The aim of that policy was the security of the whole empire. This much at any rate was readily conceded on all hands. It was not enough, however, that we approved the general aim of British policy. A broad but clear conception of the means by which our Government hoped to maintain this policy, and the sacrifices which the country would have to make in order to support this policy, was no less necessary. So soon, however, as we began to ask for further particulars, we found ourselves in the region of acute controversy4. 'Security' was a convenient political formula, which could be accepted as readily by the {242} man who placed his trust in international law, as by his neighbour who believed in battle fleets and army corps5.
In considering this question of security we could not disregard Europe, for Europe was still the storm-centre of the world. We could not afford to turn a blind eye towards the ambitions and anxieties of the great continental7 Powers. We were bound to take into account not only their visions but their nightmares. We could not remain indifferent to their groupings and alliances, or to the strength and dispositions8 of their armaments.
That the United Kingdom was a pair of islands lying on the western edge of Europe, and that the rest of the British Empire was remote, and unwilling9 to be interested in the rivalries10 of the Teuton, Slav, and Latin races, did not affect the matter in the least. Nowadays no habitable corner of the earth is really remote; and as for willingness or unwillingness11 to be interested, that had nothing at all to do with the question. For it was clear that any Power, which succeeded in possessing itself of the suzerainty of Europe, could redraw the map of the world at its pleasure, and blow the Monroe Doctrine12, no less than the British Empire, sky-high.
Looking across thousands of leagues of ocean, it was difficult for the Dominions and the United States to understand how their fortunes, and the ultimate fate of their cherished institutions, could possibly be affected13 by the turmoil14 and jealousies15 of—what appeared in their eyes to be—a number of reactionary16 despotisms and chauvinistic17 democracies. Even the hundred and twenty leagues which separate Hull18 from Emden, or the seven which divide Dover from Calais, were enough to convince many people {243} in the United Kingdom that we could safely allow Europe to 'stew19 in her own juice.' But unfortunately for this theory, unless a great continental struggle ended like the battle of the Kilkenny cats, the outside world was likely to find itself in an awkward predicament, when the conqueror20 chose to speak with it in the gates, at a time of his own choosing.
British policy since 1901 had tended, with ever increasing self-consciousness, towards the definite aim of preventing Germany from acquiring the suzerainty of Western Europe. It was obvious that German predominance, if secured, must ultimately force the other continental nations, either into a German alliance, or into a neutrality favourable21 to German interests. German policy would then inevitably22 be directed towards encroachments upon British possessions. Germany had already boldly proclaimed her ambitions overseas. Moreover, she would find it pleasanter to compensate23, and soothe24 the susceptibilities of those nations whom she had overcome in diplomacy25 or war, and to reward their subsequent services as allies and friendly neutrals, by paying them out of our property rather than out of her own. For this reason, if for no other, we were deeply concerned that Germany should not dominate Europe if we could help it.
GERMAN AIMS
During this period, on the other hand, Germany appeared to be setting herself more and more seriously to acquire this domination. Each succeeding year her writers expressed themselves in terms of greater candour and confidence. Her armaments were following her policy. The rapid creation of a fleet—the counterpart of the greatest army in Europe—and the recent additions to the striking power of her {244} already enormous army could have no other object. Certainly from 1909 onwards, it was impossible to regard German preparations as anything else than a challenge, direct or indirect, to the security of the British Empire.
Consequently the direction of British policy returned, gradually, unavowedly, but with certainty, to its old lines, and became once more concerned with the maintenance of the Balance of Power as the prime necessity. The means adopted were the Triple Entente26 between Britain, France, and Russia. The object of this understanding was to resist the anticipated aggressions of the Triple Alliance, wherein Germany was the predominant partner.
DERELICT MAXIMS27
The tendency of phrases, as they grow old, is to turn into totems, for and against which political parties, and even great nations, fight unreasoningly. But before we either yield our allegiance to any of these venerable formulas, or decide to throw it out on the scrap-heap, there are advantages in looking to see whether or not there is some underlying28 meaning which may be worth attending to. It occasionally happens that circumstances have changed so much since the original idea was first crystallised in words, that the old saying contains no value or reality whatsoever29 for the present generation. More often, however, there is something of permanent importance behind, if only we can succeed in tearing off the husk of prejudice in which it has become encased. So, according to Disraeli, "the divine right of Kings may have been a plea for feeble tyrants30, but the divine right of government is the keystone of human progress." For many years the phrase British interests, which used to figure so largely in speeches {245} and leading articles, has dropped out of use, because it had come to be associated unfavourably with bond-holders' dividends31. The fact that it also implied national honour and prestige, the performance of duties and the burden of responsibilities was forgotten. Even the doctrine of laissez faire, which politicians of all parties have lately agreed to abjure32 and contemn33, has, as regards industrial affairs, a large kernel34 of practical wisdom and sound policy hidden away in it. But of all these derelict maxims, that which until quite recently, appeared to be suffering from the greatest neglect, was the need for maintaining the Balance of Power in Europe. For close on two generations it had played no overt35 part in public controversy, except when some Tory matador36 produced it defiantly37 as a red rag to infuriate the Radical38 bull.
If this policy of the maintenance of the Balance of Power has been little heard of since Waterloo, the reason is that since then, until quite recently, the Balance of Power has never appeared to be seriously threatened.[1] And because the policy of maintaining this balance was in abeyance39, many people have come to believe that it was discredited40. Because it was not visibly and actively41 in use it was supposed to have become entirely42 useless.
This policy can never become useless. It must inevitably come into play, so soon as any Power appears to be aiming at the mastery of the continent. It will ever remain a matter of life or death, to the United Kingdom and to the British Empire, that no continental state shall be allowed to obtain {246} command, directly or indirectly43, of the resources, diplomacy, and armaments of Europe.
In the sixteenth century we fought Philip of of Spain to prevent him from acquiring European predominance. In the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries we fought Louis XIV., Louis XV., and Napoleon for the same reason. In order to preserve the balance of power, and with it our own security, it was our interest under Elizabeth to prevent the Netherlands from being crushed by Spain. Under later monarchs44 it was our interest to prevent the Netherlands, the lesser45 German States, Prussia, Austria, and finally the whole of Europe from being crushed by France. And we can as ill afford to-day to allow France to be crushed by Germany, or Holland and Belgium to fall into her power. The wheel has come round full circle, but the essential British interest remains46 constant.
The wheel is always turning, sometimes slowly, sometimes with startling swiftness. Years hence the present alliances will probably be discarded. It may be that some day the danger of a European predominance will appear from a different quarter—from one of our present allies, or from some upstart state which may rise to power with an even greater rapidity than the Electorate47 of Brandenburg. Or it may be that before long the New World, in fact as well as phrase, may have come in to redress48 the balance of the Old. We cannot say, because we cannot foresee what the future holds in store. But from the opening of the present century, the immediate49 danger came from Germany, who hardly troubled to conceal50 the fact that she was aiming at predominance by mastery of the Low Countries and by crushing France.
{247}
CONDITIONS OF BRITISH FREEDOM
That this danger was from time to time regarded seriously by a section of the British Cabinet, we know from their own statements both before war broke out and subsequently. It was no chimera51 confined to the imaginations of irresponsible and panic-stricken writers. In sober truth the balance of power in Europe was in as much danger, and the maintenance of it had become as supreme52 a British interest, under a Liberal government at the beginning of the twentieth century, as it ever was under a Whig government at the close of the seventeenth and opening of the eighteenth.
The stealthy return of this doctrine into the region of practical politics was not due to the prejudices of the party which happened to be in power. Quite the contrary. Most Liberals distrusted the phrase. The whole mass of the Radicals53 abhorred54 it. The idea which lay under and behind the phrase was nevertheless irresistible55, because it arose out of the facts. Had a Socialist56 Government held office, this policy must equally have imposed itself and been accepted with a good or ill grace, for the simple reason that, unless the balance of power is maintained in Europe, there can be no security for British freedom, under which we mean, with God's help, to work out our own problems in our own way.
English statesmen had adopted this policy in fact, if unavowedly—perhaps even to some extent unconsciously—when they first entered into, and afterwards confirmed, the Triple Entente. And having once entered into the Triple Entente it was obvious that, without risking still graver consequences, we could never resume the detached position which we occupied before we took that step. It is difficult to {248} believe—seeing how the danger of German predominance threatened France and Russia as well as ourselves—that we should not have excited the ill-will of those two countries had we refused to make common cause by joining the Triple Entente. It was obvious, however, to every one that we could not afterwards retire from this association without incurring57 their hostility58. If we had withdrawn59 we should have been left, not merely without a friend in Europe, but with all the chief Powers in Europe our enemies—ready upon the first favourable occasion to combine against us.
There is only one precedent60 in our history for so perilous61 a situation—when Napoleon forced Europe into a combination against us in 1806. And this precedent, though it then threatened our Empire with grave dangers, did not threaten it with dangers comparable in gravity with those which menaced us a century later.
The consequences of breaking away from the Triple Entente were sufficiently62 plain. "We may build ships against one nation, or even against a combination of nations. But we cannot build ships against half Europe. If Western Europe, with all its ports, its harbours, its arsenals63, and its resources, was to fall under the domination of a single will, no effort of ours would be sufficient to retain the command of the sea. It is a balance of power on the continent, which alone makes it possible for us to retain it. Thus the maintenance of the balance of power is vital to our superiority at sea, which again is vital to the security of the British Empire."[2]
{249}
Security in the widest sense was the ultimate end of our policy—security of mind, security from periodic panic, as well as actual military security. Looked at more closely, the immediate end was defence—the defence of the British Empire and of the United Kingdom.
DEFENCE AND INVASION
In the existing condition of the world a policy of 'splendid isolation64' was no longer possible. Conditions with which we are familiar in commercial affairs, had presented themselves in the political sphere, and co-operation on a large scale had become necessary in order to avoid bankruptcy65. England had entered into the Triple Entente because her statesmen realised, clearly or vaguely66, that by doing so we should be better able to defend our existence, and for no other reason.
After 1911 it must have been obvious to most people who considered the matter carefully that in certain events the Triple Entente would become an alliance. It is the interest as well as the duty of allies to stand by one another from first to last, and act together in the manner most likely to result in victory for the alliance. What then was the manner of co-operation most likely to result in victory for that alliance which lay dormant67 under the Triple Entente?
But first of all, to clear away one obscurity—Invasion was not our problem; Defence was our problem; for the greater included the less.
The word 'defence' is apt to carry different meanings to different minds. The best defence of England and British interests, at any given time, may or may not consist in keeping our main army in the United Kingdom and waiting to be attacked here. It all depends upon the special circumstances {250} of each case. The final decision must be governed by one consideration, and one only—how to strike the speediest, heaviest, and most disabling blow at the aggressor. If by keeping our army in England and endeavouring to lure68 the enemy into our toils69, that end is most likely to be accomplished70, then it is obviously best to keep our army here. If by sending it into the north of France to combine with the French the supreme military object has a superior chance of being achieved, then it is best to send it into the north of France.
A defensive71 war cannot be defined and circumscribed72 as a war to drive out invaders73, or even to prevent the landing of invaders. The best way to defend your castle may be to man the walls, to fall upon the enemy at the ford6, to harry74 his lands, or even to attack him in his castle. There is no fixed75 rule. The circumstances in each case make the rule.
CO-OPERATION WITH FRANCE
A war is not less a defensive war if you strike at your enemy in his own territory, or if you come to the aid of your ally, whose territory has been invaded or is threatened. In the circumstances which prevailed for a considerable number of years prior to the outbreak of the present war, it gradually became more and more obvious, that our soundest defence would be joint76 action with France upon her north-eastern frontier. For there, beyond any doubt, would Germany's supreme effort be made against the Triple Entente. If the attack failed at that point, it would be the heaviest and most disabling blow which our enemy could suffer. If, on the other hand, it succeeded, France and England would have to continue the struggle on terms immensely less favourable.
{251}
This opinion was not by any means unanimously or clearly held; but during the summer of 1911 and subsequently, it was undoubtedly77 the hypothesis upon which those members of our Government relied, who were chiefly responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs. Unfortunately Parliament and the country had never accepted either the policy or its consequences; they had never been asked to accept either the one or the other; nor had they been educated with a view to their acceptance.
At that time the error was exceedingly prevalent, that it is a more comfortable business fighting in your own country than in somebody else's. From this it followed that it would be folly78 to engage in what were termed disapprovingly79 'foreign adventures,' and that we should be wise to await attack behind our own shores. Recent events have wrought80 such a complete and rapid conversion81 from this heresy82, that it is no longer worth while wasting words in exposing it. It is necessary, however, to recall how influential83 this view of the matter was, not only up to the declaration of war, but even for some time afterwards.
As to the precise form of co-operation between the members of the Triple Entente in case of war, there could be no great mystery. It was obvious to any one who paid attention to what happened during the summer and autumn of 1911, that in the event of Germany attacking France over the Agadir dispute, we had let it be understood and expected, that we should send our Expeditionary Force across the Channel to co-operate with the French army on the north-eastern frontier.
[1] It can hardly be overlooked, however, that this principle, rightly or wrongly interpreted, had something to do with the Crimean War (1854-56) and with the British attitude at the Congress of Berlin (1878).
[2] Viscount Milner in the United Service Magazine, January 1912.
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1
epoch
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| n.(新)时代；历元 | |
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inadequate
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| adj.(for,to)不充足的，不适当的 | |
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dominions
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| 统治权( dominion的名词复数 )； 领土； 疆土； 版图 | |
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controversy
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| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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Ford
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| n.浅滩，水浅可涉处；v.涉水，涉过 | |
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continental
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| adj.大陆的，大陆性的，欧洲大陆的 | |
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dispositions
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| 安排( disposition的名词复数 )； 倾向； （财产、金钱的）处置； 气质 | |
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unwilling
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| adj.不情愿的 | |
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rivalries
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| n.敌对，竞争，对抗( rivalry的名词复数 ) | |
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unwillingness
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| n. 不愿意，不情愿 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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turmoil
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| n.骚乱，混乱，动乱 | |
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jealousies
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| n.妒忌( jealousy的名词复数 )；妒羡 | |
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reactionary
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| n.反动者，反动主义者；adj.反动的，反动主义的，反对改革的 | |
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chauvinistic
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| a.沙文主义(者)的 | |
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hull
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| n.船身；(果、实等的)外壳；vt.去(谷物等)壳 | |
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stew
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| n.炖汤，焖，烦恼；v.炖汤，焖，忧虑 | |
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conqueror
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| n.征服者，胜利者 | |
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favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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compensate
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| vt.补偿，赔偿；酬报 vi.弥补；补偿；抵消 | |
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soothe
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| v.安慰；使平静；使减轻；缓和；奉承 | |
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diplomacy
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| n.外交；外交手腕，交际手腕 | |
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entente
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| n.协定；有协定关系的各国 | |
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maxims
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| n.格言，座右铭( maxim的名词复数 ) | |
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underlying
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| adj.在下面的，含蓄的，潜在的 | |
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whatsoever
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| adv.（用于否定句中以加强语气）任何；pron.无论什么 | |
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tyrants
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| 专制统治者( tyrant的名词复数 )； 暴君似的人； （古希腊的）僭主； 严酷的事物 | |
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dividends
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| 红利( dividend的名词复数 )； 股息； 被除数； （足球彩票的）彩金 | |
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abjure
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| v.发誓放弃 | |
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contemn
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kernel
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| n.(果实的)核，仁；(问题)的中心，核心 | |
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overt
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| adj.公开的，明显的，公然的 | |
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matador
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| n.斗牛士 | |
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defiantly
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radical
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| n.激进份子，原子团，根号；adj.根本的，激进的，彻底的 | |
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abeyance
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| n.搁置，缓办，中止，产权未定 | |
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discredited
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| 不足信的，不名誉的 | |
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actively
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| adv.积极地，勤奋地 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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indirectly
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| adv.间接地，不直接了当地 | |
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monarchs
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| 君主，帝王( monarch的名词复数 ) | |
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lesser
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| adj.次要的，较小的；adv.较小地，较少地 | |
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remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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electorate
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| n.全体选民；选区 | |
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redress
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| n.赔偿，救济，矫正；v.纠正，匡正，革除 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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conceal
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| v.隐藏，隐瞒，隐蔽 | |
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chimera
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| n.神话怪物；梦幻 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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radicals
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| n.激进分子( radical的名词复数 )；根基；基本原理；[数学]根数 | |
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abhorred
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| v.憎恶( abhor的过去式和过去分词 )；（厌恶地）回避；拒绝；淘汰 | |
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irresistible
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| adj.非常诱人的，无法拒绝的，无法抗拒的 | |
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socialist
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| n.社会主义者；adj.社会主义的 | |
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incurring
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| 遭受，招致，引起( incur的现在分词 ) | |
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hostility
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| n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争 | |
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withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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precedent
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| n.先例，前例；惯例；adj.在前的，在先的 | |
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perilous
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| adj.危险的，冒险的 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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arsenals
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| n.兵工厂，军火库( arsenal的名词复数 )；任何事物的集成 | |
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isolation
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| n.隔离，孤立，分解，分离 | |
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bankruptcy
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| n.破产；无偿付能力 | |
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vaguely
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| adv.含糊地，暖昧地 | |
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dormant
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| adj.暂停活动的；休眠的；潜伏的 | |
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lure
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| n.吸引人的东西，诱惑物；vt.引诱，吸引 | |
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toils
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| 网 | |
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accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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circumscribed
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| adj.[医]局限的：受限制或限于有限空间的v.在…周围划线( circumscribe的过去式和过去分词 )；划定…范围；限制；限定 | |
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73
invaders
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| 入侵者，侵略者，侵入物( invader的名词复数 ) | |
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74
harry
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| vt.掠夺，蹂躏，使苦恼 | |
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75
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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76
joint
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| adj.联合的，共同的；n.关节，接合处；v.连接，贴合 | |
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77
undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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78
folly
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| n.愚笨，愚蠢，蠢事，蠢行，傻话 | |
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79
disapprovingly
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| adv.不以为然地，不赞成地，非难地 | |
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80
wrought
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| v.引起；以…原料制作；运转；adj.制造的 | |
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81
conversion
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| n.转化，转换，转变 | |
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82
heresy
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| n.异端邪说；异教 | |
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83
influential
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| adj.有影响的，有权势的 | |
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