But from that time forward, Lord Roberts had no reason to complain of popular neglect. Overcoming his natural disinclination to platform oratory1 and political agitation2, sacrificing his leisure, putting a dangerous strain upon his physical strength, he continued his propaganda at a series of great meetings in the industrial centres. Everywhere he was listened to with respect, and apparently3 with a great measure of agreement. Only on one occasion was he treated with discourtesy, and that was by a civic4 dignitary and not by the audience. But he had now become an important figure in the political conflict, and he had to take the consequences, in a stream of abuse and misrepresentation from the party which {351} disapproved5 of his principles; while he received but little comfort from the other party, which lived in constant terror lest it might be thought to approve of them. Lord Roberts's advocacy of national service continued up to the autumn of 1913, when the gravity of the situation in Ireland made it impossible to focus public interest on any other subject.
TRIUMPH OF VOLUNTARY SYSTEM
After the present war had run its course for a month or two, the minds of many people reverted6 to what Lord Roberts had been urging upon his fellow-countrymen for nine years past. His warnings had come true; that at any rate was beyond doubt. The intentions which he had attributed to Germany were clearly demonstrated, and likewise the vastness and efficiency of her military organisation7. The inadequacy8 of British preparations was made plain. They were inadequate9 in the sense that they had failed to deter10 the aggressor from a breach11 of the peace, and they had been equally inadequate for withstanding his onset12. The deficiencies of the Territorial13 Army in numbers, discipline, training, and equipment had made it impossible to entrust14 it with the responsibility of Home Defence immediately upon the outbreak of war. As a consequence of this, the whole of the Regular Army could not be released for foreign service, although Sir John French's need of reinforcements was desperate. Notwithstanding, however, that Lord Roberts's warnings had come true, many people professed15 to discover in what had happened a full justification—some even went so far as to call it a 'triumph'—for the voluntary system.
Even after the first battle of Ypres, those who held such views had no difficulty in finding evidences {352} of their truth on all hands. They found them in the conduct of our army in France, and in the courage and devotion with which it had upheld the honour of England against overwhelming odds16. They found it in the response to Lord Kitchener's call for volunteers, and in the eagerness and spirit of the New Army. They found it in our command of the sea, in the spirit of the nation, and in what they read in their newspapers about the approval and admiration17 of the world.
In the short dark days of December and January we were cheered by many bold bills and headlines announcing what purported18 to be victories; and we were comforted through a sad Christmastide by panegyrics19 on British instinct, pluck, good-temper, energy, and genius for muddling20 through. Philosophic21 commentators22 pointed23 out that, just as Germany was becoming tired out and short of ammunition24, just as she was bringing up troops of worse and worse quality, we should be at our very best, wallowing in our resources of men and material of war. Six months, a year, eighteen months hence—for the estimates varied—Britain would be invincible25. Economic commentators on the other hand impressed upon us how much better it was to pay through the nose now, than to have been bleeding ourselves white as the Germans, the French, and the Russians were supposed (though without much justification) to have been doing for a century.
To clinch26 the triumph of the voluntary system—when the Hour came the Man came with it.
LORD KITCHENER'S APPOINTMENT
Many of these things were truly alleged27. Lord Kitchener at any rate was no mirage28. The gallantry of our Army was no illusion; indeed, its heroism29 {353} was actually underrated, for the reason that the extent of its peril30 had never been fully31 grasped. Although British commerce had suffered severely32 from the efforts of a few bold raiders, the achievements of our Navy were such that they could quite fairly be described, as having secured command of the sea.[1] The German fleet was held pretty closely within its harbours. We had been able to move our troops and munitions33 of war wherever we pleased, and so far, without the loss of a ship, or even of a man. Submarine piracy—a policy of desperation—had not then begun. The quality of the New Army, the rapidity with which its recruits were being turned into soldiers, not only impressed the public, but took by complete surprise the severest of military critics.
This is not the place for discussing how Lord Kitchener came to be appointed Secretary of State for War, or to attempt an estimate of his character and career.[2] He was no politician, but a soldier {354} and an administrator34. He was in his sixty-fifth year, and since he had left the Royal Military Academy in 1871, by far the greater part of his work had been done abroad—in the Levant, Egypt, South Africa, and India.[3] In no case had he ever failed at anything he had undertaken. The greater part of his work had been completely successful; much of it had been brilliantly successful. He believed in himself; the country believed in him; foreign nations believed in him. No appointment could have produced a better effect upon the hearts of the British people and upon those of their Allies. The nation felt—if we may use so homely35 an image in this connection—that Lord Kitchener was holding its hand confidently and reassuringly36 in one of his, while with the other he had the whole race of politicians firmly by the scruff, and would see to it that there was no nonsense or trouble in that quarter.
It is no exaggeration to say that from that time to this,[4] Lord Kitchener's presence in the Cabinet {355} has counted for more with the country, than that of any other minister, or indeed than all other ministers put together. That in itself proves his possession of very remarkable37 qualities; for nine such months of public anxiety and private sorrow, as England has lately known, will disturb any reputation which is not firmly founded upon merit. During this time we have seen other reputations come and go; popularities made, and unmade, and remade. We have seen great figures all but vanish into the mist of neglect. But confidence in Lord Kitchener has remained constant through it all. Things may have gone wrong; the Government may have made mistakes; even the War Office itself may have made mistakes; yet the faith of the British people in the man of their choice has never been shaken for an instant.
HIS GRASP OF ESSENTIALS
The highest of all Lord Kitchener's merits is, that being suddenly pitchforked into office by an emergency, he nevertheless grasped at once the two or three main features of the situation, and turned the whole force of his character to dealing38 with them, letting the smaller matters meanwhile fall into line as best they might. He grasped the dominating factor—that it was essential to subordinate every military and political consideration to supporting France, whose fight for her own existence was equally a fight for the existence of the British Empire. He grasped the urgent need for the enrolment of many hundreds of thousands of men fit for making into soldiers, if we were to win this fight and not lose it. He grasped the need for turning these recruits into soldiers at a pace which hardly a single military expert believed to be possible. He may, or may {356} not, have fully grasped at the beginning, the difficulties—mainly owing to dearth39 of officers—with which he was faced: but when he did grasp them, by some means or another, he succeeded in overcoming them.
It is dangerous to speak of current events in confident superlatives; but one is tempted40 to do so with regard to the training of the New Army. Even the most friendly among expert critics believed that what Lord Kitchener had undertaken was a thing quite impossible to do in the prescribed time. Yet he has done it. And not only the friendly, but also the severest critics, have admitted that the New Army is already fit to face any continental41 army, and that, moreover, to all appearance, it is one of the finest armies in history. The sternest proof is yet to come; but it is clear that something not far short of a miracle has been accomplished42.
If we search for an explanation of the miracle, we find it quite as much in Lord Kitchener's character as in his methods. Fortunately what was so painfully lacking in the political sphere was present in the military—Leadership.
HIS DISADVANTAGES
Despite the support which Lord Kitchener derived43 from the public confidence he laboured under several very serious disadvantages. A man cannot spend almost the whole of his working life out of England, and then return to it at the age of sixty-four, understanding all the conditions as clearly as if he had never left it. Lord Kitchener was ignorant not only of English political conditions, but also of English industrial conditions, which in a struggle like the present are certainly quite as important as the other. He may well have consoled himself, however, with the reflection that, although he himself was {357} lacking in knowledge, his colleagues were experts in both of these spheres.
It was inevitable44 that Lord Kitchener must submit to the guidance of Ministers in the political sphere, providing they agreed with his main objects—the unflinching support of France, and the creation of the New Army.
In the industrial sphere, on the other hand, it was the business of Ministers, not merely to keep themselves in touch with Lord Kitchener's present and future needs, and to offer their advice and help for satisfying them, but also to insist upon his listening to reason, if in his urgent need and unfamiliarity45 with the business world, he was seen to be running upon danger in any direction.
It is impossible to resist the impression that, while his colleagues held Lord Kitchener very close by the head as to politics, and explained to him very clearly what they conceived the people would stand and would not stand, they did not show anything like the same vigilance or determination in keeping him well advised as to the means of procuring46 the material of war.
[1] Partly by good fortune, but mainly owing to the admirable promptitude and skill with which our naval47 resources were handled, the bulk of the German fleet was imprisoned48 from the outset. We did not experience anything like the full effect of our unpreparedness. If Mr. Churchill had not taken his decision on the day following the delivery of the Austrian ultimatum49 to Servia (July 24) by postponing50 the demobilisation of the Fleet—to the great scandal of his own party, when the facts first became known—there would have been a very different tale to tell as regards the fate of the British merchant service on the high seas.
[2] Critics of the present Government, such as the editor of the National Review, have maintained that Lord Kitchener was forced upon an unwilling51 Cabinet by the pressure of public opinion; that although he was in England throughout the crisis he was allowed to make all his preparations for returning to Egypt, and was only fetched back as he was on the point of stepping aboard the packet; that the well-known form of Lord Haldane had been seen at the War Office, and that if the Lord Chancellor52 had, as was intended, relinquished53 his legal position in order to become Secretary of State for War, we should probably not have sent abroad our Expeditionary Force. It is undeniable that during Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday (August 2, 3, and 4) London was buzzing with a strange rumour54 (which was fathered altogether falsely upon the French Ambassador) that France did not ask for or require our assistance on land; but only at sea. If this were so the absurdity55 of sending our Expeditionary Force would have been obvious. It is noteworthy that a usually well-inspired section of the Ministerial Press—even after they had reluctantly accepted war as inevitable—were still maintaining stoutly56, even so late as Tuesday and Wednesday (4th and 5th), that the Expeditionary Force should not be allowed to cross the channel. Lord Kitchener was appointed on the Thursday, and the Expeditionary Force began to go abroad the following week. The chapter of English political history which begins with the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia on the 23rd of July, and ends with the appointment of Lord Kitchener on the 6th of August, will no doubt prove to be one of the most interesting in our annals. Whether it will prove to be one of the most glorious or one of the most humiliating exhibitions of British statesmanship we cannot say until we possess fuller knowledge than we do at present of the attitude of ministers at the Cabinets of Friday, Saturday, and Sunday (July 31, August 1 and 2).
[3] Palestine, 1874-1878; Cyprus, 1878-1882; Egypt, 1882-1899; South Africa, 1899-1902; India, 1902-1909; Egypt, 1911-1914. Only during the years 1871-1874 and 1909-1911 does Lord Kitchener appear to have been freed from foreign service, and during a part of the latter interval57 he was travelling in China and Japan.
[4] End of May 1915.
点击
收听单词发音
收听单词发音 |
1
oratory
|
|
| n.演讲术；词藻华丽的言辞 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
2
agitation
|
|
| n.搅动；搅拌；鼓动，煽动 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
3
apparently
|
|
| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
4
civic
|
|
| adj.城市的，都市的，市民的，公民的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
5
disapproved
|
|
| v.不赞成( disapprove的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
6
reverted
|
|
| 恢复( revert的过去式和过去分词 )； 重提； 回到…上； 归还 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
7
organisation
|
|
| n.组织，安排，团体，有机休 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
8
inadequacy
|
|
| n.无法胜任，信心不足 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
9
inadequate
|
|
| adj.(for,to)不充足的，不适当的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
10
deter
|
|
| vt.阻止，使不敢，吓住 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
11
breach
|
|
| n.违反，不履行；破裂；vt.冲破，攻破 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
12
onset
|
|
| n.进攻，袭击，开始，突然开始 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
13
territorial
|
|
| adj.领土的，领地的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
14
entrust
|
|
| v.信赖，信托，交托 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
15
professed
|
|
| 公开声称的，伪称的，已立誓信教的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
16
odds
|
|
| n.让步，机率，可能性，比率；胜败优劣之别 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
17
admiration
|
|
| n.钦佩，赞美，羡慕 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
18
purported
|
|
| adj.传说的，谣传的v.声称是…，（装得）像是…的样子( purport的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
19
panegyrics
|
|
| n.赞美( panegyric的名词复数 )；称颂；颂词；颂扬的演讲或文章 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
|
20
muddling
|
|
| v.弄乱，弄糟( muddle的现在分词 )；使糊涂；对付，混日子 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
21
philosophic
|
|
| adj.哲学的，贤明的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
22
commentators
|
|
| n.评论员( commentator的名词复数 )；时事评论员；注释者；实况广播员 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
23
pointed
|
|
| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
24
ammunition
|
|
| n.军火，弹药 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
25
invincible
|
|
| adj.不可征服的，难以制服的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
26
clinch
|
|
| v.敲弯，钉牢；确定；扭住对方 [参]clench | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
27
alleged
|
|
| a.被指控的，嫌疑的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
28
mirage
|
|
| n.海市蜃楼，幻景 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
29
heroism
|
|
| n.大无畏精神，英勇 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
30
peril
|
|
| n.(严重的)危险；危险的事物 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
31
fully
|
|
| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
32
severely
|
|
| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
33
munitions
|
|
| n.军火，弹药；v.供应…军需品 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
34
administrator
|
|
| n.经营管理者，行政官员 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
35
homely
|
|
| adj.家常的，简朴的；不漂亮的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
36
reassuringly
|
|
| ad.安心，可靠 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
37
remarkable
|
|
| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
38
dealing
|
|
| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
39
dearth
|
|
| n.缺乏，粮食不足，饥谨 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
40
tempted
|
|
| v.怂恿（某人）干不正当的事；冒…的险（tempt的过去分词） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
41
continental
|
|
| adj.大陆的，大陆性的，欧洲大陆的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
42
accomplished
|
|
| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
43
derived
|
|
| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
44
inevitable
|
|
| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
45
unfamiliarity
|
|
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
46
procuring
|
|
| v.（努力）取得， （设法）获得( procure的现在分词 )；拉皮条 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
47
naval
|
|
| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
48
imprisoned
|
|
| 下狱，监禁( imprison的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
49
ultimatum
|
|
| n.最后通牒 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
50
postponing
|
|
| v.延期，推迟( postpone的现在分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
51
unwilling
|
|
| adj.不情愿的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
52
chancellor
|
|
| n.(英)大臣；法官；(德、奥)总理；大学校长 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
53
relinquished
|
|
| 交出，让给( relinquish的过去式和过去分词 )； 放弃 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
54
rumour
|
|
| n.谣言，谣传，传闻 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
55
absurdity
|
|
| n.荒谬，愚蠢；谬论 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
56
stoutly
|
|
| adv.牢固地，粗壮的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
57
interval
|
|
| n.间隔，间距；幕间休息，中场休息 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
| 欢迎访问英文小说网 |