Indeed, constructions of this sort are really nothing but classificatory schemes, from the more simple to the more complex. Their terms are obtained by abstract analyses and generalization14, and their series appears to the imagination as a history of the successive development of the more complex from the more simple. Their right to exist as classificatory schemes is incontestable, and their utility is also incontestable, for they avail themselves of imagination to assist learning and to aid the memory.
This only becomes contestable when they are estranged15 from themselves, lose their real nature, lay claim to illegitimate functions, and take their imaginary historicity too seriously. We find this in the metaphysic of naturalism, especially in evolutionism, which has been its most recent form. This is due, not so much to the men of science (who are as a rule cautious and possess a more or less clear consciousness of the limits of those schemes and series) as to the dilettante17 scientists and dilettante philosophers to whom we owe the many books that undertake to narrate18 the origin of the world, and which, aided by the acrisia of their authors, run on without meeting any obstacle, from the cell, indeed from the nebula19, to the French Revolution,[Pg 130] and even to the socialist20 movements of the nineteenth century. 'Universal histories,' and therefore cosmological romances (as we have already remarked in relation to universal histories), are composed, not of pure thought, which is criticism, but of thought mingled21 with imagination, which finds its outlet22 in myths. It is useless to prove in detail that the evolutionists of to-day are creators of myths, and that they weary themselves with attempts to write the first chapters of Genesis in modern style (their description is more elaborate, but they confuse such description with history in a manner by no means inferior to that of Babylonian or Israelitish priests), because this becomes evident as soon as such works are placed in their proper position. Their logical origin will at once make clear their true character.
But setting aside these scientific monstrosities, already condemned23 by the constant attitude of restraint and scepsis toward them on the part of all scientifically trained minds—condemned, too, by the very fact that they have had to seek and have found their fortune at the hands of the crowd or 'great public,' and have fallen to the rank of popular propaganda—we must here determine more precisely24 how these classificatory schemes of historiographical appearance are formed and how they operate. With this object, it is well to observe that classificatory schemes and apparent histories do not appear to be confined to the field of what are called the natural sciences or sub-human world, but appear also in that of the moral sciences or sciences of the human world. And to adduce simple and perspicuous examples, it often happens that in the abstract analysis of language and the positing25 of the types of the parts of speech, noun, verb, adjective, pronoun, and so on, or in the analysis of the word into syllables27 and sounds, or of style into proper or[Pg 131] metaphorical28 words and into various classes of metaphors29, we construct classes that go from the more simple to the more complex. This gives rise to the illusion of history of language, exposed as the successive acquisition of the various parts of speech or as the passage from the single sound to the syllable26 (monosyllabic languages), from the syllable to the aggregate30 of syllables (plurisyllabic languages), from words to propositions, metres, rhymes, and so on. These are imaginary histories that have never been developed elsewhere than in the studies of scientists. In like manner, literary styles that have been abstractly distinguished31 and arranged in series of increasing complexity32 (for example, lyric33, epic34, drama) have given rise and continue to give rise to the thought of a schematic arrangement of poetry, which, for example, should appear during a first period as lyric, a second as epic, a third as drama.
The same has happened with regard to the classifications of abstract political, economic, philosophical35 forms, and so on, all of which have been followed by their shadows in the shape of imaginative history. The repugnance that historians experience in attaching their narratives37 to naturalistic-mythological prologues—that is to say, in linking together in matrimony a living being and a corpse—is also proved by their reluctance38 to admit scraps39 of abstract history into concrete history, for they at once reveal their heterogeneity40 in regard to one another by their mere41 appearance. De Sanctis has often been reproached for not having begun his History of Italian Literature with an account of the origins of the Italian language and of its relations with Latin, and even with the linguistic42 family of Indo-European languages, and of the races that inhabit the various parts of Italy. An attempt has even been made to correct the design of[Pg 132] that classic work by supplying, with a complete lack of historical sense, the introductions and additions that are not needed. But de Sanctis, who took great pains to select the best point of departure for the narrative36 of the history of Italian literature, and finally decided43 to begin with a brief sketch44 of the state of culture at the Suabian court and of the Sicilian poetical45 school, did not hesitate a moment in rejecting all abstractions of languages and races which to his true historical sense did not appear to be reconcilable with the tenzone of Ciullo, with the rhythms of Friar Jacob, or with the ballades of Guido Cavalcanti, which are quite concrete things.
We must also remember that plans for classification and pseudo-historical arrangements of their analogies are created not only upon the bodies of histories that are living and really reproducible and rethinkable, but also upon those that are dead—that is to say, upon news items, documents, and monuments. This observation makes more complete the identification of imaginary histories arising from the natural sciences with those which have their source in the moral sciences. The foundation of both is therefore very often not historical intelligence, but, on the contrary, the lack of it, and their end not only that of aiding living history and keeping it alive, but also the mediate46 end of assisting in the prompt handling of the remains47 and the cinders48 of the vanished world, the inert49 residues50 of history.
The efficacy of this enlargement of the concept of abstract history, which is analogical or naturalizing in respect to the field known as 'spiritual' (and thus separated from that empirically known as 'natural'), cannot be doubted by one who knows and remembers the great consequences that philosophy draws from the resolution of the realistic concept of 'nature' in the[Pg 133] idealistic conception of 'construction,' which the human spirit makes of reality, looking upon it as nature. Kant worked upon the solution of this problem indefatigably51 and with subtlety52; he gave to it the direction that it has followed down to our own days. And the consequence that we draw from it, in respect to the problem that now occupies us, is that an error was committed when, moved by the legitimate16 desire of distinguishing abstract from concrete history, naturalizing history from thinking history, genuine from fictitious53 history, a sort of agnosticism was reached, as a final result, by means of limiting history to the field of humanity, which was said to be cognoscible, and declaring all the rest to be the object of metastoria and the limit of human knowledge. This conclusion would lead again to a sort of dualism, though in a lofty sphere. But if metastoria also appears, as we have seen, in the human field, it is clear that the distinction as formulated54 stands in need of correction; and the agnosticism founded upon it vacillates and falls. There is not a double object before thought, man and nature, the one capable of treatment in one way, the other in another way, the first cognizable, and the second uncognizable and capable only of being constructed abstractly; but thought always thinks history, the history of reality that is one, and beyond thought there is nothing, for the natural object becomes a myth when it is affirmed as object, and shows itself in its true reality as nothing else but the human spirit itself, which schematized history that has been lived and thought, or the materials of the history that has already been lived and thought. The saying that nature has no history is to be understood in the sense that nature as a rational being capable of thought has not history, because it is not—or, let us say, it is nothing that is real. The opposite saying,[Pg 134] that nature is also formative and possesses historical life, is to be taken in the other sense that reality, the sole reality (comprehending man and nature in itself, which are only empirically and abstractly separate), is all development and life.
What substantial difference can ever be discovered on the one hand between geological stratifications and the remains of vegetables and animals, of which it is possible to construct a prospective55 and indeed a serial56 arrangement, but which it is never possible to rethink in the living dialectic of their genesis, and on the other hand the relics57 of what is called human history, and not only that called prehistorical, but even the historical documents of our history of yesterday, which we have forgotten and no longer understand, and which we can certainly classify and arrange in a series, and build castles in the air about or allow our fancies to wander among, but which it is no longer possible really to think again? Both cases, which have been arbitrarily distinguished, are reducible to one single case. Even in what is called 'human history' there exists a 'natural history,' and what is called 'natural history' also was once 'human' history—that is to say, spiritual, although to us who have left it so far behind it seems to be almost foreign, so mummified and mechanicized has it become, if we glance at it but summarily and from the outside. Do you wish to understand the true history of a Ligurian or Sicilian neolithic58 man? First of all, try if it be possible to make yourself mentally into a Ligurian or Sicilian neolithic man; and if it be not possible, or you do not care to do this, content yourself with describing and classifying and arranging in a series the skulls59, the utensils60, and the inscriptions61 belonging to those neolithic peoples. Do you wish to understand[Pg 135] the history of a blade of grass? First and foremost, try to make yourself into a blade of grass, and if you do not succeed, content yourself with analysing the parts and even with disposing them in a kind of imaginative history. This leads to the idea from which I started in making these observations about historiography, as to history being contemporary history and chronicle being past history. We take advantage of the idea and at the same time confirm that truth by solving with its aid the antithesis62 between a history that is 'history' and a 'history of nature,' which, although it is history, was supposed to obey laws strangely at variance63 with those of the only history. It solves this antithesis by placing the second in the lower rank of pseudo-history.
[1] By the economist64 Professor Gotti, at the seventh congress of German historians, held at Heidelberg. The lecture can be read in print under the anything but clear or exact title of Die Grenzen der Geschichte (Leipzig, Duncker u. Humblot, 1904).
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1 entities | |
实体对像; 实体,独立存在体,实际存在物( entity的名词复数 ) | |
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2 treatises | |
n.专题著作,专题论文,专著( treatise的名词复数 ) | |
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3 pointed | |
adj.尖的,直截了当的 | |
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4 purely | |
adv.纯粹地,完全地 | |
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5 temperament | |
n.气质,性格,性情 | |
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6 repugnance | |
n.嫌恶 | |
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7 aloof | |
adj.远离的;冷淡的,漠不关心的 | |
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8 reconstruction | |
n.重建,再现,复原 | |
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9 naturalists | |
n.博物学家( naturalist的名词复数 );(文学艺术的)自然主义者 | |
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10 accurately | |
adv.准确地,精确地 | |
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11 apparently | |
adv.显然地;表面上,似乎 | |
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12 chronological | |
adj.按年月顺序排列的,年代学的 | |
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13 spatially | |
空间地,存在于空间地 | |
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14 generalization | |
n.普遍性,一般性,概括 | |
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15 estranged | |
adj.疏远的,分离的 | |
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16 legitimate | |
adj.合法的,合理的,合乎逻辑的;v.使合法 | |
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17 dilettante | |
n.半瓶醋,业余爱好者 | |
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18 narrate | |
v.讲,叙述 | |
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19 nebula | |
n.星云,喷雾剂 | |
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20 socialist | |
n.社会主义者;adj.社会主义的 | |
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21 mingled | |
混合,混入( mingle的过去式和过去分词 ); 混进,与…交往[联系] | |
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22 outlet | |
n.出口/路;销路;批发商店;通风口;发泄 | |
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23 condemned | |
adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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24 precisely | |
adv.恰好,正好,精确地,细致地 | |
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25 positing | |
v.假定,设想,假设( posit的现在分词 ) | |
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26 syllable | |
n.音节;vt.分音节 | |
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27 syllables | |
n.音节( syllable的名词复数 ) | |
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28 metaphorical | |
a.隐喻的,比喻的 | |
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29 metaphors | |
隐喻( metaphor的名词复数 ) | |
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30 aggregate | |
adj.总计的,集合的;n.总数;v.合计;集合 | |
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31 distinguished | |
adj.卓越的,杰出的,著名的 | |
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32 complexity | |
n.复杂(性),复杂的事物 | |
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33 lyric | |
n.抒情诗,歌词;adj.抒情的 | |
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34 epic | |
n.史诗,叙事诗;adj.史诗般的,壮丽的 | |
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35 philosophical | |
adj.哲学家的,哲学上的,达观的 | |
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36 narrative | |
n.叙述,故事;adj.叙事的,故事体的 | |
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37 narratives | |
记叙文( narrative的名词复数 ); 故事; 叙述; 叙述部分 | |
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38 reluctance | |
n.厌恶,讨厌,勉强,不情愿 | |
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39 scraps | |
油渣 | |
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40 heterogeneity | |
n.异质性;多相性 | |
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41 mere | |
adj.纯粹的;仅仅,只不过 | |
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42 linguistic | |
adj.语言的,语言学的 | |
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43 decided | |
adj.决定了的,坚决的;明显的,明确的 | |
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44 sketch | |
n.草图;梗概;素描;v.素描;概述 | |
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45 poetical | |
adj.似诗人的;诗一般的;韵文的;富有诗意的 | |
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46 mediate | |
vi.调解,斡旋;vt.经调解解决;经斡旋促成 | |
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47 remains | |
n.剩余物,残留物;遗体,遗迹 | |
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48 cinders | |
n.煤渣( cinder的名词复数 );炭渣;煤渣路;煤渣跑道 | |
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49 inert | |
adj.无活动能力的,惰性的;迟钝的 | |
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50 residues | |
n.剩余,余渣( residue的名词复数 );剩余财产;剩数 | |
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51 indefatigably | |
adv.不厌倦地,不屈不挠地 | |
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52 subtlety | |
n.微妙,敏锐,精巧;微妙之处,细微的区别 | |
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53 fictitious | |
adj.虚构的,假设的;空头的 | |
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54 formulated | |
v.构想出( formulate的过去式和过去分词 );规划;确切地阐述;用公式表示 | |
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55 prospective | |
adj.预期的,未来的,前瞻性的 | |
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56 serial | |
n.连本影片,连本电视节目;adj.连续的 | |
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57 relics | |
[pl.]n.遗物,遗迹,遗产;遗体,尸骸 | |
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58 neolithic | |
adj.新石器时代的 | |
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59 skulls | |
颅骨( skull的名词复数 ); 脑袋; 脑子; 脑瓜 | |
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60 utensils | |
器具,用具,器皿( utensil的名词复数 ); 器物 | |
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61 inscriptions | |
(作者)题词( inscription的名词复数 ); 献词; 碑文; 证劵持有人的登记 | |
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62 antithesis | |
n.对立;相对 | |
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63 variance | |
n.矛盾,不同 | |
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64 economist | |
n.经济学家,经济专家,节俭的人 | |
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