The new Cabinet contains those members of the late one in whom the country has most confidence. Lord Kitchener, Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Lloyd George, and Mr. Churchill have all made mistakes. In a great crisis it is the bigger characters who are most liable to make mistakes. Their superiority impels3 them to take risks which the smaller men, playing always for safety, are concerned to avoid.
The present Ministry4 also contains representatives of that class of politicians which, according to the view set forth5 in the following pages, is primarily responsible for our present troubles. Lawyer-statesmanship, which failed to foresee the war, to prepare against it, and to conduct it with energy and thoroughness when it occurred, still occupies a large share of authority. Possibly ministers of this school {xiv} will now walk in new ways. In any case, they are no longer in a position of dangerous predominance.
The Coalition Government, having wisely refused to part with any of those men who rose to the emergency, and having received an infusion6 of new blood (which may be expected to bring an accession of vigour) starts upon its career with the goodwill7 and confidence of the People.
What has happened, however, is a revolution upon an unprecedented8 scale—one which is likely to have vast consequences in the future. The country realises this fact, and accepts it as a matter of course—accepts it indeed with a sigh of relief. But in other quarters, what has just happened is hardly realised at all—still less what it is likely to lead to in the future.
During the 'Cabinet Crisis' one read a good deal of stuff in the newspapers, and heard still more by word of mouth, which showed how far, during the past nine months, public opinion has moved away from the professionals of politics; how little account it takes of them; also how much these gentlemen themselves mistake the meaning of the present situation.
In political circles one has heard, and read, very frequently of late, expressions of regret—on the one hand that unionists should have come to the assistance of a discredited9 and bankrupt administration—on the other hand that a government, secure in the confidence of the country, should, through a mistaken {xv} sense of generosity10, have admitted its opponents to a share in the glory and prestige of office. One has read, and heard, cavillings at the idea of appointing this, or that, public character to this, or that, office, as a thing beyond what this, or that, party 'could fairly be expected to stand.' Reports have appeared of meetings of 'a hundred' perturbed11 Liberals; and very possibly meetings, though unreported, of equally perturbed unionists have also been held. An idea seems still to be prevalent in certain quarters, that what has just occurred is nothing more important than an awkward and temporary disarrangement of the party game; and that this game will be resumed, with all the old patriotism12 and good feeling, so soon as war is ended. But this appears to be a mistaken view. You cannot make a great mix-up of this sort without calling new parties into existence. When men are thrown into the crucible13 of a war such as this, the true ore will tend to run together, the dross14 to cake upon the surface. No matter to what parties they may have originally owed allegiance, the men who are in earnest, and who see realities, cannot help but come together. May be for several generations the annual festivals of the National Liberal Federation15 and the union of Conservative Associations will continue to be held, like other picturesque16 survivals of ancient customs. When Henry VII. was crowned at Westminster, the Wars of the Roses ended; the old factions17 of York and Lancaster were dissolved, and {xvi} made way for new associations. Something of the same sort has surely happened during the past month—Liberal and Conservative, Radical18 and Tory have ceased for the present to be real divisions. They had recently become highly artificial and confusing; now they are gone—it is to be hoped for ever.
Will the generation which is fighting this war—such of them as may survive—be content to go back to the old barren wrangle19 when it is done? Will those others who have lost husbands, sons, brothers, friends—all that was dearest to them except the honour and safety of their country—will they be found willing to tolerate the idea of trusting their destinies ever again to the same machines, to be driven once more to disaster by the same automatons20? To all except the automatons themselves—who share with the German Supermen the credit of having made this war—any such resumption of business on old-established lines appears incredible. There is something pathetic in the sight of these huckstering sentimentalists still crying their stale wares21 and ancient make-believes at the street corners, while their country is fighting for its life. They remind one, not a little, of those Pardoners of the fourteenth century who, as we read in history books, continued to hawk22 their Indulgences with unabated industry during the days of the Black Death.
{xvii}
It is necessary to offer a few words of explanation as to how this book came to be written. During the months of November and December 1912 and January 1913, various meetings and discussions took place under Lord Roberts's roof and elsewhere, between a small number of persons, who held widely different views, and whose previous experience and training had been as different as were their opinions.
Our efforts were concerned with endeavouring to find answers to several questions which had never been dealt with candidly23, clearly, and comprehensively in the public statements of political leaders. It was clear that there was no 'national' policy, which the British people had grasped, accepted, and countersigned24, as was the case in France. But some kind of British policy there must surely be, notwithstanding the fact it had never been disclosed. What were the aims of this policy? With what nation or nations were these aims likely to bring us into collision? What armaments were necessary in order to enable us to uphold this policy and achieve these aims? How, and when, and where would our armaments be required in the event of war? Assuming (as we did in our discussions) that our naval25 forces were adequate, was the same statement true of our military forces? And if it were not true, by what means could the necessary increases be obtained?
The final conclusion at which we arrived was that National Service was essential to security. {xviii} Under whatever aspect we regarded the problem we always returned—even those of us who were most unwilling26 to travel in that direction—to the same result. So long as Britain relied solely27 upon the voluntary principle, we should never possess either the Expeditionary Force or the Army for Home Defence which were requisite28 for safety.
It fell to me during the winter 1912-1913 to draft the summary of our conclusions. It was afterwards decided—in the spring of 1913—that this private Memorandum29 should be recast in a popular form suitable for publication. I was asked to undertake this, and agreed to do so. But I underestimated both the difficulties of the task and the time which would be necessary for overcoming them.
When we met again, in the autumn of that year, the work was still far from complete, and by that time, not only public attention, but our own, had become engrossed30 in other matters. The Irish controversy31 had entered upon a most acute and dangerous stage. Lord Roberts put off the meetings which he had arranged to address during the ensuing months upon National Service, and threw his whole energies into the endeavour to avert32 the schism33 which threatened the nation, and to find a way to a peaceful settlement. Next to the security and integrity of the British Empire I verily believe that the thing which lay nearest his heart was the happiness and unity34 of Ireland.
It is needless to recall how, during the ensuing {xix} months, affairs in Ireland continued to march from bad to worse—up to the very day when the menace of the present war suddenly arose before the eyes of Europe.
During August 1914 I went through the old drafts and memoranda35 which had now been laid aside for nearly a year. Although that very thing had happened which it had been the object of our efforts to avert, it seemed to me that there might be advantages in publishing some portion of our conclusions. The form, of course, would have to be entirely36 different; for the recital37 of prophecies which had come true, though it might have possessed38 a certain interest for the prophets themselves, could have but little for the public.
Early in September I consulted Lord Roberts, and also such of my friends, who had originally worked with me, as were still within reach. Finding that their opinion agreed with my own upon the desirability of publication, I laid out a fresh scheme, and set to for a third time at the old task. But as the work grew, it became clear that it would contain but little of the former Memorandum, and much which the former Memorandum had never contemplated39. So many of our original conclusions, laboriously40 hammered out to convince the public in the spring of the year 1913, had become by the autumn of 1914, the most trite41 of commonplaces. And as for the practical scheme which we had evolved—endeavouring to keep our demands at the most modest {xx} minimum—it was interesting chiefly by reason of its triviality when contrasted with the scale of warlike preparations upon which the Government was now engaged. Practically, therefore, the whole of the present volume is new—not merely redrafted, but for the most part new in substance.
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1
coalition
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| n.结合体，同盟，结合，联合 | |
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helping
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| n.食物的一份&adj.帮助人的，辅助的 | |
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impels
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| v.推动、推进或敦促某人做某事( impel的第三人称单数 ) | |
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ministry
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| n.(政府的)部；牧师 | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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infusion
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| n.灌输 | |
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goodwill
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| n.善意，亲善，信誉，声誉 | |
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unprecedented
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| adj.无前例的，新奇的 | |
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discredited
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| 不足信的，不名誉的 | |
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generosity
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| n.大度，慷慨，慷慨的行为 | |
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perturbed
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| adj.烦燥不安的v.使（某人）烦恼，不安( perturb的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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patriotism
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| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
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crucible
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| n.坩锅，严酷的考验 | |
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dross
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| n.渣滓；无用之物 | |
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federation
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| n.同盟，联邦，联合，联盟，联合会 | |
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picturesque
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| adj.美丽如画的，（语言）生动的，绘声绘色的 | |
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factions
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| 组织中的小派别，派系( faction的名词复数 ) | |
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radical
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| n.激进份子，原子团，根号；adj.根本的，激进的，彻底的 | |
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wrangle
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| vi.争吵 | |
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automatons
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| n.自动机，机器人( automaton的名词复数 ) | |
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wares
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| n. 货物, 商品 | |
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hawk
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| n.鹰，骗子；鹰派成员 | |
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candidly
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| adv.坦率地，直率而诚恳地 | |
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countersigned
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| v.连署，副署，会签 （文件）( countersign的过去式 ) | |
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naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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unwilling
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| adj.不情愿的 | |
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solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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requisite
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| adj.需要的，必不可少的；n.必需品 | |
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memorandum
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| n.备忘录，便笺 | |
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engrossed
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| adj.全神贯注的 | |
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controversy
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| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
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avert
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| v.防止，避免；转移(目光、注意力等) | |
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schism
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| n.分派，派系，分裂 | |
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unity
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| n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调 | |
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memoranda
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| n. 备忘录, 便条 名词memorandum的复数形式 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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recital
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| n.朗诵，独奏会，独唱会 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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contemplated
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| adj. 预期的 动词contemplate的过去分词形式 | |
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laboriously
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| adv.艰苦地；费力地；辛勤地；（文体等）佶屈聱牙地 | |
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trite
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| adj.陈腐的 | |
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