Alike in Alsace and Lorraine, the actions which made the 6th of August a date so memorable1 in this swiftly moving war were undesigned on the part of the assailant and unexpected on the part of the assailed3. In other words, as General von Moltke did not intend to throw the force of his right and centre against the main body of the Imperialists until all the Corps4 were closer to the frontier and to each other, so the Crown Prince proposed to employ the day in changing front from the south to the west and then direct his serried5 lines upon the front and flanks of MacMahon’s Army, which he confidently expected to find in position behind the Sulz and the Sauer, covering the road to Bitsche. The despatches of the French Marshal also show that he counted on a day’s respite7, since his orders to De Failly were that the two divisions commanded by that ill-used officer were to march on the 6th to join the 1st Corps, so that they might be in line to fight a battle on the following day. But De Failly, harassed8 by fluctuating orders from Metz, shifted hither and thither9, now to the right, now to the left, and never permitted to keep his Corps in hand, was unable to do more than start one division on the road to Reichshofen, while he assembled [p 97] the other at Bitsche, and left one-half the third on the Saar to share the misfortunes of Napoleon and Bazaine. No such hesitation10 and infirmity of purpose characterized the conduct of the German commanders. They had well-defined plans, indeed, and issued clear and precise orders, yet both the one and the other were so framed that they could be modified to deal with unexpected incidents, and adapted at once to the actually ascertained12 circumstances of the moment, which is the very essence of war. The spirit of the German training gives a large discretion13 to superior officers, who are taught to apply the rules issued for their guidance to the military situation which, in the field, is certain to vary from day to day, or even from hour to hour. Moreover, a German general who attacks is certain to receive the ready support of comrades who may be near, while those more remote, who hear the sound of battle or receive a request for help, at once hasten forward, reporting the fact to, without awaiting orders from, superior authority. Nothing testifies more effectively to the soundness of the higher education in the Prussian military system than the fact that it is possible not only to confer these large powers on subordinates, but to encourage the use of them. At the same time it must be acknowledged that, in any army where the officers do not make the study of war their daily and hourly business, and where the best of the best are not selected for command and staff duty, the latitude15 enjoyed by the Germans could not be granted, because its capricious and unintelligent use would lead to needless bloodshed, the frustration16 of great designs, and perhaps shameful17 defeat.
It has been already stated that both commanders had intended to assume the offensive and fight a battle on the 7th, the Crown Prince proposing to bring up the greater part of his Army and envelop18 the French, and Marshal [p 98] MacMahon, who thought he was dealing19 with the heads of columns, having drawn20 up a plan to attack the Germans in front with the 1st and turn their right flank with the 5th Corps. Had he known how strong and how compact was the array of his opponent he never could have framed a scheme which would have transferred to the enemy all the advantages possessed21 by himself. The contingency22 of a forward movement on his part had been foreseen and guarded against, and the precautions adopted on the evening of the 5th would have become far more formidable had the next day passed by without a battle. But those very protective measures, as will be seen, tended to precipitate23 a conflict by bringing the troops into contact on the front and left flank of the French position. Marshal MacMahon had selected and occupied exceptionally strong ground. He posted his divisions on a high plateau west of the Sauer and the Sulz, between Neehwiller and Eberbach, having Froeschwiller as a kind of redoubt in the centre, and the wooded slopes of the hills running steeply down to the brooks24 in his front. The left wing, where General Ducrot commanded, was thrown back to guard the passages through the woodlands, which led down the right bank of the Sulz from Mattstal into the position. The centre fronted Woerth, which was not occupied, and the right, without leaning on any special protective obstacle, was in the woods and villages south-east of Elsasshausen, with reserves in the rear which, says the German official narrative25, together with the open country, were a sufficient guard against a direct flank attack, an opinion not justified26 by the result. The Sauer was deep, the bridges had been broken, and the ascents27 on the French side were prolonged, except on one point, and swept by musketry and cannon28. Among the vines and copses, in the villages and farmsteads, everywhere protected by open ground, over which an [p 99] assailant must pass, stood the French Army—Ducrot on the left, facing north-west, Raoult in the centre, Lartigue on the right, having behind him Conseil-Dumesnil’s division of the 7th Corps. Pellé, who succeeded Abel Douay, was in reserve; and the cavalry29 were partly in rear of the right, and partly behind the centre. The official German history speaks of the position as especially strong, regards the mass of troops seated there, put down at forty-five thousand men, as amply sufficient for a vigorous defence, and contends that the defect of numbers was balanced by a respectable artillery30 and the superiority of the Chassepot over the far-famed needle-gun. A Bavarian soldier-author, Captain Hugo Helvig, however, says that the ground held by the French had all the disadvantages of so-called “unassailable” positions—it had no issues to the front, consequently the defenders31 could not become the assailants; its right was “in the air” and its left “rested on that most doubtful of all supports to wings—a wood.” Thus the Bavarian captain differs from the General Staff. The fact seems to be that the position was so formidable that it could only be carried by onsets34 on both flanks, which, of course, implies that the assailant must have the control of superior numbers. Another point to be noted35 is that the great road to Bitsche was a prolongation of the front and in rear of the left, and that, as happened, in case of a severe defeat, the temptation would be all powerful to retreat by cross roads on Saverne, that is, away from instead of towards the main body of the Imperial Army. Marshal MacMahon had hoped to be the assailant, but he held that if the German Army continued its march southward beyond Hagenau, he would have to retreat, a movement the Crown Prince was not likely to make, since the orders from the King’s head-quarters were to seek out and fight the enemy wherever he might be found, a rule which [p 100] governed all the German operations up to the fatal day of Sedan.
Early on the morning of the 6th, the German columns were approaching, from the north and the east, the strong position just described. Hartmann’s Bavarians, after marching westward36 through the Hochwald to Mattstal, had turned south, down the Sulzbach. The 5th Corps, in position overnight at Preuschdorf, had, of course, strong advanced posts between Goersdorf and Dieffenbach, while von der Tann’s Bavarians were on the march from Ingolsheim, also through the lower Hochwald road, by Lampertsloch upon Goersdorf and the Sauer. Further to the left, the 11th Corps and Von Werder’s combined divisions were wheeling up to the right, so as to extend the line on the outer flank of the 5th Corps. The Hochwald rose five or six hundred feet above the battlefield. Like most uplands, it was intersected by vales and country roads, and nearly every hollow had its beck which flowed into the principal stream. This was the Sauer. Rising in hills beyond Lembach, it ran in a southerly direction along the whole German front, receiving the Sulz at Woerth, and dividing into two streams opposite Gunstett. These greater and lesser37 brooks, though spanned by few bridges, were well supplied with mills, which always facilitate the passage of streams. Large villages, also, filled up the valley bottoms here and there, and the country abounded38 in cultivation39. Through this peopled and industrious40 region the main roads ran from north to south, generally speaking, the road and railway from Bitsche to Hagenau, and on to Strasburg, passing in rear of MacMahon’s position close to Niederbronn and Reichshofen, and another highway to Hagenau, a common centre for roads in these parts, descended41 from Lembach, and, after crossing, followed the right bank of the Sauer. Thus there were plenty of communications in [p 101] all directions, despite the elevated, wooded and broken character of a district, wherein all arms could move freely, except cavalry.
PLAN I: BATTLE of WOERTH, ABOUT NOON
Weller & Graham Ltd. Lithos.? London, Bell & Sons
The Battle Begins.
The action was brought on by the eagerness of each side to discover the strength and intentions of the other. In this way, General von Walther, at daybreak, riding towards the Sauer, hearing noises in the French camp, which he construed42 to mean preparations for a retreat, ordered out a battery and some infantry43, to test the accuracy of his observations. The guns cannonaded Woerth, and the skirmishers, finding the town unoccupied, but the bridge broken, forded the stream, and advanced far enough to draw fire from the French foot and four batteries. The Prussian guns, though fewer, displayed that superiority over the French which they maintained throughout, and the observant officers above Woerth knew, by the arrival of the ambulance men on the opposite hills, that their shells had told upon the enemy. The skirmish ceased after an hour had passed, but it served to show that the French were still in position. Opposite Gunstett there stood a Bruch-Mühle, or mill in the marsh6, and in this place the Germans had posted a company, supported by another in the vines. Their purpose was to protect the left flank of the 5th Corps, and keep up a connection with the 11th, then on the march. The French sent forward, twice, bodies of skirmishers against the mill, supporting them the second time by artillery, and setting the mill on fire; but on neither occasion did they press the attack, and the Germans retained a point of passage which proved useful later in the day.
These affairs at Woerth and Gunstett ceased about eight [p 102] o’clock, but the cannonade at the former, echoing among the hills to the north, brought the Bavarians down the Sulz at a sharp pace, and thus into contact with Ducrot’s division. For General Hartmann, on the highlands, could see the great camp about Froeschwiller, and, directing his 4th Division on that place, and ordering up the reserve artillery from Mattstal, the General led his men quickly down the valley. An ineffective exchange of cannon-shots at long range ensued; but as the Bavarians emerged into the open, they came within reach of the French artillery. Nevertheless they persisted, until quitting the wood, they were overwhelmed by the Chassepot and fell back. A stiff conflict now arose on a front between Neehwiller and the Saw Mill on the Sulz, and even on the left bank of this stream, down which the leading columns of a Bavarian brigade had made their way. In short, Hartmann’s zealous46 soldiers, working forward impetuously, had fairly fastened on to the French left wing, striking it on the flank which formed an angle to the main line of battle, and holding it firmly on the ground. The French, however, had no thought of retiring, and besides, at that moment, they had the vantage. When the combat had lasted two hours, General von Hartmann received an order directing him to break it off, and he began at once his preparations to withdraw. The task was not easy, and before it was far advanced a request arrived from the Commander of the 5th Corps for support, as he was about to assail2 the heights above Woerth. It was heartily47 complied with, all the more readily, as the roar of a fierce cannonade to the south swept up the valley; but as the Bavarians had begun to withdraw, some time elapsed before the engagement on this side could be strenuously48 renewed.
[p 103]
Attack on Woerth.
We have already said that the Crown Prince, not having all his Corps in compact order, did not intend to fight a battle until the next day. But what befell was this. The officer at the head of the staff of the 5th Corps reached the front after the reconnaissance on Woerth was over. Just as he rode up, the smoke of Hartmann’s guns was visible on one side, and the noise of the skirmishers at Gunstett on the other. In order to prevent the French from overwhelming either, it was agreed, there and then, to renew the contest, and shortly after nine o’clock the artillery of the 5th Corps, ranged on the heights, opened fire. At the same time, a portion of the 11th Corps, hearing the guns, had moved up rapidly towards Gunstett, and three of their batteries were soon in line. Thus, the Bavarians rushed into battle in order to support the 5th Corps, this body resumed the combat to sustain the Bavarians, and the advanced guard of the 11th fell on promptly49, because the 5th seemed in peril50. The Prussian artillery soon quelled51, not the ardour, but the fire of the French gunners; and then the infantry, both in the centre and on the left, went steadily52 into action, passing through Woerth, and beginning to creep up the opposite heights. They made no way, and many men fell, while further down the stream, opposite Spachbach and Gunstett, part of the troops which had gone eagerly towards the woods, were smitten53 severely54, and driven back headlong over the river. Still some clung to the hollow ways, Woerth was always held fast, and when the foot recoiled55 before the telling Chassepot, the eighty-four pieces in battery lent their aid, averted56 serious pursuit, and flung a shower of shells into the woods. It was at this period that the defect of the French position became apparent. If the hardy57 Gauls [p 104] could repel58 an onset33, they could not, in turn, deliver a counter stroke, because the advantages of the defensive59 would pass, in that case, to the adversary60. But the Germans across the Sauer, who still held their ground, had much to endure, and were only saved by the arrival of fresh troops, and by seeking every available shelter from the incessant61 rifle fire. In the meantime, the 11th Corps was marching to the sound of the guns. General von Bose, its commander, had reached Gunstett in the forenoon, and, seeing how matters stood, had called up his nearest division, had ordered the other to advance on the left, and had informed Von Werder that an action had begun, in consequence whereof the Badeners and Würtembergers were also directed on the Sauer.
It was about one o’clock when the Crown Prince rode up to the front and took command. He had ridden out from Soultz at noon, because he plainly heard the sounds of conflict, and on his road had been met by an officer from Von Kirchbach, bearing a report which informed the Commander-in-Chief that it was no longer possible to stop the fray62. At the time he arrived, the advanced brigade of Von der Tann’s Bavarians had thrust itself into the gap between Preuschdorf and Goersdorf, and had brought three batteries into action, but the remainder of the Corps were still in the rear. The Crown Prince thus found his front line engaged without any reserve close at hand, and that no progress had been made either on the centre or the wings; but he knew that the latter would be quickly reinforced, and that the former, sustained by two hundred guns, constituted an ample guarantee against an offensive movement. No better opportunity of grappling with a relatively63 weak enemy was likely to occur, and it was to be feared that if the chance were offered, he would escape from a dangerous situation by skilfully64 extricating65 his Army. The Crown Prince, [p 105] therefore, determined66 to strike home, yet qualifying his boldness with caution, he still wished to delay the attack in front and flank until the troops on the march could reach the battlefield. No such postponement67 was practicable, even if desirable, because the fighting Commander of the 5th Corps had already, before the advice came to hand, flung his foremost brigades over the Sauer. So the action was destined68 to be fought out, from beginning to end, on places extemporized69 by subordinate officers; but they were adapted to the actual facts, and in accordance with the main idea which was sketched70 by the Chief. It may be said, indeed, that the battle of Woerth was brought on, worked out, and completed by the Corps commanders; and the cheerful readiness with which they supported each other, furnished indisputable testimony71 to the soundness of their training, the excellence72 of the bodies they commanded, and the formidable character, as well as the suppleness73 of the military institutions, which, if not founded, had been carried so near to perfection by Von Roon, Von Moltke and the King.
Begun in the early morning by a series of skirmishes on the river front, the action had developed into a battle at mid-day. The resolute74 Von Kirchbach, acting75 on his own responsibility, had thrown the entire 5th Corps into the fight; yet so strong was the position occupied by the defenders, that a successful issue depended upon the rapidity and energy with which the assaults on both flanks were conducted by brigades and divisions only then entering one after the other upon a fiercely contested field. At mid-day, the French line of battle had been nowhere broken or imperilled. Hartmann’s Bavarians on one side had been checked; the advance brigade of the 11th Corps, on the other, had been driven back over the Sauer, and Lartigue’s troops were actually pressing upon the bridges [p 106] near the mill in the marsh, which, however, they could not pass. The enormous line of German guns restrained and punished the French infantry, when not engaged in silencing the inferior artillery of the defender32. But no impression had been made upon the wooded heights filled with the soldiers of Ducrot, upon Raoult’s men in the centre above Woerth, or on Lartigue’s troops, who, backed by Conseil-Dumesnil, stood fast about Morsbronn, Eberbach, and Elsasshausen. So it was at noon, when the hardihood of Von Kirchbach forced on a decisive issue. Passing his men through, and on both sides of Woerth, he began a series of sustained attacks upon Raoult, who stiffly contested every foot of woodland, and even repelled76 the assailants, who, nevertheless, fighting with perseverance77, and undismayed by the slaughter78, gradually gained a little ground on both sides of the road to Froeschwiller. By comparatively slow degrees, they crept up the slopes, and established a front of battle; but the regiments80, battalions82, companies, were all mixed together, and, as the officers fell fast, the men had often to depend upon themselves. While these alternately advancing, receding83, and yet again advancing troops were grappling with the centre, Hartmann renewed his onsets, part of Von der Tann’s Corps dashed over the Sauer, filling up the gap in the line, and joining his right to Hartmann’s left; and the leading brigades of a fresh division of the 11th Corps, moving steadily and swiftly over the river below Gunstett, backed by all the cannon which the nature of the ground permitted the gunners to use, assailed the French right with measured and sustained fury, and, indeed, decided84 the battle.
Attack on the French right.
The French were posted in great force on their right—where they had two divisions, one in rear of the other, [p 107] between the Sauer and the Eberbach, having in support a powerful brigade of horsemen, Cuirassiers and Lancers, under General Michel. The infantry, as a rule, faced to the eastward85; while the attacking columns not only fronted to the westward, but also to the north-west; in other words, they fastened on the front from Spachbach, struck diagonally at the outer flank from Morsbronn, and even swept round towards the rear. The area of the combat on this part of the field was included on an oblong space bounded on the west by the Eberbach, and on the east by the Sauer, having Morsbronn at the south-eastern angle and outside the French lines; Albrechtshaüser, a large farmstead, a little to the north of the former, and opposite Gunstett; and beyond that point to the north-west the undulating wooded uplands, called the Niederwald, whence the ground slightly fell towards Elsasshausen, and rose again to a greater height at Froeschwiller, the centre and redoubt of the position. As the 22nd Division of the 11th Corps came up from Dürrenbach, they broke obliquely86 into this oblong, the direction of their attack mainly following the cross road through the forest from Morsbronn to Elsasshausen, while their comrades pierced the woods to the north of the great farmstead. No difficulty was encountered in expelling the handful of French from the village, but at the farm the Germans had a sharper combat, which they won by a converging87 movement, yet the defenders had time to retire into the forest. Thus two useful supports were secured, almost perpendicular88 to the French flank, and the pathways leading towards Reichshofen were uncovered. General Lartigue at once discerned the peril, and, in order that he might obtain time to throw back his right, he directed General Michel to charge the left flank of the Germans before they could recover from the confusion consequent on a rapid and irregular advance through the [p 108] villages, outbuildings, and hopfields, and array a less broken front.
The French cavalry appear to have considered that their main function was restricted to combats in great battles. The traditions handed down from the days of Kellerman and Murat and Lasalle survived in all their freshness, and the belief prevailed that a charge of French horseman, pushed home, would ride over any infantry, even in serried formation. They had disdained89 to reckon with the breech-loader in the hands of cool, well-disciplined opponents; and as their chance of acting on their convictions had come, so they were ready and willing to prove how strong and genuine was their faith in the headlong valour of resolute cavaliers. Instead of using one regiment79, Michel employed both, and a portion of the 6th lancers as well. He started forth90 from his position near Eberbach, his horsemen formed in echelon91 from the right, the 8th Cuirassiers leading in column of squadrons, followed by the 9th and the Lancers. Unluckily for them, they had to traverse ground unsuitable for cavalry. Here groups of trees, there stumps92, and again deep drains, disjointed the close formations, and when they emerged into better galloping93 ground, indeed before they had quitted the obstructions95, these gallant96 fellows were exposed to the deadly fire of the needle-gun. Nevertheless, with fiery97 courage, the Cuirassiers dashed upon the scattered98 German infantry, who, until the cavalry approached, had been under a hail of shot from the Chassepots in the Niederwald. Yet the Teutons did not quail99, form square, or run into groups—they stood stolidly100 in line, hurled101 out a volley at three hundred yards, and then smote102 the oncoming horsemen with unintermitted fire. The field was soon strewn with dead and wounded men and horses; yet the survivors103 rushed on, and sought safety by riding round the German [p 109] line or through the village, where they were brought to bay, and captured by the score. Each regiment, as it rode hardily104 into the fray, met with a similar fate, and even the fugitives105 who got into the rear were encountered by a Prussian Hussar regiment, and still further scattered, so that very few ever wandered back into the French lines. As a charge Michel’s valiant106 onset was fruitless; yet the sacrifice of so many brave horsemen secured a great object—it enabled General Lartigue to throw back his right, rearrange his defensive line in the woods, and renew the contest by a series of violent counter-attacks.
A furious outburst of the French infantry from the south-west angle of the Niederwald overpowered the German infantry, and drove them completely out of the farmstead so recently won. Yet the victors could not hold the place, because the batteries north of Gunstett at once struck and arrested them with a heavy fire, which gave time for fresh troops to move rapidly into line, restore the combat, and once more press back the dashing French infantry into the wood. On this point the fighting was rough and sustained, for the French charged again and again, and did not give way until the Germans on their right, forcing their way through the wood, had crowned a summit which turned the line. The sturdy adversary, who yielded slowly, was now within the forest, and the German troops on the left had come up to Eberbach, capturing MacMahon’s baggage, thus developing a connected front from stream to stream across the great woodland. In short, nearly all the 11th Corps was solidly arrayed, and in resistless motion upon the exposed flank of MacMahon’s position, while part of the Würtembergers, with some horse, were stretching forward beyond the Eberbach, and heading for Reichshofen itself. The Germans, indeed, had gained the north-western border of the woodland, [p 110] and General von Bose had ordered the one-half of his guns and his reserve of foot to cross the Sauer, and push the battle home. His right was now in connection with the left of the 5th Corps, which had continued its obstinate107 and sanguinary conflict with Raoult’s division on both sides of the road from Woerth to Froeschwiller, without mastering much ground. As the Bavarians were equally held at bay by the French left, the issue of the battle plainly depended on the vigorous and unfaltering energies of the 11th Corps.
Attack on Elsasshausen.
That fine body had been in action for two hours and a half, and, despite a long march on to the field, was still fresh, its too impetuous advanced brigade, alone, having been roughly handled, and thrust back earlier in the day. The task now before them was the capture of Elsasshausen, which would open the road to Froeschwiller, take off the pressure from the 5th Corps, place Ducrot’s steadfast108 infantry in peril, and enable the whole available mass of German troops to close in upon the outnumbered remnant of MacMahon’s devoted109 Army. For these brave men, although obliged to give ground, were fighting in a manner worthy110 of their old renown111, now dashing forward in vehement112 onslaughts, again striking heavy blows when overpowered and thrust back. Lartigue’s and some of Raoult’s troops stood on the right and left of Elsasshausen, supported by batteries on the higher ground, and two cavalry brigades in a hollow near the Eberbach. The foremost infantry occupied a copse which was separated from the main forest by a little glade113, and this defensive wooded post had, so far, brought the extreme right of the 11th Corps to a stand. About half-past two, the centre and left had come [p 111] up to the north-western edge of the Niederwald, and thus the French in the copse had fresh foes115 on their hands. They replied by a bold attack upon the adversary, whose front lines of skirmishers were immediately driven in. The gallant effort carried the assailants into the great wood, but not far; for behind the flying skirmishers, on both sides of the road, were troops which had more or less maintained a compact formation. Instead of yielding before the French advance, the German infantry, accepting the challenge, came steadily forward along the whole front, bore down the skirmishers, dispersed116 the supporting battalion81, and, following the enemy with unfaltering steps, crossed the glade, and drove him into, and out of, the copse-wood, which had hitherto been an impassable obstacle. As the entire line rushed forward, they arrived at the skirt of the wood, and, coming at once under the fire of the French guns on the heights, and the infantry in Elsasshausen, they suffered severe losses. Then their own artillery drove up and went into action, setting the village on fire, yet not dismaying its garrison117. The tension was so great, and the men fell so fast, that General von Bose resolved to risk a close attack upon an enemy whose position was critical, and whose endurance had been put to so exhausting a strain.
Thereupon, at the welcome signal, the bands of disordered foot soldiers—for nearly every atom of regular formation had long disappeared—dashed, with loud shouts, into the French position, carrying the village at a bound, and, pushing up the hillsides, took two guns and five mitrailleuses. The troops of the 11th had now crossed the deep road running south-westward from Woerth, had effected a junction118 with groups of several regiments belonging to the 5th, which formed a sort of spray upon the inner flank; and had besides, as already noted, [p 112] extended south-westward towards the road to Reichshofen. Once more the French strove, if not to retrieve119 a lost battle, at least to insure time for retreat. They fell upon the Germans along the whole line, making great gaps in its extent, and driving the adversary into the forest; but here, again, the artillery saved the foot, and, by its daring and effective fire, restored the battle, giving the much-tried infantry time to rally, and return upon their tracks. The Germans had barely time to recover from the confusion into which they had been thrown by a furious onset, than the four Cuirassier regiments, commanded by General Bonnemains, were seen preparing to charge. Unluckily for these stout120 horsemen, the tract121 over which they had to gallop94 was seamed with deep ditches, and barred by rows of low trees, so that not only could no compact formation be maintained, but the cavaliers were not, in some instances, able to reach their foes, who were well sheltered among the vine-stocks, and behind the walls of the hop-gardens. Moreover, the German infantry were assisted by batteries of guns, which were able to begin with shells, and end with grape-shot. The cavalry did all they could to close; but their efforts were fruitless, and the enormous loss they endured may be fairly regarded as a sacrifice willingly made to gain time for the now hardly bested army to retire.
MacMahon Orders a Retreat.
Indeed, the hour when a decision must be taken had struck, and MacMahon, who had cleverly fought his battle, did not hesitate. He determined to hold Froeschwiller as long as he could to cover the retreat, and then fly to Saverne. For, although neither Hartmann nor Von der Tann, despite their desperate onsets, had been able to shake [p 113] or dismay Ducrot, still, he was well aware that Raoult’s and Lartigue’s divisions had been driven back upon Froeschwiller, and he could see from the heights one fresh column of Bavarians moving towards Neehwiller, on his left, and another descending122 from the Hochwald to join the throng123 on the right bank of the Sulz. Moreover, two brigades of Würtembergers had come up to support the 11th Corps, and one part of them, with horsemen and guns, threatened Reichshofen, a Bavarian brigade, as we have said, was heading for Niederbronn. In addition, some of Ducrot’s intrenchments were carried by a Prussian Regiment on the right of the 5th Corps, and it was evident that the fierce struggle for Froeschwiller would be the last and final act of the tragedy. Yet, so slowly did the French recede124, that an hour or more was consumed in expelling them from their last stronghold; and except on that point, their does not seem to have been any serious fighting. The reason was that the place was held to facilitate the withdrawal125 of such troops as could gain the line of retreat, and although the disaster was great, it would have been greater had not Raoult, who was wounded and captured in the village, done his uttermost to withstand the concentric rush of his triumphant126 enemies.
The Close of the Battle.
No specific and detailed127 account, apparently128, exists, of this last desperate stand. But it is plain that, as the French centre and right yielded before Von Kirchbach and especially Von Bose, as the impetuous infantry onsets were fruitless, as the cavalry had been destroyed and the French guns could not bear up against the accurate and constant fire of their opponents, so the Germans swept onwards and almost encircled their foes. When Ducrot began to retire, [p 114] the Bavarians sprang forward up the steeps and through the woods, which had held them so long at bay; the stout and much-tried 5th Corps pushed onward129, and the 11th, already on the outskirts130 of Froeschwiller and extending beyond it, broke into its south-eastern and southern defences; so that portions of all the troops engaged in this sanguinary battle swarmed131 in, at last, upon the devoted band who hopelessly, yet nobly, clung to the final barrier. How bravely and steadfastly132 they fought may be inferred from the losses inflicted133 upon the Germans, whose officers, foremost among the confused crowd of mingled134 regiments and companies, were heavily punished, whose rank and file went down in scores. Even after the day had been decided, the French in Froeschwiller still resisted, and the combats there did not cease until five o’clock. But in the open the German flanking columns had done great execution on the line of retreat. A mixed body of Prussian and Würtemberg cavalry had ridden up on the extreme left, one Bavarian brigade had moved through Neehwiller upon Niederbronn, and another had marched through Froeschwiller upon Reichshofen. The horsemen kept the fugitives in motion and captured matériel; the first mentioned Bavarian brigade struck the division of General Guyot de Lespart, which had reached Niederbronn from Bitsche; and the second bore down on Reichshofen. The succouring division had arrived only in time to share the common calamity135, for assailed by the Bavarians and embarrassed by the flocks of fugitives, one-half retreated with them upon Saverne, and the other hastily retraced136 its steps to Bitsche, marching through the summer night. The battle had been so destructive and the pursuit so sharp that the wrecks137 of MacMahon’s shattered host hardly halted by day or night until they had traversed the country roads leading upon Saverne, whence they could gain the western side of the [p 115] Vosges. Nor did all his wearied soldiers follow this path of safety. Many fled through Hagenau to Strasburg, more retreated with the brigade of Abbatucci to Bitsche, and nine thousand two hundred officers and men remained behind as prisoners of war. The Marshal’s Army was utterly138 ruined, Strasburg was uncovered, the defiles139 of the Vosges, except that of Phalsbourg, were open to the invader140 who, in addition to the mass of prisoners, seized on the field, in some cases after a brilliant combat, twenty-eight guns, five mitrailleuses, one eagle, four flags, and much matériel of war. The actual French loss in killed and wounded during the fight did not exceed six thousand; while the victors, as assailants, had no fewer than 489 officers and 10,153 men killed and wounded. It was a heavy penalty, and represents the cost of a decisive battle when forced on by the initiative of Corps commanders before the entire force available for such an engagement could be marched up within striking distance of a confident and expectant foe114.
One other consequence of an unforeseen engagement was that the 5th Division of cavalry, which would have been so useful towards the close of the day, was unable to enter the field until nightfall. The Crown Prince and General Blumenthal, not having the exact information which might have been supplied by horsemen who rode at the heels of the fugitives, remained in doubt as to the line or lines of retreat which they followed. It was not until the next day that reports were sent in which suggested rather than described whither the French Army had gone. Prince Albrecht, who led the cavalry, had hastened forward to Ingweiler, on the road to Saverne, but he notified that, though a considerable body had fled by this route, the larger part had retired141 towards Bitsche. Later on the 7th he entered Steinburg, where he was in contact with the enemy, but, as [p 116] infantry were seen, he was apprehensive142 of a night attack from Saverne, and judged it expedient143 to fall back upon Buchswiller. The division had ridden more than forty miles in a difficult country during the day. From the north-west came information that the patrols of the 6th Corps had been met at Dambach, and that the French were not visible anywhere. The explanation of this fact is that one division of the 6th, directed on Bitsche, had, in anticipation144 of orders, pushed troops into the hills, and had thus touched the right of the main body. The reason why neither MacMahon nor De Failly were discovered was that the Marshal had fallen back to Sarrebourg, and that the General had hurried to join him by Petite-Pierre; and thus contact with the enemy was lost by the Germans because the defiles of the Vosges were left without defenders.
2.—Spicheren.
As the critical hours drew nearer when the capacity of the Emperor Napoleon and Marshal Leb?uf, applied145 to the conduct of a great war, was to be put to the severest test, so their hesitation increased and their inherent unfitness for the heavy task became more and more apparent. Marshal Bazaine had been intrusted with the command of three corps “for military operations only,” yet the supreme146 control was retained in Metz, and the Corps commanders looked more steadily in that direction than they did towards the Marshal’s head-quarters at St. Avold. Along the whole front, at every point, an attack by the enemy was apprehended147. General de Ladmirault was convinced that the 7th Prussian Corps would strive to turn his left; Marshal Bazaine was disturbed by the fear that the same body of troops would come upon him from Saarlouis; General Frossard felt so uncomfortable in the angle or [p 117] curve on the Saar, which he occupied, that he vehemently148 desired to see the Army concentrated in the position of Cadenbronn, a few miles to the rear of Spicheren; General Montaudon, who had a division at Sarreguemines, was certain that the enemy intended to swoop149 down upon him; and General de Failly was in daily alarm lest the Prussians should advance upon the gap of Rohrbach. At Metz all these conflicting surmises150 weighed upon, we might almost say collectively governed the Emperor and the Marshal, who issued, recalled, qualified151, and again issued perplexing orders. It is true that, owing to the supineness of the cavalry, and the indifference152 of the peasantry on the border, they were without any authentic153 information; but if that had been supplied it is very doubtful whether they would have been able to profit by it; and they were evidently unable to reason out a sound plan which would give them the best chances of thwarting154 the adversary’s designs or of facing them on the best terms. The sole idea which prevailed was that every line should be protected; and thus, on the 5th, the Guard was at Courcelles; Bazaine’s four divisions, hitherto echeloned on the line from St. Avold to Forbach, were strung out on a country road between St. Avold and Sarreguemines; De Ladmirault, who had been ordered to approach the Marshal, misled by the apparition155 of Prussian patrols, gave only a partial effect to the order; while Frossard, on the evening of that day, instead of the next morning, made those movements to the rear which attracted the notice of his opponents and drew them upon him. At dawn on the 6th, “the Army of the Rhine” was posted over a wide space in loosely-connected groups; yet, despite all the errors committed, there were still three divisions sufficiently156 near the 2nd Corps on the Spicheren heights to have converted the coming defeat into a brilliant victory. That great opportunity was lost, because the [p 118] soldierly spirit and the warlike training, in which the French were deficient157, were displayed to such an astonishing degree by the Germans whom they had so unwisely despised.
The watchful158 cavalry on the right bank of the Saar had noted at once the retrograde movement which General Frossard effected on the evening of the 5th, and the German leaders were led to infer from the tenour of the reports sent in, that the whole French line was being shifted to the rear, which was not a correct inference at that moment. Yet it was true and obvious that Frossard had withdrawn159 from the hills in close proximity160 to Saarbrück. In order to ascertain11, if possible, how far and in what degree the French had retired, small parties of horsemen crossed the river soon after daylight, and rode, not only along the direct route to Forbach until they were stopped by cannon fire, but swept round the left flank, and even looked into the rear, observed the French camps, and alarmed both Marshal Bazaine and General de Ladmirault. Above Sarreguemines they tried to break up the railway, and did destroy the telegraph; and thus, by appearing on all sides, these enterprising mounted men filled the adversary with apprehensions161, and supplied their own Generals with sound intelligence. Some information, less inaccurate162 than usual, must have reached the Imperial head-quarters at Metz, seeing that a telegram sent thence, between four and five in the morning, warned Frossard that he might be seriously attacked in the course of the day; but it does not appear that the same caution was transmitted to Bazaine, with or without instructions to support his comrade. It is a nice question whether the general conduct of the war suffered the greater damage from the active interference or the negligence163 of the Emperor and his staff.
While the cavalry were keeping the French well in view, [p 119] the leading columns of the 7th and 8th Corps were moving up towards the Saar, and one division of the Third was equally on the alert. General von Rheinbaben had already ridden over the unbroken bridges, had posted some squadrons on the lower ground, and had drawn a sharp fire from the French guns. The German staff were astonished when they learned that the bridges had not been injured. The reason was soon apparent. The Emperor still cherished the illusion that he might be able to assume the offensive, a course he had prepared for by collecting large magazines at Forbach and Sarreguemines on the very edge of the frontier; and his dreams were now to be dispelled164 by the rude touch of the zealous and masterful armies whose active outposts were now over the Saar.
PLAN II: BATTLE of SPICHEREN, 3.30 P.M.
Weller & Graham Ltd. Lithos.? London, Bell & Sons
The Battle-field.
The ground occupied by the 2nd Corps was an undulating upland lying between the great road to Metz and the river, which, running in a northerly direction from the spurs of the Vosges, turns somewhat abruptly165 to the west a couple of miles above Saarbrück on its way to the Moselle. The heights of Spicheren, partly wooded and partly bare, fall sharply to the stream in the front and on the eastern flank, while on the west lies the hollow through which the highway and the railroad have been constructed. The foremost spur of the mass, separated by a valley from the Spicheren hills, is a narrow rocky eminence166, which Frossard names the Spur, and the Germans call the Rotheberg, or Red Hill, because its cliffs were so bright in colour, and shone out conspicuously167 from afar. On the French right of this rugged169 cliff were dense170 woods, and on the left the vale, having beyond it more woods, and towards Forbach, farms, houses and factories. The upper or southern end [p 120] was almost closed by the large village of Stiring-Wendel, inhabited by workers in iron, and having on the outskirts those unseemly mounds171 of slag172 with which this useful industry defaces the aspect of nature. The village stands between the road and railway, and as the heights rise abruptly on each side, all the approaches, except those through the woods on the west and north-west, were commanded by the guns and infantry on the slopes. It should be noted that west of the neck which connected the red horse-shoe shaped hill with the central heights in front of Spicheren village, there is a deep, irregular, transversal valley, which proved useful to the defence. General Frossard placed Laveaucoupet’s division upon the Spicheren hills, in two lines, and occupied the Red Hill, which he had intrenched, with a battalion of Chasseurs. In rear of all stood Bataille’s division at ?tingen. On the left front, Jolivet’s brigade of Vergé’s division occupied Stiring, and Valazé’s was placed to the west of Forbach, looking down the road to Saarlouis. As Frossard dreaded173 an attack from that side, especially as the road up the valley from Rosseln turned the position, his engineer-general threw up a long intrenchment, barring the route. It was in this order that the 2nd Corps stood when some daring German horsemen trotted174 up the high road to feel for it, while others, on the west, pressed so far forward that they discerned the camps at St. Avold. Below the front of the position, and just outside Saarbrück, the foot-hills, Reppertsberg, Galgenberg, Winterberg, and so on, and the hollows among them were unoccupied by the French, and it was into and upon these that Rheinbaben pushed with his cavalry and guns, which, from the Parade ground, exchanged shots with the French pieces established on the Red Hill or Spur.
[p 121]
The Germans begin the Fight.
On the German side, the determination to lay hands upon, and arrest what was supposed to be a retreating enemy, was identical and simultaneous; and it is the spontaneous activity of every officer and soldier within reach, to share in the conflict which is the characteristic of the day’s operations. General Kameke, commanding the 14th Division, 7th Corps, when on the march, heard that Frossard had drawn back, and, asking whether he might cross the river, was told to act on his own judgment175; so he pressed southward. General Goeben, chief of the 8th Corps, had ridden out to judge for himself, and finding his comrades of the 7th ready to advance, offered his support. General von Alvensleben, commanding the 3rd Corps, a singularly alert and ready officer, ordered up his 5th Division, commanded by General von Stülpnagel, but before the order arrived, General Doering, who had been early to the outposts, had anticipated the command, because he thought that Kameke might be overweighted. General von Schwerin, later in the day, collected his brigade at St. Ingbert, and sent a part of them forward by rail. In like manner General von Barnekoff, commanding the 16th Division, 8th Corps, hearing the sound of artillery, had anticipated the desire of Goeben, and by mid-day his advanced guard, under Colonel von Rex, was close upon the scene of action. General von Zastrow, who had permitted Kameke to do what he thought fit, applied to Von Steinmetz for leave to push forward the whole 7th Corps, and the fiery veteran at once complied, saying, “The enemy ought to be punished for his negligence,” a characteristic yet not necessarily a wise speech, as the business of a General is not to chastise176 even the negligent177, unless it serves the main [p 122] purpose of the operations in hand. Thus we see that the mere178 noise of battle attracted the Germans from all quarters; and hence it happened that the fronts of the two armies, then in line of march, hastened into a fight by degrees—in detachments, so to speak—which would have produced a heavy reverse had all the French brigade and divisional commanders who were within hail, been as prompt, persistent179 and zealous as their impetuous opponents.
Until near noontide, there had been merely a bickering180 of outposts, chiefly on the north-western side; and it was only when the 14th Division crossed the river and moved up the foothills, that the action really began. At this time it was still supposed that the battalions, batteries, and sections of horsemen visible were a rear-guard, covering what is now called the “entrainment” of troops at Forbach; for the greater part of Laveaucoupet’s soldiers were below the crests182, and in the forest-land, while Jolivet’s brigade made no great show in and about the village of Stiring. Kameke’s young soldiers went eagerly and joyously183 into their first battle. They consisted of six battalions, led by General von Fran?ois, and were soon extended from the Metz road on the German right, to the wooded ascents east of the Red Hill, which, in reality, became the main object of attack. The plan followed was the favourite tactical movement, so often practised with success—a direct onset on the enemy’s front, and an advance on both flanks. These operations were supported by the fire of three batteries, which soon obliged the French gunners on the Red Spur to recede. An extraordinary and almost indescribable infantry combat now began over a wide space, sustained by the battalions of the 14th Division fighting by companies. On one side they endeavoured to approach Stiring; in the centre they were a long time huddled184 [p 123] together under the craigs of the Rotheberg; further to the left they dashed into the Giffert Wald, and emerged into comparatively open ground, only to find themselves shattered by a heavy fire, and obliged to seek cover. For the battalions engaged soon discovered that, instead of a rear-guard, they had to encounter half a corps d’armée; and, although reinforcements were rapidly approaching, yet, as the afternoon wore on, it became evident that the assailants could only maintain their footing by displaying great obstinacy185, and enduring bitter losses. After two hours’ hard fighting five fresh battalions, belonging to Von Woyna’s brigade of Kameke’s division came into action on the right, and sought to operate on the French left flank, some following the railway, others pressing into the thick woods on the west. The density186 of the copses threw the lines into confusion, so that the companies were blended, and, as guidance was almost impossible, trust had to be reposed187 in the soldierly instincts and training alike of officers and men, and on the genuine comradeship so conspicuous168 throughout all ranks of the Prussian Army. Practically, at this moment, the French, although beset188 on all sides by their enterprising foes, had a distinct advantage, for they smote the venturesome columns as they emerged here and there, and it may be said that, between three and four o’clock, the German artillery on the Galgenberg and Folster H?he, held the French in check, and averted an irresistible189 offensive movement. Yet the German infantry were tenacious190; when pressed back they collected afresh in groups, and went on again; and General Frossard was so impressed by the audacity191 of his foes, that he brought up Bataille’s division from ?tingen, and directed Valazé to quit the hill above Forbach, and reinforce the defenders of Stiring. Indeed, threatened on both flanks, the whole of the 2nd [p 124] Corps was gradually drawn into the fray, and its commander, though somewhat late, appealed for aid to Marshal Bazaine, who himself did not feel secure at St. Avold.
The Red Hill Stormed.
Shortly after three o’clock, General von Fran?ois, obeying the orders of his chief, Von Kameke, resolved to storm the Red Hill. The German leader was under the impression that the French were yielding on all sides, which was not strictly192 correct, for the fresh troops were just coming into action, and the Germans were superior, alone, in the range and accuracy of their superb artillery. The gallant Fran?ois, sword in hand, leading the Fusilier battalion of the 74th Regiment, climbed the steep, springing from ledge14 to ledge, and dashed over the crest181, and drove the surprised French chasseurs out of the foremost intrenchment, and fastened themselves firmly on the hill. The Chasseurs, who had retired into a second line of defences, poured in a murderous fire; General von Fran?ois, heading a fresh onset, fell pierced by five bullets, yet lived long enough to feel that his Fusiliers and a company of the 39th, which had clambered up on the left, had gained a foothold they were certain to maintain. There were many brilliant acts of heroism193 on that day, but the storming of the Red Hill stands out as the finest example of soldiership and daring. Nor less so the stubbornness with which the stormers stood fast; especially as the French, at that moment, had thrown a body of troops against the German left, so strong and aggressive, that the valiant companies in the Giffert Wald were swept clean out of the wood.
Fortunately, at the same time, the advanced guards of the 5th and 16th Divisions, already referred to, had [p 125] crossed the Saar. General von Goeben, who had also arrived, took command, and formed a strong resolution. He decided that, as the battle had reached a critical stage, it would be unwise to keep reserves; so he flung everything to hand into the fight, on the ground that the essential thing was to impart new life to a combat which had become indecisive, if not adverse194 to the assailant. Accordingly, the artillery was brought up to a strength of six batteries, and one part of the fresh troops was sent to reinforce the left, and another towards the Red Hill. Shortly afterwards, Von Goeben had to relinquish195 the command to his senior, Von Zastrow, the commander of the 7th Corps; but the chief business of the principal leaders consisted in pushing up reinforcements as they arrived; the forward fighting being directed by the Generals and Colonels in actual contact with the enemy.
Progress of the Action.
For two hours, that is, between four and six o’clock, the front of battle swagged to and fro, for the French fought valiantly196, and, by repeated forward rushes, compelled their pertinacious197 assailants to give, or repelled their energetic attempts to gain, ground. A German company would dash out from cover, and thrust the defenders to the rear; then, smitten in front and flank, it would recede, followed by the French, who, taken in flank by the opportune198 advent199 of a hostile group, would retreat to the woods, or the friendly shelter of a depression in the soil. Nevertheless, in the centre, and on their own left, the Germans made some progress. A battalion of the 5th Division mastered the defence in the Pfaffen Wald on the French right; a group of companies crowned the highest point in the Giffert Wald; and the new arrivals, drawn alike from the 8th [p 126] and the 3rd Corps, pushed up the ravine on the east, and the slopes on the west of the Red Hill, until their combined fire and frequent rushes forced the French out of their second line of intrenchments on the neck of high land which connected the Red Hill with the heights of Spicheren. The French strove fiercely, again and again, to recover the vantage ground, yet could not prevail; but their comrades below, in the south-west corner of the Giffert Wald, stoutly200 held on, so that the fight in this quarter became stationary201, as neither side could make any progress.
On the German right, during the same interval202 of time, there had been sharper alternations of fortune. Here the French held strong positions, not only in the village of Stiring-Wendel, but on the hillsides above it, and especially on the tongue of upland called the Forbacher Berg. The assailant had succeeded in taking and keeping the farmsteads on the railway, the “Brême d’or” and the “Baraque Mouton,” but the efforts of General von Woyna to operate on the French left had been so roughly encountered that he drew back his troops to a point far down the valley. In fact, General Frossard had strengthened Vergé, who held fast to Stiring, by Valazé’s brigade, and General Bataille had also sent half his division to support his comrade. The consequence was that the German projects were frustrated203; while, on the other hand, their heavy batteries on the Folster H?he had such an ascendancy204 that the French could not secure any advantage by moving down the vale.
Yet they were not, as yet, worsted in the combat at any point, save on the salient of the Red Hill. Upon that eminence the German commanders now determined to send both cavalry and guns. The horsemen, however, could gain no footing, either by riding up the hillsides, or following the zigzags205 of the Spicheren road, which ascends206 the eastern [p 127] face of the promontory207. The artillery had better fortune. First one gun, and then another, was welcomed by the shouts of the much-tried and steadfast defenders; eight pieces first succeeded in overcoming all obstacles; finally, four other guns, completing the two batteries, came into action, and their fire was efficacious in restraining the ardour of the French, and rendering208 the position absolutely secure from assault. But they suffered great losses, which were inflicted not only by the powerful batteries on the opposite height, but by the Chassepot fire from the front and the Giffert Wald. The German commanders had discovered by a harsh experience that the battle could not be won either by an offensive movement from the centre, or flanking operations on the left, because the neck of highland44 south of the Red Hill was too strongly held, while the deep valley interposed between the forests and the Spicheren Downs brought the flanking battalions to a halt, under cover. It was then determined to employ the latest arrivals, the troops of the 5th Division, in an effort to storm the Forbacher Berg from the Metz road valley, and at the same time to renew a front and flank attack upon Stiring-Wendel.
Here we may note two facts which are apt illustrations of that efficiency, the fruit of wise forethought, which prevailed in the German host. One is that a battery, attached to the 1st Corps, arrived on the Saar, by railway, direct from K?nigsberg, on the confines of East Prussia, and, driving up, actually went into position, and opened fire from the Folster H?he. It was the first light battery commanded by Captain Schmidt, whose exploit was, then, at least, without parallel. The other is that the 2nd battalion of the 53rd Regiment, starting at six in the morning from Wadern, actually marched, part of the time as artillery escort, nearly twenty-eight miles in thirteen [p 128] hours, and, towards sunset, stood in array on the field of battle. The like goodwill209 and energy were displayed by all the troops; but this example of zeal45 and endurance deserves special record.
Frossard Retires.
The final and decisive encounters on this sanguinary field were delivered on the western fronts. Four battalions were directed along or near the Metz road upon the heights above Stiring, while the troops on the extreme German right, which, it will be remembered, had suffered a reverse, resumed their march upon the village. These simultaneous onsets were all the more effective, because the French commander was alarmed by the advance guard of the 13th Division, which, having moved up from Rosseln, was now near to Forbach itself. He had become apprehensive of being turned on both flanks, for Laveaucoupet was, at that moment, engaged in a desperate, although a partially210 successful strife211 against the Germans in the Giffert Wald. The flank attack on the Forbacher Berg, skilfully conducted, drove back the adversary, yet could not be carried far, because he was still strong and it was growing dusk. In like manner, Stiring itself was only captured in part. On the other hand, so vehement a rush was made upon the Giffert Wald that the French once more penetrated212 its coverts213. Practically, however, the battle had been decided. General Frossard, receiving no support from Bazaine’s divisions, greatly disturbed by the news that the head of a hostile column was close to Forbach, unable to oust214 the Germans from the Red Hill or effectively repel their onsets on the Metz road had, half an hour before a footing on the Forbacher Berg was won, given orders for a retreat upon Sarreguemines, so that the furious outburst of French [p 129] valour in the Giffert Wald was only the expiring flash of a finely-sustained engagement, and the forerunner215 of a retrograde night march.
Indeed, General Frossard is entitled to any credit which may accrue216 from the stoutness217 with which he held his main position until nightfall. He himself assigns the march of Von Golz from Rosseln upon Forbach as the reason for his retreat. Having been obliged to leave the heights north-west of Forbach practically undefended, in order to support Vergé in Stiring-Wendel, he lost, or thought he had lost, control over the high road and railway to Metz, and felt bound to retire eccentrically upon Sarreguemines, a movement which it is not easy to comprehend. It is true that the guns of Von Golz, firing from the hills above Forbach, drove back a train bringing reinforcements from St. Avold, but a couple of miles to the rear was Metman’s entire division; and it was from and not towards this succour that the main body of the French took their way. The most astonishing fact connected with this battle is that during the whole day three of Bazaine’s divisions were each within about nine miles of the battlefield. It was not the Marshal’s fault that not one assisted the commander of the 2nd Corps. Each had been directed to do so, but none succeeded. General Montaudon did, indeed, move out from Sarreguemines, but halted after covering a few miles. General de Castagny, as soon as he heard the guns, and without waiting for orders, marched his division from Puttelange; but, unluckily for him, the sound led him into the hills, where the dense woods and vales obstructed218 the passage of the sound. Hearing nothing he returned to Puttelange, but no sooner had he got there than the roar of artillery, more intense than ever, smote his ear. The ready veteran at once set out afresh, this time following the route which would have brought him into the heart of the Spicheren [p 130] position. He was too late; night came on apace, the distant tumult219 died down, he endeavoured to communicate with Frossard, but his messenger only found Metman, who, coming on from Marienthal, had halted at Bening, and did not move upon Forbach until nearly dark. Thus were three strong divisions wasted, and a force which would have given the French victory, spent the day in wandering to and fro or in weak hesitation. General de Castagny was the only officer who really did his utmost to support the 2nd Corps; for Metman awaited orders, and they came too late. During the night, or early in the morning, they all, except De Castagny, who was called up to St. Avold, assembled near Puttelange, wearied and disgusted with their fruitless exertions220; and there they were joined by the 2nd Corps.
The Germans bivouacked on the field. They had had in action twenty-seven battalions and ten batteries, and the day’s irregular and confused fighting had cost them in killed and wounded a loss of no fewer than 223 officers and 4,648 men; while the French lost 249 officers and 3,829 men, including more than two thousand prisoners. The great disproportion is due to the fact that the Germans were the assailants and that throughout the day and on all points they fought the battle with relatively small groups, parts of the 7th, 8th, and 3rd Corps, which arrived in succession on the scene. That the victory was not more complete must be ascribed to the improvised221 character of the conflict. Both Woerth and Spicheren were accidental combats due to the initiative of subordinate officers, a practice which has its dangers; but the success attained222 in each case is a striking proof that the discipline and training of all ranks in the German Army had created a living organism which could be trusted to work by itself.
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memorable
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assail
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corps
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serried
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marsh
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respite
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harassed
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| adj. 疲倦的，厌烦的 动词harass的过去式和过去分词 | |
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thither
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| adv.向那里；adj.在那边的，对岸的 | |
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10
hesitation
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| n.犹豫，踌躇 | |
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11
ascertain
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| vt.发现，确定，查明，弄清 | |
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12
ascertained
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| v.弄清，确定，查明( ascertain的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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discretion
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| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
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14
ledge
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| n.壁架，架状突出物；岩架，岩礁 | |
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latitude
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| n.纬度，行动或言论的自由(范围)，(pl.)地区 | |
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16
frustration
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| n.挫折，失败，失效，落空 | |
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17
shameful
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| adj.可耻的，不道德的 | |
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18
envelop
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| vt.包，封，遮盖；包围 | |
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19
dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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20
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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21
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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22
contingency
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| n.意外事件，可能性 | |
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23
precipitate
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| adj.突如其来的；vt.使突然发生；n.沉淀物 | |
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24
brooks
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| n.小溪( brook的名词复数 ) | |
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25
narrative
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| n.叙述，故事；adj.叙事的，故事体的 | |
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26
justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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27
ascents
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| n.上升( ascent的名词复数 )；（身份、地位等的）提高；上坡路；攀登 | |
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28
cannon
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| n.大炮，火炮；飞机上的机关炮 | |
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29
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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30
artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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31
defenders
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| n.防御者( defender的名词复数 )；守卫者；保护者；辩护者 | |
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32
defender
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| n.保卫者，拥护者，辩护人 | |
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33
onset
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| n.进攻，袭击，开始，突然开始 | |
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34
onsets
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| 攻击，袭击（onset的复数形式） | |
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35
noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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36
westward
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| n.西方，西部；adj.西方的，向西的；adv.向西 | |
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37
lesser
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| adj.次要的，较小的；adv.较小地，较少地 | |
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38
abounded
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| v.大量存在，充满，富于( abound的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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39
cultivation
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| n.耕作，培养，栽培（法），养成 | |
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40
industrious
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| adj.勤劳的，刻苦的，奋发的 | |
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41
descended
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| a.为...后裔的，出身于...的 | |
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42
construed
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| v.解释（陈述、行为等）( construe的过去式和过去分词 )；翻译，作句法分析 | |
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43
infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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44
highland
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| n.(pl.)高地，山地 | |
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45
zeal
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| n.热心，热情，热忱 | |
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46
zealous
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| adj.狂热的，热心的 | |
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47
heartily
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| adv.衷心地，诚恳地，十分，很 | |
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48
strenuously
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| adv.奋发地，费力地 | |
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49
promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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50
peril
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| n.(严重的)危险；危险的事物 | |
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51
quelled
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| v.（用武力）制止，结束，镇压( quell的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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52
steadily
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| adv.稳定地；不变地；持续地 | |
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53
smitten
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| 猛打，重击，打击( smite的过去分词 ) | |
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54
severely
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| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
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55
recoiled
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| v.畏缩( recoil的过去式和过去分词 )；退缩；报应；返回 | |
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56
averted
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| 防止，避免( avert的过去式和过去分词 )； 转移 | |
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57
hardy
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| adj.勇敢的，果断的，吃苦的；耐寒的 | |
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58
repel
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| v.击退，抵制，拒绝，排斥 | |
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59
defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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60
adversary
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| adj.敌手，对手 | |
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61
incessant
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| adj.不停的，连续的 | |
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62
fray
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| v.争吵；打斗；磨损，磨破；n.吵架；打斗 | |
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63
relatively
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| adv.比较...地，相对地 | |
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64
skilfully
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| adv. (美skillfully)熟练地 | |
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65
extricating
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| v.使摆脱困难，脱身( extricate的现在分词 ) | |
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66
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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67
postponement
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| n.推迟 | |
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68
destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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69
extemporized
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| v.即兴创作，即席演奏( extemporize的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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70
sketched
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| v.草拟（sketch的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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71
testimony
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| n.证词；见证，证明 | |
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72
excellence
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| n.优秀，杰出，(pl.)优点，美德 | |
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73
suppleness
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| 柔软； 灵活； 易弯曲； 顺从 | |
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74
resolute
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| adj.坚决的，果敢的 | |
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75
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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76
repelled
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| v.击退( repel的过去式和过去分词 )；使厌恶；排斥；推开 | |
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77
perseverance
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| n.坚持不懈，不屈不挠 | |
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78
slaughter
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| n.屠杀，屠宰；vt.屠杀，宰杀 | |
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79
regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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80
regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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81
battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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82
battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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83
receding
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|
| v.逐渐远离( recede的现在分词 )；向后倾斜；自原处后退或避开别人的注视；尤指问题 | |
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84
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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85
eastward
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|
| adv.向东；adj.向东的；n.东方，东部 | |
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86
obliquely
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| adv.斜； 倾斜； 间接； 不光明正大 | |
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87
converging
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| adj.收敛[缩]的，会聚的，趋同的v.（线条、运动的物体等）会于一点( converge的现在分词 )；（趋于）相似或相同；人或车辆汇集；聚集 | |
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88
perpendicular
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|
| adj.垂直的，直立的；n.垂直线，垂直的位置 | |
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89
disdained
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|
| 鄙视( disdain的过去式和过去分词 )； 不屑于做，不愿意做 | |
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90
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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91
echelon
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| n.梯队；组织系统中的等级；v.排成梯队 | |
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92
stumps
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| （被砍下的树的）树桩( stump的名词复数 )； 残肢； （板球三柱门的）柱； 残余部分 | |
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93
galloping
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| adj. 飞驰的, 急性的 动词gallop的现在分词形式 | |
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94
gallop
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| v./n.(马或骑马等)飞奔；飞速发展 | |
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95
obstructions
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| n.障碍物( obstruction的名词复数 )；阻碍物；阻碍；阻挠 | |
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96
gallant
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| adj.英勇的，豪侠的；(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
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97
fiery
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| adj.燃烧着的，火红的；暴躁的；激烈的 | |
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98
scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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99
quail
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| n.鹌鹑；vi.畏惧，颤抖 | |
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100
stolidly
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| adv.迟钝地，神经麻木地 | |
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101
hurled
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| v.猛投，用力掷( hurl的过去式和过去分词 )；大声叫骂 | |
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102
smote
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| v.猛打，重击，打击( smite的过去式 ) | |
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103
survivors
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| 幸存者，残存者，生还者( survivor的名词复数 ) | |
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104
hardily
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| 耐劳地，大胆地，蛮勇地 | |
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105
fugitives
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| n.亡命者，逃命者( fugitive的名词复数 ) | |
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106
valiant
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| adj.勇敢的，英勇的；n.勇士，勇敢的人 | |
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107
obstinate
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| adj.顽固的，倔强的，不易屈服的，较难治愈的 | |
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108
steadfast
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| adj.固定的，不变的，不动摇的；忠实的；坚贞不移的 | |
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109
devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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110
worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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111
renown
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| n.声誉，名望 | |
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112
vehement
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| adj.感情强烈的；热烈的；(人)有强烈感情的 | |
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113
glade
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| n.林间空地，一片表面有草的沼泽低地 | |
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114
foe
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| n.敌人，仇敌 | |
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115
foes
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| 敌人，仇敌( foe的名词复数 ) | |
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116
dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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117
garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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118
junction
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| n.连接，接合；交叉点，接合处，枢纽站 | |
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119
retrieve
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| vt.重新得到，收回；挽回，补救；检索 | |
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121
tract
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| n.传单，小册子，大片(土地或森林) | |
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122
descending
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| n. 下行 adj. 下降的 | |
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123
throng
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| n.人群，群众；v.拥挤，群集 | |
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124
recede
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| vi.退(去)，渐渐远去；向后倾斜，缩进 | |
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125
withdrawal
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| n.取回，提款；撤退，撤军；收回，撤销 | |
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126
triumphant
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| adj.胜利的，成功的；狂欢的，喜悦的 | |
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127
detailed
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| adj.详细的，详尽的，极注意细节的，完全的 | |
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128
apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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129
onward
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| adj.向前的，前进的；adv.向前，前进，在先 | |
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130
outskirts
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| n.郊外，郊区 | |
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131
swarmed
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| 密集( swarm的过去式和过去分词 )； 云集； 成群地移动； 蜜蜂或其他飞行昆虫成群地飞来飞去 | |
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132
steadfastly
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| adv.踏实地，不变地；岿然；坚定不渝 | |
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133
inflicted
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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134
mingled
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| 混合，混入( mingle的过去式和过去分词 )； 混进，与…交往[联系] | |
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135
calamity
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| n.灾害，祸患，不幸事件 | |
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136
retraced
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| v.折回( retrace的过去式和过去分词 )；回忆；回顾；追溯 | |
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137
wrecks
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| n.沉船( wreck的名词复数 )；（事故中）遭严重毁坏的汽车（或飞机等）；（身体或精神上）受到严重损伤的人；状况非常糟糕的车辆（或建筑物等）v.毁坏[毁灭]某物( wreck的第三人称单数 )；使（船舶）失事，使遇难，使下沉 | |
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138
utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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139
defiles
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| v.玷污( defile的第三人称单数 )；污染；弄脏；纵列行进 | |
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140
invader
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| n.侵略者，侵犯者，入侵者 | |
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141
retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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142
apprehensive
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| adj.担心的，恐惧的，善于领会的 | |
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143
expedient
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| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
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144
anticipation
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| n.预期，预料，期望 | |
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145
applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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146
supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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147
apprehended
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| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 )； 理解 | |
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148
vehemently
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| adv. 热烈地 | |
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149
swoop
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| n.俯冲，攫取；v.抓取，突然袭击 | |
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150
surmises
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| v.臆测，推断( surmise的第三人称单数 )；揣测；猜想 | |
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151
qualified
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| adj.合格的，有资格的，胜任的，有限制的 | |
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152
indifference
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| n.不感兴趣，不关心，冷淡，不在乎 | |
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153
authentic
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| a.真的，真正的；可靠的，可信的，有根据的 | |
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154
thwarting
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| 阻挠( thwart的现在分词 )； 使受挫折； 挫败； 横过 | |
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155
apparition
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| n.幽灵，神奇的现象 | |
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156
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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157
deficient
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| adj.不足的，不充份的，有缺陷的 | |
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158
watchful
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| adj.注意的，警惕的 | |
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159
withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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160
proximity
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| n.接近，邻近 | |
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161
apprehensions
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| 疑惧 | |
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162
inaccurate
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| adj.错误的，不正确的，不准确的 | |
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163
negligence
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| n.疏忽，玩忽，粗心大意 | |
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dispelled
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| v.驱散，赶跑( dispel的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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abruptly
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| adv.突然地，出其不意地 | |
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166
eminence
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| n.卓越，显赫；高地，高处；名家 | |
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conspicuously
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| ad.明显地，惹人注目地 | |
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conspicuous
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| adj.明眼的，惹人注目的；炫耀的，摆阔气的 | |
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169
rugged
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| adj.高低不平的，粗糙的，粗壮的，强健的 | |
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170
dense
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| a.密集的，稠密的，浓密的；密度大的 | |
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171
mounds
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| 土堆，土丘( mound的名词复数 )； 一大堆 | |
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slag
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| n.熔渣，铁屑，矿渣；v.使变成熔渣，变熔渣 | |
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173
dreaded
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| adj.令人畏惧的；害怕的v.害怕，恐惧，担心( dread的过去式和过去分词) | |
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174
trotted
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| 小跑，急走( trot的过去分词 )； 匆匆忙忙地走 | |
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175
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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176
chastise
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| vt.责骂，严惩 | |
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177
negligent
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| adj.疏忽的；玩忽的；粗心大意的 | |
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178
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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179
persistent
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| adj.坚持不懈的，执意的；持续的 | |
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180
bickering
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| v.争吵( bicker的现在分词 )；口角；（水等）作潺潺声；闪烁 | |
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181
crest
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| n.顶点；饰章；羽冠；vt.达到顶点；vi.形成浪尖 | |
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182
crests
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| v.到达山顶（或浪峰）( crest的第三人称单数 )；到达洪峰，达到顶点 | |
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183
joyously
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| ad.快乐地, 高兴地 | |
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184
huddled
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| 挤在一起（huddle的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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185
obstinacy
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| n.顽固；（病痛等）难治 | |
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186
density
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| n.密集，密度，浓度 | |
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187
reposed
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| v.将（手臂等）靠在某人（某物）上( repose的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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188
beset
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| v.镶嵌；困扰，包围 | |
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189
irresistible
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| adj.非常诱人的，无法拒绝的，无法抗拒的 | |
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190
tenacious
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| adj.顽强的，固执的，记忆力强的，粘的 | |
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191
audacity
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| n.大胆，卤莽，无礼 | |
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192
strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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193
heroism
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| n.大无畏精神，英勇 | |
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194
adverse
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| adj.不利的；有害的；敌对的，不友好的 | |
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195
relinquish
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| v.放弃，撤回，让与，放手 | |
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196
valiantly
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| adv.勇敢地，英勇地；雄赳赳 | |
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197
pertinacious
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| adj.顽固的 | |
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198
opportune
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| adj.合适的，适当的 | |
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199
advent
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| n.(重要事件等的)到来，来临 | |
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200
stoutly
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| adv.牢固地，粗壮的 | |
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201
stationary
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| adj.固定的，静止不动的 | |
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202
interval
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| n.间隔，间距；幕间休息，中场休息 | |
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203
frustrated
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| adj.挫败的，失意的，泄气的v.使不成功( frustrate的过去式和过去分词 )；挫败；使受挫折；令人沮丧 | |
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204
ascendancy
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| n.统治权，支配力量 | |
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205
zigzags
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| n.锯齿形的线条、小径等( zigzag的名词复数 )v.弯弯曲曲地走路，曲折地前进( zigzag的第三人称单数 ) | |
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206
ascends
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| v.上升，攀登( ascend的第三人称单数 ) | |
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207
promontory
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| n.海角；岬 | |
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208
rendering
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| n.表现，描写 | |
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209
goodwill
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| n.善意，亲善，信誉，声誉 | |
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210
partially
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| adv.部分地，从某些方面讲 | |
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211
strife
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| n.争吵，冲突，倾轧，竞争 | |
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212
penetrated
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| adj. 击穿的，鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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213
coverts
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| n.隐蔽的，不公开的，秘密的( covert的名词复数 )；复羽 | |
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214
oust
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| vt.剥夺，取代，驱逐 | |
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215
forerunner
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| n.前身，先驱（者），预兆，祖先 | |
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216
accrue
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| v.(利息等)增大，增多 | |
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217
stoutness
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| 坚固，刚毅 | |
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218
obstructed
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| 阻塞( obstruct的过去式和过去分词 )； 堵塞； 阻碍； 阻止 | |
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219
tumult
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| n.喧哗；激动，混乱；吵闹 | |
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220
exertions
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| n.努力( exertion的名词复数 )；费力；（能力、权力等的）运用；行使 | |
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221
improvised
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| a.即席而作的,即兴的 | |
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222
attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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