An esteemed7 methodologist of our day has been tempted8 to found the faith placed in this order of evidence upon a sort of telepathy of the past, an almost spiritualistic revival9. But there is nothing so mysterious in the genesis of that belief as to need a risky10 and fantastic explanation, to which even Horace's Jew would not give credence11. On the contrary, it is a question of something that we can observe in process of formation in our private life of every day. We are noting down in our diary, for instance, certain of our acts, or striking the balance of our account. After a certain interval12 has elapsed those facts fade from memory and the only way of affirming to ourselves that they have happened and must be considered true is the evidence of our notes: the document bears witness; trust the book. We behave in a similar way in respect to the statements of others on the authority of their diaries or account-books. We presume that if the thing has been written down it answers to the truth. Doubtless this assumption, like every assumption, may turn out to be false in fact, owing to the note having been made in a moment of distraction13 or of hallucination, or too late, when the memory of the fact was already imprecise and lacking in certainty, or because it was capriciously made or made with the object of deceiving others. But just for this reason, written evidence is not usually accepted with closed eyes; its verisimilitude is examined and we confront it with other written evidence, we investigate the probity14 and accuracy of the writer or witness. It is just for this reason that the penal15 code threatens with pains and penalties those who alter or falsify documents. And although these and other subtle and[Pg 138] severe precautions do not in certain cases prevent fraud, deception16, and error (in the same way that the tribunals established for the purpose of condemning18 the guilty often send away the guilty unpunished and sometimes condemn17 the innocent), yet the use of documents and evidence works out on the whole in accordance with the truth; it is held to be useful and worthy19 of support and encouragement, because the injuries that it is liable to cause are greatly inferior to those that it prevents.
Now what men do with regard to their private affairs in daily life may be said to be done on a large scale by the human race when it delivers itself of the load of innumerable facts and fixes them externally where they are recoverable in a weakened form as unverifiable documentary evidence, yet are nevertheless such that as a whole we are justified20 in looking upon them end treating them as true. Historical faith then is not the result of telepathy or spiritualism, but of a wise economic provision, which the spirit continues to realize. In this way we understand historical work directed toward the prevention of alterations21 and deformations22, and its acceptation of certain testimony23, as 'what must be held to be true in the present state of science,' and its graduation of the rest as uncertain, probable, and most probable to be sometimes accepted in the expectation of ulterior inquiries24. Finally, it explains the dislike of 'hypercriticism' when, not content with a constant refinement25 of criticism, hypercriticism contests the value of the most ingenuous26 and authoritative27 testimony. The reason is that it thus breaks the rules of the game that is being played sub regula, and only serves at the most to remind those apt to forget it that history by evidence is at bottom an altogether[Pg 139] external history, never fundamental, true history, which is contemporary and present.
This genesis or nature of 'attested' evidence already contains the answer to the other question as to its function. It is clear that this cannot be to posit2 true history or to take its place, but to supply it with those secondary particulars which it would not be worth while to make the effort of keeping alive and complete in the mind, for this effort would result in damaging what is most important to us. Finally, whether the De docta ignorantia were written some time earlier or later is something that may quite well be determined28 by a different interpretation29 of this or that thought of Cusanus, but it does not affect the function that the doctrine of the coincidence of opposites exercises in the formation of logical science. Again, whether the Sepolcri was composed or planned prior to Foscolo's visit to France would without doubt change to some extent our representation of the gradual development of the soul and genius of the poet, but it would hardly at all change our mode of interpreting his great ode. Those who despair of historical truth, owing to the lack of a verifiable certainty of some particulars, or to the uncertainty30 and dubiety that surrounds it, resemble him who, having forgotten the chronicle of his life in this or that year, should think that he did not know himself in his present condition, which is both the recapitulation of his past and carries with it his past in all that it really concerns him to know. But, on the other hand, attested evidence that has been field to be true is a stimulus31 to us to search ourselves more closely, an enrichment of what we have found by means of analysis and meditation32 and a confirmation33 or proof of our thoughts, which are not to be neglected, especially when true evidence and attested evidence[Pg 140] agree with one another. To refuse the assistance and the facilities afforded by attested evidence, owing to the fear that some of it may prove false, or because all of it possesses an external and somewhat general and vague character, would be to refuse the authority of the human race, and so to commit the sin of Descartes and of Malebranche. This great refusal does not concern or assist the understanding of history. All that does matter and does assist is that authority—including the authority of the human race—should never be allowed to take the place of the thought of humanity, to which, in any case, belongs the first place.
点击收听单词发音
1 legitimate | |
adj.合法的,合理的,合乎逻辑的;v.使合法 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
2 posit | |
v.假定,认为 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
3 doctrine | |
n.教义;主义;学说 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
4 cardinal | |
n.(天主教的)红衣主教;adj.首要的,基本的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
5 valid | |
adj.有确实根据的;有效的;正当的,合法的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
6 attested | |
adj.经检验证明无病的,经检验证明无菌的v.证明( attest的过去式和过去分词 );证实;声称…属实;使宣誓 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
7 esteemed | |
adj.受人尊敬的v.尊敬( esteem的过去式和过去分词 );敬重;认为;以为 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
8 tempted | |
v.怂恿(某人)干不正当的事;冒…的险(tempt的过去分词) | |
参考例句: |
|
|
9 revival | |
n.复兴,复苏,(精力、活力等的)重振 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
10 risky | |
adj.有风险的,冒险的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
11 credence | |
n.信用,祭器台,供桌,凭证 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
12 interval | |
n.间隔,间距;幕间休息,中场休息 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
13 distraction | |
n.精神涣散,精神不集中,消遣,娱乐 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
14 probity | |
n.刚直;廉洁,正直 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
15 penal | |
adj.刑罚的;刑法上的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
16 deception | |
n.欺骗,欺诈;骗局,诡计 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
17 condemn | |
vt.谴责,指责;宣判(罪犯),判刑 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
18 condemning | |
v.(通常因道义上的原因而)谴责( condemn的现在分词 );宣判;宣布…不能使用;迫使…陷于不幸的境地 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
19 worthy | |
adj.(of)值得的,配得上的;有价值的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
20 justified | |
a.正当的,有理的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
21 alterations | |
n.改动( alteration的名词复数 );更改;变化;改变 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
22 deformations | |
损形( deformation的名词复数 ); 变形; 畸形; 破相 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
23 testimony | |
n.证词;见证,证明 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
24 inquiries | |
n.调查( inquiry的名词复数 );疑问;探究;打听 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
25 refinement | |
n.文雅;高尚;精美;精制;精炼 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
26 ingenuous | |
adj.纯朴的,单纯的;天真的;坦率的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
27 authoritative | |
adj.有权威的,可相信的;命令式的;官方的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
28 determined | |
adj.坚定的;有决心的 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
29 interpretation | |
n.解释,说明,描述;艺术处理 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
30 uncertainty | |
n.易变,靠不住,不确知,不确定的事物 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
31 stimulus | |
n.刺激,刺激物,促进因素,引起兴奋的事物 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
32 meditation | |
n.熟虑,(尤指宗教的)默想,沉思,(pl.)冥想录 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
33 confirmation | |
n.证实,确认,批准 | |
参考例句: |
|
|
欢迎访问英文小说网 |