It has now to be shown how they had employed the 16th outside the area of the conflict, where the several Corps9 stood in the evening, and by what means the Great Staff, on the 17th, acquired the knowledge that the “Army of the Rhine” had retired10 upon the line of hills immediately to the westward12 of Metz.
The movement of troops comes first under notice. On [p 189] the extreme left the 4th Corps having crossed the Moselle at Marbache, had pushed forward in a south-westerly direction, part of the Corps making a dashing but fruitless attempt to intimidate13 the garrison14 of Toul, so important because it barred the railway to Chalons, and at the end of the day was still under orders to march upon the Meuse. The Guard, preceded by its cavalry, advanced from Dieulouard to several points half-way between the Moselle and the Meuse, the right being at Bernecourt and the left about Beaumont. The 12th Corps, Saxons, crossed the Moselle at Pont à Mousson, and had one division there and one about Regnièville en Haye. The 2nd Corps, still approaching the Moselle by forced marches, had attained16 villages east of the Seille. It will be readily understood that, as the 4th and 2nd Corps were so far distant from the centre of action west of Metz, they could hardly be moved up in time to share in the impending17 struggle; and they, therefore, for the present, may be omitted from the narrative18. It was otherwise with the remaining Corps, and it was the aim of the Great Staff to bring them all up to the Verdun road.
From the very earliest moment, General von Moltke held the opinion that the full consequences of the action on the 14th could only be secured by vigorous operations on the left bank of the Moselle; and as the reports came in from the front on the 16th, that sound judgment19 was more than confirmed. The Royal head-quarters were transferred in the forenoon to Pont à Mousson, whither King William repaired; and Von Moltke, who had preceded the King, found information which led the general to the conclusion that a new chapter in the campaign had been opened. Accordingly, he desired to push up to the front the largest possible number of troops, so that he might, if such a design were feasible, have ample means wherewith to shoulder [p 190] off the French to the northward20, and sever8 their communications with Chalons. At this stage, the idea of shutting them up in Metz had not yet been conceived. The 7th, 8th and 9th were ordered to hasten forward on the road towards Vionville, and some part of them, as we have seen, were engaged on the 16th. Extra bridges were erected22 on the Moselle, the roads were cleared of all impediments, and the results rewarded the foresight23, energy and goodwill24 displayed by officers and men. The 12th Corps was eighteen, and the Guard twenty-two miles from the battlefield, but so keen and intelligent were their commanders, that, inferring from the information they received what would be required of them, they stood prepared to execute any order as soon as it arrived. The former body, indeed, marched off northward in the night, and sent word of the fact to the Guard, which led the commander to assemble the divisions on the instant and stand ready to step forth25. So that when the formal orders were brought, the Guard started at five in the morning, when the Saxons were already on the road. The 8th Corps, or rather its remaining division, were on the way at dawn, preceded by the 9th, and followed by the 7th from its cantonments on the left bank of the Seille. Thus the whole available portions of the Second and First Armies were in motion, to sustain the 3rd and 10th, if they were attacked on the 17th; to act, as circumstances required, if the French abandoned the battlefield.
Prince Frederick Charles, who had slept at Gorze, took horse at dawn, and reached his watch-tower on the hill south-west of Flavigny at half-past four o’clock, early enough to distinguish by the increasing light the French line of outposts between Bruville and Rezonville. About six o’clock the King joined the Prince, and at the same time the 9th Corps took post near the right wing of the [p 191] 3rd. What the staff had now to determine was whether the French intended to retire or attack, and if they retired whither they went. Patrols, busy on all sides, gave in contradictory26 or rather discordant27 reports, which for some time left it doubtful whether the retreat was not actually being carried out by Conflans on the Briey road; but by degrees the head-quarters arrived at the conclusion that the French would not attack, that they had not withdrawn28 far, and that the task of grappling with them must be deferred29 until the next day. Soon after noon, when General Metman, acting30 as rear guard, quitted Rezonville, there were on or near the field no fewer than seven German Corps and three divisions of cavalry; so that had the French renewed the battle for the Verdun road, even early in the morning, they would have found it a severe task to make their way at least along the southern or Mars la Tour high road. About eight in the morning General von Moltke had dictated31 an order on the height near Flavigny, in obedience32 to which the 7th Corps marched by Borny and Ars upon Gravelotte, following the Mance brook33, and occupying the woods on the right and left; while the 8th, already in part on the field, ascended34 the watercourse and ravine which gives access to Rezonville. The object of the double movement was to accelerate the retreat of the French from these places. It was not accomplished35 without some wood-fighting, but about half-past three General Metman withdrew his flankers, and glided36 out of sight beyond the ridge21 near Point du Jour. But the firing had alarmed Von Moltke, who, dreading37 lest the fiery38 Steinmetz should bring on a general or even partial engagement, sent him positive orders to stop the combat. The veteran, however, pressed forward himself with Von Zastrow, Von Kameke and their staff officers. Emerging from the woods into the open, they beheld39 across the deep [p 192] ravine the French camps on the opposite plateau, and even discerned the works thrown up by the careful Frossard to cover his guns and infantry. A mitrailleuse at once opened fire on the group of horsemen, and drove them away, but not before they had seen enough to prove, when combined with the cavalry reports from the north-west flank, that the French Army was encamped on the heights to the west of Metz, and had not attempted to withdraw by any of the still open roads towards Mézières or Chalons. Therefore, the German armies halted, and the Generals had a little leisure to frame a plan of operations for the 18th.
Marshal Bazaine.
Human ingenuity40 has imputed41 various motives42 to the French Marshal, some of them being discreditable to his loyalty43, all based on a low estimate of his character as a man, and capacity as a soldier. His own account is that he did not persevere44 in trying to effect his retreat, either by force or skill, partly because the Army was not well supplied with food and munitions, and partly, as is apparent from his evidence and books, because he had formed a military theory which he proposed to work out near Metz to the disadvantage of the enemy. He held that he had a strong post on the flank of the German communications, and that, if he could make his adversaries45 waste their troops in repeated attacks upon “inexpugnable” positions, he might be able to resume the offensive when the Army at Chalons should take the field. Secretly, we suspect, he had become imbued46 with a belief or apprehension47 that what the French call the moral of the Army had been seriously impaired48; that their staying power in action was not what it should have been, and that they could not be trusted to perform so delicate an operation as a long flank march [p 193] within reach of a foe49 exalted50 by victory, aided by a powerful and audacious cavalry, and an infantry capable of marching twenty miles a day, and enjoying the advantage of greatly superior numbers. As usual, the motives of Bazaine were “mixed,” but there does not seem any good reason to believe that he was selfishly disloyal to the Emperor, faithless to France, or insensible to the charms of “glory.” His chief defect was that he did not possess sufficient military competence51 to command a large Army—a defect he shared with his comrades of high rank; and his misfortune was that he succeeded to an inheritance of accumulated error entailing52 severe penalties, from the infliction53 of which only a rare genius, like that of the First Napoleon, could have saved himself and his Army.
Active warfare54 had now continued for a fortnight, and at sundown on the 17th of August the “Army of the Rhine” found itself obliged to form front facing, not Berlin, but Paris; while the formidable Armies of King William, with their backs to the French capital, turned their eyes towards the Rhine.
PLAN V: BATTLE of GRAVELOTTE, 2.45 P.M.
Weller & Graham Ltd. Lithos.? London, Bell & Sons
The Battlefield of Gravelotte.
Whatever may have been his motives, Marshal Bazaine directed his Army to retire upon a position of exceptional strength on the heights to the westward of Metz, which look towards the wooded ravine of the Mance brook throughout its course, and beyond its source over the undulating plain in the direction of the river Orne. This ridge of upland abuts55 on the Moselle near Ars, is covered at its broad southern end by the Bois de Vaux, is intersected by the great highway from Metz to Verdun, which is carried along a depression where the wood terminates, and over the shoulder above Gravelotte. North of the road the high ground, with a westerly bias56, runs as far as [p 194] Amanvillers, and thus trending slightly eastward57, ascends58 to St. Privat la Montagne and Roncourt, and back to the Moselle bottom lands below Metz. The left of the position, opposite the Bois de Vaux, is curved outwards59, its shape being indicated by the high road, which, after bending round and creeping up the hill as far as Point du Jour, turns abruptly60 to the west, and crosses the Mance upon a causeway east of Gravelotte. This bulwark61, occupied by Frossard’s Corps, from near Point du Jour to St. Ruffine in the lowlands, was made more formidable by shelter-trenches62, field works, and gunpits. The two houses at Point du Jour were pierced for musketry, and the immense quarries63 in the hill-side, at the elbow of the ridge facing the Mance, were filled with troops. The only mode of reaching the front was either up the narrow causeway by St. Hubert, or across the deep ravine. Behind this strong front the ground sloped inwards, so that the troops and reserves could be, and were, screened from view as well as from fire. In the bottom stood the village of Rozérieulles; and above, the eminences64 on which the engineers had planted the forts of St. Quentin and Plappeville. The hollow through which the highway ran was bordered with vineyards, and near to Metz villages and houses clustered thickly astride of the road. On the right of Frossard were the four divisions forming the Corps of Leb?uf, extending as far as the farm of La Folie, opposite Vernéville. Here the ground was high and open, yet also sloping to the rear as well as the front, and its chief strength lay in the strongly-built farmsteads of St. Hubert, seated on the roadside just above Gravelotte, in those of Moscow and Leipzig, standing66 on the bare hill-side; and in the Bois de Genivaux, a thick wood, which filled the upper part of the Mance ravine. Beyond the 3rd Corps lay the 4th, under De Ladmirault, having its left in [p 195] the farm and chateau67 of Montigny le Grange, and its right at, and a little north of, Amanvillers, a considerable village, planted in a depression at a point where one of the roads from Metz quits the deep defile68 of Chatel St. Germain, and bends suddenly westward to join, at Habonville, the road to Briey. The track of the railway, then unfinished, ascends this wooded gully, and winds on to the open ground at Amanvillers. The country in front of the ridge, from that place to Roncourt, is an extensive open descent, which has been compared to the glacis of a fortress69, at the foot of which stand the villages of Habonville, St. Ail15, and St. Marie aux Chênes. On the southern edge of this succession of bare fields is the Bois de la Cusse, which was not, strictly70 speaking, a continuous wood, but a sort of common irregularly strewed71 with copses; and on the north were the valley of the Orne and the woods bordering its meandering72 course. The 6th Corps, Canrobert’s, occupied and guarded the right flank, having an outpost in St. Marie, and detachments in the villages beyond Roncourt; but placing its main reliance on St. Privat, which, looked at from the west, stood on the sky line, and, being nearly surrounded by garden walls, had the aspect of a little fortress. The Imperial Guard, considered as a reserve, was drawn up in front of the fort of Plappeville, on the east side of the deep ravine of St. Germain. The fort of St. Quentin looked well over, and protected the whole of the French left, and served especially as a support to Lapasset’s Brigade at St. Ruffine, which faced south. Here the edge of the position touched the suburbs of Metz, and was within cannon73-shot of the right bank of the Moselle, opposite Jussy.
It will be seen that the battlefield may be divided into two portions, differing from each other in their external aspects. The bold curved ridge held by Frossard rose [p 196] between two and three hundred feet above the bed of the Mance, having in rear ground still higher, and was backed by the mass upon which stands Fort St. Quentin. It was, indeed, a natural redoubt open to the rear, covered along its front by the steep sides of a deep ravine, and accessible only by the viaduct built over the brook, a solid embankment, except where a vaulted74 opening allowed the stream to pass. On the French side of the bridge was the strong farmstead of St. Hubert, well walled towards the assailant; and further north the thick woods of Genivaux, which ran near to and beyond the farm of Leipzig; so that while a deep gully protected Frossard, Leb?uf had defensive76 outposts in the wood, which he intrenched in a series of recessed77 field works, and in the stout78 farm buildings, which stormers could only reach by passing up gentle acclivities, every yard whereof could be swept by fire. The right half of the line was different in every respect from the left—for there was no wood, and the whole front, from Amanvillers to Roncourt was, for practical purposes, though not so steep, as free from obstacles as the slope of the South Downs. The left and centre were supplied with artificial defences, but the right, which did not rest on any natural support, and might be turned, was not fortified79 by field works, because Marshal Canrobert’s intrenching tools had been, perforce, left behind at Chalons. The great defects of this “inexpugnable” position were that it had bad lateral80 communications, no good lines of retreat, and a weak right flank. Marshal Bazaine, who misjudged the formidable strength of his left wing, and gave his opponent the credit of contemplating81 an attack on that side, had taken post in Fort Plappeville, where he placed the reserves, and whence he could not see the right, which it does not appear that he had ever examined. The penalty for so grave an error was the loss of the battle.
[p 197]
The German Plans.
Before starting from the hill over Flavigny for Pont à Mousson on the afternoon of the 17th, General von Moltke had issued an order to Prince Frederick Charles and Von Steinmetz, indicating the operations which were to begin the next morning. Their purport82 was that while the 7th Corps stood fast, and the 8th leant towards the right of the Second Army, the Corps composing it should move forward, left in front, facing north. It was a general direction, intended to place the troops in such an array as would enable them to strike and stop the French, if they still sought to reach Chalons by the northern roads, or by a right wheel bring the whole German force to bear upon the enemy if he were found in position before Metz. By six o’clock on the morning of the 18th, King William and his staff were once more on the height near Flavigny, soon after which time the whole Army was in movement, and a sputter83 of musketry had begun on the extreme right between Frossard’s foreposts and those of the 7th Corps in the woods. The 8th had come up near to Rezonville; the 9th was moving between that village and St. Marcel; the Guard was passing Mars la Tour; and the 12th was on the road to Jarny. Behind, in second line, were the 10th and 3rd, the 5th and 6th divisions of cavalry being attached to the latter Corps respectively; while the 2nd Corps, which had bivouacked at Pont à Mousson, had started on another forced march, in order, should there be a battle, to enter the field before dark. The morning wore away, and, except on the right where his left was visible and his skirmishers active, no evidence of the enemy’s presence could be found. The Saxon cavalry division, scouting84 northward and westward, lighted only on stragglers and patrols; the horsemen [p 198] and staff officers out in front of the other Corps watching as well as they could the movements of the French, sent in divergent statements, leaving it doubtful where their main body was, and what it was doing or intended to do. Great uncertainty, in short, prevailed until after ten o’clock, and even then General von Moltke and the staff were under the impression that the French right was near Montigny la Grange; but, believing that the adversary86 would fight, an order went forth at 10.30 a.m., which finally brought the German Armies into line facing eastward. Meantime Prince Frederick Charles had, by degrees, also arrived at the conclusion that the French would accept battle, and, at half-past ten, he likewise instructed General von Manstein to move towards La Folie and begin an attack with his artillery87, provided the enemy’s right was not beyond Amanvillers. Immediately afterwards, while Von Moltke still believed that the flank he wished to turn was at the last-named village, the Prince acquired certain information, from a Hessian cavalry patrol, that the French right rested on St. Privat la Montagne. By such slow degrees was the long-sought flank discovered. Orders were then given directing the 12th and the Guard to wheel to the right and move on St. Marie aux Chênes and Habonville; but before they could come into line, Manstein’s guns were heard, and Von Moltke became apprehensive88 lest the exciting sounds of conflict would carry away the impetuous Steinmetz, lest the First Army, always so eager for battle, might strike in prematurely89 and injure a combination which depended so much upon a simultaneous onset91. Accordingly, the rein92 upon that General was tightened93, and he was told that he might use artillery, yet not do more with his infantry than attract the notice of the enemy and keep his attention on the strain. But so thoroughly94 were the chiefs of the [p 199] German Corps imbued with the same principles of conduct, that the Prince Royal of Saxony and Prince Augustus of Würtemberg had already, in anticipation95, prepared to play the part which was to be assigned them. Having learned, from their own scouting parties, where the French right stood, and having heard the guns at Vernéville, they had both wheeled their divisions to the eastward, and pushed out their advance Guards. Thus they were ready to march at the moment when the order arrived; in fact, the order was in course of execution before it reached the officers to whom it had been addressed. Meantime, acting on the first instructions from the Prince, drawn up when he believed the right rested on Amanvillers, General von Manstein, a little before noon, had begun
The Battle of Gravelotte.
At this moment, it should be noted96, the French camps on the right centre and right did not know that an enemy was within a long mile of their bivouacs. The usual patrols had been sent out and had returned—even scouts97 selected by the local officials for their knowledge of the country—to report that they had not seen anybody. Marshal Canrobert, in his evidence on the Bazaine court-martial, expressly testifies to the fact, and adds that the first intimation he received came from the boom of hostile guns on his left front. The troops of Ladmirault’s Corps, encamped on both sides of Amanvillers, were peacefully engaged in cooking their noontide meal, when General von Manstein, who seems to have been endowed with some of the impetuosity of his namesake, who figured in the wars of Frederick II., riding ahead of his corps, caught sight of the quiescent98 camp. The temptation could not be withstood. From the hills near Vernéville he could not see the [p 200] troops at St. Privat, but he had been informed by the Hessian Cavalry that the French were there. He had been formally enjoined99 to attack if the enemy’s right was near La Folie; it was much to the north of that farm; yet Manstein, unable to neglect the opportunity of startling a negligent100 camp by an outburst of fire, sent the solitary101 battery which had accompanied him into instant action from a rising ground east of Vernéville. The first shot was fired at a quarter to twelve, and its successors roused the French line from St. Privat to the centre, for Frossard and Leb?uf seemed to have been on the alert. General von Blumenthal, with the leading infantry battalions103, was at that time moving on the farm of Chantrenne, and he was stopped by the lively musketry salute104 which greeted his men. Manstein, seeing that his guns were too distant from their living targets, now ordered the battery forward, and it was soon joined, first by the divisional then by the corps artillery; the whole finally forming a long line of fifty-four pieces, each battery having, as it dashed up, wheeled to the right and opened fire. The movement was a grave error, for the long rounded hill on which the batteries stood faced south-east, offered no shelter except on its low right shoulder, and the guns were exposed to a fire from the front, the flank, and even from the left rear. Two batteries were slewed105 round to the left, but that did not remedy the original mistake. There were no infantry at hand to keep down the fire of the French foot, which, lurking106 in the hollows, sent a hail of bullets among the guns. Committed to this false position, the superb German artillerymen did their utmost to make it good; but no heroism107 could avail against its cruel disadvantages. General Blumenthal, indeed, had carried the Chantrenne farm, but the enemy, at the first shot, had thrown a garrison into another homestead named Champenois, [p 201] whence the chassepots smote108 the front of the batteries. The Hessians, also, had developed a powerful attack through the Bois de la Cusse towards the railway embankment and Amanvillers, thus taking off some of the severe pressure from the devoted109 gunners. But the French infantry crept nigher and nigher; under the rush of shells, shrapnel, and bullets, officers, men, and horses fell fast and faster. By concentrating their aim the Germans crushed one or silenced another battery; by using shell they sometimes scattered110 oncoming infantry; still the penalty of haste and a wrong direction had to be paid. The left battery, disabled, was caught in the tempest and borne down by a rush of French foot. Two pieces were dragged away by hardy112 men and wounded horses; two were left on the field; and two were captured. Yet this astonishing artillery, though horribly shattered, continued to hold its ground. It was saved, at a later moment, from a persevering113 attack on its vulnerable flank by the steady onset of an infantry battalion102, which lost nearly half its strength in succouring the guns. Then, for the position was really untenable, all the batteries, except three on the right, where there was a little shelter, at length drew reluctantly, in succession, out of the shambles114 and went rearward to refit. It was half-past two; they had been more than two hours in the jaws115 of death, and had lost no fewer than 210 officers and men and 370 horses. So audaciously, if sometimes unwisely, was this grand arm employed in battle that no one need be astonished to learn how Canrobert, who loved a picturesque116 phrase, called his dreaded117 and admired opponents, “tirailleurs d’artillerie.”
Prince Frederick Charles at the Front.
Manstein, who was to have attacked the French right, had dashed somewhat impetuously against the right centre, [p 202] and for some two hours his Corps sustained the brunt of the engagement, for the Guards and the Saxons were still on the march, the first heading for Vernéville and Habonville, the second on St. Marie aux Chênes, into which Canrobert had hurried three battalions. North of the artillery, whose bloody118 adventure has been described, the Hessian division, under Prince Louis, posted astride of the railway embankment, which, running from Amanvillers to Habonville, cut the line of troops at right angles, held the copses of the Bois de la Cusse, and, supported by thirty guns, formed the backbone119 of the German attack in that exposed quarter. Further south, the other half of the 9th Corps, the 18th Division, had its reserves near Vernéville, with troops established in Chantrenne and L’Envie; but they could make no way, because the French were solidly planted in Champenois, in the Bois de Genivaux, in a spinney projecting to the westward of La Folie, in that farm and on the higher ground above. About half-past two the contest in the centre had become defensive on the part of the 9th Corps, and the energies of the leaders and the troops alike were taxed to retain the ground already occupied and extricate120 the artillery. Prince Frederick Charles, on learning just before noon, from the cavalry reports, where the French right actually stood, became anxious when he heard at St. Marcel the uproar121 of a hot artillery engagement, and he rode off at once towards the sound and smoke which rose in clouds above the woods. On reaching Habonville he was able to survey the conflict, and also discern, in outline, the enemy’s position at St. Privat. The great head-quarters were still imperfectly informed, yet they wished to restrain precipitate122 action and prevent a home-thrusting central attack until strong bodies could be launched against the French right. The Prince, however, saw that the combat could not be [p 203] broken off, and he set himself to make all secure by placing a brigade of the Guard, as a reserve, to assist the 9th Corps, which was all that Manstein requested, and by ordering up four batteries from the 3rd Corps, the infantry masses of which were not far from Vernéville. Prince Augustus of Würtemberg had preceded the Guard Corps, and as soon as General Pape, commanding the 1st infantry division, arrived with the advanced guard it was arranged that his four batteries should go into action to the south-west of Habonville, that is on the left of the much-tried Hessians, and cover the march of the Guard towards St. Marie. The spot first selected for the guns was found defective123, and the batteries, at a gallop124, took up new ground further to the left, to the south-west of St. Ail. Thereupon, that village was occupied by the Guard; Prince Augustus sent for the corps artillery, and soon nine batteries were arrayed between the two villages, on a diagonal line pointing to the north-west, that is, so disposed as to bring to bear a heavy fire on St. Privat, a succour which gave further relief to the gunners of the 9th Corps. For not only Canrobert’s cannon, but his infantry, lurking in the shallow valleys along the front, now directed their shells and bullets upon the Guard batteries. Although the French did not attempt any heavy stroke, they were active and enterprising, and kept their swarms125 of skirmishers within a thousand yards of the guns, but, as the official historian remarks, over and over again, beyond the range of the needle-gun. Before three o’clock the Guard Corps was up, and the 12th, or rather half of it, had approached near St. Marie. Such was the condition of the battle on that side; and it is now necessary to describe the daring operations of the First Army, on the German right wing.
[p 204]
Steinmetz Attacks the French Left.
It will be remembered that the 7th and 8th Corps, commanded by Von Steinmetz, upon whom it was necessary to keep a tight hand, had been brought up to the south and west of Gravelotte, the left of the 8th touching126 Manstein’s right. The 7th provided the outposts which lined the fringe and salient of the Bois de Vaux, and these troops were engaged in an intermittent127 and bickering128 contest with the French infantry thrown out upon that flank. The 1st Division of Cavalry, from the right bank, crossing the Moselle at Borny, rode up about noon as a support, and General von Fransecky, preceding the 2nd Corps, assured the King, whom he found near Flavigny, that one division would arrive in time to form a reserve for the First Army. Von Steinmetz, on a height near Gravelotte, nervously129 observed the French, sent in repeated information that they were moving off, and evidently desired to adopt the tactics which he had applied130 on two previous occasions. He was ordered to be still, and when the guns spoke131 at Vernéville, Von Moltke, knowing their effect upon the veteran warrior132, intimated afresh that he must stand expectant yet awhile. Permission was given, as already mentioned, to use his guns; but when the despatch133 was handed to Steinmetz he had already opened fire with the batteries of the 7th Corps, arrayed to the south, and of the 8th to the north of Gravelotte; and the infantry had been moved eastward to the edge of the region just clear of the French fire. The troops in the Bois de Vaux were reinforced, the mill of the Mance and the gully itself were occupied, and an ample force was posted above the ravine to protect the line of guns.
The expectant attitude, always distasteful to Von Steinmetz, was not, and in the nature of things could not be [p 205] long maintained by the First Army. The generals on the spot knew more accurately134 what had occurred in the centre than the Great Staff when the order to look on was written. General von Goeben, knowing how deeply Manstein had committed the 9th Corps, felt bound to attack in order that he might detain and provide employment for the French left. From a point near Gravelotte he could see the masses of troops held in reserve by Leb?uf and Frossard, and, with the ready assent135 of his immediate11 chief he pushed forth columns from both his divisions. On the south of the high road the soldiers disappeared in the deep gully of the Mance, their path marked by puffs136 of smoke as they drove back the French skirmishers, and reappeared climbing the opposite slope leading to the huge quarries below Point du Jour; but here, struck and repelled137 by the defenders138, they vanished again into the depths, where they held on to the gravel1 pits in the bottom. Nearer the high road, one battalion wedged itself in to the quarries close to St. Hubert; while beyond the highway, the Germans dashed through the wood, established themselves on its eastern border above and about the farmstead, and stormed the stone parapets set up by the French foreposts at the confluence140 of the two streamlets which form the Mance. Farther they could not go, because Leb?uf’s men stiffly held the eastern patch of woodland, while the open ground towards the Moscow farm was swept by musketry fire from the deep banks in the cross-roads, from the shelter trenches above, and from the loopholed buildings of the farm. But the attack on the Bois de Genivaux aided the men of the 9th Corps, who, from Chantrenne, had entered its northern border, and compelled the defenders of the lines in front of Moscow to turn upon the new assailants. Then the companies which had gathered about St. Hubert became engaged in a destructive contest, for the [p 206] walls were high and well garnished141, and the northern point of attack was more or less commanded by the higher ground towards Moscow. On the south front, however, there proved to be more chances of success.
Relying, perhaps, on Frossard’s infantry and guns, the discharges from which commanded the high road, the garrison had forgotten to barricade142 the gates, doors, and windows; and when the place had been cannonaded by the southern line of guns, the assailants, who had suffered great loss with unflinching hardihood, came on with an irresistible143 rush, and carried the farm by storm. The feat144 was accomplished about three o’clock; and the work done gave a solid support to the German right wing. At this time, the German guns, so well fought, having taken more forward positions, had mastered the French artillery, which sank into comparative silence. There were seventy-eight pieces in action on the south of the high road, and fifty-four on the north, and their superiority is admitted and recorded by Frossard himself, who saw his batteries idle or withdrawn, his reserves smitten145, and its defenders literally146 burnt out of the farm buildings at Point du Jour. Yet the French left was not shaken, it was hardly touched, by a vehement147 attack which had given the Germans a better defensive position, indeed, but still one only on the verge85 of Frossard’s stronghold, and affording no facilities for a rush against the fortified lines occupied by the 3rd French Corps, in the thickets148 of Genivaux and on the brow of the bare hills.
The capture of St. Hubert was nearly coincident with that stage in the heady fight before Vernéville which saw the Hessians embattled on the Bois de la Cusse, the exposed artillery of the 9th Corps in retreat from a false position, and the opportune149 appearance of the Guard about Habonville and of the Saxons to the north-west of St. Marie. In [p 207] front of their main line the French held the latter village, were well forward in the hollows west of Amanvillers, stood fast in the farms of La Folie, Leipsic, Moscow, Champenois, and that portion of the Bois de Genivaux which covered the eastern arm of the Mance. The fight had raged for more than three hours, and they had only lost possession of the L’Envie and Chantrenne, places distant from their front, and St. Hubert, which, no doubt, was a dangerous-looking salient within a few hundred yards of the well-defended ridge where the high road turned at right angles towards the blazing farm of Point du Jour. From end to end, therefore, and it was between seven and eight miles in length, measured by an air-line, the whole of Bazaine’s formidable position was intact. The Imperial Guard, the effective reserve, still stood on the heights east of Chatel St. Germain, behind the left, and six miles from the right where the battle was to be decided150.
Operations by the German Left Wing.
The two Corps, forming the left wing of the German Army, had been guided far more by the reports brought in by daring cavalry scouts, than by the orders received either from Prince Frederick Charles or Von Moltke, because these latter were necessarily less well-informed than the Corps commanders who were the first to receive the information. Yet the latter, of course, while taking their own line conformed to the governing idea, which was that the French right flank, wherever it was, should be turned. Moving eastward from Jarny, with the 12th Corps the Crown Prince of Saxony learned before two o’clock, that Roncourt was the extreme northern limit of Canrobert’s Corps, and he, therefore, varied151 a head-quarter’s order to march upon St. Marie, by directing one division, the 23rd, under Prince [p 208] George, to march down the right bank of the Orne, through Auboué, and turn to the right upon Roncourt. One brigade of the 24th Division he directed on St. Marie, keeping the other back as a support. About the same time the whole of the Guard, except one brigade detached to back up the 9th Corps, had formed up near Habonville, and their batteries, as we have seen, had taken up a position which enabled them to smite152 St. Privat. When, therefore, General Pape had moved up the Guards by the ravine west of St. Marie he found the Saxons ready to co-operate with him in driving out the French battalions occupying the pretty village which has the air of a small rural town. It sits at the foot of the long bare incline leading down from St. Privat, traversed by a straight road bordered, as usual, by tall scraggy trees; and nestling amid gardens and walled inclosures shines out a cheerful white spot in the diversified153 landscape. From this point, St. Privat looms154 dark and large on the hill-top, larger and darker looking than it really is. To the southward of that village, beyond a dip, down and up which the cottages creep, stands the farmstead of Jerusalem, and further south the ground rolls away towards Amanvillers. More than a mile of open country separates St. Privat from St. Marie, affording no lurking places to either side, except such as can be found in the gentle swelling155 and falling of the fields; indeed, to the casual observer the smoothness of the surface seems broken only by the poplars on the highway. West of St. Marie there is a shallow ravine, and beyond it copses, and south, as we know towards Vernéville, more copses, ruddy brown farmsteads, and white villages. At this moment the battle-smoke puffed156 out, curled, rose in fantastic clouds, or rolled along the ground, upon the hill-sides and above the thickets and barns; about St. Marie, however, the air as yet was untainted by the sulphurous mists of combat so rank a mile [p 209] away, but the garrison stood painfully expectant of the coming fray157. For though the Guards were hidden the Saxon brigade to the north-west was visible, and the skirmishers driven from St. Ail, told how the “Prussians” were mustering158 for the onset.
Suddenly lines of skirmishers appear, gun after gun drives up, the Saxon artillery reinforcing the pieces which the Guard can spare, until three distinct lines of batteries are formed and open on the village. The German Generals, who judged the place to be stronger and more strongly garrisoned159 than it was, had brought to bear overwhelming forces—probably also to save time; so that, after enduring a hot cannonade from seventy-eight guns, the French battalions, who had borne the bombardment and had spent abundance of ammunition160 in return, did not await the shock of the storming columns sent against them, but fled by the eastern outlet161 to their main body. The Guard and the Saxons, who had come on with ringing hurrahs, swept into the place on all sides; some prisoners were taken, but the greater mass of the defenders and the French battery which had kept up a flank fire on the approach to the south face of the village, got safely up the hill. When they were inside St. Marie the assailants were able to see that “the adversary had done nothing to increase, by artificial means, the defensive value of a post, naturally strong; and had even neglected to barricade the roads and paths by which it is entered.” The truth is that the occupation of St. Marie by the French was an after thought, and that although defensible in itself the place was far too remote from the main French line of battle to be supported; and the garrison, which no doubt, in a different temper, might have died fighting in the streets and houses, yielded when they felt the hail of shells and saw the impending storm-cloud of infantry ready to burst upon them. The [p 210] defenders hastened towards Roncourt and St. Privat, losing men from the fire of their exulting162 enemies, who followed on the eastern side until stopped by the chassepot and the guns on the hills. Thus a point of support was secured in that quarter, about half-past three, but no advance could be made until the artillery had prepared the way, and the turning column had made further progress in its march.
Nevertheless, the Saxon troops on the north of St. Marie and some who had been engaged in its capture, carried away by their ardour and the sight of a retreating foe, pursued so far and were so promptly163 reinforced that a fierce infantry fight ensued. For a French brigade, led by General Péchot, dashed out of their lines, struck roughly on the front and turned the left flank of the Saxons who, being obstinate164, held the slightly uneven165 meadow lands with great difficulty and much loss. Although they were aided by their own batteries and those of the Guard which had been moved forward on the front between St. Ail and Habonville, and whose fire smote diagonally the French columns rushing out of Roncourt and St. Privat, yet the Saxons were overmatched; and, after much labour, as they were nearly all spread out in skirmishing order, General Nehrdorff, who comprehended the situation, and saw the waste of effort, gradually drew them back to the original line. The French counter attack, swift and sharp, was well sustained, and the bold Saxons paid a heavy price for their temerity166. While this combat was in progress, the Crown Prince of Saxony from a height in front of Auboué, gazing intently towards Roncourt, made an important discovery—he saw troops in movement to the north of that village, and, in fact, Canrobert’s outposts extended nearly to the Orne. Thus, after a long search, yet not before four o’clock, the extreme right of the French Army was at length found, and thereupon the turning column of horse, [p 211] foot, and guns, one-half Prince George’s division, was ordered to take a still wider sweep northward ere it wheeled in upon the French rear. As it marched stealthily on its way, the Saxon artillery developed a long line of batteries pointing towards Roncourt, protected by Craushaar’s brigade, which made a lodgment in the western block of a deep wooded ravine on the left of the guns, and stood ready to dash forward when their comrades emerged from the villages and copses behind the French right. In the centre the troops of the 9th Corps had stormed and occupied the farm of Champenois, had tried again, without success, to win the eastern tracts167 of the Bois de Genivaux, and, supported by 106 guns, had maintained a sanguinary contest with Leb?uf’s steady brigades, ensconced over against them in the farms, thickets, and hollow ways. About five o’clock the fury of the battle diminished for a moment, in the centre, on the left, and even on the right, where, down to that hour, it had raged with a spirit and vigour168 which must now be described.
General Frossard Repels169 a fresh Attack.
The enormous defensive strength of the position held by General Frossard’s Corps does not seem to have been thoroughly understood by anyone except that accomplished engineer. Marshal Bazaine did not perceive its value, for he was perpetually afraid that the Germans would break in upon it, either from the Bois de Vaux or by the high road, and his apprehensions170 or prejudices were confirmed when a column of troops was seen to be ascending171 the river-road from Ars towards Jussy, near St. Ruffine. General von Steinmetz, on the other hand, who had peered out from every available height between the Bois des Ognons and Gravelotte, although each attack which he [p 212] had directed had been repelled, thought he discerned symptoms of weakness and even of retreat. The truth is that Frossard’s men were well hidden, not less by the natural features of the ground than by the trenches which he had dug and the breastworks which he had thrown up. If his batteries were silent or withdrawn it was because, although overpowered in the gun fight, they were yet still able to arrest the onsets172 of infantry; and if the French fantassins were invisible, it was because they were lying down or arrayed on the reverse of the ridge. The hot-tempered General of the First Army, however, surmised173, after the capture of St. Hubert, that troops had been detached to aid the distant right, or that a moment had come when, if pressed home by an attack of all arms, Point du Jour could be carried and the French driven headlong into Metz. Under the influence of this delusion174 he rode up to General von Goeben, who was watching the battle near Gravelotte. Captain Seton, an Indian officer who was present, noticed the violent gestures and rapid talk of Steinmetz because they offered so strong a contrast to the steady coolness of the younger warrior. At that moment he was expounding175 opinions and issuing orders which brought on one of the most brilliant and destructive episodes in the battle. Goeben had already sent forward Gneisenau’s brigade, partly on and partly north of the road, but they were needed to feed the combat, support the weakened and scattered companies, and secure St. Hubert.
What Steinmetz now designed was a home-thrust on the French position; and, accordingly, he ordered several batteries of the 7th Corps and Von Hartmann’s cavalry division to cross the Gravelotte defile and plant themselves on the gentle acclivities to the south of the road. Now the highway runs first through a cutting, is then carried [p 213] on an embankment, and only near St. Hubert are the gentle southern slopes above the gully accessible to horses and guns. But this narrow track swarmed176 with troops, into the midst of which came the cavalry and artillery. The infantry gave way and four batteries arrived on the opposite side of the defile, followed by the 9th Uhlans. But so deadly was the storm of shot which burst from the French position—for cannon, mitrailleuse, and chassepot went instantly to work—that two of the batteries were at once driven into the ravine below. The Uhlans actually rode out into the open, took up a position, and remained until it was plain to all that the lives of men and horses were being uselessly sacrificed. The other regiments178, “well peppered,” had already gone “threes about” before clearing the defile, and the Uhlans, who were dropping fast, rode back, as well as they could, to Gravelotte or the sheltering woods. A more extravagant179 movement has rarely been attempted in war, or one less justified180 by the evident facts of the situation as well as by the deadly results. Yet two batteries actually remained, one, under Captain Hasse, in the open, about seven hundred yards from the French lines of musketry; the other, commanded by Captain Gnügge, covered in front by the low wall of the St. Hubert garden, but lending a flank to the adversary at the top of the road. Captain Hasse and his gunners were stubborn men; they fought their battery for two hours, in fact, until nearly all the men and horses were down. Even then Hasse would not retire, and one of his superiors was obliged to hurry up fresh teams and forcibly drag the guns away. But the battery under the wall held on, and did good service by firing on the French about the Moscow farm.
The failure of these mistaken attacks and the retreat of guns and horsemen seems to have shaken the constant [p 214] German infantry, for they gave ground everywhere but at St. Hubert, and the French came on with such vigour that General Steinmetz himself and his staff were under a heavy fire. Fortunately three fresh battalions plunged181 into the combat; but they could not do more than sustain it; for every attempt made to approach the French, either towards the Moscow farm or Point du Jour, met with a speedy repulse183. Indeed, down to five o’clock, the point of time at which we have arrived, along the whole line, no progress whatever had been made by the German right wing, which held on to St. Hubert, the ravine of the Mance, and the western portion of the Bois de Genivaux, but could not show a rifle or bayonet beyond in any direction. It was only the powerful German artillery which still remained the superb masters of the field, so far as their action was concerned.
It was at this time that King William and his staff, which included Prince Bismarck, rode up to the high ground above Malmaison, where he established his head-quarters in the field, and whence, until nearly dark, he watched the battle. Over against him, concerned respecting his left, and ignorant of the state of the battle on his right, was Marshal Bazaine, in the fort of Plappeville, whither he had returned from St. Quentin, which commanded a wide view to the south and south-west. He says that he gave General Bourbaki discretion184 to use the Guard wherever it might be wanted. But that officer knew little more than the Commander-in-Chief. An hour or two earlier, taking with him the Grenadier Division of the Guard, he had started towards the north, following a hilly road east of the St. Germain ravine. He had seen the immense mountain of white smoke which towered up in the north-west, but the current of air, hardly a wind, apparently185 blew from the south-east, since at Plappeville he could not hear [p 215] the roar of the guns, and the view was so obstructed186 that he could not obtain even a glimpse of the country about St. Privat. He had to leave behind him the Voltigeurs and Chasseurs of the Guard, who were partly in reserve and partly posted to support Leb?uf, who called up one regiment177 from Brincourt’s brigade. Bazaine had also sent some guns to support Lapasset in his contest with the troops which Von Golz had marched up from Ars to the woodlands and vineyards opposite St. Ruffine. The French at this stage were still in good spirits. If Leb?uf was a little anxious behind his farmsteads, his woods, and skilfully187-disposed re-entering echelons189 of shelter trenches; Frossard, who soon after relieved his front ranks from the reserve, was content; and De Ladmirault, as was usual with him, believed that he might be almost considered victorious190, and only required a few battalions of the Guard to insure his success. The ammunition on both sides was running out here and there; indeed, Canrobert declares that he was compelled to borrow from De Ladmirault; still there was enough to last out the day. Over the seven or eight miles of flame and smoke and tumult191, for a brief interval192, came what may be called a lull193 compared with the deafening194 tempest of sounds which smote on the ear when the rival combatants raged most fiercely.
The last Fights near St. Hubert.
For some time longer the German right wing did little more than defend its somewhat irregular line of front. The 2nd Corps, which had been marching every day since it quitted the Saar, had attained Rezonville, and King William placed it under the orders of Von Steinmetz. As the minutes flew by, the head-quarter staff on the hill near Malmaison were impressed by a fact and an appearance[p 216]—the increase of the vivacity195 and volume of fire towards the north—where the Guard had begun its onset on St. Privat—and the symptoms of wavering which seemed, and only seemed, to be visible on the French left. The King, therefore, sanctioned a fresh and formidable advance upon Frossard’s brigades by all the troops which Von Steinmetz could spare for the enterprise. But the main object of Von Moltke, we infer, was to prevent, by striking hard, the despatch of any assistance to Canrobert, and thus assist, by a resolute196 advance, upon one wing, the decisive movement then approaching its critical stage on the other. The 2nd Corps was, therefore, brought up to Gravelotte, and all the available troops of the 7th and 8th were held in readiness to assail75, once more, the enemies beyond the Mance.
But the French, who, though wearied, were still undaunted, anticipating their foes197, became the assailants. Their silent guns spoke out in thunder, the heights were shrouded198 in a canopy199 of smoke, and the bolts hurled200 from the batteries fell like hail on the woods, and sent such an iron shower as far forward as the hill-top where the King and his great men stood, that Von Roon prevailed on the King to ride further back. The lively French skirmishers dashed forth into the open, strove hard to reach St. Hubert, drove the German foreposts headlong down the steeps into the Mance gully, filled the high road with a rushing, clamorous201 crowd of fugitives202, and even caused terror and commotion203 in the rear of Gravelotte, so vehement and unexpected was the stroke. Fortunately for the Germans, the principal bodies of troops in St. Hubert and the woods were unshaken, and their rapid fire, as well as the responses sent from the artillery, checked the violent outfall. Then, as the sun was getting low, the fresh German brigades struck in. The men of the 7th Corps went down into [p 217] and over the Mance valley, and stormed up the eastern bank. The 2nd Corps, eager to win, pressed along the highway, with their drums and trumpets204 sounding the change, or moved on the south side. They passed onward205 in a tumult, and boldly tried to grapple with the strong lines of the defence. Not only their commander, Fransecky, and Steinmetz, but Von Moltke himself rode into the defile to witness and direct this huge and uproarious column of attack. But neither their numbers, and they were many, nor their valour, which was great, nor the unfaltering devotion of their officers could resist the smashing fire of cannon and mitrailleuse and chassepot which the French brought to bear upon them. Some daring spirits pressed close up towards the ditches and breastworks, a few clung to the banks and bushes on the brow of the slope near Point du Jour. A dense206 mass collected near St. Hubert, where Fransecky and Steinmetz, in the thick of the throng207, saw the bands who had hurried to the front break off, turn and hasten rearward, while fresh troops still pressed upward through the confused crowds of fugitives. So for some time, in the twilight208, the strange fight went on. As it grew darker, the outlines of Leb?uf’s cleverly-designed shelter trenches near the Moscow farm were drawn in lines of musketry fire, and gradually nothing, save the flashes of guns and rifles, could be seen in the gloom. At length, when friend could not be distinguished209 from foe, when no breach210 could be made in the French line, which, except the outpost of St. Hubert, remained what it had been in the morning, the Generals placed strong guards on their front, and stood prepared to renew the battle with the dawn. General Frossard, who had engaged all his reserves, was proud of his achievement, and not less of the foresight he displayed in providing artificial cover for his men. That had made the position, from the Great Quarries to the farm and copse of [p 218] La Folie, impregnable, and renders it all the more difficult to comprehend how Marshal Bazaine could have shown such manifest distrust of the fastness which protected his left wing. The attack on St. Ruffine by Von Golz was merely a diversion shrewdly designed to increase the Marshal’s alarms, and its relative success shows how correctly Von Moltke estimated his adversary’s abilities as a soldier. He reaped an ample reward, since long before the last shot was fired in the neighbourhood of St. Hubert, the French had been worsted at the other and distant extremity212 of the vast field of battle.
The Prussian Guard on the Centre and Left.
It may be said, indeed, that not one, but several battles were fought on the 18th of August, in the long space between the Bois de Vaux and the Forest of Moy?uvre. They were inter-dependent, because one mass of combatants held fast another, and the essence of the German plan was that three-fourths of the French Army should be nailed to the positions they had taken up, while the remainder were crushed by the pressure of superior forces. The original design of Von Moltke was framed on the supposition that the French right stood near Amanvillers, and that he would be able to fling upon an exposed flank two Corps d’Armée. Before the error was discovered, several hours had been consumed; the Guard had been obliged to prolong the front fighting line; only a part of the Saxon Corps could be spared to engage in the turning movement, and the ground which they had to traverse grew longer and longer as the day waxed shorter. The extent of country over which the various armies operated, and the smoke which obscured the view, prevented a correct appreciation213 of the situation of affairs at a given moment, and the German commanders were liable to be deceived, and were [p 219] deceived by appearances. The knowledge that so brief an interval of daylight remained, and an anxiety to make the most of precious moments, quickened the tendency to decisive action, and thus brought about the rash and premature90 attack which was so destructive, and nearly proved so fatal to the Prussian Guard.
Their magnificent divisions of Infantry, it will be remembered, stood between St. Ail and St. Marie, except one brigade which had been annexed214 to the 9th Corps. It was intended that they should remain quiescent until the Saxon column broke out upon the French right in the direction of Roncourt, and for a brief interval of time, after five o’clock, the action in the centre as well as on the left was confined to a deliberate cannonade. Prince Augustus of Würtemberg, who was then near St. Ail gazing alternatively on the ebb215 and flow of Manstein’s battle in the Bois de la Cusse and towards the Bois de Genivaux, and on the aspect of the field about St. Privat, thought he saw French troops moving south from Roncourt. Combining this impression with the fact that, as we have already stated, a long line of Saxon guns had been arrayed due north of St. Marie, he rapidly formed the opinion that the turning column was on the point of striking the enemy, and that the moment had come when the Guard should be employed. He was also somewhat affected216 by the condition of the combat in the centre, and, perhaps, as much by the waning217 day which left so narrow a margin218 of time for decisive activity. He appealed to Prince Frederick Charles and easily converted the Commander-in-Chief of the Second Army to his views. So the order went forth that the Guard should attack, and having set Budritzki’s division in motion from St. Ail, Prince Augustus rode to St. Marie. There General von Pape revealed to him his misconception—the [p 220] turning column was not even then in sight, and unless preceded by bombardment from all the batteries, a front attack on St. Privat, Pape said, would have but a slight chance of success. Why, then, was it delivered? Because the other division of the Guard was actually at that moment under fire and losing men by scores on the open slope. It was a bitter moment for Prince Augustus, whose error was to cost the Guard losses which are counted by thousands. Moreover, General Manstein, seeing Budritzki in motion, and De Cissey, whose division formed De Ladmirault’s right, wheeling up diagonally on the flanks of the new foe, determined219 to despatch his Brigade of Guards, the 3rd, straight upon Amanvillers, to resume the offensive with his Hessians, and support, by all the means he possessed220, the daring onset initiated221 on his immediate left. Practically, therefore, although other troops were engaged at different points on the front of the 9th Corps, the battle on the northern half of the field was thenceforth fought out by the Saxons and the Guard.
The character of the unequal combat was the same from end to end of the line—superb, because it proved the steadfast222 valour of Prussia’s chosen infantry; awful, because the bare fields in the track of the onslaught were soon literally strewed with thousands of dead and wounded. The charge of the 3rd Brigade towards Amanvillers was pushed with such unwavering velocity223 that, although the ranks were thinned at every stride, the hardy survivors224, spread out in skirmishing order, carried their front to the brow of a hill within half a mile of Amanvillers. There they were stopped by the fire which smote them in front and flank. Yet there they stayed undaunted, and maintained a steady contest with antagonists who, if they tried to dash forward, could not reach the unyielding line of the 3rd Brigade. On their left the Hessians moved up on both [p 221] sides of the railroad cutting, and finally captured a house built for the watchman at a level crossing. Comrades of the 9th Corps, from the Bois de la Cusse, soldiers who had been toiling225 for many hours, essayed to reach the Guard, but they had not strength enough left, and retired when they suddenly discerned, above Amanvillers, two regiments of Grenadiers—it was Bourbaki who had led Picard’s battalions on to the plateau, but who, distrusting appearances visible about and beyond St. Privat, feared to plunge182 into the fight at Amanvillers. Looking out from his hill, Bourbaki may have seen the devoted march of Budritzki’s troops up the gentle slope in front of St. Ail; for these, what was left of them, were closing on the spur which lies south-west of St. Privat, and stretching out as far as the high road to St. Marie, a long dark streak226 of fire and smoke and the broad fields behind them black with the dying and dead. For the constant Guards, undismayed, the remnant of a splendid division, not only persevered227 and won the little rounded hill, but rooted themselves under its shelving terraces, while the left companies, next the high road, found shelter in its ditches. They had suffered most when beyond the effective range of the needle-gun, in the belt where the chassepot had rained balls as thick as hail. They could now retort the fire, and at least keep their opponents at bay. These battalions, like those of the 3rd Brigade, had dared all the deadly perils228 of the open ground; they had bought a relative success at a heavy price, and were resolved to retain what they had won, their line of fire extending from the high road to the rounded eminence65, or long hillock, south-west of Jerusalem. Three batteries had driven up to aid the infantry; the main body of the Guard Artillery had advanced eastward; and the Hessians and 3rd Brigade prolonged the front of combat to the south.
[p 222]
During part of the period thus occupied General Pape, holding one brigade in reserve at St. Marie, attacked with the other on the north of the high road. Starting at a quarter to six o’clock, this body of Guardsmen crossed the road facing north, and then wheeling in succession to the right, went obstinately229 forward. The French fire, from the outset, was close and deadly; officers of all ranks fell fast; companies were reduced to straggling groups or scattered files; the whole line was soon dispersed230 here and there; but they still pressed on. One moiety231 trended to the right another to the left, and General von Pape, watchful232, active, and fortunate, for he was not hit, led fresh battalions to fill up the gaping233 intervals234. Soon after the foremost bands had got within seven hundred yards of St. Privat, where, in places, at least, the slope afforded shelter, the reinforcements arrived; and it may be said that thenceforth a continuous, yet thin line, curved inwards at the northern end, and fringed with smoke and fire, stretched irregularly over the vast glacis-like declivities from opposite Amanvillers to the outskirts235 of Roncourt, where the Saxons prolonged the ragged111 and shapeless, but redoubtable236 array. Against this mere211 thread of riflemen, not even when they were weakest, the French directed no bold attack, perhaps because they had no reserves and stood in respectful awe237 of the hostile artillery which drew nearer and nearer as the evening wore on, until the black batteries formed a second line to the intrepid238 infantry.
It was about seven o’clock. St. Privat was in flames, the black and tawny239 smoke of the burning village, boiling upwards240, stood out against the obscured sky in strong contrast to the swelling clouds of white vapour, through which leaped incessant241 sparkles from hundreds of rifles, and the broader flashes of the cannon. At no preceding period of this dreadful day had the battle raged with such intensity242; [p 223] for now along the whole front of eight miles there was a deafening roar and crash and tumult, and a murky243 atmosphere concealing244 the ghastly sights which make these fields of carnage so appalling245 to the lively imagination, which seeks in vain to realize its multitude and variety of horror. Yet there was an element of grandeur246 and sublimity247 in the exhibition of courage, constancy and fortitude248 upon such a stupendous scale. “It is a good thing that war is so terrible,” said General Robert Lee, “otherwise we should become too fond of it.” Here, among these woods and villages of Lorraine, war showed in abundance its attractive and repulsive249 forms.
The Capture of St. Privat.
Marshal Canrobert had discerned the approaching Saxons, who were now marching from the north upon Roncourt, Montois, and Malancourt. He felt that his right had been turned, and looked in vain for the expected succour. Bazaine, he says, had promised to send a division of the Guard. Bourbaki, astounded250 by the spectacle which met his eyes, when he emerged from the wooded defiles251 west of Saulny, had, as we have seen, allowed himself to be attracted, for a moment, towards De Ladmirault, had then retraced252 his steps, and had taken a position to cover the high road to Woippy, the so-called northern road from Metz which goes to Briey. He had with him, according to his own statement, three or four thousand Grenadiers and some artillery; but he did not arrive in time to frustrate253 the Saxons and Prussian Guards. The Marshal, a little after seven, or even before, felt that he could not stand. He complains of failing ammunition, declares that the German artillery had obtained a complete mastery over his guns, and that his flank was turned. “At this moment,” [p 224] he says in his own picturesque fashion, “a valiant254 officer, who has since been killed before Paris, and who was called Péchot, arrived at St. Privat [from Roncourt] with the 9th battalion of Chasseurs, the 6th and 12th of the Line. He dashed forward to stop the enemy; but, as the enemy flung at us masses of iron, and did not come himself, as it was shells which came instead, we could not hold on. Péchot warned me, and we were obliged to retire. We did so by moving in echelon188 from the centre, and, in good order, I emphasize the phrase, we gained the heights beside the wood of Saulny.” The German Staff acknowledge that the rearward movement was admirably done; but the succinct255 narrative vouchsafed256 by the Marshal to the Court which tried Bazaine, gives only a vague glimpse of the closing scene.
When the “valiant Péchot” retired from Roncourt before the Saxon inroad, he skilfully put his brigade into the forest of Jaumont, on the right rear of the original line. Colonel Montluisant, the gallant257 artilleryman, having received a welcome supply of ammunition, sent up from St. Quentin by the order of Bazaine, posting his batteries in lines one above the other on the terraces near the wood of Saulny, opened a sustained fire to cover the retreat. Bourbaki, although Canrobert did not know it at the time, such was the confusion and so thick was the air, had moved his batteries and Grenadiers near enough at dusk to bring both musketry and cannon-shot to bear upon the Germans. In St. Privat, glowing like a furnace, and as the darkness became deeper, shedding a wild light upon the scene, there were still stout and obstinate soldiers who either would not, or could not, follow the retiring brigades. Upon these devoted troops, as the sun went down behind the dark border of woods beyond the valley of the Orne, the much-tried Prussian Guards and the leg-weary Saxons [p 225] threw themselves with all their remaining vigour; and in rear of them, yet far down the slope, stepped one Division of the 10th Corps. The guns reinforced had again been dragged forward, some overwhelming St. Privat, others pounding Montluisant, or facing south-east, and smiting258 the French about Amanvillers. Then, with loud hurrahs, the assailants broke into St. Privat, pursued the defenders amid the burning houses, captured two thousand prisoners, who were unable to escape from the buildings, and developed their lines in the twilight on the plateau beyond. The capture of St. Privat enabled the German artillery to press on once more, each battery striving to gain the foremost place. For Canrobert’s retreat exposed the right flank of De Ladmirault’s Corps, and, under a scathing259 fire, he was obliged to throw it back, protected by Bourbaki on the hill, and supported by a brigade promptly despatched towards that side by Leb?uf, who, all through the eddying260 fight, showed a fine tactical sense and great decision. How far the Germans were able to push their advantage it is difficult to say, since General Gondrecourt, who was near the place, maintains that some of De Ladmirault’s soldiers remained through the night in Amanvillers; whereas the Germans assert that they broke into part of the village. Be that as it may, Montigny la Grange, La Folie, and the posts thence to Point du Jour, for certain, were held by the French until the morning. Marshal Leb?uf has stated that he summoned his Generals in the evening, and said to them: “The two Corps on our right, crushed by superior forces, have been obliged to retire. We have behind us,” he added, “one of the defiles through which they (‘cette troupe’) may retreat. If we give back a step the Army is lost. The position, doubtless, is difficult, but we will remain.” He declares that the attack continued until midnight, and that not one of his men budged261 a foot, which [p 226] is true; but Canrobert’s men did fly in disorder262 to Woippy, and De Ladmirault confessed that there was “some disorder” in his Corps, and that what remained of them in the wood of Saulny stood to their arms all night. The General states his case in an extraordinary manner. “Night,” he says, “surprised us in this situation, having gained the battle, but not having been able to maintain our positions.” What he meant to assert was that he, De Ladmirault had won the battle, but that the defeat of Canrobert had obliged him to retire. The truth was that some troops remained in Montigny la Grange, but that the rest, or nearly all of them, where huddled263 together in the wood of Saulny, whence they retreated at dawn.
During the night each Corps commander received from Marshal Bazaine an order to occupy certain positions under the guns of Metz. Canrobert, De Ladmirault, and the Guard, marched in the night, or very early in the morning, to the places assigned them; Leb?uf began his movement at dawn, but Frossard kept outposts on his front line long after daylight. During the forenoon, however, the Army of the Rhine had gained the shelter of a fortified town, which they were not able to quit until they marched off to Germany as prisoners of war.
The effective strength of the German Armies present on the field of Gravelotte was 203,402 men, and 726 guns; it would not be easy to calculate how many were actually engaged in the fight, but the forces held in reserve were considerable. The number on the French side has been put as low as 120,000, and as high as 150,000 men, and probably about 530 guns. The loss of the Germans in killed and wounded was 20,159, and 493 missing. The French loss is set down at 7,853 killed and wounded and 4,419 prisoners, many of whom were wounded men. The disproportion is tremendous, and shows once again that, armed with the [p 227] breechloader, the defender139 is able to kill and injure nearly two to one. There were killed or mortally wounded in the German ranks no fewer than 5,237 officers and men, while the aggregate264 for the French is only 1,144. The loss of officers and men in the Prussian Guards, nearly all inflicted265 in half an hour before St. Privat, reached the dreadful total of 2,440 killed or mortally injured, and of wounded 5,511!
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1
gravel
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| n.砂跞；砂砾层；结石 | |
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2
munitions
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| n.军火，弹药；v.供应…军需品 | |
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3
antagonists
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| 对立[对抗] 者，对手，敌手( antagonist的名词复数 )； 对抗肌； 对抗药 | |
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infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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5
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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6
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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7
uncertainty
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| n.易变，靠不住，不确知，不确定的事物 | |
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8
sever
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| v.切开，割开；断绝，中断 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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10
retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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11
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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westward
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| n.西方，西部；adj.西方的，向西的；adv.向西 | |
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intimidate
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| vt.恐吓，威胁 | |
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14
garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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15
ail
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| v.生病，折磨，苦恼 | |
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16
attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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17
impending
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| a.imminent, about to come or happen | |
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18
narrative
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| n.叙述，故事；adj.叙事的，故事体的 | |
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19
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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northward
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| adv.向北；n.北方的地区 | |
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21
ridge
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| n.山脊；鼻梁；分水岭 | |
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22
ERECTED
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| adj. 直立的，竖立的，笔直的 vt. 使 ... 直立，建立 | |
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23
foresight
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| n.先见之明，深谋远虑 | |
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24
goodwill
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| n.善意，亲善，信誉，声誉 | |
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25
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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26
contradictory
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| adj.反驳的，反对的，抗辩的；n.正反对，矛盾对立 | |
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27
discordant
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| adj.不调和的 | |
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28
withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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29
deferred
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| adj.延期的，缓召的v.拖延，延缓，推迟( defer的过去式和过去分词 )；服从某人的意愿，遵从 | |
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30
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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31
dictated
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| v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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32
obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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33
brook
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| n.小河，溪；v.忍受，容让 | |
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34
ascended
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| v.上升，攀登( ascend的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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35
accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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36
glided
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| v.滑动( glide的过去式和过去分词 )；掠过；（鸟或飞机 ） 滑翔 | |
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37
dreading
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| v.害怕，恐惧，担心( dread的现在分词 ) | |
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38
fiery
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| adj.燃烧着的，火红的；暴躁的；激烈的 | |
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39
beheld
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| v.看，注视( behold的过去式和过去分词 )；瞧；看呀；（叙述中用于引出某人意外的出现）哎哟 | |
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40
ingenuity
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| n.别出心裁；善于发明创造 | |
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41
imputed
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| v.把（错误等）归咎于( impute的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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42
motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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43
loyalty
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| n.忠诚，忠心 | |
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44
persevere
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| v.坚持，坚忍，不屈不挠 | |
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45
adversaries
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| n.对手，敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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46
imbued
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| v.使（某人/某事）充满或激起（感情等）( imbue的过去式和过去分词 )；使充满；灌输；激发（强烈感情或品质等） | |
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47
apprehension
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| n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑 | |
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48
impaired
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| adj.受损的；出毛病的；有（身体或智力）缺陷的v.损害，削弱( impair的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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49
foe
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| n.敌人，仇敌 | |
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50
exalted
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| adj.(地位等)高的，崇高的；尊贵的，高尚的 | |
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51
competence
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| n.能力，胜任，称职 | |
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52
entailing
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| 使…成为必要( entail的现在分词 )； 需要； 限定继承； 使必需 | |
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53
infliction
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| n.（强加于人身的）痛苦，刑罚 | |
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54
warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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55
abuts
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| v.（与…）邻接( abut的第三人称单数 )；（与…）毗连；接触；倚靠 | |
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56
bias
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| n.偏见，偏心，偏袒；vt.使有偏见 | |
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57
eastward
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| adv.向东；adj.向东的；n.东方，东部 | |
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ascends
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| v.上升，攀登( ascend的第三人称单数 ) | |
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outwards
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| adj.外面的，公开的，向外的；adv.向外；n.外形 | |
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abruptly
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| adv.突然地，出其不意地 | |
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61
bulwark
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| n.堡垒，保障，防御 | |
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62
trenches
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| 深沟，地沟( trench的名词复数 )； 战壕 | |
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63
quarries
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| n.（采）石场( quarry的名词复数 )；猎物（指鸟，兽等）；方形石；（格窗等的）方形玻璃v.从采石场采得( quarry的第三人称单数 )；从（书本等中）努力发掘（资料等）；在采石场采石 | |
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64
eminences
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| 卓越( eminence的名词复数 )； 著名； 高地； 山丘 | |
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eminence
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| n.卓越，显赫；高地，高处；名家 | |
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66
standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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chateau
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| n.城堡，别墅 | |
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68
defile
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| v.弄污，弄脏；n.(山间)小道 | |
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69
fortress
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| n.堡垒，防御工事 | |
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70
strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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71
strewed
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| v.撒在…上( strew的过去式和过去分词 )；散落于；点缀；撒满 | |
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72
meandering
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| 蜿蜒的河流，漫步，聊天 | |
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73
cannon
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| n.大炮，火炮；飞机上的机关炮 | |
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74
vaulted
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| adj.拱状的 | |
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75
assail
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| v.猛烈攻击，抨击，痛斥 | |
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defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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recessed
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| v.把某物放在墙壁的凹处( recess的过去式和过去分词 )；将（墙）做成凹形，在（墙）上做壁龛；休息，休会，休庭 | |
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fortified
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| adj. 加强的 | |
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lateral
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| adj.侧面的，旁边的 | |
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81
contemplating
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| 深思，细想，仔细考虑( contemplate的现在分词 )； 注视，凝视； 考虑接受（发生某事的可能性）； 深思熟虑，沉思，苦思冥想 | |
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82
purport
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| n.意义，要旨，大要；v.意味著，做为...要旨，要领是... | |
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83
sputter
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| n.喷溅声；v.喷溅 | |
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84
scouting
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| 守候活动，童子军的活动 | |
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verge
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| n.边，边缘；v.接近，濒临 | |
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adversary
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| adj.敌手，对手 | |
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87
artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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88
apprehensive
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| adj.担心的，恐惧的，善于领会的 | |
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prematurely
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| adv.过早地，贸然地 | |
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premature
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| adj.比预期时间早的；不成熟的，仓促的 | |
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onset
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| n.进攻，袭击，开始，突然开始 | |
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rein
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| n.疆绳，统治，支配；vt.以僵绳控制，统治 | |
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93
tightened
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| 收紧( tighten的过去式和过去分词 )； （使）变紧； （使）绷紧； 加紧 | |
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thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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anticipation
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| n.预期，预料，期望 | |
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noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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97
scouts
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| 侦察员[机，舰]( scout的名词复数 )； 童子军； 搜索； 童子军成员 | |
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98
quiescent
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| adj.静止的，不活动的，寂静的 | |
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99
enjoined
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| v.命令( enjoin的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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100
negligent
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| adj.疏忽的；玩忽的；粗心大意的 | |
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101
solitary
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| adj.孤独的，独立的，荒凉的；n.隐士 | |
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102
battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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103
battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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104
salute
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| vi.行礼，致意，问候，放礼炮；vt.向…致意，迎接，赞扬；n.招呼，敬礼，礼炮 | |
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105
slewed
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| adj.喝醉的v.杀死，宰杀，杀戮( slay的过去式 )( slew的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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106
lurking
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| 潜在 | |
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107
heroism
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| n.大无畏精神，英勇 | |
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108
smote
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| v.猛打，重击，打击( smite的过去式 ) | |
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109
devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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110
scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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111
ragged
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| adj.衣衫褴褛的，粗糙的，刺耳的 | |
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112
hardy
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| adj.勇敢的，果断的，吃苦的；耐寒的 | |
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113
persevering
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| a.坚忍不拔的 | |
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114
shambles
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| n.混乱之处；废墟 | |
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115
jaws
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| n.口部；嘴 | |
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116
picturesque
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| adj.美丽如画的，（语言）生动的，绘声绘色的 | |
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117
dreaded
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| adj.令人畏惧的；害怕的v.害怕，恐惧，担心( dread的过去式和过去分词) | |
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118
bloody
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| adj.非常的的；流血的；残忍的；adv.很；vt.血染 | |
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119
backbone
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| n.脊骨，脊柱，骨干；刚毅，骨气 | |
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120
extricate
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| v.拯救，救出；解脱 | |
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121
uproar
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| n.骚动，喧嚣，鼎沸 | |
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122
precipitate
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| adj.突如其来的；vt.使突然发生；n.沉淀物 | |
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123
defective
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| adj.有毛病的，有问题的，有瑕疵的 | |
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124
gallop
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| v./n.(马或骑马等)飞奔；飞速发展 | |
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125
swarms
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| 蜂群，一大群( swarm的名词复数 ) | |
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126
touching
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| adj.动人的，使人感伤的 | |
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127
intermittent
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| adj.间歇的，断断续续的 | |
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128
bickering
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| v.争吵( bicker的现在分词 )；口角；（水等）作潺潺声；闪烁 | |
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129
nervously
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| adv.神情激动地，不安地 | |
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130
applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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131
spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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132
warrior
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| n.勇士，武士，斗士 | |
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133
despatch
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| n./v.(dispatch)派遣；发送；n.急件；新闻报道 | |
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134
accurately
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| adv.准确地，精确地 | |
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135
assent
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| v.批准，认可；n.批准，认可 | |
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136
puffs
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| n.吸( puff的名词复数 )；（烟斗或香烟的）一吸；一缕（烟、蒸汽等）；（呼吸或风的）呼v.使喷出( puff的第三人称单数 )；喷着汽（或烟）移动；吹嘘；吹捧 | |
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137
repelled
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| v.击退( repel的过去式和过去分词 )；使厌恶；排斥；推开 | |
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138
defenders
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| n.防御者( defender的名词复数 )；守卫者；保护者；辩护者 | |
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139
defender
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| n.保卫者，拥护者，辩护人 | |
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140
confluence
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| n.汇合，聚集 | |
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141
garnished
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| v.给（上餐桌的食物）加装饰( garnish的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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142
barricade
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| n.路障，栅栏，障碍；vt.设路障挡住 | |
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143
irresistible
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| adj.非常诱人的，无法拒绝的，无法抗拒的 | |
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144
feat
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| n.功绩；武艺，技艺；adj.灵巧的，漂亮的，合适的 | |
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145
smitten
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| 猛打，重击，打击( smite的过去分词 ) | |
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146
literally
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| adv.照字面意义，逐字地；确实 | |
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147
vehement
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| adj.感情强烈的；热烈的；(人)有强烈感情的 | |
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148
thickets
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| n.灌木丛( thicket的名词复数 )；丛状物 | |
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149
opportune
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| adj.合适的，适当的 | |
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150
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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151
varied
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| adj.多样的，多变化的 | |
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152
smite
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| v.重击；彻底击败；n.打；尝试；一点儿 | |
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153
diversified
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| adj.多样化的，多种经营的v.使多样化，多样化( diversify的过去式和过去分词 )；进入新的商业领域 | |
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154
looms
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| n.织布机( loom的名词复数 )v.隐约出现，阴森地逼近( loom的第三人称单数 )；隐约出现，阴森地逼近 | |
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155
swelling
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| n.肿胀 | |
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156
puffed
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| adj.疏松的v.使喷出( puff的过去式和过去分词 )；喷着汽（或烟）移动；吹嘘；吹捧 | |
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157
fray
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| v.争吵；打斗；磨损，磨破；n.吵架；打斗 | |
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158
mustering
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| v.集合，召集，集结（尤指部队）( muster的现在分词 )；（自他人处）搜集某事物；聚集；激发 | |
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159
garrisoned
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| 卫戍部队守备( garrison的过去式和过去分词 )； 派部队驻防 | |
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160
ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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161
outlet
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| n.出口/路；销路；批发商店；通风口；发泄 | |
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162
exulting
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| vi. 欢欣鼓舞，狂喜 | |
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163
promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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164
obstinate
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| adj.顽固的，倔强的，不易屈服的，较难治愈的 | |
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165
uneven
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| adj.不平坦的，不规则的，不均匀的 | |
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166
temerity
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| n.鲁莽，冒失 | |
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167
tracts
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| 大片土地( tract的名词复数 )； 地带； （体内的）道； （尤指宣扬宗教、伦理或政治的）短文 | |
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168
vigour
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| （=vigor）n.智力，体力，精力 | |
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169
repels
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| v.击退( repel的第三人称单数 )；使厌恶；排斥；推开 | |
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170
apprehensions
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| 疑惧 | |
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171
ascending
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| adj.上升的，向上的 | |
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172
onsets
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| 攻击，袭击（onset的复数形式） | |
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173
surmised
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| v.臆测，推断( surmise的过去式和过去分词 )；揣测；猜想 | |
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174
delusion
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| n.谬见，欺骗，幻觉，迷惑 | |
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175
expounding
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| 论述，详细讲解( expound的现在分词 ) | |
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176
swarmed
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| 密集( swarm的过去式和过去分词 )； 云集； 成群地移动； 蜜蜂或其他飞行昆虫成群地飞来飞去 | |
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177
regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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178
regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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179
extravagant
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| adj.奢侈的；过分的；(言行等)放肆的 | |
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180
justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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181
plunged
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| v.颠簸( plunge的过去式和过去分词 )；暴跌；骤降；突降 | |
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182
plunge
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| v.跳入，(使)投入，(使)陷入；猛冲 | |
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183
repulse
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| n.击退，拒绝；vt.逐退，击退，拒绝 | |
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184
discretion
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| n.谨慎；随意处理 | |
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185
apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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186
obstructed
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| 阻塞( obstruct的过去式和过去分词 )； 堵塞； 阻碍； 阻止 | |
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187
skilfully
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| adv. (美skillfully)熟练地 | |
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188
echelon
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| n.梯队；组织系统中的等级；v.排成梯队 | |
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189
echelons
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| n.（机构中的）等级，阶层( echelon的名词复数 )；（军舰、士兵、飞机等的）梯形编队 | |
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190
victorious
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| adj.胜利的，得胜的 | |
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191
tumult
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| n.喧哗；激动，混乱；吵闹 | |
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192
interval
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| n.间隔，间距；幕间休息，中场休息 | |
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193
lull
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| v.使安静，使入睡，缓和，哄骗；n.暂停，间歇 | |
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194
deafening
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| adj. 振耳欲聋的, 极喧闹的 动词deafen的现在分词形式 | |
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195
vivacity
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| n.快活，活泼，精神充沛 | |
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196
resolute
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| adj.坚决的，果敢的 | |
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197
foes
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| 敌人，仇敌( foe的名词复数 ) | |
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198
shrouded
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| v.隐瞒( shroud的过去式和过去分词 )；保密 | |
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199
canopy
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| n.天篷，遮篷 | |
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200
hurled
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| v.猛投，用力掷( hurl的过去式和过去分词 )；大声叫骂 | |
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201
clamorous
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| adj.吵闹的，喧哗的 | |
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202
fugitives
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| n.亡命者，逃命者( fugitive的名词复数 ) | |
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203
commotion
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| n.骚动，动乱 | |
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204
trumpets
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| 喇叭( trumpet的名词复数 )； 小号； 喇叭形物； （尤指）绽开的水仙花 | |
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205
onward
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| adj.向前的，前进的；adv.向前，前进，在先 | |
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206
dense
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| a.密集的，稠密的，浓密的；密度大的 | |
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207
throng
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| n.人群，群众；v.拥挤，群集 | |
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208
twilight
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| n.暮光，黄昏；暮年，晚期，衰落时期 | |
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209
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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210
breach
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| n.违反，不履行；破裂；vt.冲破，攻破 | |
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211
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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212
extremity
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| n.末端，尽头；尽力；终极；极度 | |
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213
appreciation
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| n.评价；欣赏；感谢；领会，理解；价格上涨 | |
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214
annexed
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| [法] 附加的，附属的 | |
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215
ebb
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| vi.衰退，减退；n.处于低潮，处于衰退状态 | |
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216
affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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217
waning
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| adj.（月亮）渐亏的，逐渐减弱或变小的n.月亏v.衰落( wane的现在分词 )；（月）亏；变小；变暗淡 | |
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218
margin
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| n.页边空白；差额；余地，余裕；边，边缘 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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221
initiated
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| n. 创始人 adj. 新加入的 vt. 开始，创始，启蒙，介绍加入 | |
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222
steadfast
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| adj.固定的，不变的，不动摇的；忠实的；坚贞不移的 | |
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velocity
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| n.速度，速率 | |
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224
survivors
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| 幸存者，残存者，生还者( survivor的名词复数 ) | |
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225
toiling
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| 长时间或辛苦地工作( toil的现在分词 )； 艰难缓慢地移动，跋涉 | |
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226
streak
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| n.条理，斑纹，倾向，少许，痕迹；v.加条纹，变成条纹，奔驰，快速移动 | |
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persevered
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| v.坚忍，坚持( persevere的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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228
perils
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| 极大危险( peril的名词复数 )； 危险的事（或环境） | |
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229
obstinately
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| ad.固执地，顽固地 | |
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230
dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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moiety
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| n.一半；部分 | |
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232
watchful
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| adj.注意的，警惕的 | |
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gaping
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| adj.口的；张口的；敞口的；多洞穴的v.目瞪口呆地凝视( gape的现在分词 )；张开，张大 | |
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intervals
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| n.[军事]间隔( interval的名词复数 )；间隔时间；[数学]区间；（戏剧、电影或音乐会的）幕间休息 | |
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235
outskirts
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| n.郊外，郊区 | |
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236
redoubtable
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| adj.可敬的；可怕的 | |
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237
awe
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| n.敬畏，惊惧；vt.使敬畏，使惊惧 | |
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intrepid
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| adj.无畏的，刚毅的 | |
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239
tawny
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| adj.茶色的，黄褐色的；n.黄褐色 | |
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240
upwards
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| adv.向上，在更高处...以上 | |
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241
incessant
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| adj.不停的，连续的 | |
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242
intensity
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| n.强烈，剧烈；强度；烈度 | |
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243
murky
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| adj.黑暗的，朦胧的；adv.阴暗地，混浊地；n.阴暗；昏暗 | |
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244
concealing
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| v.隐藏，隐瞒，遮住( conceal的现在分词 ) | |
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appalling
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| adj.骇人听闻的，令人震惊的，可怕的 | |
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246
grandeur
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| n.伟大，崇高，宏伟，庄严，豪华 | |
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sublimity
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| 崇高，庄严，气质高尚 | |
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248
fortitude
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| n.坚忍不拔；刚毅 | |
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249
repulsive
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| adj.排斥的，使人反感的 | |
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250
astounded
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| v.使震惊(astound的过去式和过去分词)；愕然；愕；惊讶 | |
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defiles
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| v.玷污( defile的第三人称单数 )；污染；弄脏；纵列行进 | |
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retraced
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| v.折回( retrace的过去式和过去分词 )；回忆；回顾；追溯 | |
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frustrate
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| v.使失望；使沮丧；使厌烦 | |
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254
valiant
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| adj.勇敢的，英勇的；n.勇士，勇敢的人 | |
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succinct
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| adj.简明的，简洁的 | |
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256
vouchsafed
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| v.给予，赐予( vouchsafe的过去式和过去分词 )；允诺 | |
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gallant
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| adj.英勇的，豪侠的；(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
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smiting
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| v.猛打，重击，打击( smite的现在分词 ) | |
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scathing
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| adj.（言词、文章）严厉的，尖刻的；不留情的adv.严厉地，尖刻地v.伤害，损害（尤指使之枯萎）( scathe的现在分词) | |
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eddying
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| 涡流，涡流的形成 | |
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261
budged
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| v.（使）稍微移动( budge的过去式和过去分词 )；（使）改变主意，（使）让步 | |
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disorder
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| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
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263
huddled
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| 挤在一起（huddle的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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264
aggregate
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| adj.总计的，集合的；n.总数；v.合计；集合 | |
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inflicted
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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