To the historians, by whom we mean those who had a special disposition8 for the investigation9 of particular facts rather than theories, and a greater acquaintance with and practice of historical than speculative10 literature, is due the saying that history should be history and not philosophy. Not that they ventured to deny philosophy, for on the contrary they protested their reverence11 for it and even for religion and theology, and condescended12 to make an occasional rapid and cautious excursion into those waters; but they generally desired to steer13 their way through the placid14 gulfs of historical truth, avoiding the tempestuous15 oceans of the other discipline: philosophy was relegated16 to the horizon of their works. Nor did they[Pg 290] even contest, at least in principle, the right of existence of those grandiose17 constructions of 'universal history,' but they recommended and preferred national or otherwise monographical histories, which can be sufficiently18 studied in their particulars, substituting for universal histories collections of histories of states and of peoples. And since romanticism had introduced into those universal histories and into the national histories themselves its various practical tendencies (which the philosophy of history had then turned into dogmas), the historians placed abstention from national and party tendencies upon their programme, although they reserved the right of making felt their patriotic19 and political aspirations20, but, as they said, without for that reason altering the narrative21 of the facts, which were supposed to move along independently of their opinions, or chime in with them spontaneously in the course of their natural development. And since passion and the philosophic22 judgment23 had been confused and mutually contaminated in romanticism, the abstention was extended also to the judgment as to the quality of the facts narrated25; the reality and not the value of the fact being held to be the province of the historian, appeal being made to what theorists and philosophers had thought about it, where a more profound consideration of the problem was demanded. History should not be either German or French, Catholic or Protestant, but it should also not pretend to apply a more ample conception to the solution of these or similar antitheses26, as the philosophers of history had tried to do, but rather should neutralize27 them all in a wise scepticism or agnosticism, and attenuate28 them in a form of exposition conducted in the tone of a presidential summing-up, where careful attention is paid to the opinions of opposed parties and courtesy is observed toward all. There was[Pg 291] diplomacy29 in this, and it is not astonishing that many diplomatists or disciples30 of diplomacy should collaborate31 in this form of history, and that the greatest of all the historians of this school, Leopold Ranke, in whom are to be found all the traits that we have described, should have had a special predilection32 for diplomatic sources. He always, indeed, combated philosophy, especially the Hegelian philosophy, and greatly contributed to discredit33 it with the historians, but he did this decorously, carefully avoiding the use of any word that might sound too rough or too strong, professing34 the firm conviction that the hand of God shows itself in history, a hand that we cannot grasp with ours, but which touches our face and informs us of its action. He completed his long and very fruitful labours in the form of monographs35, avoiding universal constructions. When, at the end of his life, he set to work to compose a Weltgeschichte, he carefully separated it from the universe, declaring that it would have been "lost in phantasms and philosophemes" had he abandoned the safe ground of national histories and sought for any other sort of universality than that of nations, which "acting36 upon one another, appear one after the other and constitute a living whole." In his first book he protested with fine irony37 that he was not able to accept the grave charge of judging the past or of instructing the present as to the future, which had been assigned to history, but he felt himself capable only of showing "how things really had happened" (wie es eigentlich gewesen) this was his object in all his work, and he held fast to it, thus culling38 laurels39 unobtainable by others, attaining40 even to the writing of the history of the popes of the period of the Counter-Reformation, although he was a Lutheran and remained so all his life. This history was received with favour in all Catholic[Pg 292] countries. His greatest achievement was to write of French history in a manner that did not displease41 the French. A writer of the greatest elegance42, he was able to steer between the rocks, without even letting appear his own religious or philosophical43 convictions, and without ever finding himself under the obligation of forming a definite resolution, and in any case never pressing too hard upon the conceptions themselves to which he had recourse, such as 'historical ideas,' the perpetual struggle between Church and State, and the conception of the State. Ranke was the ideal and the master to many historians within, and to some without, his own country. But even without his direct influence, the type of history that he represented germinated44 everywhere, a little earlier or later according to position and to the calming down of the great political passions and philosophical fervour in the different countries. This took place, for instance, in France earlier than in Italy, where the idealistic philosophy and the national movement made their strength felt in historiography after 1848, and even up to 1860. But the type of history which I should almost be disposed to baptize with the name of 'diplomatic,' taking seriously the designation that I had at first employed jocosely45, still meets with success among the moderately disposed, who are lovers of culture, but do not wish to become infected with party passions or to rack their brains with philosophical speculations46: but, as may be imagined, it is not always treated with the intelligence, the balance, and the finesse47 of a Leopold Ranke.
The ambition of altogether rejecting the admission of thought into history, which has been lacking to the diplomatic historians (because they were without the necessary innocence48 for such an ambition), was, on the[Pg 293] other hand, possessed49 by the philologists, a most innocent group. They were all the more disposed to abound50 in this sense, since their opinion of themselves, which had formerly51 been most modest, had been so notably52 increased, owing to the high degree of perfection attained53 by research into chronicles and documents and by the recent foundation (which indeed had not been a creation ex nihilo) of the critical or historical method, which was employed in a fine and close examination into the origin of sources and the reduction of these, and in the internal criticism of texts. This pride of the philologists prevailed, the method reaching its highest development in a country like Germany, where haughty54 pedantry55 flourishes better than elsewhere, and where, as a result of that most admirable thing, scientific seriousness, 'scientificism' is much idolized. This word was also ambitiously adopted for everything that concerns the surroundings and the instruments of true and proper science, such as is the case with the collection and criticism of narratives56 and documents. The old school of learned men, French and Italian, who did not effect less progress in 'method' than was attained during the nineteenth century in Germany, did not dream that they were thus producing 'science,' much less did they dream of vying57 with philosophy and theology, or that they could drive them from their positions and take their places with the documentary method. But in Germany every mean little copier of a text, or collector of variants58, or examiner of the relations of texts and conjecturer as to the genuine text, raised himself to the level of a scientific man and critic, and not only dared to look upon himself as the equal of such men as Schelling, Hegel, Herder, or Schlegel, but did so with disdain59 and contempt, calling them 'anti-methodical.' This pseudo-scientific[Pg 294] haughtiness60 diffused61 itself from Germany over the other European countries, and has now reached America, though in other countries than Germany it met more frequently with irreverent spirits, who laughed at it. Then for the first time there manifested itself that mode of historiography which I have termed 'philological63' or 'erudite' history. That is to say, the more or less judicious64 compilations65 of sources which used to be called Antiquitates, Annales, Penus, Thesauri, presented themselves disguised as histories, which alone were dignified66 and scientific. The faith of these historians was reposed68 in a narrative of which every word could be supported by a text, and there was nothing else whatever in their work, save what was contained in the texts, torn from their contexts and repeated without being thought by the philologist7 narrator. Their object was that their histories should reach the rank of comprehensive compilations, starting from those relating to particular times, regions, and events, and finally attaining to the arrangement of the whole of historical knowledge in great encyclop?dias, out of which articles are to be supplied, systematic69 or definitional, put together by groups of specialists, directed by a specialist, for classical, romantic, Germanic, Indo-European, and Semitic philology70. With a view to alleviating71 the aridity72 of their labours, the philologists sometimes allowed themselves a little ornament73 in the shape of emotional affections and ideal view-points. With this purpose, they had recourse to memories of their student days, to the philosophical catchwords which had been the fashion at the time, and to the ordinary sentiments of the day toward politics, art, and morality. But they did all this with great moderation, that they might not lose their reputation for scientific gravity, and that they might not fail in[Pg 295] respect toward scientific philological history, which disdains74 the vain ornaments75 in which philosophers, dilettantes, and charlatans76 delight. They ended by tolerating historians of the type above described, but as a lesser77 evil, and as a general rule inclined to pardon the sins arising out of their commerce with 'ideas' in favour of the 'new documents' which they had discovered or employed, and which they could always dig out of their books as a useful residue78, while purifying them from 'subjective79' admixtures—that is to say, from the elaboration of them which had been attempted. Philosophy was known to them only as 'philosophy of history,' but even thus rather by reason of its terrible ill-fame than from direct acquaintance. They remembered and were ever ready to repeat five or six anecdotes80 concerning errors in names and dates into which celebrated81 philosophers had actually fallen, easily forgetful of the innumerable errors into which they fell themselves (being more liable as more exposed to danger); they almost persuaded themselves that philosophy had been invented to alter the names and confuse the dates which, had been confided82 to their amorous83 care, that it was the abyss opened by the fiend to lead to the perdition of serious 'documentary history.'
The third band of those opposed to the philosophy of history was composed of philosophers or of historian—philosophers, but of those who rejected the name and selected another less open to suspicion, or tempered it with some adjective, or accepted it indeed, but with opportune84 explanations: they styled themselves positivists, naturalists85, sociologists, empiricists, criticists, or something of that sort. Their purpose was to do something different from what the philosophers of history had done, and since these had worked with the conception[Pg 296] of the end, they all of them swore that they would work with the conception of the cause; they would search out the cause of every fact, thus generalizing more and more widely the causes or the cause of the entire course of history: those others had attempted a dynamic of history; they would work at a mechanic of history, a social physics. A special science arose, opposed to the philosophy of history, in which that naturalistic and positivistic tendency became exalted86 in its own eyes: sociology. Sociology classified facts of human origin and determined87 the laws of mutual24 dependence88 which regulated them, furnishing the narratives of historians with the principles of explanation, by means of these laws. Historians, on the other hand, diligently89 collected facts and offered them to sociology, that it might press the juice out of them—that is to say, that it might classify and deduce the laws that governed them. History and sociology, then, stood to one another in the same relation as physiology90 and zoology91, physics and mineralogy, or in another relation of the same sort; they differed from the physical and natural sciences only by their greater complexity92. The introduction of mathematical calculation seemed to be the condition of progress for history as for all the sciences, physical and natural. A new 'science' came forward to support this notion, in the shape of that humble93 servant of practical administration and inspired creation of bureaucracy known as statistics. And since the whole of science was being modelled upon the idea of a factory of condensation94, so were 'syntheses' invoked95 and outlined for history—that is to say, historical frameworks, in which the laws and facts chat dominate single histories should be resumed, as though in a sort of table or atlas96, which should show at a glance causes and the facts which arose from them.[Pg 297] Need we recall the names and supporters of this school—Comte, Buckle97, Taine, and so on, until we come to those recent historians who follow them, such as Lamprecht and Breysig? Need we recall the most consequent and the most paradoxical programmes or the school, as, for instance, Buckle's introduction to his history of civilization or Bourdeau's book on the Histoire des historiens? These and similar positivistic doctrines99 are present to the memory, either because they are nearest to us chronologically100, or because the echo of the noise they made in the world has not yet ceased, and we see everywhere traces of their influence. Everywhere we see it, and above all in the prejudice which they have solidly established (and which we must patiently corrode101 and dissolve), that history, true history, is to be constructed by means of the naturalistic method, and that causal induction102 should be employed. Then there are the manifold naturalistic conceptions with which they have imbued103 modern thought: race, heredity, degeneration, imitation, influence, climate, historical factors, and so forth104. And here, too, as in the case of the philosophies of history, since it suffices us to select only the essential in each fact, we shall not dwell upon the various particular forms of it—that is to say, upon the various modes in which historical causes were enunciated105 and enumerated106, and upon the various claims that one or other of them was supreme108: now the race, now the climate, now economy, now technique, and so forth. Here, too, the study of the particular forms would be of use to anyone who wished to develop in particular the dialectic and to trace the internal dissolution of that school, to demonstrate in its particular modes its intrinsic tendency to surpass itself, though it failed to do so by that path.
[Pg 298]
We have already mentioned that the three classes of opponents of the 'philosophies of history' and the three methods by which they proposed to supplant109 it—diplomatic, philological, and positivistic history—showed that they disagreed among themselves. Confirmation110 of this may now be found in the contempt of the diplomatic historians for mere111 erudition and in their diffidence for the constructions of positivism, the erudite, for their part, being fearful of perversions112 of names and dates and shaking their heads at diplomatic histories and the careless style of the men of the world who composed them. Finally, the positivists looked upon the latter as people who did not go to the bottom of things, to their general or natural causes, and reproved the erudite with their incapacity for rising to the level of laws and to the establishment of facts in accordance with these laws, sociological, physiological113, or pathological. But there is further confirmation of what has been noted114 in respect to the common conception that animated115 them all and of their substantial affinity116, because when the erudite wished to cloak themselves in a philosophy of some sort, they very readily strutted117 about draped in some shreds118 of positivistic thought or phraseology. They also participated in the reserve and in the agnosticism of the positivists and the diplomatic historians toward speculative problems, and in like manner it was impossible not to recognize the justice of their claim that evidence should be reliable and documents authentic119. The diplomatic historians agreed with them in the formula that history should not be philosophy and that research should dispense120 with finality and follow the line of causality. In fact, all three sorts of opponents, at one with the transcendency of the philosophy of history, negated121 the unity of history with philosophy, but in[Pg 299] various degrees and with various particular meanings, with various preliminary studies and in various ways. And although these schools were in agreement as to what they negated, all three of them become for us exposed to a criticism which unites them beneath a single negation122. For not even do the ability and the intelligence of a Ranke avail to give vigour123 to the moderatism and to maintain firmly the eclecticism124 of diplomatic history, and the transaction breaks down before the failure on the part of those who attempted it, owing to its being contrary to their own powers and intrinsically impossible. The idea of an agnostic history turns out to be fallacious—that is to say, of a history that is not philosophical but does not deny philosophy, that is not theological but is not anti-theological, limiting itself to nations and to their reciprocal influence upon one another, because Ranke himself was obliged to recognize powers or ideals that are superior to nations and that as such require to be speculatively125 justified126 in a philosophy or in a theology. In this way he laid himself open to the accusations127 of the positivists, who discredited128 his ideas as 'mystical.' For the same reason others were proceeding129 to reduce them little by little from the position of ideals or movements of the spirit to natural and physiological products, as was attempted by Lorenz, an ardent130 follower131 of Ranke, who, with his doctrine98 of generation and of heredity, fell into that physiologism and naturalism from which the master had preserved himself. And when this passage from spirituality to nature was accomplished132, the dividing line between history and pre-history, between history of civilization and history of nature, was also not respected. On the other hand, a return was made to the 'philosophies of history,' when ideas were interpreted as transcendental and as answering to the[Pg 300] designs of the divine will, which governs the world according to a law and conducts it according to a plan of travel. The boasted impartiality133 and objectivity, which was based upon a literary device of half-words, of innuendoes134, of prudent135 silences, was also equally illusory, and the Jesuit who objected to Ranke and his history of the popes will always prevail from the point of view of rigorous criticism—either the Papacy is always and everywhere what it affirms itself to be, an institution of the Son of God made man, or it is a lie. Respect and caution are out of place here. Tertium non datur. Indeed, it was not possible to escape from taking sides by adopting that point of view; at the most a third party was thus formed, consisting of the tolerant, the tepid136, and the indifferent. The slight coherence137 of Ranke's principles can be observed in that part of his Universal History where, when speaking of Tacitus he touches upon his own experience as a teacher of history, he declares that "it is impossible to speak of a tranquil138 and uniform progressive development of historiography either among the ancients or the moderns, because the object itself is formed in the course of time and is always different, and conceptions depend upon the circumstances among which the author lives and writes." He thus comes to perform an act of resignation before blind contingentism, and the present historical sketch139 shows how unjust this is, for it has traced the organic and progressive development of historical thought from the Greeks to modern times. And the whole of the Universal History is there to prove, on the other hand, that his slight coherence of ideas, or web of ideas that he left intentionally140 vague, made it difficult for him to give life to a vast historical narrative, so lacking in connexion, so heavy, and sometimes even issuing in extraneous141 reflections, such, for[Pg 301] example, as those in the first pages of the first volume, where there is a comparison of Saul and Samuel with the emperors at strife142 with the popes, and of the policy of Rehoboam and Jeroboam with the political strife between the centralizing states and the centrifugal regions of modern times. We find in general in Ranke an inevitable143 tendency to subside144 into the pragmatic method. And what has been said of Ranke is to be repeated of his disciples and of those who cultivated the same conciliatory type of history. As for philological history, the description that has been given of the programme makes clear its nullity, for it leads by a most direct route to a double absurdity145. When the most rigorous methods of examining witnesses is really applied146, there is no witness that cannot be suspected and questioned, and philological history leads to the negation of the truth of that history which it wishes to construct. And if value be attributed to certain evidence arbitrarily and for external reasons, there is no extravagance that may not be accepted, because there is no extravagance that may not have honest, candid147, and intelligent men on its side. It is not possible to reject even miracles by the philological method, since these repose67 upon the same attestations which make certain a war or a peace treaty, as Lorenz has shown by examining the miracles of St Bernard in the light of the severest philological criticism. In order to save himself from the admission of the inconceivable and of the nullification of history, which follows the nullification of witnesses, there remains148 nothing but appeal to thought, which reconstitutes history from the inside, and is evidence to itself, and denies what is unthinkable for the very reason that it is not to be thought. This appeal is the declaration of bankruptcy149 for philological history. We may certainly[Pg 302] say that this form of history more or less sustains itself as history, to the extent that it has recourse to all the aids furnished by history proper, and contradicts itself; or it contradicts itself and yet does not sustain itself, or only for a little while and in appearance, by again adopting the methods of pragmaticism, of transcendency, and of positivism. And the last of these in its turn encounters the same experiences in a different order, because its principle of history that explains facts causally presupposes the facts, which as such are thought and therefore are in a way already explained. Hence a vicious circle, evident in the connexion between history and sociology, each one of which is to be based upon and at the same time to afford a base for the other, much in the same way as a column which should support a capital and at the same time spring from it. But if, with a view to breaking the circle, history be taken as the base and sociology as its fulfilment, then the latter will no longer be the explanation of the former, which will find its explanation elsewhere. And this will be, according to taste, either an unknown principle or some form of thought that acts in the same way as God, and in both cases a transcendental principle. Hence we have the fact of positivism leading to philosophies of history, as exemplified in the Apocalypses and the Gospels of Comte, of Buckle, and of others of like sort: they are all most reverent62 theologians, but chaotic150, falling back into those fallacious conceptions which had been refuted by romantic historiography.
Truly, when faced with such histories as these, superficial or unintelligent or rude and fantastic, romanticism, conscious of the altitude to which it had elevated the study of the development of human affairs, might have exclaimed (and indeed it did exclaim by the mouth of[Pg 303] its epigoni) to its adversaries151 and successors, in imitation of the tone of Bonaparte on the 18th of Brumaire: "What have you done with the history which I left to you so brilliant? Were these the new methods, by means of which you promised to solve the problems which I had not been able to solve? I see nothing in them but revers et misère!" But we who have never met with absolute regressions during the secular152 development of historiography shall not allow ourselves to be carried away upon the polemical waves now beating against the positivistic and naturalistic school which is our present or recent adversary153, to the point of losing sight of what it possessed that was substantially its own, and owing to which it really did represent progress. We shall also refrain from drawing comparisons between romanticism and positivism, by measuring the merits of both, and concluding with the assertion of the superiority of the former; because it is well known that such examinations of degrees of merit, the field of professors, are not permissible154 in history, where what follows ideally after is virtually superior to that from which it is derived156, notwithstanding appearances to the contrary. And in the first place, it would be erroneous, strictly157 speaking, to believe that what had been won by romanticism had been lost in positivism, because when the histories of this period are looked upon from other points of view and with greater attention, we see how they were all preserved. Romanticism had abolished historical dualism, for which there existed in reality positive and negative, elect and outcast, facts. Positivism repeated that all facts are facts and all have an equal right to enter history. Romanticism had substituted the conception of development for the abysses and the chasms158 that previous historiography had introduced[Pg 304] into the course of events, and positivism repeated that conception, calling it evolution. Romanticism had established periods in development, either in the form of a cycle of phases, like Vico, or as phases without a circle and in linear order, like the German romantics, and had exemplified the various phases as a series of the forms of the spirit or of psychological forms, and positivism renewed these conceptions (although owing to the lack of culture usual with its adherents159 it often believed that it had made discoveries never made before), as can be proved by a long series of examples. These range from the three ages of mental development of Comte to the eight phases of social development or four political periods which are respectively the 'novelties' of the contemporaries Lamprecht and Breysig. Romanticism, judging that the explanation of events by means of the caprices, the calculations, and the designs of individuals taken atomistically was frivolous160, took as the subject of history the universals, the Idea, ideas, the spirit, nations and liberty and positivism; it also rejected individualistic atomicism, talking of masses, races, societies, technique, economy, science, social tendencies; of everything, in fact, with the exception that the caprice of Tizius and Caius was now no longer admitted. Romanticism had now not only reinforced the histories of ideal values, but had conceived them as in organic connexion; positivism in its turn insisted upon the interdependence of social factors and upon the unity of the real, and attempted to fill up the interstices of the various special histories by means of the history of civilization and of culture, and so-called social history, containing in itself politics, literature, philosophy, religion, and every other class of facts. Romanticism had overthrown161 heteronomous, instructive, moralizing, serviceable history, and positivism[Pg 305] in its turn boasted that its history was a science, an end in itself, like every other science, although like every science it afforded the basis for practice, and was therefore capable of application. Romanticism had enhanced the esteem162 for erudition, and had given an impetus163 to intercourse164 between it and history. But whence did the erudition and philology of the positivistic period derive155 that pride which made them believe that they were themselves history, save from the consciousness that they had inherited from romanticism, which they had preserved and exaggerated? Whence did they inherit the substance of their method save (as Fueter well notes) from the romantic search for the primitive165, the genuine, the ingenuous166, which manifested itself in Wolf, who inaugurated the method? It is well to remember that Wolf was a pre-romantic, an admirer of Ossian and of popular poetry. And, finally, what is the meaning of the efforts of positivism to seek out the causes of history, the series of historical facts, the unity of the factors and their dependence upon a supreme cause, save the speculations of the romantics themselves upon the manner, the end, and the value of development? Whoever pays attention to all these and other resemblances which we could enumerate107 must conclude that positivism is to romanticism as was the enlightenment to the Renaissance—that is to say, it is not so much its antithesis167 as it is the logical prosecution168 and the exaggeration of its presuppositions. Even its final conversion169 into theology corresponds to that of romanticism. This is for the rest an obvious matter, for transcendency is always transcendency, whether it be thought of as that of a God or of reason, of nature or of matter. But thinking of it as Matter or Nature, this naturalistic and materialistic170 travesty171, which at first seems[Pg 306] odious172 or ridiculous, of the problems and conceptions of romanticism, of the idea into cause, of development into evolution, of the spirit into mass and the like, to which one would at first be inclined to attribute the inferiority of positivistic historiography, is, on the contrary, for the close observer the progress made by it upon romanticism. That travesty contains the energetic negation of history as moved by extramundane forces, by external finalities, by transcendental laws, just both in its motive and in its general tendency, and the correlative affirmation that its law must be sought in reality, which is one and is called 'nature.' The positivism, which on no account wished to hear anything of 'metaphysic,' had in mind the dogmatic and transcendental metaphysic, which had filtered into the thought of Kant and of his successors; and the target of its contempt was a good one, although it ended by confusing metaphysic with philosophy in general, or dogmatic with critical metaphysic, the metaphysic of being with that of the mind, and was not itself altogether free from that which it undertook to combat. But this does not prevent its repugnance173 to 'metaphysic' and, restricting ourselves to what is our more immediate174 interest, to the 'philosophy of history' from having produced durable175 results. Thanks to positivism historical works became less na?ve and richer in facts, especially in that class of facts which romanticism had neglected, such as the dispositions176 that are called natural, the processes that are called degenerative or pathological, the spiritual complications that are called psychological illusions, the interests that are called material, the production and the distribution of wealth, or economic activity, the facts of force and violence, or of political and revolutionary power. Positivism, intent upon the[Pg 307] negation of transcendency and upon the observation of what appertained to it, felt itself to be, and was in that respect, in the right. And each one of us who pays due attention to that order of things and renews that negation is gathering177 the fruit of positivism, and in that respect is a positivist. Its very contradictions had the merit of making more evident the contradictions latent in romantic historiography. This merit must be admitted to the most extravagant178 doctrines of the positivists, such as that of Taine, that knowledge is a true hallucination and that human wisdom is an accident (une rencontre), which presumed irrationality179 to be the normal condition, much as Lombroso believed that genius is madness. Another instance of this is the attempt to discover in what way heterogeneity180 and historical diversity come into existence, if homogeneity is posited181; and again the methodical canon that the explanation of history is to be found in causality, but is to stop at genius and virtue182, which are without it, because they refuse to accept of causal explanation, or the frightful183 Unknowable, which was placed at the head of histories of the real, after so great a fuss being made about that Titan science which was ready to scale the skies. But since romanticism had left spirit and nature without fusion184, the one facing the other, it was just that if in the first place spirit swallowed up nature without being able to digest it (because, as had been laid down, it was indigestible), now nature was engaged in doing the same thing to spirit, and with the same result. So just and logical was this that not a few of the old idealists went over to the crassest185 materialism186 and positivism, and that confession187 of not being able to see their way in the confusion was at once instructive and suggestive, as was also the perplexity decorated with the name of 'agnosticism.'[Pg 308] And as the precise affirmation of the positivity of history represented an advance in thought, so the antithesis of materialism, pushed to an extreme, was an advance in the preparation of the new problem and in the new way of solving the relation between spirit and nature. Oportet ut scandala, eveniant, and this means that even scandal, the scandal of the absurd, and of offensive false criticisms of human conscience, is an advance.
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unity
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| n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调 | |
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narration
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| n.讲述，叙述；故事；记叙体 | |
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opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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motive
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| n.动机，目的；adv.发动的，运动的 | |
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philologists
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| n.语文学( philology的名词复数 ) | |
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philologist
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| n.语言学者，文献学者 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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investigation
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| n.调查，调查研究 | |
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speculative
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| adj.思索性的，暝想性的，推理的 | |
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reverence
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| n.敬畏，尊敬，尊严；Reverence:对某些基督教神职人员的尊称；v.尊敬，敬畏，崇敬 | |
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condescended
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| 屈尊，俯就( condescend的过去式和过去分词 )； 故意表示和蔼可亲 | |
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steer
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| vt.驾驶，为…操舵；引导；vi.驾驶 | |
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placid
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| adj.安静的，平和的 | |
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tempestuous
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| adj.狂暴的 | |
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relegated
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| v.使降级( relegate的过去式和过去分词 )；使降职；转移；把…归类 | |
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grandiose
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| adj.宏伟的，宏大的，堂皇的，铺张的 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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patriotic
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| adj.爱国的，有爱国心的 | |
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aspirations
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| 强烈的愿望( aspiration的名词复数 )； 志向； 发送气音； 发 h 音 | |
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21
narrative
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| n.叙述，故事；adj.叙事的，故事体的 | |
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22
philosophic
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| adj.哲学的，贤明的 | |
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23
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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24
mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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narrated
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| v.故事( narrate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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26
antitheses
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| n.对照，对立的，对比法；对立( antithesis的名词复数 )；对立面；对照；对偶 | |
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27
neutralize
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| v.使失效、抵消，使中和 | |
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28
attenuate
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| v.使变小，使减弱 | |
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29
diplomacy
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| n.外交；外交手腕，交际手腕 | |
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30
disciples
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| n.信徒( disciple的名词复数 )；门徒；耶稣的信徒；（尤指）耶稣十二门徒之一 | |
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31
collaborate
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| vi.协作，合作；协调 | |
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32
predilection
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| n.偏好 | |
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33
discredit
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| vt.使不可置信；n.丧失信义；不信，怀疑 | |
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34
professing
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| 声称( profess的现在分词 )； 宣称； 公开表明； 信奉 | |
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35
monographs
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| n.专著，专论( monograph的名词复数 ) | |
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36
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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37
irony
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| n.反语，冷嘲；具有讽刺意味的事，嘲弄 | |
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38
culling
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| n.选择，大批物品中剔出劣质货v.挑选，剔除( cull的现在分词 ) | |
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39
laurels
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| n.桂冠，荣誉 | |
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40
attaining
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的现在分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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41
displease
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| vt.使不高兴，惹怒；n.不悦，不满，生气 | |
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42
elegance
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| n.优雅；优美，雅致；精致，巧妙 | |
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43
philosophical
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| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
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44
germinated
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| v.（使）发芽( germinate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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45
jocosely
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| adv.说玩笑地，诙谐地 | |
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46
speculations
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| n.投机买卖( speculation的名词复数 )；思考；投机活动；推断 | |
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47
finesse
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| n.精密技巧，灵巧，手腕 | |
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48
innocence
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| n.无罪；天真；无害 | |
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49
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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50
abound
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| vi.大量存在；(in，with)充满，富于 | |
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51
formerly
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| adv.从前，以前 | |
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52
notably
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| adv.值得注意地，显著地，尤其地，特别地 | |
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53
attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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54
haughty
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| adj.傲慢的，高傲的 | |
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55
pedantry
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| n.迂腐，卖弄学问 | |
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56
narratives
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| 记叙文( narrative的名词复数 )； 故事； 叙述； 叙述部分 | |
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57
vying
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| adj.竞争的；比赛的 | |
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58
variants
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| n.变体( variant的名词复数 )；变种；变型；（词等的）变体 | |
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59
disdain
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| n.鄙视，轻视；v.轻视，鄙视，不屑 | |
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60
haughtiness
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| n.傲慢；傲气 | |
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61
diffused
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| 散布的，普及的，扩散的 | |
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62
reverent
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| adj.恭敬的，虔诚的 | |
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63
philological
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| adj.语言学的，文献学的 | |
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64
judicious
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| adj.明智的，明断的，能作出明智决定的 | |
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65
compilations
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| n.编辑，编写( compilation的名词复数 )；编辑物 | |
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66
dignified
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| a.可敬的，高贵的 | |
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67
repose
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| v.(使)休息；n.安息 | |
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68
reposed
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| v.将（手臂等）靠在某人（某物）上( repose的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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69
systematic
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| adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的 | |
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70
philology
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| n.语言学；语文学 | |
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71
alleviating
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| 减轻，缓解，缓和( alleviate的现在分词 ) | |
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72
aridity
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| n.干旱，乏味；干燥性；荒芜 | |
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73
ornament
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| v.装饰，美化；n.装饰，装饰物 | |
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74
disdains
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| 鄙视，轻蔑( disdain的名词复数 ) | |
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75
ornaments
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| n.装饰( ornament的名词复数 )；点缀；装饰品；首饰v.装饰，点缀，美化( ornament的第三人称单数 ) | |
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76
charlatans
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| n.冒充内行者，骗子( charlatan的名词复数 ) | |
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77
lesser
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| adj.次要的，较小的；adv.较小地，较少地 | |
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78
residue
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| n.残余，剩余，残渣 | |
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79
subjective
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| a.主观(上)的，个人的 | |
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80
anecdotes
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| n.掌故，趣闻，轶事( anecdote的名词复数 ) | |
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81
celebrated
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|
| adj.有名的，声誉卓著的 | |
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82
confided
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|
| v.吐露（秘密，心事等）( confide的过去式和过去分词 )；（向某人）吐露（隐私、秘密等） | |
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83
amorous
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|
| adj.多情的；有关爱情的 | |
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84
opportune
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|
| adj.合适的，适当的 | |
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85
naturalists
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| n.博物学家( naturalist的名词复数 )；（文学艺术的）自然主义者 | |
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86
exalted
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|
| adj.(地位等)高的，崇高的；尊贵的，高尚的 | |
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87
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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88
dependence
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| n.依靠，依赖；信任，信赖；隶属 | |
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89
diligently
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| ad.industriously;carefully | |
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90
physiology
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| n.生理学，生理机能 | |
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91
zoology
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| n.动物学，生态 | |
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92
complexity
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| n.复杂(性)，复杂的事物 | |
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93
humble
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| adj.谦卑的，恭顺的；地位低下的；v.降低，贬低 | |
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94
condensation
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| n.压缩，浓缩；凝结的水珠 | |
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95
invoked
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| v.援引( invoke的过去式和过去分词 )；行使（权利等）；祈求救助；恳求 | |
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96
atlas
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| n.地图册，图表集 | |
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97
buckle
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| n.扣子，带扣；v.把...扣住，由于压力而弯曲 | |
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98
doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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99
doctrines
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| n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 )；教义；学说；（政府政策的）正式声明 | |
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100
chronologically
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| ad. 按年代的 | |
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101
corrode
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| v.使腐蚀，侵蚀，破害；v.腐蚀，被侵蚀 | |
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102
induction
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| n.感应，感应现象 | |
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103
imbued
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| v.使（某人/某事）充满或激起（感情等）( imbue的过去式和过去分词 )；使充满；灌输；激发（强烈感情或品质等） | |
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104
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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105
enunciated
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| v.（清晰地）发音( enunciate的过去式和过去分词 )；确切地说明 | |
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106
enumerated
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| v.列举，枚举，数( enumerate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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107
enumerate
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| v.列举，计算，枚举，数 | |
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108
supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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109
supplant
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| vt.排挤；取代 | |
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110
confirmation
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| n.证实，确认，批准 | |
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111
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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112
perversions
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| n.歪曲( perversion的名词复数 )；变坏；变态心理 | |
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113
physiological
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| adj.生理学的，生理学上的 | |
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114
noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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115
animated
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| adj.生气勃勃的，活跃的，愉快的 | |
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116
affinity
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| n.亲和力，密切关系 | |
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117
strutted
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| 趾高气扬地走，高视阔步( strut的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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118
shreds
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| v.撕碎，切碎( shred的第三人称单数 )；用撕毁机撕毁（文件） | |
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119
authentic
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| a.真的，真正的；可靠的，可信的，有根据的 | |
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120
dispense
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| vt.分配，分发；配(药)，发(药)；实施 | |
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121
negated
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| v.取消( negate的过去式和过去分词 )；使无效；否定；否认 | |
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122
negation
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| n.否定；否认 | |
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123
vigour
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| （=vigor）n.智力，体力，精力 | |
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124
eclecticism
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| n.折衷主义 | |
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125
speculatively
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| adv.思考地，思索地；投机地 | |
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126
justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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127
accusations
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| n.指责( accusation的名词复数 )；指控；控告；（被告发、控告的）罪名 | |
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128
discredited
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| 不足信的，不名誉的 | |
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129
proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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130
ardent
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| adj.热情的，热烈的，强烈的，烈性的 | |
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131
follower
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| n.跟随者；随员；门徒；信徒 | |
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132
accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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133
impartiality
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| n. 公平, 无私, 不偏 | |
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134
innuendoes
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| n.影射的话( innuendo的名词复数 )；讽刺的话；含沙射影；暗讽 | |
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135
prudent
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| adj.谨慎的，有远见的，精打细算的 | |
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136
tepid
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| adj.微温的，温热的，不太热心的 | |
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137
coherence
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| n.紧凑；连贯；一致性 | |
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138
tranquil
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| adj. 安静的, 宁静的, 稳定的, 不变的 | |
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139
sketch
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| n.草图；梗概；素描；v.素描；概述 | |
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140
intentionally
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| ad.故意地，有意地 | |
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141
extraneous
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| adj.体外的；外来的；外部的 | |
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142
strife
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| n.争吵，冲突，倾轧，竞争 | |
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143
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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144
subside
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| vi.平静，平息；下沉，塌陷，沉降 | |
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145
absurdity
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| n.荒谬，愚蠢；谬论 | |
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146
applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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candid
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| adj.公正的，正直的；坦率的 | |
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148
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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bankruptcy
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| n.破产；无偿付能力 | |
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150
chaotic
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| adj.混沌的，一片混乱的，一团糟的 | |
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adversaries
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| n.对手，敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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secular
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| n.牧师，凡人；adj.世俗的，现世的，不朽的 | |
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153
adversary
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| adj.敌手，对手 | |
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154
permissible
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| adj.可允许的，许可的 | |
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155
derive
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| v.取得；导出；引申；来自；源自；出自 | |
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derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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chasms
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| 裂缝( chasm的名词复数 )； 裂口； 分歧； 差别 | |
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adherents
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| n.支持者，拥护者( adherent的名词复数 )；党羽；徒子徒孙 | |
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frivolous
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| adj.轻薄的；轻率的 | |
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overthrown
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| adj. 打翻的，推倒的，倾覆的 动词overthrow的过去分词 | |
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esteem
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| n.尊敬，尊重；vt.尊重，敬重；把…看作 | |
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impetus
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| n.推动，促进，刺激；推动力 | |
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164
intercourse
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| n.性交；交流，交往，交际 | |
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165
primitive
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| adj.原始的；简单的；n.原(始)人，原始事物 | |
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ingenuous
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| adj.纯朴的，单纯的；天真的；坦率的 | |
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antithesis
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| n.对立；相对 | |
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168
prosecution
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| n.起诉，告发，检举，执行，经营 | |
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169
conversion
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| n.转化，转换，转变 | |
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170
materialistic
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| a.唯物主义的，物质享乐主义的 | |
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171
travesty
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| n.歪曲，嘲弄，滑稽化 | |
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172
odious
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| adj.可憎的，讨厌的 | |
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173
repugnance
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| n.嫌恶 | |
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174
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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durable
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| adj.持久的，耐久的 | |
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dispositions
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| 安排( disposition的名词复数 )； 倾向； （财产、金钱的）处置； 气质 | |
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gathering
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| n.集会，聚会，聚集 | |
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178
extravagant
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| adj.奢侈的；过分的；(言行等)放肆的 | |
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irrationality
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| n. 不合理，无理性 | |
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heterogeneity
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| n.异质性；多相性 | |
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181
posited
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| v.假定，设想，假设( posit的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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182
virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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183
frightful
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| adj.可怕的；讨厌的 | |
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184
fusion
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| n.溶化；熔解；熔化状态，熔和；熔接 | |
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185
crassest
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| adj.愚笨的，粗鲁的，全然不顾他人的( crass的最高级 ) | |
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186
materialism
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| n.［哲］唯物主义，唯物论；物质至上 | |
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confession
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| n.自白，供认，承认 | |
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