Such was the position of affairs at July 1911, as it appeared to the eyes of people who—during the ensuing period—endeavoured to arrive at an understanding of the problem without regard to the exigencies1 of party politics. Between that date and July 1914, when war broke out, various changes took place in the situation. The general effect of these changes was adverse2 to Britain and her allies.
In 1911 the German estimates provided for considerable increases, especially in artillery3 and machine-guns. The peace strength of the Army was raised.
In the following year, 1912, further additions were made to the peace strength, and two new army corps4 were formed out of existing units—one for the Polish, the other for the French frontier. Artillery and machine-guns were very greatly increased in the ordinary estimates of that year, and again in those of 1913. In addition, Germany at the same time added a squadron to her fleet in the North Sea, by arranging to keep more ships permanently5 in commission.
{270}
MILITARY INCREASES
But early in 1913 it became known, that the German Government was about to introduce an Army Bill, providing for immense and sensational6 additions. The sum of ￡50,000,000 was to be raised by loan for initial expenditure7. The increased cost of upkeep on the proposed new establishment would amount to ￡9,500,000 per annum. Sixty-three thousand more recruits were to be taken each year. The total peace strength of the Army was to be raised by approximately 200,000 men. Nearly four millions sterling8 was to be spent on aircraft, and ten and a half on fortifications; while the war-chest was to be raised from six to eighteen millions. Twenty-seven thousand additional horses were to be purchased.
These proposals were timed to take effect the same autumn; so that by the following Midsummer (1914), the military strength of Germany would have reaped the main benefit which was anticipated from the enormous additions.
It was not in the power of France to increase the actual total of her numbers, because for many years past she had already taken every man who was physically9 fit for military service. About eighty per cent of the young Frenchmen who came each year before the revision boards had been enlisted10; whereas in Germany—up to the passing of the new Army Law—considerably11 less than fifty per cent had been required to serve. The German Army as a consequence was composed of picked men, while the French Army contained a considerable proportion who were inferior both in character and physique.
But in the face of the new German menace France had to do the best she could. She had to do it alone, for the reason that the British Government {271} entertained conscientious12 and insuperable objections to bearing its due share of the burden.
Already, prior to the sensational expansion of Germany in 1913, France had endeavoured to counteract13 the current yearly increases in the military estimates of her neighbour, by various reorganisations and regroupings of active units, and by improvements calculated to improve the efficiency of the reserves. But when information was forthcoming[1] as to the nature and extent of the developments proposed under the German Army Bill of 1913, it was at once realised that more drastic measures were essential to national safety.
Before the German projects were officially announced, the French Government took the bold step of asking the legislature to sanction a lengthening14 of the period of active military service from two years to three, and an extension of the age limit of the reserves from forty-seven to forty-nine. Power was also taken to summon, in case of emergency, the annual contingent15 of recruits a year before their due time. Increases in artillery, engineers, railways, barrack accommodation, and subsidiary services were asked for and obtained. The cost of these, when the whole sum came to be calculated, was found to amount to ￡32,000,000.
Apart, therefore, from material preparations of one kind and another, Germany was taking steps to add 200,000 men to her striking force, and the intentions of France were approximately the same. In the {272} case of Germany, however, the increases of strength would be operative by Midsummer 1914, while with France they would not take effect until two years later.[2]
Germany, moreover, was arranging to take 63,000 more recruits annually16. France was unable to obtain any more recruits, as she already took all that were fit to bear arms. The increase in her striking force was made mainly at the expense of her reserves. Year by year, therefore, the numerical inferiority of France must become more marked.
Russia meanwhile was proceeding17 with her programme of military extension and reorganisation which had been decided18 on after the Japanese war. A great part of her expenditure was being devoted19 to the improvement of her exceedingly defective20 system of railways and communications, and to the fortification of the Gulf21 of Finland.
Austria did not remain stationary22 in military preparations any more than her neighbours. Her intake23 of recruits was 181,000 in 1912. It was decided to raise it to 206,000 in 1913, and again to 216,000 in 1914.
In the British Army, during this critical period, there had of course been no increases, but the reverse.
{273}
The Regular Forces, which had been, reduced in 1906 by nine battalions24,[3] were in 1914 some eight thousand men under their nominal25 strength. The Territorials26, which had never yet reached the figure postulated27 by their originator, were at this date about 47,000 short. The Army Reserve was doomed28 in the near future to an automatic shrinkage on a considerable scale, owing to the reductions which had been effected in the Regular Forces, from which the reservists were drawn29 at the expiry of their terms of service.
Actually, therefore, the weakness of our own military position had become more marked since 1911. Relatively30 it had undergone an even greater change for the worse, owing to the stupendous German programme, to the fact that we had lagged behind in the matter of aircraft, and that our naval31 preponderance was not so great as it had been three years earlier.
EFFECT OF BALKAN WARS
The events which occurred in the Turkish peninsula between October 1912, when the first Balkan war broke out, and August 1913, when the second was ended by the Treaty of Bucharest, were not without their bearing upon the general balance of power in Europe. Turkey had collapsed32 before the onset33 of {274} the allied34 states of Montenegro, Servia, Bulgaria, and Greece, and this was a serious injury to German interests. The Ottoman Empire had been warmly suitored, over a long period of years, by the diplomacy35 of Berlin, with a view to co-operation in certain contingencies36. On the other hand, the result of the second war—fomented by the intrigues37 of Vienna—in which Bulgaria was finally overpowered by the other three states, destroyed for the time being Slav solidarity38, and thereby39 considerably relieved the apprehensions40 of Austria with regard to her southern frontier and recently annexed41 provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.... Profit-and-loss accounts of this sort are impossible to work out upon an arithmetical basis, and perhaps the chief importance of such occurrences as these lies in the effect which they produce upon the nerves of the onlookers42. On the whole—judging by the tone of diplomacy at the time—the Balkan series of events appeared to have raised greater anxieties in the Chancelleries of Germany and Austria than in any other quarter; though why this should have been so, it is difficult to understand.
Looking back at the Balkan struggle in the light of subsequent events, it appears to us now a great deal less remarkable43 for what it actually produced than for what it failed to produce. It failed to set Europe in a blaze, and yet it afforded far better opportunities for doing this than the Serajevo murders in June 1914.
The full inner history of the negotiations44 between the Great Powers, for six months prior to the Treaty of Bucharest, will be interesting reading, if it ever sees the light. If even one of them had chosen to work for war during this period, nothing could have {275} kept the peace. If one or two of them had been apathetic45, war must inevitably46 have come of itself. But even France—who at that time was showing signs of superficial excitement, and on that account was credited, not only in the German press, but in a section of our own, with chauvinistic47 designs—worked hard for peace. It is certain that Germany desired peace; many well-informed people indeed believed that at this time she desired peace more ardently48 than any other state. It is true that a few days before the Treaty of Bucharest was signed, Italy had been secretly sounded by Austria as to whether she would join with her two allies in making an attack on Servia; but the Italian reply being of a kind that took away all hope of securing the military assistance of that country in the proposed adventure, the Concert of Europe continued to perform the pacific symphony apparently49 in perfect accord.
GERMANY'S TWO DATES
The policy of Germany, in 1912 and 1913, to preserve peace, and her efforts—equally successful—in the following year to provoke war, were probably due to one and the same cause. Two dates from Germany's point of view were of supreme50 importance—the summer of 1914, when her new military preparations would be complete, and when the Kiel Canal—having been widened and deepened[4]—would {276} be available for the passage of Dreadnoughts; the summer of 1916, by which date the French Army increases were due to take effect, and the Russian scheme of military reorganisation would have been carried through. From the point of view of Berlin and Vienna war could be waged to greatest advantage so soon as the first of these two dates had been reached. If, however, Italy, always a doubtful participator, could have been tempted51 by self-interest to make common cause with her allies in the summer of 1913, the certainty of her adherence52 would have turned the scales in favour of the earlier date. For Italy could put an army of 700,000 men into the field; and this no doubt would have more than compensated53 for the benefits which might have been lost by anticipating the ideal moment by a year.
[1] Germany took time by the forelock, and began to carry through the contemplated54 programme before disclosing the terms of the Army Bill to the legislature. Consequently her intentions were known in a general way to every Intelligence department in Europe, long before they were actually announced.
[2] In going through the memoranda55 upon which this chapter is based, I came across a paper written at the end of July 1913 by a retired56 soldier friend, in answer to a request on my part for certain technical information as to French and German preparations. On the margin57 of the document, which gives a very full and able analysis, he had added the following postscript58 as an expression of his personal opinion. "N.B.—Most Important: The German Bill takes immediate59 effect. The French only takes effect in 1916 because (1) the French are not going to retain the class which finishes its service this year with the colours; (2) comparatively few are fit for enrolment at twenty; (3) there has been great delay in Parliament ... A year from now will be the critical time. Germany will have had the full benefit from her Bill, whereas France will have a mass of young recruits still under instruction. The strain on officers will be tremendous in order to knock this mass of raw men into shape." It is rarely that a prophecy is fulfilled practically to a day.
[3] Mr. Haldane, the Secretary of State for War, in justifying60 this reduction explained that 'his infantry61 was in excess, the artillery was deficient62.' He would rather not have cut off these nine battalions, "but he could not use them. He had four more than he could mobilise" (Auchterarder, December 29, 1906). In his view "the first step to doing anything for developing the national basis of the Army was to cut something off the Regular Forces" (Newcastle, September 15, 1906). "He did not think Compulsory63 Training would be adopted in this country until after England had been invaded once or twice" (London, December 1, 1911). The British, however, had the best reasons for feeling secure: they "were always a nation of splendid fighters. They were never ready, but they fought the better the less ready they were..." (Glasgow, January 6, 1912).
[4] On June 23, 1914, the Emperor William opened the new lock at the North Sea end of the Kiel Canal. On the following day he performed the same function at the Baltic end. The Times correspondent remarks that the Emperor's passage through the Canal on this occasion was of symbolical64 rather than practical significance, as on the one hand German Dreadnoughts had already used the widened passage experimentally, while on the other hand it would be a long time before the whole work was finished. He continues: "The extension works, which were begun in 1907, are, however, of vast importance, especially to the Navy. The Canal has been made two metres deeper, and has been doubled in breadth. The places at which large ships can pass one another have been increased in number, and at four of them Dreadnoughts can be turned. There are now four, instead of two, at each end, which means a great saving of time in getting a fleet through. Above all, the distance between Kiel and Wilhelmshaven for battleship purposes is reduced from more than 500 to only 80 nautical65 miles. The new locks at Brunsbüttel and Holtenau are the largest in the world."—The Times, June 25, 1914.
点击
收听单词发音
收听单词发音 |
1
exigencies
|
|
| n.急切需要 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
2
adverse
|
|
| adj.不利的；有害的；敌对的，不友好的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
3
artillery
|
|
| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
4
corps
|
|
| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
5
permanently
|
|
| adv.永恒地，永久地，固定不变地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
6
sensational
|
|
| adj.使人感动的，非常好的，轰动的，耸人听闻的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
7
expenditure
|
|
| n.(时间、劳力、金钱等)支出；使用，消耗 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
8
sterling
|
|
| adj.英币的(纯粹的，货真价实的)；n.英国货币(英镑) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
9
physically
|
|
| adj.物质上，体格上，身体上，按自然规律 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
10
enlisted
|
|
| adj.应募入伍的v.（使）入伍， （使）参军( enlist的过去式和过去分词 )；获得（帮助或支持） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
11
considerably
|
|
| adv.极大地；相当大地；在很大程度上 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
12
conscientious
|
|
| adj.审慎正直的，认真的，本着良心的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
13
counteract
|
|
| vt.对…起反作用，对抗，抵消 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
14
lengthening
|
|
| （时间或空间）延长，伸长( lengthen的现在分词 )； 加长 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
15
contingent
|
|
| adj.视条件而定的；n.一组，代表团，分遣队 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
16
annually
|
|
| adv.一年一次，每年 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
17
proceeding
|
|
| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
18
decided
|
|
| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
19
devoted
|
|
| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
20
defective
|
|
| adj.有毛病的，有问题的，有瑕疵的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
21
gulf
|
|
| n.海湾；深渊，鸿沟；分歧，隔阂 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
22
stationary
|
|
| adj.固定的，静止不动的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
23
intake
|
|
| n.吸入，纳入；进气口，入口 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
24
battalions
|
|
| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
25
nominal
|
|
| adj.名义上的；(金额、租金)微不足道的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
26
territorials
|
|
| n.（常大写）地方自卫队士兵( territorial的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
|
27
postulated
|
|
| v.假定，假设( postulate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
28
doomed
|
|
| 命定的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
29
drawn
|
|
| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
30
relatively
|
|
| adv.比较...地，相对地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
31
naval
|
|
| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
32
collapsed
|
|
| adj.倒塌的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
33
onset
|
|
| n.进攻，袭击，开始，突然开始 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
34
allied
|
|
| adj.协约国的；同盟国的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
35
diplomacy
|
|
| n.外交；外交手腕，交际手腕 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
36
contingencies
|
|
| n.偶然发生的事故，意外事故( contingency的名词复数 )；以备万一 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
37
intrigues
|
|
| n.密谋策划( intrigue的名词复数 )；神秘气氛；引人入胜的复杂情节v.搞阴谋诡计( intrigue的第三人称单数 )；激起…的好奇心 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
38
solidarity
|
|
| n.团结；休戚相关 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
39
thereby
|
|
| adv.因此，从而 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
40
apprehensions
|
|
| 疑惧 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
41
annexed
|
|
| [法] 附加的，附属的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
42
onlookers
|
|
| n.旁观者，观看者( onlooker的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
43
remarkable
|
|
| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
44
negotiations
|
|
| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
45
apathetic
|
|
| adj.冷漠的，无动于衷的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
46
inevitably
|
|
| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
47
chauvinistic
|
|
| a.沙文主义(者)的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
48
ardently
|
|
| adv.热心地，热烈地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
49
apparently
|
|
| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
50
supreme
|
|
| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
51
tempted
|
|
| v.怂恿（某人）干不正当的事；冒…的险（tempt的过去分词） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
52
adherence
|
|
| n.信奉，依附，坚持，固着 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
53
compensated
|
|
| 补偿，报酬( compensate的过去式和过去分词 )； 给（某人）赔偿（或赔款） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
54
contemplated
|
|
| adj. 预期的 动词contemplate的过去分词形式 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
55
memoranda
|
|
| n. 备忘录, 便条 名词memorandum的复数形式 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
56
retired
|
|
| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
57
margin
|
|
| n.页边空白；差额；余地，余裕；边，边缘 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
58
postscript
|
|
| n.附言，又及；(正文后的)补充说明 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
59
immediate
|
|
| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
60
justifying
|
|
| 证明…有理( justify的现在分词 )； 为…辩护； 对…作出解释； 为…辩解（或辩护） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
61
infantry
|
|
| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
62
deficient
|
|
| adj.不足的，不充份的，有缺陷的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
63
compulsory
|
|
| n.强制的，必修的；规定的，义务的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
64
symbolical
|
|
| a.象征性的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
65
nautical
|
|
| adj.海上的，航海的，船员的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
| 欢迎访问英文小说网 |