The French Propose to Move.
When Marshal Bazaine took over the command, on the morning of the 13th, he was required to do in haste what his superiors might have done at leisure. The prolonged indecision of the Imperial mind, held in suspense27 down to the last moment and against its better judgment28, between the alternative of attack or retreat, was disastrous29; no margin30 was allowed for error of design, error in execution, and—the unforeseen. The Emperor had ordered Coffinières, the Governor of Metz, to build as many bridges as he could above and below the place, and the General declares, what no one disputes, that he did construct from twelve to fifteen bridges, which provided seven lines of march over the stream. He also mined the permanent bridges above the fortress32, so that on the 12th facilities [p 148] for crossing abounded33, and the means of destruction were prepared. Then came in the unforeseen. Rain had fallen heavily, and consequently the Moselle rose, flowed over the trestle bridges, damaged the rafts, disconnected the pontoons with the banks, and spread far and wide over the approaches. In short, the increase in the volume of water was so great and unusual, if not unparalleled, that the calamity34 was attributed to the Germans—they must, it was said, have destroyed the sluices35 near Marsal and have allowed the lake water of that region free access to the Moselle—as if they did not wish to cross the river themselves! Be the cause what it might, there was the obstruction36; so that the first information received by the Marshal was that the retreat, which he had been ordered to execute, could not begin until the next day, except by Canrobert’s 6th Corps37, which was near permanent bridges. Consequently, the Army remained another day on the right bank. The Corps were in position between forts Queleu and St. Julien, Frossard on the right, Decaen in the centre, and De Ladmirault on the left, the Guard being in rear of the centre behind Borny, where Marshal Bazaine had set up his head-quarters. Practically the line was a curve extending from the Seille to the banks of Moselle below Metz; and the defensive38 obstacles were a watercourse with steep banks, patches of dense39 woods, two chateaus, or country houses, which were readily made defensible, and of course the villages and farms scattered41 over the pleasant fields. The main body of the Army was covered throughout its front by outposts thrown forward towards the Metz-Saarbrück railway on the right, beyond the brook43 in the centre, and about Vremy, Nouilly, and Servigny on the left. So they stood all day, some of them aware that the Germans were dangerously near; more who were anxious to get over the river; and yet others who [p 149] would have staked everything upon the risk of a battle, so intolerable is suspense to men of ardent44 and excitable temperaments45. The night passed over quickly, and on the 14th, yet not until a late hour in the forenoon, the Corps began to file off to the rear. Canrobert was already across; Frossard sent his guns and horsemen over the town bridges, while his infantry splashed through the meadows and over the partially46 submerged temporary constructions; and leaving Grenier’s division to cover his retreat, De Ladmirault set out for the left bank over the Isle47 Chambière. The Marshal at Borny, with his old Corps, now under Decaen, and having the Guard in support, remained to protect the extensive and perilous48 movement to the rear in the face of a watchful49 and intrepid50 enemy.
Released on the evening of the 12th from the imperative51 orders which held him fast, and directed to move forward upon the French Nied, General von Steinmetz advanced the next day with characteristic alacrity52. Two Corps, the 7th and the 1st, were posted on a short line between Pange and Les Etangs, the 8th being held back at Varize on the German Nied, and the two cavalry53 divisions being thrown round the flanks, General von Golz, who commanded the twenty-sixth brigade, took the bold step of transferring it to the left, or French, bank of the stream, and he thus came into contact with the outposts of Decaen’s 3rd Corps. Nevertheless, along the whole line, on the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th, each side maintained a strictly54 observant attitude, and held aloof55 from hostile action; the French because they wished to glide56 off unassailed, the Germans because their Commander-in-Chief desired to secure a solid footing for the Second Army on the left bank of the Moselle before the French retired57. Watched as these were by keen-sighted [p 150] horsemen, they could not stir without being seen; and so soon as the state of the Moselle permitted a movement to the rear, the fact was reported to the German chiefs. A Hussar party notified, about eleven, that Frossard’s outposts were falling back; a little later that the tents were down; and then that columns of all arms were retiring. So it was in the centre and on the left; Decaen’s Corps remained, but two divisions of De Ladmirault’s Corps, it was noted58, were no longer on the ground they had held in the morning. General von Manteuffel, inferring that De Ladmirault might have gone to join in an attack upon the 7th Corps, at once put two divisions under arms, a fortunate precaution, though suggested by an erroneous inference. In front of the 7th Corps, the facts admitted of no misinterpretation. The enemy was plainly in retreat, and General von Golz felt that it was his duty to interrupt the process. Therefore, about half-past three, notifying his intention to the Divisional Commanders of his Corps, and requesting support from the 1st, a request promptly granted, Von Golz sprang forward to attack the French, in full reliance upon the readiness and energy with which his superiors and comrades would follow him into the fray60. His bold resolve did stop the retreat, and his onset61 brought on, late in the afternoon,
PLAN III: BATTLE of COLOMBEY-NOUILLY, 5. P.M.
Weller & Graham Ltd. Lithos.? London, Bell & Sons
The Battle of Colombey-Nouilly.
The scene of this sharp but severe conflict was the gentle uplands immediately to the eastward62 of Metz, and a little more than cannon63-shot beyond the forts which forbid access to that side of the place. The village of Borny, indeed, is nearly on a line with the Fort des Bordes, and no point of the area within which the action raged is more than three [p 151] miles from the fortifications. The ground slopes upward from the Moselle, rising into undulating hills, the summits of which are two or three hundred feet above the bed of the stream. Near to Metz these elevations64 are clothed with copses devoid65 of underwood, the great patches of verdure extending on a curve from Grimont close to the Moselle, as far as the right bank of the Seille. To the northward66 are more woods just outside the battlefield, the area of which was, from north to south, included between them and the railway to Saarbrück. A little to the north of this line, near Ars-Laquenexy, a village on the road from Sarreguemines, were the sources of a rivulet67 which flowed northward along the whole front of the French position, receiving on its way brooks68 which trickle69 down the hollows in the hills to the eastward. The heights east of the stream were bare of wood, and the most prominent objects were the village and church tower of St. Barbe on the crown of a rounded hill to the north-east. From this elevated hamlet another brook rose, and found its way along the bed of a gully to Lauvalliers, where all the watercourses united, and, under the name of La Vallières, ran thence to the Moselle. The French troops, four divisions of Decaen’s Corps, were posted in the woods, and on the heights above the first-mentioned rivulet from the neighbourhood of Ars-Laquenexy to the point where all the streamlets joined. The outposts were in Mercy le Haut, sometimes called Mercy les Metz, in the woods facing Ars-Laquenexy, in the Chateau40 D’Aubigny and Montoy, beyond the brook, in Colombey, a village on the south bank, and in Nouilly, a large village in the St. Barbe ravine. Beyond the confluence70 of the hill streams stood a division of De Ladmirault’s Corps upon the high ground east of Mey, and it was this body which had its outguards in Nouilly. Although it was divided by the brook Vallières on the left, the French position was strong, [p 152] chiefly because the approaches were through defiles71, over open ground, or up steep banks, but also because the woods afforded shelter to the infantry of the defenders73. Three great roads intersected the field—one from Pange, through Colombey, to Borny, a second from Saarbrück, which, after passing La Planchette, ran, at Bellecroix, into the third, which came from Saarlouis, and passed through Lauvalliers, entering Metz near the fort called Les Bordes. The Germans, early in the morning, were on the hills to the eastward, the 1st Corps being beyond St. Barbe, and the 7th near, and west of, Pange, with outposts well forward, and both cavalry and infantry in practical contact with the enemy, into whose position they looked from all sides.
Von Golz Dashes In.
It was the spectacle of a departing and decreasing host which made the eager Von Golz, without awaiting permission, dash impetuously forward with his brigade. So energetic was the onset that the French were at once driven out of the Chateau d’Aubigny, Montoy, and La Planchette. The usual tactics were applied74, the companies working together, turning a flank where the front was too strong, and following up a success until the weight of fire brought them to a halt, or even thrust them back. The batteries attached to the brigade came at once into action and persisted, though they were hard hit by the French. But the advance of Von Golz was not to be arrested, and the impetus75 of his first movement forward carried part of the brigade over the ravine and watercourse, and into the village and inclosures of Colombey. That point, however, was the limit of his progress, for the French developed strong lines of skirmishers in the woods, and although [p 153] they were unable to expel the audacious intruders, these were obliged to expend76 all their energy upon holding what they had won. On the right, that is to the north of Colombey, the assailants were brought to a stand on the eastern edge of the ravine, and at this early stage the farms, gardens and houses of Colombey formed a salient offensive angle exposed to the brunt of the French fire from the side of Borny.
At the first indication of a combat, General von Manteuffel, two of whose divisions were already under arms, sent their advance guards down the hills and through the hollow ways from St. Barbe; joined his line of battle on to the right of Von Golz and fell smartly on the outpost of Grenier’s division which De Ladmirault had left about Mey to cover his retrograde march upon the Moselle. The noise of combat, also, and the appeals sent in from the daring brigadier, put the rest of the 7th Corps in motion, so that the 14th as well as the 13th Division sprang to arms and approached the fight. General von Zastrow, however, did not quite approve of the temerity77 of his subordinate; but seeing that the Corps was committed to an engagement, he permitted General von Glümer to use the twenty-sixth brigade on the right and General von Woyna to employ the twenty-eighth on the left while he held the twenty-seventh in reserve. In like manner, the French turned fiercely on their adversaries. Canrobert and Frossard were over the Moselle, but Decaen’s four divisions were speedily arrayed; the Guard behind them fell in and marched Brincourt’s brigade towards the Seille to protect Montaudon’s right; and De Ladmirault instantly counter-marched his two divisions, moving De Lorencez towards the north-east, hoping to turn the right of Manteuffel, and ordering De Cissey, who had partially crossed the Moselle, to reinforce Grenier at Mey. About five o’clock, then, in [p 154] consequence of the hardihood of a brigadier, a furious action raged along the whole French front, towards which comrades were hurriedly retracing78 their steps, and upon which adversaries were hastening forward with equal ardour.
The rapid development of an attack, which had in it some elements of a surprise, alike unwelcome and unexpected, and the tenacity79 with which a few battalions81 clung steadfastly82 to the advantage gained, astonished but did not disconcert the French, who frankly83 answered the challenge of their foes. Nevertheless, the opening movements of the 1st Corps were as successful as those of Von Golz. The artillery84, always foremost in this campaign, going straight and swiftly to the front, soon had batteries in position, protected by cavalry, while behind them on the roads from Saarlouis and Saarbrück the infantry were quickly moving up. The leading battalions of the 1st Division poured through and round Noisseville and Nouilly, pressing back the French skirmishers and, following them fast, actually stormed the barricaded85 village of Mey, directly under Grenier’s main position in the wooded hill above. The 2nd Division directed upon Montoy, Lauvalliers and the mills at the confluence of the streams, fell on with alacrity; but the resistance was so keen that although they soon wrested86 the eastern, they suffered great loss and were once promptly repulsed87 by the defenders, when attempting to master the western bank. Yet, aided by the fire of batteries concentrated south of the St. Barbe ravine, these persistent88 troops ultimately crowned the ascent89, and established the front of battle on the French side of the brook throughout its length. From one point, however, the French could not be dislodged. There was a cross road leading from Colombey to Bellecroix. It was a hollow way, bordered by trees two or three deep, and having in front, by way of salient, a little fir wood. This position effectually frustrated91 [p 155] every effort of the Germans either to debouch92 from Colombey or push forward towards Bellecroix. Naturally strong and valiantly93 held, it was not carried until nearly seven o’clock, and then only by the repeated onsets94 of the twenty-fifth brigade which Von Zastrow, about half-past five, had permitted to take a share in an engagement which he did not like, but which he was bound to sustain. Thus was Von Golz succoured and partially relieved from the heavy pressure put on him; a pressure further mitigated95 by the advance of the twenty-eighth brigade, 7th Corps, on his left, and the capture of the wood of Borny. Still further to the left the 18th Division of the 9th Corps, which had marched up from Buchy on hearing the cannonade, and some cavalry appeared on the field towards dark and thus added to the disquietude of Montaudon on the French right who, however, held fast to his main position above Grigy.
The action on the French right and centre may fairly be regarded as an indecisive combat, although the front occupied in the morning had been driven inwards, and the daring assailant had won some ground. On the French left the combat had been equally fierce, but less favourable96 to the defenders. General de Ladmirault, indeed, when obliged to turn and succour his comrade and subordinate, Grenier, had at once resolved to assume the offensive. It was a timely determination, for Grenier’s troops had been pushed back and shaken, and, if left without aid, they would have been driven under the guns of St. Julien. But the approach of De Cissey, and the threatening direction imparted to De Lorencez, at once altered the aspect of affairs: for De Cissey struck in with vigour97, and the German troops which had entered Mey retreated fast upon Nouilly; then General von Manteuffel, hastening the march of his brigades which were still on the way to the field [p 156] formed his line to the north-west, between Servigny, Nouilly, and the mills at the confluence of the brooks, with a reserve at Servigny. As the guns, like the troops, arrived successively, they were arrayed on the new line, and, before De Ladmirault could develop his flank attack effectively, the 1st Corps had ninety guns in position between Lauvalliers and Poix, which enabled them to bar any infantry advance upon St. Barbe. The effect of this disposition98 was to frustrate90 the aggressive designs of De Ladmirault, but he is entitled to the credit of having saved his exposed division, and also of having made the only movement during the day which had the semblance99 of a real endeavour to strike for victory against a foe13 whose troops and artillery were plainly coming up in detachments along the whole line. Nor can it be denied that his vehement100 onset drove back the Germans, and recovered a large extent of ground up to the skirts of Nouilly and the water mills. Moreover, it gave great assistance to Aymard’s Division of Decaen’s Corps, and enabled it, at one moment, to scatter42 the companies operating in the angle formed by the streams, and drive them headlong over the ravine upon Lauvalliers. But the advent101 of German battalions, and the action of the guns, finally restored the combat, and as the twilight102 deepened into darkness the German right once more gained the ascendency, and the French divisions retired to their bivouacs nearer to Metz.
Long after the sun had set, portions of the 1st Corps still arrived on the scene; but then the battle was over. General de Ladmirault, three years afterwards, naturally proud of his conduct, insisted that the French had won the day. The German accounts, however, place the fact beyond dispute, since they show that the leading troops of the 1st Corps did reach Vautoux, Mey, and Villers l’Orme, which proves that the adversary103 must have retired towards [p 157] Bellecroix and the banks of the Moselle. No doubt the Germans were wisely drawn104 back, at a late hour, and on that ground the French put in a claim to the victory. For General Steinmetz had ridden on to the field just as the contest was coming to an end. He was angry because a battle had been fought, and apprehensive105 lest a counter-attack in force should be made at dawn; so he ordered the 1st and 7th Corps to retire upon the positions they occupied on the 13th. Nevertheless, Von Zastrow, who did not receive the order, insisted that his Corps should bivouac under arms on the battlefield, so that the wounded might be collected, and the honour of the Army vindicated106.
The End of the Battle.
In this action the French lost not quite four thousand, and the Germans nearly five thousand men; on both sides more than two hundred officers had been killed or wounded, General Decaen, commanding the 3rd Corps, mortally, while Bazaine and Castagny were slightly hurt. The French had actually on the field, including the Guard in reserve, with one brigade in the front line, three Corps d’Armée; for, though Lorencez did not press far forward, still the whole force under De Ladmirault was present, and in action. The Germans brought up successively two Corps and one Division, but a large portion of the 1st could not reach the scene of actual fighting until dark. It is impossible to ascertain107 exactly, and difficult to estimate the numbers engaged; but one fact is manifest—that the German assailants were numerically inferior, especially during the first two hours; that the disproportion was only lessened108 between six and seven; and that, at no time, were the French fewer in number. Marshal Bazaine emphatically states, in his report to the Emperor, that he held his [p 158] position without employing the Guard, which is true, but it is not less true that the whole front of his line was driven in; and that he stood at the close within the range of the heavy guns in the forts. The French fought well, but they fought a defensive battle, and that is why they exacted from the assailant a much heavier penalty than he inflicted109 on them. The retreat of the Imperialists was delayed; but in the Great Head-quarter Staff serious misgivings110 began to spring up, and a fear lest the habit of bringing on improvised111 battles might not become a real source of danger. An able and enterprising General in command of the French at Spicheren and Borny would have read a severe lesson to German advance-guards, and would have made them pay for their temerity.
Not until a late hour did the news of the battle reach the king, who had established his head-quarters at Herny, on the railway. Prince Frederick Charles, at Pont à Mousson, was only informed of the event the next morning. His Army, the Second, had been engaged in marching up to and towards the Moselle, and at eventide the several Corps halted at these points. The 4th Corps was over the Seille, and not far from Custines and Marbache, places just below the confluence of the Meurthe and Moselle; the Guard had one division a little lower down at Dieulouard; the 10th Corps, entire, was at Pont à Mousson, with a brigade to the westward112; the 3rd, the 9th, and the 12th, were facing the Moselle between Pont à Mousson and the left of the First Army, prepared either to frustrate a French advance up the right bank—a possible movement always present to the mind of Von Moltke—or cross the river. The 2nd Corps had come up to Falquemont; and a Reserve Landwehr Division, under General Kummer, was being organized at Saarlouis. To complete the survey, it should be added that Gneisenau’s Brigade, sent to [p 159] surprise Thionville, an enterprise which failed, was returning to rejoin the First Army; and that on the evening of the 14th, the foremost troops of the Crown Prince’s Army were some squadrons of cavalry in Nancy, and an infantry brigade in Lunéville.
The French Retreat.
Throughout the night the wearied French divisions, which had been either engaged in combat or standing113 under arms, filed over the Moselle, and the Emperor took up his quarters at Longeville, outside the town. Marshal Bazaine’s order, dated the 13th, directed the whole Army on the road to Gravelotte, whence one portion was to continue by Mars la Tour, and the other turn off to the right and march on Conflans. The rigorous construction of the Marshal’s order yields that interpretation59, but he contended, at his trial, that he merely indicated the general lines of retreat upon Verdun, and that the Staff and Corps Commanders should have used any and every road or track which would have served the main purpose. There are, or at least were, in 1870, only two roads out of Metz available for the march of heavy columns of troops of all arms and large trains—the excellent highway to Gravelotte, which is a long defile72, and the road through Woippy, turning the uplands on the north. All the intermediate lanes or cross-roads are rugged114 and narrow, and only one, that passing by Lessy, has or had any pretension115 to the character of an inferior village road. Guns and carts can move along and up them in Indian file, but not easily if numerous, and nowhere at a good pace. Thus, even, on the 14th, the Corps of Frossard and Canrobert, who both started late, found the Gravelotte road so encumbered116 by trains that they could only make their way slowly, and did [p 160] not arrive at Rozerieulles until after dark. The Emperor was still at Longeville, anxiously awaiting the issue of the fight which revived all his apprehensions117. Metz was excited and alarmed, and the streets were crowded during the afternoon and evening, with passing soldiers, guns, baggage waggons118 and provision carts. Night brought no rest, for the Guard and the 3rd Corps came hastily over the river, and were densely119 packed inside the town and outside the ramparts in the space between the walls and Mount St. Quentin; while General de Ladmirault was engaged until morning in passing his divisions across the Isle Chambière, and Metman had also strayed from Bellecroix to that side of the town.
Marshal Bazaine had quitted Borny at dusk. He rode through Metz “with difficulty,” and made his way to the Imperial head-quarters. Here Napoleon, who was in bed, welcomed him with his usual kindness, and when the Marshal explained his fears lest the Germans should cut in on his line of retreat, and referring to his wound, begged to be superseded120, the Emperor, he writes, “touching my bruised121 shoulder and the fractured epaulette, gracefully122 said, ‘It will be nothing, an affair of a few days, and you have just broken the charm.’” Apparently123, Napoleon still clung to the belief that the allies he had sought would come to his aid. “I await an answer from the Emperor of Austria and the King of Italy,” he said; “compromise nothing by too much precipitation, and, above all things, avoid fresh reverses.” He counted on one sovereign whom he had defeated in battle, and another whom he had helped to enlarge his kingdom, and he counted in vain, partly because he was unsuccessful, but chiefly because the national political interests of both countries prevailed over the gratitude124 felt by Victor Emmanuel, and the desire to turn the tables on the House of Hohenzollern [p 161] which was still strong in the House of Hapsburg-Lorraine.
“You will drag us out of this hornet’s nest, Marshal, won’t you?” exclaimed an officer, as Bazaine quitted the Imperial quarters. It was a task beyond his strength. When day dawned a thick fog shrouded125 the valley of the Moselle, and before the camp at Longeville was astir, a shell from the opposite bank burst near a tent, “cut a Colonel in two,” to use the soldatesque language of Marshal Canrobert, “carried off the leg of a battalion80 commander, and wounded two officers standing near a drummer.” The lucky shot came from a patrol of German cavalry, which had ridden forward as far as the railway station, unopposed, and its commander, observing a camp at Longeville, had brought his guns into action, and proved, once again, that the hornets were abroad and making a bold use of their offensive weapons. A battery hastily ran out, and the heavy metal of St. Quentin drove off the intruders; but they had learned that the foe was over the river before they retired. Soon afterwards, by Bazaine’s order, a mine was fired, and one section of the railway bridge was destroyed.
Then the retreat was continued. Finding the road obstructed126 by an endless stream of carts and waggons, Marshal Leb?uf turned aside, and struggling on, amid transport vehicles, threaded his way by Lessy and Chatel St. Germain to Vernéville, where about seven in the evening he had assembled the tired infantry Divisions of Castagny and Montaudon; but his cavalry and reserve artillery did not reach the bivouac until night; while Aymard’s Division was forced to halt in the defile, and Metman was at Sansonnet in the Moselle valley. Frossard, followed by Canrobert, had marched during the day as far as Rezonville, where both halted; and the Guard with the Emperor and Prince Imperial attained127 Gravelotte. General de Ladmirault [p 162] did not stir at all on the 15th, he put a strict construction on Bazaine’s orders, and affected128 also to be uncertain whether he was to continue his retreat or not. But he had allowed Lorencez to press through the town and thrust himself into the Lessy defile, where his troops, unable to get on, had to pass the night. These disjointed and irregular movements testify to the confusion of a hurried retreat, to the flurry which had got the upper hand, and to the absence of anything like a firm control over troops and generals. How could it be otherwise? The Emperor still commanded, or was believed to command, and it is plain that at no time did the Marshal secure prompt and cheerful obedience, or inspire confidence, always essential to success, and never more so than when an Army has to be extricated129 from what the Imperial Guardsman graphically130 called a “hornet’s nest.”
The Germans cross the Moselle.
Far otherwise had the hours been employed by the German host. Early in the morning King William had ridden from Herny to the heights above the battlefield, and there the Head-quarter Staff, from actual observation, were able to form a correct judgment on the actual state of affairs. At first they took precautionary measures against a possible counter attack, and it was not until eleven o’clock that, evidence sufficient to convince Von Moltke having come in, decisive steps were taken. All the Corps of the Second Army were directed upon or over the Moselle, the 1st Corps was moved to Courcelles-Chaussy; and the 7th was posted at Courcelles sur Nied to guard the railway line and the dep?ts; and the 8th was on its left, echeloned on the Lunéville road. At nightfall the [p 163] 3rd Corps had crossed the Moselle between Pagny and Novéant, where they found the bridge intact; the 10th had one division at Pont à Mousson and one westward at Thiaucourt; the Guard was at Dieulouard, and the 4th Corps astride the river at Marbache-Custines. The 2nd Corps had come up to Han sur Nied. The Crown Prince’s advanced troops were at Haney, St. Nicholas on the Meurthe, and Bayon on the Upper Moselle.
The Cavalry beyond the Moselle.
But the most interesting and effective operations were those carried out by the 5th Cavalry Division, commanded by General von Rheinbaben. They had traversed the Moselle on the 14th, and were directed to gain the Verdun road in order to ascertain the exact whereabouts of the French. At the same time the 3rd Cavalry Division attached to the First Army was instructed to pass the river below Metz and push out towards Briey; but the French had removed all the boats, no crossing could be effected, and the division was employed elsewhere. No such obstacles arrested the 5th Division. It consisted of three strong brigades under Von Redern, Von Barby, and Von Bredow, in all thirty-six squadrons, and was accompanied by two batteries of horse artillery. Leaving Barby at Thiaucourt to await the arrival of Bredow coming up from the Moselle, Redern marched through the fog at four in the morning to La Chausée, whence he detached two squadrons towards the Verdun road. During their absence Von Redern, riding on towards Xonville, discovered and was fired on by a body of French cavalry on the hills about Puxieux. These were French dragoons detached from De Forton’s division, then en route for Mars la Tour, and they were reinforced from the main body as soon as the [p 164] vedettes had opened fire. The French, led by Prince Murat, ascended131 the hill, and soon after the Germans had brought a battery to bear Murat withdrew his men, followed by Von Redern. On crowning the ridge31 De Forton’s division was plainly seen moving in the valley, or halting near Mars la Tour, supported by twelve guns. Von Redern, who did not think it prudent132 to attack, retired until a fold of the hills gave him protection. Here he was joined by two squadrons of hussars, which had approached Rezonville, captured nine prisoners, and when pursued had got deftly133 away. The sound of the cannon had attracted the rest of the brigade, and Von Redern again moved towards Mars la Tour, and again drew off without a fight. But by this time the cannonade had called up both Barby and Bredow, so that there were soon thirty-four squadrons and two batteries on the ground. The French General, De Forton, who believed erroneously that German infantry occupied Puxieux, was of opinion that he had fought a successful skirmish; yet instead of closing with enemies who were actually close to the line of retreat upon Verdun, he fell back as far as Vionville, and went into camp. Three French divisions of horse in the van of the retiring Army allowed a German division to sit down within a short distance of the Verdun road and many miles from all infantry support. On the other hand, a squadron of Uhlans pushed almost to Conflans, and stumbling on Du Barail’s division, was smartly punished; but a captain of hussars, during the evening, rode towards Rezonville and halted close enough to see Frossard’s fantassins cooking their suppers. Meantime, the Prussian Guard Cavalry, moving north-west from Dieulouard, had placed its advanced brigade at Thiaucourt; and a squadron of Guard Uhlans had audaciously summoned the Governor of Toul to surrender. No such memorable134 examples of activity can [p 165] be found in the record of the French cavalry, which had forgotten the traditions of Napoleon the Great.
Orders for the Flank March.
That evening General von Moltke issued a set of memorable instructions to General von Steinmetz and Prince Frederick Charles. The First Army was to leave a corps at Courcelles sur Nied, and place the others at Arry and Pommérieux, between the Seille and the Moselle. “It is only by a vigorous offensive movement of the Second Army,” wrote Von Moltke, “upon the routes from Metz to Verdun by Fresne and Etain that we can reap the fruits of the victory obtained yesterday. The commander of the Second Army is intrusted with this operation which he will conduct according to his own judgment and with the means at his disposal, that is, all the Corps of his Army.” It was further announced that the King would transfer his head-quarters to Pont à Mousson in the afternoon of the 16th. Preparations were thus made to place the whole force on the left bank of the Moselle, except the 1st Corps, the 3rd Division of Cavalry, and the 2nd which was still two marches from the river. In this way Von Moltke hoped to keep the whip hand of his opponents, and cut them off from the shelter they sought beyond the Meuse.
The Emperor Quits the Army.
Before narrating135 the battle which the French style Rezonville and the Germans Vionville-Mars la Tour, we may turn to the Imperial head-quarters at Gravelotte at dawn on the 16th, because the scene presents so vivid a contrast to that in the German camp. When Marshal Bazaine saw the Emperor on the preceding evening walking [p 166] meditatively136 up and down before his quarters, he was surprised by the question, “Must I go?” The Marshal frankly admitted that he had not been informed respecting the situation in front, and asked him to wait. “The answer,” writes Bazaine, appeared to please him, and turning to his suite137 he said, loud enough to be heard by all, “Gentlemen, we will remain, but keep the baggage packed.” The troops, sad and depressed, continued to defile before the inn; no shout, no vivat was evoked138 by the sight of the sovereign and his son. Yet that night the Emperor had made up his mind. In the morning he summoned Bazaine, who found him in his carriage with the Prince Imperial and Prince Napoleon. The baggage had already gone on in the night, and the lancers and dragoons of the Guard, commanded by General de France, were in the saddle ready to serve as an escort. Bazaine rode to the side of the carriage, and the Emperor said, “I have resolved to leave for Verdun and Chalons. Put yourself on the route for Verdun as soon as you can. The gendarmerie have already quitted Briey in consequence of the arrival of the Prussians”—a singularly erroneous statement, but one showing how ill-informed the head-quarters were from first to last. The Emperor then drove off from Gravelotte by the road to Conflans, through the wooded ways which were so soon to be the scene of a sanguinary encounter. Three hours after he started Von Redern’s guns opened suddenly on the French cavalry camp near Vionville, and began, by a stroke of surprise, the most remarkable139 and best-fought battle of the campaign.
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1
malady
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| n.病，疾病(通常做比喻) | |
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depressed
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| adj.沮丧的，抑郁的，不景气的，萧条的 | |
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3
aptitudes
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| （学习方面的）才能，资质，天资( aptitude的名词复数 ) | |
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unity
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| n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调 | |
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5
deferred
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| adj.延期的，缓召的v.拖延，延缓，推迟( defer的过去式和过去分词 )；服从某人的意愿，遵从 | |
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incompetence
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| n.不胜任，不称职 | |
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7
nominally
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| 在名义上，表面地； 应名儿 | |
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8
obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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mischief
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| n.损害，伤害，危害；恶作剧，捣蛋，胡闹 | |
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infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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11
opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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foes
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| 敌人，仇敌( foe的名词复数 ) | |
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13
foe
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| n.敌人，仇敌 | |
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14
dictated
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| v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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adversaries
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| n.对手，敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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16
surmised
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| v.臆测，推断( surmise的过去式和过去分词 )；揣测；猜想 | |
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17
flair
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| n.天赋，本领，才华；洞察力 | |
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18
monarchical
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| adj. 国王的，帝王的，君主的，拥护君主制的 =monarchic | |
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19
promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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20
plunge
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| v.跳入，(使)投入，(使)陷入；猛冲 | |
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invaders
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| 入侵者，侵略者，侵入物( invader的名词复数 ) | |
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22
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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23
countermanded
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| v.取消（命令），撤回( countermand的过去分词 ) | |
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24
abortive
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| adj.不成功的，发育不全的 | |
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25
postponed
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| vt.& vi.延期，缓办，（使）延迟vt.把…放在次要地位；[语]把…放在后面（或句尾）vi.（疟疾等）延缓发作（或复发） | |
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26
egregious
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| adj.非常的，过分的 | |
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27
suspense
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| n.（对可能发生的事）紧张感，担心，挂虑 | |
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28
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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29
disastrous
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| adj.灾难性的，造成灾害的；极坏的，很糟的 | |
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30
margin
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| n.页边空白；差额；余地，余裕；边，边缘 | |
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31
ridge
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| n.山脊；鼻梁；分水岭 | |
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32
fortress
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| n.堡垒，防御工事 | |
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33
abounded
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| v.大量存在，充满，富于( abound的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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34
calamity
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| n.灾害，祸患，不幸事件 | |
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35
sluices
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| n.水闸( sluice的名词复数 )；（用水闸控制的）水；有闸人工水道；漂洗处v.冲洗( sluice的第三人称单数 )；（指水）喷涌而出；漂净；给…安装水闸 | |
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36
obstruction
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| n.阻塞，堵塞；障碍物 | |
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37
corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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38
defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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39
dense
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| a.密集的，稠密的，浓密的；密度大的 | |
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40
chateau
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| n.城堡，别墅 | |
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41
scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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42
scatter
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| vt.撒，驱散，散开；散布/播；vi.分散，消散 | |
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43
brook
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| n.小河，溪；v.忍受，容让 | |
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44
ardent
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| adj.热情的，热烈的，强烈的，烈性的 | |
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45
temperaments
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| 性格( temperament的名词复数 )； （人或动物的）气质； 易冲动； （性情）暴躁 | |
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46
partially
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| adv.部分地，从某些方面讲 | |
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47
isle
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| n.小岛，岛 | |
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48
perilous
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| adj.危险的，冒险的 | |
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49
watchful
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| adj.注意的，警惕的 | |
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50
intrepid
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| adj.无畏的，刚毅的 | |
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51
imperative
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| n.命令，需要；规则；祈使语气；adj.强制的；紧急的 | |
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52
alacrity
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| n.敏捷，轻快，乐意 | |
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53
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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54
strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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55
aloof
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| adj.远离的；冷淡的，漠不关心的 | |
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56
glide
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| n./v.溜，滑行；(时间)消逝 | |
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57
retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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58
noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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59
interpretation
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| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
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60
fray
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| v.争吵；打斗；磨损，磨破；n.吵架；打斗 | |
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61
onset
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| n.进攻，袭击，开始，突然开始 | |
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62
eastward
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| adv.向东；adj.向东的；n.东方，东部 | |
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63
cannon
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| n.大炮，火炮；飞机上的机关炮 | |
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64
elevations
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| （水平或数量）提高( elevation的名词复数 )； 高地； 海拔； 提升 | |
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65
devoid
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| adj.全无的，缺乏的 | |
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66
northward
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| adv.向北；n.北方的地区 | |
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67
rivulet
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| n.小溪，小河 | |
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68
brooks
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| n.小溪( brook的名词复数 ) | |
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69
trickle
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| vi.淌，滴，流出，慢慢移动，逐渐消散 | |
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70
confluence
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| n.汇合，聚集 | |
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71
defiles
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| v.玷污( defile的第三人称单数 )；污染；弄脏；纵列行进 | |
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72
defile
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| v.弄污，弄脏；n.(山间)小道 | |
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73
defenders
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| n.防御者( defender的名词复数 )；守卫者；保护者；辩护者 | |
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74
applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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75
impetus
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| n.推动，促进，刺激；推动力 | |
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76
expend
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| vt.花费，消费，消耗 | |
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77
temerity
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| n.鲁莽，冒失 | |
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78
retracing
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| v.折回( retrace的现在分词 )；回忆；回顾；追溯 | |
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79
tenacity
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| n.坚韧 | |
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80
battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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81
battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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82
steadfastly
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| adv.踏实地，不变地；岿然；坚定不渝 | |
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83
frankly
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| adv.坦白地，直率地；坦率地说 | |
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84
artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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85
barricaded
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| 设路障于，以障碍物阻塞( barricade的过去式和过去分词 )； 设路障[防御工事]保卫或固守 | |
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86
wrested
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| （用力）拧( wrest的过去式和过去分词 )； 费力取得； （从…）攫取； （ 从… ） 强行取去… | |
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87
repulsed
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| v.击退( repulse的过去式和过去分词 )；驳斥；拒绝 | |
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88
persistent
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| adj.坚持不懈的，执意的；持续的 | |
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89
ascent
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| n.(声望或地位)提高；上升，升高；登高 | |
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90
frustrate
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| v.使失望；使沮丧；使厌烦 | |
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91
frustrated
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| adj.挫败的，失意的，泄气的v.使不成功( frustrate的过去式和过去分词 )；挫败；使受挫折；令人沮丧 | |
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92
debouch
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| v.流出，进入 | |
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93
valiantly
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| adv.勇敢地，英勇地；雄赳赳 | |
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94
onsets
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| 攻击，袭击（onset的复数形式） | |
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mitigated
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| v.减轻，缓和( mitigate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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96
favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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vigour
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| （=vigor）n.智力，体力，精力 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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semblance
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| n.外貌，外表 | |
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vehement
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| adj.感情强烈的；热烈的；(人)有强烈感情的 | |
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101
advent
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| n.(重要事件等的)到来，来临 | |
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102
twilight
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| n.暮光，黄昏；暮年，晚期，衰落时期 | |
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103
adversary
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| adj.敌手，对手 | |
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104
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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apprehensive
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| adj.担心的，恐惧的，善于领会的 | |
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106
vindicated
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| v.澄清（某人/某事物）受到的责难或嫌疑( vindicate的过去式和过去分词 )；表明或证明（所争辩的事物）属实、正当、有效等；维护 | |
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107
ascertain
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| vt.发现，确定，查明，弄清 | |
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108
lessened
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| 减少的，减弱的 | |
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109
inflicted
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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110
misgivings
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| n.疑虑，担忧，害怕；疑虑，担心，恐惧( misgiving的名词复数 )；疑惧 | |
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111
improvised
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| a.即席而作的,即兴的 | |
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112
westward
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| n.西方，西部；adj.西方的，向西的；adv.向西 | |
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113
standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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114
rugged
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| adj.高低不平的，粗糙的，粗壮的，强健的 | |
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115
pretension
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| n.要求；自命，自称；自负 | |
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116
encumbered
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| v.妨碍，阻碍，拖累( encumber的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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apprehensions
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| 疑惧 | |
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waggons
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| 四轮的运货马车( waggon的名词复数 )； 铁路货车； 小手推车 | |
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densely
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| ad.密集地；浓厚地 | |
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superseded
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| [医]被代替的，废弃的 | |
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bruised
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| [医]青肿的，瘀紫的 | |
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gracefully
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| ad.大大方方地；优美地 | |
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apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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gratitude
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| adj.感激，感谢 | |
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shrouded
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| v.隐瞒( shroud的过去式和过去分词 )；保密 | |
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obstructed
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| 阻塞( obstruct的过去式和过去分词 )； 堵塞； 阻碍； 阻止 | |
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attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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extricated
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| v.使摆脱困难，脱身( extricate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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graphically
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| adv.通过图表；生动地，轮廓分明地 | |
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ascended
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| v.上升，攀登( ascend的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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prudent
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| adj.谨慎的，有远见的，精打细算的 | |
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deftly
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| adv.灵巧地，熟练地，敏捷地 | |
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memorable
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| adj.值得回忆的，难忘的，特别的，显著的 | |
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narrating
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| v.故事( narrate的现在分词 ) | |
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meditatively
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| adv.冥想地 | |
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suite
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| n.一套(家具)；套房；随从人员 | |
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evoked
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| [医]诱发的 | |
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remarkable
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| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
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