The full gravity of the Agadir incident, though apparent to other nations, was never realised by the people of this country. The crisis arose suddenly in July 1911. Six weeks later it had subsided1; but it was not until well on in the autumn that its meanings were grasped, even by that comparatively small section of the public who interest themselves in problems of defence and foreign affairs. From October onwards, however, an increasing number began to awake to the fact, that war had only been avoided by inches, and to consider seriously—many of them for the first time in their lives—what would have happened if England had become involved in a European conflict.
THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
From various official statements, and from discussions which from time to time had taken place in Parliament, it was understood that our 'Expeditionary Force' consisted of six infantry2 divisions, a cavalry3 division, and army troops;[1] also that the national resources permitted of this force being kept up to full strength for a period of at least six months, after making all reasonable deductions4 for the wastage of {253} war. Was this enough? Enough for what? ... To uphold British policy; to preserve Imperial security; to enable the Triple Entente5 to maintain the balance of power in Europe. These were vague phrases; what did they actually amount to? ... The adequacy or inadequacy6 of such an army as this for doing what was required of it—for securing speedy victory in event of war—or still better for preserving peace by the menace which it opposed to German schemes of aggression7—can only be tested by considering the broad facts with regard to numbers, efficiency, and readiness of all the armies which would be engaged directly, or indirectly8, in a European struggle.
War, however, had been avoided in 1911, and not a few people were therefore convinced that the menace of the available British army, together with the other consequences to be apprehended9 from the participation10 of this country, had been sufficient to deter11 Germany from pursuing her schemes of aggression, if indeed she had actually harboured any notions of the kind. But others, not altogether satisfied with this explanation and conclusion, were inclined to press their enquiries somewhat further. Supposing war had actually been declared, would the British force have been sufficient—acting in conjunction with the French army—to repel12 a German invasion of France and Belgium, to hurl13 back the aggressors and overwhelm them in defeat? Would it have been sufficient to accomplish the more modest aim of holding the enemy at his own frontiers, or even—supposing that by a swift surprise he had been able to overrun Belgium—at any rate to keep him out of France?
{254}
When people proceeded to seek for answers to these questions, as many did during the year 1912, they speedily discovered that, in considerations of this sort, the governing factor is numbers—the numbers of the opposing forces available at the outbreak of war and in the period immediately following. The tremendous power of national spirit must needs be left out of such calculations as a thing immeasurable, imponderable, and uncertain. It was also unsafe to assume that the courage, intelligence, efficiency, armament, transport, equipment, supplies, and leadership of the German and Austrian armies would be in any degree inferior to those of the Triple Entente. Certain things had to be allowed for in a rough and ready way;[2] but the main enquiry was forced to concern itself with numerical strength.
There was not room for much disagreement upon the broad facts of the military situation, among soldiers and civilians15 who, from 1911 onwards, gave themselves to the study of this subject at the available sources of information; and their estimates have been confirmed, in the main, by what has happened since war began. The Intelligence departments of London, Paris, and Petrograd—with much ampler means of knowledge at their disposal—can have arrived at no other conclusions. What the English War Office knew, the Committee of Imperial Defence likewise knew; and the leading members of the Cabinet, if not the whole Government, must be presumed to have been equally well informed.
It was assumed in these calculations, that in case of tension between the Triple Entente and the Triple {255} Alliance, the latter would not be able—in the first instance at all events—to bring its full strength into the struggle. For unless Germany and Austria managed their diplomacy16 before the outbreak of hostilities17 with incomparable skill, it seemed improbable that the Italian people would consent to engage in a costly18, and perhaps ruinous, war—a war against France, with whom they had no quarrel; against England, towards whom they had long cherished feelings of friendship; on behalf of the Habsburg Empire, which they still regarded—and not altogether unreasonably—with suspicion and enmity.
NEUTRALITY OF ITALY
But although the neutrality of Italy might be regarded as a likelihood at the opening of the war, it could not be reckoned on with any certainty as a permanent condition. For as no one can forecast the course of a campaign, so no one can feel secure that the unexpected may not happen at any moment. The consequences of a defeat in this quarter or in that, may offer too great temptations to the cupidity19 of onlookers20; while diplomacy, though it may have bungled21 in the beginning, is sure to have many opportunities of recovering its influence as the situation develops. Consequently, unless and until Italy actually joined in the struggle on the side of the Triple Entente, a considerable section of the French army would, in common prudence22, have to be left on guard upon the Savoy frontier.
In a war brought on by the aggressive designs of Germany, the only nations whose participation could be reckoned on with certainty—and this only supposing that Britain stood firmly by the policy upon which her Government had embarked—were Russia, {256} France, and ourselves on the one side, Germany and Austria-Hungary on the other.
It would certainly be necessary for Germany, as well as Austria, to provide troops for coast defences, and also for the frontiers of neutral countries, which might have the temptation, in certain circumstances, to deneutralise themselves at an inconvenient23 moment, if they were left unwatched. On the north and west were Denmark, Holland, and Belgium, each of which had a small field army, besides garrison24 and fortress25 troops which might be turned to more active account upon an emergency. On the south and east were Montenegro, Servia, and Roumania, whose military resources were on a considerable scale, and whose neutrality was not a thing altogether to be counted on, even before the Balkan war[3] had lowered the prestige of Turkey. In addition there was Italy, who although a pledged ally in a defensive26 war was not likely, for that reason, to consider herself bound to neutrality, benevolent27 or otherwise, if in her judgment28, the particular contingencies29 which called for her support had not arisen at the outset.
SUPERIORITY OF GERMAN NUMBERS
After taking such precautions as seemed prudent30 under these heads, Germany would then be obliged to detach for service, in co-operation with the Austrians in Poland, and along the whole eastern border, a sufficient number of army corps31 to secure substantial superiority over the maximum forces which Russia, hampered32 by an inadequate33 railway system and various military considerations,[4] could {257} be expected to bring into the field and maintain there during the first few months of the war.
It was reckoned[5] after taking all these things into account, that Germany would have available, for the invasion of France, an army consisting of some ninety divisions—roughly, rather more than a million and three-quarters of men—and that she could maintain this force at its full strength—repairing the wastage of war out of her ample reserves—for a period of at least six months. It was assumed that the Kaiser, relying upon the much slower mobilisation of Russia, would undoubtedly34 decide to use the whole of this huge force in the west, in the hope that before pressure could begin to make itself felt in the east, France would either have been crushed, as she was in 1870, or so much mangled35 that it would be possible to send reinforcements of an overwhelming character to make victory secure in Poland.
Against this German force of 1,800,000, France, according to the best information available, could put into the field and maintain at full strength for a similar period of six months about 1,300,000 men. But this was the utmost that could be expected of the French, and the initial discrepancy36 of 500,000 men was very serious. It precluded37 all reasonable hope on their part of being able to take the offensive, to which form of warfare38 the genius of the people was most adapted. It would compel them to remain on the defensive, for which it was believed at that {258} time—though wrongly, as events have proved—that they were ill suited by temperament39 as well as tradition.
If England joined in the war by land as well as sea the numerical deficiency would be reduced to 340,000 on the arrival of our Expeditionary Force. In this connection, as well as for other reasons, the attitude of Holland and Belgium, and that of Germany with respect to these two countries, were clearly matters of high importance.
Holland had a field army of four divisions, and her interests could be summed up in the words, 'preservation40 of independence.' She would naturally wish to avoid being actively41 embroiled42 in the war on one side or the other; and, fortunately for her, she had every reason to believe that her neutrality would not be disturbed or questioned. Her territories lay to one side of the probable campaign area, and moreover, whatever might be the ulterior designs of Germany with regard to western expansion, it was obvious that her immediate14 interests must necessarily lie in Dutch neutrality, which would be infinitely43 more useful to her than a Dutch alliance. For Holland holds the mouths of the Scheldt and Rhine, and so long as she remained neutral, it was anticipated that imports and exports would readily find their way into and out of Germany. This advantage would cease were Britain to establish a blockade of these inlets, as she would certainly do if they belonged to a hostile Power.
POSITION OF BELGIUM
In certain respects Belgium was in the same case as Holland. She likewise had a field army of four divisions, and her interests could be summed up in the words, 'preservation of independence.' But {259} here all resemblance between the two countries ended.
Belgium was not merely the southern portion (Holland being the northern) of that Naboth's vineyard, the possession of which German visionaries had proclaimed to be essential to Teutonic world-power. Belgium was more even than this. If the permanent possession of Belgian territory was a political object in the future, temporary occupation was no less a military necessity of the present. For in order that Germany might benefit in full measure by her numerical superiority, Belgian roads and railways were required, along which to transport her troops, and Belgian hills and plains on which to deploy44 them. If Germany were confined to the use of her own frontiers she would not only lose in swiftness of attack, but her legions would be piled up, one behind another, like a crowd coming out of a theatre. She needed space on which to spread out her superior numbers in order that her superior numbers might make certain of victory.
There was an idea at this time (1911-12) that Germany would be satisfied to keep to the south-east of the fortified45 line of the Meuse—moving through Luxemburg and the mountains of the Ardennes—and that if Belgium saw fit to yield, under protest, to force majeure, the northern region, containing the great plain of Flanders and all cities of importance, would be left inviolate46. This theory was probably erroneous, for the reason that—as the event has shown—Germany required a greater space and more favourable47 ground, than would have been provided under this arrangement, in order to bring her great superiority to bear.
{260}
With the French on the other hand there was no similar advantage to be gained by the violation48 of Belgian neutrality. From their point of view the shorter the battle front could be kept the better. If Belgium chose to range herself by the side of France as a willing ally it would undoubtedly be a great gain; but if she chose to remain neutral the French could have no object in invading or occupying her territories.
It was assumed, and no doubt rightly, that, like Holland, Belgium would prefer to remain neutral—leaving the question of future absorption to take care of itself—provided she could do this without enduring the humiliation49 of allowing foreign armies to violate her soil. For she knew that, in the event of a French victory, her independence would remain assured; whereas, if the Germans were successful, she would have avoided awakening50 their hostility51 and giving them an excuse for annexation52. But even if Belgium, under gross provocation53, were forced to take sides against Germany, the deficit54 in numbers on the side of the Triple Entente would only be reduced by some eighty or a hundred thousand men. The deficit would still stand, roughly, at a quarter of a million men.
INADEQUACY OF BRITISH ARMY
In view of the foregoing considerations it was clearly absurd to think that our own small force was at all adequate, in a military sense, to deter Germany from engaging in a war of aggression. Had we been able, during the years 1912 to 1914, to see into the minds of the German General Staff we should probably have realised that this inadequacy was even greater than it appeared. We should then have {261} known that the numbers of the Kaiser's striking force had been carefully understated; and that the amount of preparations in the way of material had been hidden away with an equal industry. We should also have learned, that the sending of our army abroad was viewed with scepticism in German military circles, as an event hardly likely to occur. But even if our Expeditionary Force did go, it was altogether inadequate to redress55 the adverse56 balance; still more inadequate to bring an immediate victory within the range of practical possibility. It was inadequate to hold back the premeditated invasion, either at the German frontier, or even at the French frontier. It was inadequate to make Belgian resistance effective, even if that nation should determine to throw in its lot with the Triple Entente.
As a matter of the very simplest arithmetic our land forces were inadequate for any of these purposes. They were unequal to the task of maintaining the balance of power by giving a numerical superiority to the armies of the Triple Entente. Our armaments therefore did not correspond with our policy. It was clear that they would not be able to uphold that policy if it were put to the supreme57 test of war. It was impossible to abandon our policy. It was not impossible, and it was not even in 1912 too late, to have set about strengthening our armaments. Nothing of the kind, however, was undertaken by the Government, whose spokesmen, official and unofficial, employed themselves more congenially in deriding58 and rebuking59 Lord Roberts for calling attention to the danger.
Of course if it had been possible to place reliance upon the statement of the English War Minister, {262} made little more than a year before war broke out,[6] that every soldier under the voluntary system is worth ten conscripts, we and our Allies would have been in a position of complete security. In that case our force of 160,000 would have been the equivalent of 1,600,000 Germans, and we should from the first have been in a superiority of more than a million over our enemies.
Even if we could have credited the more modest assumption of the Attorney-General—made nearly four months after war broke out—that one volunteer was worth three 'pressed' men, the opposing forces would have been somewhere about an equality.[7]
Unfortunately both these methods of ready-reckoning were at fault, except for their immediate purpose of soothing60, or deluding61 the particular audiences to which they were addressed. The words were meaningless and absurd in a military sense; though conceivably they possessed62 some occult political virtue63, and might help, for a time at least, to avert64 the retribution which is due to unfaithful stewards65.
Both these distinguished66 statesmen, as well as {263} many of their colleagues and followers67, were beset68 by the error of false opposites. A soldier who has enlisted69 voluntarily, and another who is a conscript or 'pressed' man, have equally to fight their country's enemies when they are ordered to do so. In both cases the particular war may be against their consciences and judgments70; and their participation in it may therefore be involuntary.
Of two men—equal in age, strength, training, and courage—one of whom believes his cause to be just, while the other does not, there can be no doubt that the former will fight better than the latter—even though the latter was enlisted under the voluntary system while the former was a conscript or 'pressed' man. In this sense the superiority of the 'voluntary' principle is incontestable. But is there any evidence to show, that either the original soldiers, or the new levies71, of the German army are risking their lives in this war any less willingly than our own countrymen, who went out with the Expeditionary Force, or those others who have since responded to Lord Kitchener's appeal? Is there any reason to suppose that they are fighting any less bravely and intelligently?[8]
Another matter of importance in these calculations with regard to the military strength of the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance was the time limit.
THE THREE PERIODS OF WAR
There are three periods in war. There is the onset72 of war, where swiftness of action is what tells most; there is the grip of war, where numbers of {264} trained men are what tell most; and there is the drag of war, when what tells most is the purse.
Speaking by the book, it is of course numbers which tell all the way through. At the beginning—in the onset—the aim is to hurl superior numbers at a vital point—taking the enemy by surprise, and thereby73 disordering his whole plan of campaign—very much as you knock a limpet off a rock, with a sharp unexpected blow.
If this effort fails to settle matters, then we are in the grip. Here it is a case of sheer heavy slogging of all the available trained troops. The weaker side is driven to the defensive. It is found making use of every artificial and natural advantage to counteract74 the superiority which threatens it, and which must speedily prevail, if only it be superior enough.
Finally, after a longer or shorter period of indecisive deadlock75, the time comes when trained troops and material of war accumulated in advance begin to run short—when new levies, raised since the war broke out, begin to take the field, well or ill equipped, well or ill armed, as the case may be. When this stage is reached we are in the drag of war; and the side which can best afford to feed, clothe, and arm its fresh reinforcements stands at an enormous advantage.
In 1870 war was announced on July 15th, and formally declared on the 19th. Three weeks later, on August 6th, the important battles of Woerth and Spicheren were won by the Germans. On September 2nd, the issue of the war was decided76, when the Emperor of the French, with his main army, surrendered at Sedan. Metz fell in the last days of October, and Paris on the first day of March in the {265} following year. In that war the onset settled everything. There was no real grip of the opposing forces. The German attack had been so swift, vigorous, and successful that France was knocked out in the first round.
RESULTS OF SUCCESS IN ONSET
The speed with which great armies can be mobilised and hurled77 against one another has not diminished in the forty odd years which have elapsed since the débacle. On the contrary, the art of war has been largely concerned in the interval78 with the vital question, how to get in the first deadly blow.
The military view was, that probably not earlier than the fifteenth day—certainly not later than the twenty-first—a battle would take place which must be of the highest importance, and which might quite well be decisive. It might make ultimate German victory only a matter of time; or it might only determine whether the ensuing campaign was to be waged on French or German soil—whether there was to be a German invasion of France or a Franco-British invasion of Germany. Consequently, if our Expeditionary Force was to render assistance at the critical time, it must reach its position on the frontier within a fortnight of the outbreak of war.
As to the drag of war, the Triple Entente had the advantage, if that stage were ever reached. For the purses of England, France, and Russia were much longer than those of Germany and Austria. It was important, however, to remember that there would be no hope for us in the drag of war, if Germany could deliver a heavy enough blow at the beginning, as she did in 1870.
These were the considerations as to time, which presented themselves to students of the military {266} situation during the breathing space which followed upon the Agadir crisis. The substantial accuracy of this forecast was confirmed by what happened during August and September of last year. In 1914 war was declared by Germany on August 1st. For several days before she had been engaged actively in mobilisation. Three weeks later three important battles—on the road to Metz, at Charleroi, and at Mons[9]—were won by the Germans. If it had not been for the unexpected obstacle of Liège the last two engagements would in all probability have been fought at an even earlier date, and in circumstances much more unfavourable to the Franco-British forces. But in the early days of September, instead of the crushing defeat of Sedan, there was the victory of the Marne, and the Germans were forced to retreat to entrenched79 positions north of the Aisne.[10]
The onset period was ended; but the issue had not been settled as in 1870. France and England had not been knocked out in the first round. To this extent the supreme German endeavour had miscarried. Nevertheless a great advantage had been secured by our enemies, inasmuch as it was now apparent that the ensuing campaign—the grip of war—would be contested, not on German soil, but in France and Belgium.
LIMITATIONS OF SEA POWER
The value of the assistance which the British Navy would be able to render to the cause of the Triple Entente was a consideration of the highest importance. But while the fleet, if the national confidence in it were justified80, would render invaluable81 assistance to military operations, it was necessary {267} to bear in mind—what Englishmen in recent times have been very apt to forget—that no success at sea, whether it consisted in the wholesale82 destruction of hostile ships, or in an absolute blockade of the enemy's coast, could by itself determine the main issue of a European contest of this character. Disaster in a land battle could not be compensated83 for, nor could the balance of power be maintained, by any naval84 victory. War would not be brought to an end favourable to the Triple Entente, even by a victory as complete as that of Trafalgar. It is also well to remember that peace came, not after Trafalgar, but after Waterloo, nearly ten years later.
The strange idea that the security of the British Empire can be maintained by the Navy alone, seems to be derived85 by a false process of reasoning, from the undeniable truth, that the supremacy86 of our Navy is essential to our security. But though it is essential—and the first essential—it is not the only essential of security.
An insular87 Power, largely dependent on sea-borne food supplies and raw materials for its industries—a Power which governs an empire in the East, which has dependencies scattered88 in every sea, which is politically united with immense but sparsely89 peopled dominions90 in the four quarters of the globe—must keep command of the sea. If that supremacy were once lost the British Empire, as an empire, would come to an end. Its early dissolution would be inevitable91. Therefore it is true enough to say that if the German Alliance—or any other alliance—were to win a decisive naval victory against Britain, it would end the war completely and effectively so far as we were concerned.
{268}
But the converse92 is not the case, and for obvious reasons. In a contest with a continental93 enemy who conquers on land, while we win victory after victory at sea, the result will not be a settlement in our favour, but a drawn94 issue. And the draw will be to his advantage, not our own. For having overthrown95 the balance of power by reason of his successful campaign and invasions, he will then be free to concentrate his whole energies upon wresting96 away naval supremacy from the British Empire. In time the Sea Power which is only a Sea Power will be overborne with numbers, and finally worsted by the victorious97 Land Power. For how is it possible to fight with one hand against an enemy with two hands? The fleets of Europe which at last must be combined against us, if we allow any rival to obtain a European predominance, are too heavy odds98. German preparations alone were already causing us grave anxiety nearly three years before the Agadir crisis occurred. How then could we hope to build against the whole of Europe? Or even against half of Europe, if the other half remained coldly neutral?
[1] In all about 160,000 men, of whom some 25,000 were non-combatants.
[2] Such, for instance, as the fact that the time-table of German mobilisation appeared to be somewhat more rapid than that of the French, and much more so than that of the Russians.
[3] The first Balkan war broke out in the autumn of 1912.
[4] Russia had anxieties of her own with regard to the intentions of Roumania, of Turkey in Persia and the Caucasus, and of China and Japan in the Far East.
[5] These calculations were worked out in various ways, but the net results arrived at were always substantially the same. In view of the fact that the main conclusions have been amply proved by the results of the present war, it does not seem worth while to weary the reader with more sums in arithmetic than are absolutely necessary.
[6] Colonel Seely at Heanor, April 26, 1913.
[7] Sir John Simon (Attorney-General and a Cabinet Minister), at Ashton-under-Lyne, November 21, 1914.... This speech is instructive reading. It is also comforting for the assurance it contains, that if the speaker approved of our taking part in this war (as he vowed99 he did) his audience might rest satisfied that it was indeed a righteous war; seeing that war was a thing which, on principle, he (Sir John Simon) very much reprehended100. And yet we are not wholly convinced and reassured101. There is a touch of over-emphasis—as if perhaps, after all, the orator102 needed the support of his own vehemence103 to keep him reminded of the righteousness. The pacifist in war-paint is apt to overact the unfamiliar104 part. One wonders from what sort of British officer at the front the Attorney-General had derived the impression that 'one' of our own voluntary soldiers—gallant fellows though they are—is the equal of 'three' of the Germans who face him, or of the Frenchmen who fight by his side.... This speech puts us not a little in mind of Evangelist's warning to Christian105, with regard to Mr. Legality's fluent promises to relieve him of his burden—"There is nothing in all this noise save a design to beguile106 thee of thy salvation107."
[8] Sir John Simon clinched108 his arithmetical calculation of 'three' to 'one,' by stating that 'the Kaiser already knew it'; and this reassuring109 statement was received with 'laughter and cheers.' The laughter we can understand.
[9] The battle in Northern Alsace was fought on August 21 and 22. A French army was driven back at Charleroi on the 22nd, and the British at Mons on the 23rd.
[10] September 6-12.
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subsided
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| v.（土地）下陷（因在地下采矿）( subside的过去式和过去分词 )；减弱；下降至较低或正常水平；一下子坐在椅子等上 | |
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infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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deductions
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| 扣除( deduction的名词复数 )； 结论； 扣除的量； 推演 | |
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entente
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| n.协定；有协定关系的各国 | |
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inadequacy
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| n.无法胜任，信心不足 | |
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aggression
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| n.进攻，侵略，侵犯，侵害 | |
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indirectly
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| adv.间接地，不直接了当地 | |
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apprehended
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| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 )； 理解 | |
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participation
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| n.参与，参加，分享 | |
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deter
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| vt.阻止，使不敢，吓住 | |
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repel
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| v.击退，抵制，拒绝，排斥 | |
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hurl
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| vt.猛投，力掷，声叫骂 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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civilians
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| 平民，百姓( civilian的名词复数 )； 老百姓 | |
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diplomacy
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| n.外交；外交手腕，交际手腕 | |
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hostilities
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| n.战争；敌意(hostility的复数)；敌对状态；战事 | |
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costly
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| adj.昂贵的，价值高的，豪华的 | |
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cupidity
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| n.贪心，贪财 | |
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onlookers
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| n.旁观者，观看者( onlooker的名词复数 ) | |
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bungled
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| v.搞糟，完不成( bungle的过去式和过去分词 )；笨手笨脚地做；失败；完不成 | |
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prudence
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| n.谨慎，精明，节俭 | |
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inconvenient
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| adj.不方便的，令人感到麻烦的 | |
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garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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fortress
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| n.堡垒，防御工事 | |
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defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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benevolent
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| adj.仁慈的，乐善好施的 | |
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judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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contingencies
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| n.偶然发生的事故，意外事故( contingency的名词复数 )；以备万一 | |
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prudent
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| adj.谨慎的，有远见的，精打细算的 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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hampered
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| 妨碍，束缚，限制( hamper的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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33
inadequate
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| adj.(for,to)不充足的，不适当的 | |
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34
undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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35
mangled
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| vt.乱砍（mangle的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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36
discrepancy
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| n.不同；不符；差异；矛盾 | |
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37
precluded
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| v.阻止( preclude的过去式和过去分词 )；排除；妨碍；使…行不通 | |
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38
warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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39
temperament
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| n.气质，性格，性情 | |
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40
preservation
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| n.保护，维护，保存，保留，保持 | |
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41
actively
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| adv.积极地，勤奋地 | |
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42
embroiled
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| adj.卷入的；纠缠不清的 | |
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43
infinitely
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| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
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44
deploy
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| v.（军）散开成战斗队形，布置，展开 | |
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45
fortified
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| adj. 加强的 | |
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46
inviolate
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| adj.未亵渎的，未受侵犯的 | |
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47
favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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violation
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| n.违反(行为)，违背(行为)，侵犯 | |
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49
humiliation
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| n.羞辱 | |
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50
awakening
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| n.觉醒，醒悟 adj.觉醒中的；唤醒的 | |
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51
hostility
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| n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争 | |
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52
annexation
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| n.吞并，合并 | |
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53
provocation
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| n.激怒，刺激，挑拨，挑衅的事物，激怒的原因 | |
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deficit
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| n.亏空，亏损；赤字，逆差 | |
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redress
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| n.赔偿，救济，矫正；v.纠正，匡正，革除 | |
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adverse
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| adj.不利的；有害的；敌对的，不友好的 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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deriding
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| v.取笑，嘲笑( deride的现在分词 ) | |
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rebuking
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| 责难或指责( rebuke的现在分词 ) | |
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soothing
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| adj.慰藉的；使人宽心的；镇静的 | |
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deluding
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| v.欺骗，哄骗( delude的现在分词 ) | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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avert
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| v.防止，避免；转移(目光、注意力等) | |
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stewards
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| （轮船、飞机等的）乘务员( steward的名词复数 )； （俱乐部、旅馆、工会等的）管理员； （大型活动的）组织者； （私人家中的）管家 | |
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distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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followers
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| 追随者( follower的名词复数 )； 用户； 契据的附面； 从动件 | |
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beset
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| v.镶嵌；困扰，包围 | |
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enlisted
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| adj.应募入伍的v.（使）入伍， （使）参军( enlist的过去式和过去分词 )；获得（帮助或支持） | |
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judgments
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| 判断( judgment的名词复数 )； 鉴定； 评价； 审判 | |
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levies
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| （部队）征兵( levy的名词复数 )； 募捐； 被征募的军队 | |
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72
onset
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| n.进攻，袭击，开始，突然开始 | |
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73
thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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74
counteract
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| vt.对…起反作用，对抗，抵消 | |
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deadlock
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| n.僵局，僵持 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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hurled
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| v.猛投，用力掷( hurl的过去式和过去分词 )；大声叫骂 | |
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interval
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| n.间隔，间距；幕间休息，中场休息 | |
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79
entrenched
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| adj.确立的，不容易改的(风俗习惯) | |
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80
justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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81
invaluable
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| adj.无价的，非常宝贵的，极为贵重的 | |
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82
wholesale
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| n.批发；adv.以批发方式；vt.批发，成批出售 | |
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83
compensated
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| 补偿，报酬( compensate的过去式和过去分词 )； 给（某人）赔偿（或赔款） | |
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84
naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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85
derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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86
supremacy
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| n.至上；至高权力 | |
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87
insular
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| adj.岛屿的，心胸狭窄的 | |
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88
scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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sparsely
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| adv.稀疏地；稀少地；不足地；贫乏地 | |
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dominions
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| 统治权( dominion的名词复数 )； 领土； 疆土； 版图 | |
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91
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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92
converse
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| vi.谈话，谈天，闲聊；adv.相反的，相反 | |
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continental
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| adj.大陆的，大陆性的，欧洲大陆的 | |
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94
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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95
overthrown
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| adj. 打翻的，推倒的，倾覆的 动词overthrow的过去分词 | |
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96
wresting
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| 动词wrest的现在进行式 | |
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97
victorious
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| adj.胜利的，得胜的 | |
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98
odds
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| n.让步，机率，可能性，比率；胜败优劣之别 | |
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99
vowed
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| 起誓，发誓（vow的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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100
reprehended
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| v.斥责，指摘，责备( reprehend的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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101
reassured
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| adj.使消除疑虑的；使放心的v.再保证，恢复信心( reassure的过去式和过去分词) | |
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102
orator
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| n.演说者，演讲者，雄辩家 | |
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103
vehemence
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| n.热切；激烈；愤怒 | |
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104
unfamiliar
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| adj.陌生的，不熟悉的 | |
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105
Christian
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| adj.基督教徒的；n.基督教徒 | |
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106
beguile
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| vt.欺骗，消遣 | |
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107
salvation
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| n.（尤指基督）救世，超度，拯救，解困 | |
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108
clinched
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| v.（尤指两人）互相紧紧抱[扭]住( clinch的过去式和过去分词 )；解决（争端、交易），达成（协议） | |
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109
reassuring
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| a.使人消除恐惧和疑虑的，使人放心的 | |
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