The Battle of Noisseville.
His plan, succinctly15 described, was to break through the line of investment on the right bank of the Moselle by directing three Corps, the 3rd, 4th, and 6th, principally upon St. Barbe, and he hoped, if successful, to march them forward upon Kedange, while the Guard and the 2nd Corps followed the track by the river. He estimates the force which was available for battle at 100,000 men, but he probably had more; at any rate, the delays which had occurred on the 14th of August, and were in part repeated on the 31st, shows how arduous16 is the task of issuing with such masses from a fortified17 town and position astride of a river. The weather was not favourable18, for the continuous rain had soaked the ground, and at dawn a thick fog, which hung about for several hours, impeded19 the operations. The Germans had been more than usually on the alert since the abortive20 attempt on the 26th, and had thought it expedient21 to include Noisseville within the line of defence. The noise and preparations in Metz did not escape their notice, but the dense22 mist concealed23 much from their searching gaze. Yet they saw and heard enough, both on the eastern and western fronts of Metz, to warrant a belief [p 278] that a resolute24 onset25 was impending26. As the fog bank rolled away, the batteries and the massing of troops became visible, and General von Manteuffel transmitted the results of his careful observations to Von Steinmetz and Prince Frederick Charles, both of whom made instant arrangements to support the 1st Corps and the other troops on the right bank. The forenoon passed by, and, except some slight skirmishes and a brief artillery27 duel28, no action ensued. About midday the French sat down to cook, and the smoke from their fires rose in clouds, indicated their position, but hid them from view; at the same time, although the sun was shining, the culinary haze29 concealed the workmen engaged in throwing up shelter for the heavy guns drawn from the forts; and the German leaders arrived at the conclusion that the onslaught would be deferred30 until the next day; their soldiers also fell to cooking, and some fractions recrossed the Moselle to join their main body; but their attention to the phenomena31 before them was not relaxed.
Yet the afternoon began to wear away. It was not until half-past two that Marshal Bazaine gave that signal for attack which was nevertheless not obeyed until another hour and a half had been consumed. The signal was a salvo from the battery of heavy guns placed behind the field works hastily thrown up in front of Fort St. Julien. The battlefield of the 31st was one with which we were made acquainted when Von Golz took upon himself to arrest the retreat of the French over the Moselle on the 14th of August. It extended from Mercy les Metz by Colombey, Noisseville, and Failly to Malroy on the Moselle. The French assailants, therefore, had to cross the ravines east of Borny and work up both banks of the Vallières brook32 which, rising near St. Barbe, enters the Moselle opposite the Isle33 Chambière. The 6th Corps, Canrobert’s, was to attack by the river road towards Malroy; De Ladmirault, with the 4th, was to move [p 279] by Failly and Vrémy to outflank St. Barbe on its right, while the left of that position was to be carried by Leb?uf’s 3rd Corps; and Frossard, with the 2nd, was to follow and cover the right flank of Leb?uf. The Guard, the cavalry34, and reserve artillery were to stand between Fort St. Julien and the Bois de Grimont, and all the baggage was to be ready in the Isle Chambière. The Germans were prepared to meet such an attack, but, as we have said, they had come to believe that it would be deferred.
Suddenly, about four o’clock, the dead silence was broken by a salvo from the heavy guns, followed by the fire of De Ladmirault’s batteries. Then the action began along the whole front, the Germans at once developing a powerful line of fifty guns about Servigny and Poix, far in advance of the main line of defence, and bringing other pieces to bear from different points. Nevertheless, favoured by the broken ground and resolute to win, the French infantry35 persistently36 advanced until about six o’clock they had driven in all the foreposts, and had gained possession on their right of Noisseville, the garrison37 of which village they curiously38 complain held out longer than they were entitled to do. The capture of Noisseville facilitated the principal attacks which were directed upon Servigny and Poix, villages which served as redoubts guarding the avenues to St. Barbe, the culminating point in the region. At the same time the French right had pushed well forward towards Retonfay, the object being to protect the flank of the 3rd Corps, now in motion upon the central posts of the German line. Here the contest was severe, and in the end the great line of guns which had held De Ladmirault at bay so long, unable to bear the musketry fire in front and flank, was compelled to withdraw behind the villages. But, although the French infantry came up boldly on both flanks, as well as in front, they were unable to overcome the sturdy [p 280] defenders39, in whose possession the villages remained at dark. The French left under Canrobert had made repeated attacks upon Failly, which met with no success, and he halted at Chieulles and Vany: so that the movement near the Meuse had secured but little ground. At dark the French had not done more than occupy a line extending from Canrobert’s right in front of Villers l’Orme to Noisseville, and thence by Flanville to Chateau40 d’Aubigny. By this time General von Manteuffel had been reinforced by two brigades of Landwehr, and the 25th Division, under Prince Louis of Hesse, which had crossed the Moselle, and considerably41 strengthened his right wing. Then occurred a remarkable42 incident. General Aymard, about nine o’clock, creeping silently up to Servigny, flung forward his division, and, without firing a shot, burst in upon the surprised Germans, engaged in preparing the defences, and carried the place. Astonished and enraged43, General von Gayl immediately gathered up a force, and breaking, in his turn, upon the enemy, drove him out and recovered possession before ten o’clock. Aymard’s is an example of a night attack well performed; but the weak defence of what had been skilfully44 won, was not so creditable to the French.
During the night General Manstein, with the other half of the 9th Corps, crossed the Moselle, halted in rear of the German right wing, and thus enabled the Hessian Division to take post behind St. Barbe. A dense fog again filled the valley at dawn, but at an early hour General von Manteuffel, holding his ground in the centre and on the right, brought his batteries to bear upon Noisseville and promptly45 assumed the offensive. The place was strongly occupied and stoutly46 defended. Although the Germans broke in for a moment they were speedily expelled, and several hours elapsed before the village fell into their [p 281] hands. But throughout the day, except towards Rupigny and Failly, the French stood on the defensive47. For the Germans arrayed 114 guns on the hills, crushed the adverse artillery, and prevented the French infantry from making any combined attack. The position on their right was soon rendered less safe by the arrival of a brigade of the 7th Corps which, coming up from Laquenexy, drove the French out of Flanville. This demonstration48 on the right of Marshal Leb?uf’s line, together with the terrible fire of the German artillery, induced him, about eleven o’clock, to draw back the whole of his troops and allow his adversary49 once more to occupy Noisseville. On the French left, Marshal Canrobert’s soldiers had been forced back upon Chieulles, and the attacks upon Failly had wholly failed. Prince Frederick Charles who, at Malancourt, had heard the opening cannonade at Sedan on the morning of the 1st, took up his post of observation on a hill towards the Moselle before eight o’clock, and provided for the arrival of strong reinforcements, should they be needed, from the left bank, but only the 10th Corps passed the Moselle and was stationed between Argancy and Antilly. The retreat of Marshal Leb?uf had been followed by that of the other corps, and a little after noon the French Army was marching back to the camps and bivouacs whence it had advanced on the 31st. The great sortie had signally failed in opening a road through the investing lines. The French had 3,547 officers and men killed and wounded, including in the latter category four Generals, one of whom, Manèque, mortally. The German loss was 2,976 killed and wounded. Marshal Bazaine estimates the number he put in the field at 100,000; the German authorities say they began the fight with 40,800 men and 138 guns; and at the end of the encounter had over the Moselle 73,800 men and 290 guns.
Marshal Bazaine and his troops re-entered their prison [p 282] on the afternoon of the day when the white flag was hoisted50 on the Citadel51 of Sedan; and with his and their subsequent misfortunes we have nothing more to do in this work. Neither is it our business to consider whether by marching up instead of down the right bank he could have escaped with some portion of his Army safe and sound to the South of France. That he did his uttermost to push through on the 31st is the contention52 of the German staff, but it is doubtful whether on the second day the same spirit prevailed. All the knotty53 questions suggested by the military situation about Metz and elsewhere at the end of August could only be adequately discussed by entering upon a history of transactions with which we have no present concern. The essential fact is that the French Marshals tried to break the barrier and failed at a moment when even their success could not have prevented the capitulation at Sedan. The attempt demonstrated the immense advantages of a carefully prepared defensive position combined with a readiness to use artillery in the front line from the first, and an equal readiness to become the assailant whenever a useful opportunity occurred. But to the mind of this writer the moral of the Metz episode in the great war is the danger attending these large intrenched camps, which will certainly exert in the future, as they have in the past, an irresistible54 attraction upon inferior commanders, and will task the intellect, and the ingenuity55 and the firmness of the greatest to put them to a proper use. Neither Bazaine nor any colleague in superior command could be described as a man of genius, and to such soldiers, while war is conducted on a vast scale and armies in the field are numbered by the hundred thousand, places like Metz will not cease to become traps in which frustrated56 or beaten armies will be caught and captured, sometimes, it may be, by force or stratagem57; usually by stress of famine. [p 283] Meantime the issue of the war will be decided58, as it always has been, by the belligerent59 who is able to keep the field.
Although huge Armies had penetrated60 so swiftly into France on the morrow of the frontier victories, there were still, besides the fortress61 of Metz, which was in an exceptional case, several other strongholds which stood out defiant62 upon the main lines of the German communications. They were Verdun, Toul, Bitsche, Phalsburg, Strasburg, and, at a later stage, Belfort. Each of these, except the last-named, required to be, and were, watched or invested by troops drawn from the active Armies or the reserves in Germany; but they had little or no influence upon the colossal63 events which decided the issue of what we have called the Campaign of Sedan. Strasburg alone was a cause of any anxiety, because the Germans were eager to obtain possession of a fortress the fall of which would give them undisputed command of the Rhine, and become of great value in the event of unlooked-for and improbable reverses. General von Werder, with the Baden Division, after the battle of Woerth, had been sent to invest the town, and he arrived before it on the 11th. It is not intended to relate in these pages the siege of Strasburg, which properly belongs to the story of the Franco-German war as a whole. The point to note is that the regular siege was preceded by a useless bombardment. The engineer desired to proceed in the orthodox way; the chief of the staff wished to try the more violent method. He insisted that a bombardment would terrify the inhabitants, and make them exert such a pressure on the Governor, General Uhrich, a gallant64 veteran, as would compel him to surrender. The dispute was determined65 by an appeal to the Great Head-quarters, then at Pont à Mousson, and General von Moltke, who desired that the place should be taken in the shortest possible time, and that the 40,000 [p 284] men before it might be available for other operations, decided in favour of the bombardment. The consequence was that dreadful sufferings were inflicted66 upon the inhabitants of Strasburg, and terrible devastation67 brought upon the town, but that the cruelty did not attain68 the end in view; and that the wise engineer was permitted to apply his method at a moment when, had his advice been adopted, the besieging69 Army would have been near the success which was ultimately attained70. The bombardment of Strasburg was not only an error regarded from a military point of view, it was a great political blunder; for who can doubt that the agonies endured in the last days of August, 1870, and the resentment71 created by the awful destruction of life and property, have materially helped to render inveterate72 that hostility73 to German rule which even now reigns74 in Strasburg as strong as ever. Strasburg would have been captured, probably at an earlier date, had there been no bombardment, humanity would have been spared a heartrending spectacle, and Germany would have profited by showing some deference75 towards the feelings and some regard for the lives of the people whose town it was intended to restore to the Reich, and over whom she had determined to rule. It was only on the 26th, when the King had just turned northward76 from the Ornain to hunt after MacMahon, that Von Werder, finding Uhrich resolute, decided to proceed by way of a regular siege. After the end of the month the fortress ceased to be, in any sense, a danger to the German Armies, which, whether closed around Metz or marching westward77 through France, could afford to await, with calmness, the certain surrender of Strasburg, an end which might have been attained just as quickly had the wisdom of King William’s statesmen been called in to sustain the sound judgment of General Schulz, the accomplished78 Engineer.
点击
收听单词发音
收听单词发音 |
1
corps
|
|
| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
2
huddled
|
|
| 挤在一起（huddle的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
3
judgment
|
|
| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
4
importunate
|
|
| adj.强求的；纠缠不休的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
5
entreaties
|
|
| n.恳求，乞求( entreaty的名词复数 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
6
torrents
|
|
| n.倾注；奔流( torrent的名词复数 )；急流；爆发；连续不断 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
7
consultation
|
|
| n.咨询；商量；商议；会议 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
8
adverse
|
|
| adj.不利的；有害的；敌对的，不友好的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
9
despatch
|
|
| n./v.(dispatch)派遣；发送；n.急件；新闻报道 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
10
authenticity
|
|
| n.真实性 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
11
drawn
|
|
| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
12
apparently
|
|
| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
13
cipher
|
|
| n.零；无影响力的人；密码 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
14
confirmation
|
|
| n.证实，确认，批准 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
15
succinctly
|
|
| adv.简洁地；简洁地，简便地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
16
arduous
|
|
| adj.艰苦的，费力的，陡峭的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
17
fortified
|
|
| adj. 加强的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
18
favourable
|
|
| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
19
impeded
|
|
| 阻碍，妨碍，阻止( impede的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
20
abortive
|
|
| adj.不成功的，发育不全的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
21
expedient
|
|
| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
22
dense
|
|
| a.密集的，稠密的，浓密的；密度大的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
23
concealed
|
|
| a.隐藏的，隐蔽的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
24
resolute
|
|
| adj.坚决的，果敢的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
25
onset
|
|
| n.进攻，袭击，开始，突然开始 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
26
impending
|
|
| a.imminent, about to come or happen | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
27
artillery
|
|
| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
28
duel
|
|
| n./v.决斗；(双方的)斗争 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
29
haze
|
|
| n.霾，烟雾；懵懂，迷糊；vi.(over)变模糊 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
30
deferred
|
|
| adj.延期的，缓召的v.拖延，延缓，推迟( defer的过去式和过去分词 )；服从某人的意愿，遵从 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
31
phenomena
|
|
| n.现象 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
32
brook
|
|
| n.小河，溪；v.忍受，容让 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
33
isle
|
|
| n.小岛，岛 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
34
cavalry
|
|
| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
35
infantry
|
|
| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
36
persistently
|
|
| ad.坚持地；固执地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
37
garrison
|
|
| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
38
curiously
|
|
| adv.有求知欲地；好问地；奇特地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
39
defenders
|
|
| n.防御者( defender的名词复数 )；守卫者；保护者；辩护者 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
40
chateau
|
|
| n.城堡，别墅 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
41
considerably
|
|
| adv.极大地；相当大地；在很大程度上 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
42
remarkable
|
|
| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
43
enraged
|
|
| 使暴怒( enrage的过去式和过去分词 )； 歜； 激愤 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
44
skilfully
|
|
| adv. (美skillfully)熟练地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
45
promptly
|
|
| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
46
stoutly
|
|
| adv.牢固地，粗壮的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
47
defensive
|
|
| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
48
demonstration
|
|
| n.表明，示范，论证，示威 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
49
adversary
|
|
| adj.敌手，对手 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
50
hoisted
|
|
| 把…吊起，升起( hoist的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
51
citadel
|
|
| n.城堡；堡垒；避难所 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
52
contention
|
|
| n.争论，争辩，论战；论点，主张 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
53
knotty
|
|
| adj.有结的，多节的，多瘤的，棘手的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
54
irresistible
|
|
| adj.非常诱人的，无法拒绝的，无法抗拒的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
55
ingenuity
|
|
| n.别出心裁；善于发明创造 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
56
frustrated
|
|
| adj.挫败的，失意的，泄气的v.使不成功( frustrate的过去式和过去分词 )；挫败；使受挫折；令人沮丧 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
57
stratagem
|
|
| n.诡计，计谋 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
58
decided
|
|
| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
59
belligerent
|
|
| adj.好战的，挑起战争的；n.交战国，交战者 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
60
penetrated
|
|
| adj. 击穿的，鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
61
fortress
|
|
| n.堡垒，防御工事 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
62
defiant
|
|
| adj.无礼的，挑战的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
63
colossal
|
|
| adj.异常的，庞大的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
64
gallant
|
|
| adj.英勇的，豪侠的；(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
65
determined
|
|
| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
66
inflicted
|
|
| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
67
devastation
|
|
| n.毁坏；荒废；极度震惊或悲伤 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
68
attain
|
|
| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
69
besieging
|
|
| 包围，围困，围攻( besiege的现在分词 ) | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
70
attained
|
|
| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
71
resentment
|
|
| n.怨愤，忿恨 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
72
inveterate
|
|
| adj.积习已深的，根深蒂固的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
73
hostility
|
|
| n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
74
reigns
|
|
| n.君主的统治( reign的名词复数 )；君主统治时期；任期；当政期 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
75
deference
|
|
| n.尊重，顺从；敬意 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
76
northward
|
|
| adv.向北；n.北方的地区 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
77
westward
|
|
| n.西方，西部；adj.西方的，向西的；adv.向西 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
|
78
accomplished
|
|
| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
参考例句： |
|
|
|
| 欢迎访问英文小说网 |