The object of the German forward movement was two-fold—if MacMahon had crossed the Vosges to join the Emperor, Strasburg was to be invested, and the rest of the Third Army was to pass through the hills to the Saar and [p 86] effect a junction18 with the Second. If the Marshal were still east of the hills, then he was to be assailed19 wherever found. Consequently, the whole Army was set in motion, but it was by a gift of fortune, who, however, rarely favours the imprudent, that they were enabled to defeat the division exposed to their onset20. At four and six in the morning, the Corps moved out on a broad front stretching from the hills to the Rhine. Bothmer’s Bavarians, on the right, marched direct on Wissembourg, followed by the other divisions of the Bavarian Army. Next in order, to the left, came the 5th Corps, which was directed upon Altenstadt; the 11th, which pushed through the Bien Wald; and the Badeners, whose object was Lauterbourg; while the remainder of the Army was still far to the rear.
The Combat on the Lauter.
Wissembourg, a picturesque21 old town, standing22 upon the Lauter at a point where it enters the plain, is defended by walls not armed with guns, and surrounded by deep ditches filled from the stream, one arm of which curves through the place. There were three gates. Under the archway of the northern, named after the town of Hagenau, passed the great road from Strasburg, which, turning to the eastward23, quitted the ramparts by the gate of Landau. The western gate, a mere24 entrance cut through the wall, having in advance a small lunette, received the road from Pirmasens. It took its name from the fort of Bitsche, but the track from that place came down the folded hills by the Col du Pigeonnier, or Dove-cote Neck, and joined the Strasburg highway just outside the Hagenau gate. Beyond the walls were factories, pottery25 fields, and mills; above and below were the once famous Lines of the Lauter [p 87] thrown up on, and following the right bank of the stream through the forest to Lauterbourg; while on the foot-hills were vines, which do not add to the beauty of any scene, and hop-gardens; and here and there the usual rows of stiff trees bordering, yet not shading, the roads. Distant about a mile or so to the eastward is a spur of the Vosges, the Geisberg, thrust into the plain, falling steeply towards it, and crowned by a substantial chateau26, seated above terraces difficult of access. From this elevation27 were visible, spread out like a map, the woodlands stretching towards the Rhine, the roads to the east and south, and the town, with its railway station, now silent, near the gate of Landau.
As Abel Douay had only available about eight thousand troops, he could not defend the approaches through the Bien Wald, or prevent a turning movement round his right flank. Still, had he not been under a delusion28 respecting the proximity29 of the enemy, he could and would have destroyed the few bridges over the Lauter, and so disposed his troops as not to be surprised. But his scouts had reported that the foe11 was not near, and thus, when the Bavarian advance appeared on the hills at eight o’clock and opened fire from a battery, the French soldiers were engaged in the ordinary routine of camp labours. Startled by the guns, they ran to their arms with alacrity30; but an encounter begun under such conditions is always disadvantageous to the assailed. General Douay, an able soldier, came to a rapid decision. He placed two battalions in the town, another with a battery at the railway station, and posted the rest and twelve guns on the slopes of the Geisberg. The walls and ditches of the town, the railway buildings, and part of the Lauter Lines, brought the Bavarians to a stand, and the combat of small arms and artillery on this point continued amid the vineyards and hop-grounds, while [p 88] the German centre and Left were swinging round through the forest. The operation occupied considerable time, as two hours passed by, from the firing of the first gun, before the leading battalions of the 5th Corps were brought into play. At length, they came into action against the railway station, and as the 11th Corps had also developed an attack on the Geisberg from the east, it was evident that the combat could not last long. The combined efforts of the Bavarians and the Prussians, after severe fighting and some loss, drove the French out of the station, and captured the town, together with a battalion13 of the French regiment5 of the Line, the 74th, which was cut off, and forced to surrender. The assailants had penetrated31 by the gates after they had been broken in by artillery, and thus the town was won. It was really the strong pivot32 of the defence, and its resistance delayed the onset upon the Geisberg for some time. In the meantime, General Abel Douay had been killed by the explosion of the ammunition33 attached to a mitrailleuse battery; and the command had devolved upon General Pellé.
The whole stress of the action now fell upon the Geisberg and its castle. The height was steep, the building pierced for musketry and strong enough to resist anything but cannon-shot. The front was approached by successive terraces, and there was a hop-garden near by on the Altenstadt road. The main body of the French and all their artillery, except one disabled gun which had been captured after a sharp fight, were on the hills to the south, threatened every moment on their right flank by the development of the 11th Corps which had entered the area of battle. The little garrison1 in the castle made a stout34 resistance, slew35 many of the assailants, who swarmed36 upon all sides, and compelled the more daring among them to seek shelter at the foot of the walls. Then the Germans [p 89] with great labour brought up in succession four batteries, by whose fire alone they could hope to master the obstinate37 defenders38 who had manned even the tiled roof with riflemen. Surrounded, threatened with the weight of twenty-four guns, and seeing their comrades outside in full retreat, the garrison which had done its uttermost, surrendered as prisoners of war. They were two hundred, had killed and wounded enemies amounting to three-fourths of their own number, and had seriously injured General von Kirchbach, the commander of the 5th Corps. When the castle had fallen the French retired39 altogether. Making only one show of resistance they disappeared among the hills, and what is remarkable40 were not pursued, for the Crown Prince riding up, halted all the troops and even the cavalry who were in full career on the track of the enemy. The Germans lost in killed and wounded no fewer than 1,550 officers and men; but the French loss is not exactly known. They left behind, however, nearly a thousand unwounded prisoners, their camp, and one gun.
It may fairly be said of this combat, especially considering they were surprised and greatly outnumbered, that the French sustained their old renown41 as fighting men and that the first defeat, although severe, reflected no discredit42 on the soldiers of the 1st Corps. By no chance could they have successfully withstood the well-combined and powerful onsets43 of their more numerous adversaries44. Nevertheless, the death of Douay, the defeat, and the disorganization of the division had a profound moral effect, keenly felt at Metz and more keenly in Hagenau and Reichshofen. Marshal MacMahon called for instant aid from the 7th Corps; and the Emperor, moved by the news, decided45 to send him the 5th Corps, which General de Failly was at once ordered to assemble at Bitsche and then move up the great road to Reichshofen. In the German head-quarters [p 90] and camps, on the contrary, there was rejoicing and that natural accession of confidence in the breasts of the soldiers now pressing towards the Saar which springs up in fuller vigour46 than ever when they learn that their common standard has floated victoriously47 over the first foughten field. The First and Second Armies were still distant from the rocky steeps and thick woods where they also were to gain the day; but the Third Army, which, by the way, was a fair representative of South and North Germany, had actually crossed the frontier, had penetrated into Alsace, through woods and field-works and over streams renowned48 in story, and had inflicted49 a sharp defeat upon the Gallic troops, whose rulers had challenged the Teutons to wager50 of battle.
It is admitted that, on the evening of August 4th, the Germans had lost touch of the adversary51. The reason was that the 4th Cavalry Division, which had been ordered up by the Crown Prince early in the day, had found the roads blocked by an Infantry Corps, and the vexatious delay prevented the horsemen from reaching the front before nightfall. So difficult is it to move dense52 masses of men, horses, and guns, in accurate succession through a closed country, along cross-roads and field-lanes. The few squadrons at hand were not strong enough to pursue on the several roads which radiate from Wissembourg, and the defect could not be remedied until the next day. It was known that the fugitives53 could not have followed the southern roads, yet there were hostile troops in that direction, and it was surmised54 that they must have retreated into the highlands by the western track, yet they might have traversed another way, lying under the foot of the hills. On the 5th of August, the cavalry, starting out at daylight, soon gathered up accurate information. General von Bernhardi, with a brigade of Uhlans, rode forward on [p 91] the highway, into the Hagenau forest, where he was stopped by a broken bridge guarded by infantry; but he heard the noise of trains, the whistling of engines, and, of course, inferred the movement of troops; while on the east, nearer the Rhine, the squadrons sent in that direction were turned back both by infantry and barricaded55 roads. Towards the west, a squadron of Uhlans crossed the Sauer at Gunstett, a place we shall soon meet again; while Colonel Schauroth’s Hussars found the bridge at Woerth broken, were fired on by guns and riflemen, and saw large bodies in motion on the heights beyond the stream. Hence it was inferred that the army of MacMahon was in position about Reichshofen, an inference confirmed by the reports from the Bavarians who had marched on Lembach, from the 5th Corps whose leading columns attained56 Preuschdorf, with outposts towards Woerth, and from the Badeners on the left, who found the enemy retiring westward57. At night, the Crown Prince’s Army had not wholly crossed the frontier. In front, were Hartmann’s Bavarians at Lembach, the 5th Corps before Woerth, the 11th, on the railway as far as Surburg; the Badeners on their left rear behind the Selz; Von der Tann’s Bavarians at Ingolsheim, and the head-quarters and 4th Cavalry Division at Soultz, otherwise Sulz. The 6th Corps—having one division at Landau, formed a reserve. MacMahon’s troops, except Conseil-Dumesnil’s division of the 7th Corps, near Hagenau, were all in position between Morsbronn and Neehwiller behind the Sulz and the Sauer, a continuous line of water which separated the rival outposts. The Emperor had placed the 5th Corps at the disposal of MacMahon, yet he finally detained one-half of Lapasset’s division at Saareguemines, and drew it to himself; while that of Guyot de Lespart was sent, on the 6th, towards Niederbronn, and Goze’s, not wholly assembled at Bitsche on the 5th, [p 92] remained with General de Failly, who, at no moment in the campaign—such was his ill-fortune—had his entire Corps under his orders.
French Position on the Saar.
We may now revert58 to the positions occupied by the rivals on both banks of the Saar, in order to complete the survey of an extensive series of operations which stretched without a break, in a military sense, from the Rhine opposite Rastadt, towards the confluence59 of the Saar and Moselle. If the German Head-Quarter Staff at Mainz, considering how well it was served, and what pains were taken to acquire information, remained in some doubt as to the positions and projects of the Imperialists, at Metz, ill-served and hesitating, all was bewilderment and conjecture60. Neither the Emperor Napoleon, nor his chief adviser61 Marshal Leb?uf, seemed capable of grasping the situation now rapidly becoming perilous62 to them; they had, indeed, fallen under an influence which tells so adversely63 on inferior minds—dread of the adversary’s combinations; and, perplexed64 by the scraps65 of intelligence sent in from the front, they adopted no decisive resolution, but waited helplessly on events. No serious attempt was made to concentrate the Army in a good position where it could fight, or man?uvre, or retreat, although, as General Frossard and Marshal Bazaine both state such a central defensive66 position had been actually studied and marked out, in 1867. Whether the occupation of the country between Saareguemines and ?tingen would have produced a favourable67 effect on the campaign or not, it would have prevented the Army from being crushed in detail, and have given another turn to the war. But there was no firmness nor insight at Metz. The orders issued by the Emperor look like the [p 93] work of an amateur who had read much of war, but who possessed68 neither the instincts of the born soldier, nor the indefatigable69 industry and business-like skill of a man who, thrust into an unwonted employment, compelling him to face hard realities, endeavours to cope with them by a steady and intelligent application of the principles of common sense.
On the morning of the 4th, the Emperor did no more than shift his left wing a little nearer to his centre, by bringing General de Ladmirault into closer contact with Marshal Bazaine, leaving Frossard in front of Saarbrück, and directing De Failly to assemble two divisions at Bitsche, and report to Marshal MacMahon. The notion prevailing70 in the Imperial head-quarters was, that the Germans designed to march upon Nancy, which was not their plan at all, and that the 7th Corps, reported to be on the march from Treves, might make an offensive movement to protect Saarlouis, forgetting, as Frossard observes, that their rule was concentration and not isolated71 operations; and that the railroad from Saarbrück afforded the only serious inlet into Lorraine. In the evening the news of Abel Douay’s defeat and “wound,” not death, reached Metz, and created alarm, but did not cause any serious modification72 of the Imperial plans. The next day the Emperor, still retaining the supreme73 direction of the Army, and keeping the Guard to himself, formally handed over the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Corps to Marshal Bazaine, “for military operations only;” and the 1st, 5th, partly at Bitsche, and 7th, mainly at Belfort, to Marshal MacMahon. The incomplete 6th Corps, under Marshal Canrobert, had not yet moved out from the camp at Chalons. Thus, there were practically two Corps remote from the decisive points, and one in an intermediate position, so handled by the Imperial Commander as to be useless. Not only was [p 94] the force called out for war scattered over an extensive area, but—and the fact should be borne in mind—the fortresses74 were without proper and effective garrisons, and, what was equally important, they had no adequate stores of provisions, arms, and munitions75; while the great works at Metz itself, upon which such reliance had been placed, were far from being in a defensive condition. Early on the 5th, in answer to a suggestion from Frossard, who was always urging concentration, the Emperor directed him, yet not until the 6th, to fix his head-quarters at Forbach, and draw his divisions round about in such a manner that, when ordered, he might remove his head-quarters to St. Avold; instructions which left him in doubt, and inspired him with anxiety. During the evening, however, acting76 on his own discretion77, he thought it fit to place his troops in fresh positions, somewhat to the rear on the uplands of Spicheren, with one division, upon higher ground in the rear, yet that step, though an improvement, did not remove his apprehension78 respecting his left flank, which had been weakened by the withdrawal79 of Montaudon’s division of the 3rd Corps to Saareguemines. General Frossard has been much censured80, but he was a man of real ability, and almost the only general who, from first to last, always took the precaution of covering his front with field works.
German Position on the Saar.
We have indicated, in the preceding chapter, the stages attained by the First and Second German Armies on the 4th; and have now only to repeat, for the sake of clearness, a summary of their array on the evening of the 5th. The several Corps of the Second were still moving up towards the Saar. The 4th Corps was at Ein?d and Homburg, [p 95] the Guard near Landstuhl; the 9th about Kaiserslautern, and the 12th a march to the rear. Further westward, the 10th halted at Cusel, and the 3rd was in its front, between St. Wendel and Neunkirchen. The First Army remained in the villages where it was located on the 4th, that is the 7th and 8th between Lebach and Steinweiler, with one division of the incomplete First Corps at Birkenfeld. On the evening of that day, however, General Steinmetz issued an order of movement for the next, which carried the leading columns of the 7th and 8th close to Saarbrück, and, as a consequence, brought on the battle of Spicheren, the narrative81 of which sanguinary and spirited fight will fall into its natural place later on. As the main current of the campaign flowed Metzward, it will be convenient to recount, first, the operations of the Crown Prince’s Army, which though in a measure subsidiary, produced more telling and decisive effects upon the fortunes of the French, than the engagement which broke down their foremost line of battle on the Saar.
点击收听单词发音
1 garrison | |
n.卫戍部队;驻地,卫戍区;vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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2 garrisons | |
守备部队,卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
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3 corps | |
n.(通信等兵种的)部队;(同类作的)一组 | |
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4 infantry | |
n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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5 regiment | |
n.团,多数,管理;v.组织,编成团,统制 | |
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6 regiments | |
(军队的)团( regiment的名词复数 ); 大量的人或物 | |
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7 cavalry | |
n.骑兵;轻装甲部队 | |
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8 nominally | |
在名义上,表面地; 应名儿 | |
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9 northward | |
adv.向北;n.北方的地区 | |
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10 scattered | |
adj.分散的,稀疏的;散步的;疏疏落落的 | |
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11 foe | |
n.敌人,仇敌 | |
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12 foes | |
敌人,仇敌( foe的名词复数 ) | |
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13 battalion | |
n.营;部队;大队(的人) | |
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14 battalions | |
n.(陆军的)一营(大约有一千兵士)( battalion的名词复数 );协同作战的部队;军队;(组织在一起工作的)队伍 | |
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15 scouts | |
侦察员[机,舰]( scout的名词复数 ); 童子军; 搜索; 童子军成员 | |
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16 artillery | |
n.(军)火炮,大炮;炮兵(部队) | |
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17 precisely | |
adv.恰好,正好,精确地,细致地 | |
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18 junction | |
n.连接,接合;交叉点,接合处,枢纽站 | |
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19 assailed | |
v.攻击( assail的过去式和过去分词 );困扰;质问;毅然应对 | |
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20 onset | |
n.进攻,袭击,开始,突然开始 | |
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21 picturesque | |
adj.美丽如画的,(语言)生动的,绘声绘色的 | |
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22 standing | |
n.持续,地位;adj.永久的,不动的,直立的,不流动的 | |
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23 eastward | |
adv.向东;adj.向东的;n.东方,东部 | |
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24 mere | |
adj.纯粹的;仅仅,只不过 | |
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25 pottery | |
n.陶器,陶器场 | |
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26 chateau | |
n.城堡,别墅 | |
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27 elevation | |
n.高度;海拔;高地;上升;提高 | |
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28 delusion | |
n.谬见,欺骗,幻觉,迷惑 | |
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29 proximity | |
n.接近,邻近 | |
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30 alacrity | |
n.敏捷,轻快,乐意 | |
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31 penetrated | |
adj. 击穿的,鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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32 pivot | |
v.在枢轴上转动;装枢轴,枢轴;adj.枢轴的 | |
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33 ammunition | |
n.军火,弹药 | |
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35 slew | |
v.(使)旋转;n.大量,许多 | |
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36 swarmed | |
密集( swarm的过去式和过去分词 ); 云集; 成群地移动; 蜜蜂或其他飞行昆虫成群地飞来飞去 | |
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37 obstinate | |
adj.顽固的,倔强的,不易屈服的,较难治愈的 | |
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38 defenders | |
n.防御者( defender的名词复数 );守卫者;保护者;辩护者 | |
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39 retired | |
adj.隐退的,退休的,退役的 | |
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40 remarkable | |
adj.显著的,异常的,非凡的,值得注意的 | |
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41 renown | |
n.声誉,名望 | |
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42 discredit | |
vt.使不可置信;n.丧失信义;不信,怀疑 | |
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43 onsets | |
攻击,袭击(onset的复数形式) | |
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44 adversaries | |
n.对手,敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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45 decided | |
adj.决定了的,坚决的;明显的,明确的 | |
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46 vigour | |
(=vigor)n.智力,体力,精力 | |
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47 victoriously | |
adv.获胜地,胜利地 | |
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48 renowned | |
adj.著名的,有名望的,声誉鹊起的 | |
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49 inflicted | |
把…强加给,使承受,遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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50 wager | |
n.赌注;vt.押注,打赌 | |
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51 adversary | |
adj.敌手,对手 | |
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52 dense | |
a.密集的,稠密的,浓密的;密度大的 | |
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53 fugitives | |
n.亡命者,逃命者( fugitive的名词复数 ) | |
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54 surmised | |
v.臆测,推断( surmise的过去式和过去分词 );揣测;猜想 | |
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55 barricaded | |
设路障于,以障碍物阻塞( barricade的过去式和过去分词 ); 设路障[防御工事]保卫或固守 | |
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56 attained | |
(通常经过努力)实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 ); 达到; 获得; 达到(某年龄、水平、状况) | |
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57 westward | |
n.西方,西部;adj.西方的,向西的;adv.向西 | |
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58 revert | |
v.恢复,复归,回到 | |
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59 confluence | |
n.汇合,聚集 | |
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60 conjecture | |
n./v.推测,猜测 | |
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61 adviser | |
n.劝告者,顾问 | |
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62 perilous | |
adj.危险的,冒险的 | |
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63 adversely | |
ad.有害地 | |
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64 perplexed | |
adj.不知所措的 | |
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65 scraps | |
油渣 | |
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66 defensive | |
adj.防御的;防卫的;防守的 | |
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67 favourable | |
adj.赞成的,称赞的,有利的,良好的,顺利的 | |
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68 possessed | |
adj.疯狂的;拥有的,占有的 | |
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69 indefatigable | |
adj.不知疲倦的,不屈不挠的 | |
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70 prevailing | |
adj.盛行的;占优势的;主要的 | |
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71 isolated | |
adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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72 modification | |
n.修改,改进,缓和,减轻 | |
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73 supreme | |
adj.极度的,最重要的;至高的,最高的 | |
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74 fortresses | |
堡垒,要塞( fortress的名词复数 ) | |
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75 munitions | |
n.军火,弹药;v.供应…军需品 | |
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76 acting | |
n.演戏,行为,假装;adj.代理的,临时的,演出用的 | |
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77 discretion | |
n.谨慎;随意处理 | |
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78 apprehension | |
n.理解,领悟;逮捕,拘捕;忧虑 | |
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79 withdrawal | |
n.取回,提款;撤退,撤军;收回,撤销 | |
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80 censured | |
v.指责,非难,谴责( censure的过去式 ) | |
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81 narrative | |
n.叙述,故事;adj.叙事的,故事体的 | |
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