 使联合( unify的第三人称单数 )； 使相同； 使一致； 统一 | |
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inert
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| adj.无活动能力的，惰性的；迟钝的 | |
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extrinsic
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| adj.外部的；不紧要的 | |
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copious
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| adj.丰富的，大量的 | |
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proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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criteria
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| n.标准 | |
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conformity
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| n.一致，遵从，顺从 | |
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discourse
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| n.论文，演说；谈话；话语；vi.讲述，著述 | |
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decadence
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| n.衰落，颓废 | |
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analogous
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| adj.相似的；类似的 | |
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periphery
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| n.(圆体的)外面；周围 | |
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infinity
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| n.无限，无穷，大量 | |
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entities
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| 实体对像； 实体，独立存在体，实际存在物( entity的名词复数 ) | |
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pretension
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| n.要求；自命，自称；自负 | |
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otiose
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| adj.无效的，没有用的 | |
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chronological
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| adj.按年月顺序排列的，年代学的 | |
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