These remarks must not be taken, in any way, as underrating the value of the work of our infantry2, who, as always, bore the brunt of the fighting, while denied much of the interest and excitement of the long pursuits that fell to the lot of the cavalry. In both the main series of operations, the infantry prepared the way for the cavalry, and enabled them to complete the victory won, in the first instance, by the bayonets.
General Allenby's campaign divides itself naturally into three phases. First, the Beersheba-Gaza battle and the subsequent pursuit over the Philistine3 Plain, culminating in the capture of Jerusalem; secondly4, the operations in the Jordan Valley, and east of the river Jordan; and thirdly, the final series, resulting in the destruction of the Turkish Armies, and the[Pg xiii] capture of Damascus, Aleppo, etc., followed by the capitulation of the Turkish Empire.
Though the Turks at their best are not to be compared in fighting value with the troops of the first-class fighting nations of Europe, such as the British, French, and Germans, they generally fought well against our infantry, attacking with vigour5, and defending their entrenched6 positions most stubbornly. They were well supplied with all the appurtenances of modern warfare7, and, in the first part of the campaign, were generally well led.
At the commencement of the operations, the Turkish soldiers were of good morale8 on the whole, their physique was excellent, and their health satisfactory. There was a large proportion of seasoned soldiers among them, many with the Gallipoli medal. In the latter part of the campaign, however, their morale had deteriorated9 considerably10, their physique was greatly undermined by disease, and there were few old soldiers left, nearly all having been killed or captured, or died of disease. Many units were full of untrained troops, ill-disciplined and demoralised. After the first day's fighting, there was little resistance by the enemy, except when stiffened11 by a large proportion of German troops, as at Semakh and Jisr Benat Yakub.
There were doubtless many causes for this deterioration12 of morale among the Turkish troops, but, unquestionably, one of the chief was the constant friction13 that existed between Turkish and German officers, which spread downwards14 to the ranks of both nations. The hectoring stupidity of the Prussian was nowhere better exemplified than in his treatment of his Turkish Allies. German officers openly and constantly expressed their contempt for the Turks, whom they compared to niggers, and numerous[Pg xiv] instances came to our knowledge of German N.C.O.'s and privates beating and kicking Turkish officers.
The three things which the Turks feared most were a threat to their communications, a charge of cavalry, and a heavy aerial attack. As regards the first, there was, I believe, no instance in the campaign when they fought on to the end after being surrounded, though, on several occasions, Turkish units continued to attack till annihilated15.
The losses of the Turks were much heavier than ours in every action of the campaign, even when they were successful, or partially16 so, as in the two trans-Jordan raids.[1] This fact was largely due to their bad rifle shooting. While our troops were good enough shots to pick off Turkish soldiers showing their heads above rocks and trenches17, the Turks, as a rule, could only hit our men when standing18 up during an advance. When the enemy made his great effort to retake Jerusalem, on the 26th of December 1917, the number of dead Turks found on the position after the battle was greater than our total casualties.
As a set-off to their bad rifle shooting, the enemy troops were supplied with a far larger proportion of machine guns than we were. Their machine-gun companies, which were largely staffed by Germans, were generally effective, and caused us the major part of our casualties during the war.
Their field artillery19 work in general was slow and inaccurate20, but the heavy artillery, manned by Germans or Austrians, was almost invariably good.
The above remarks as to morale should be borne in mind in estimating the tactics of General Allenby.
[Pg xv]
It will be noticed that he took greater risks in the latter part of the campaign than he had done at the beginning. These risks were fully21 justified22 by the very complete knowledge of the reduced state of the enemy's morale which had been acquired by our Intelligence Staff.
In spite of the indifferent morale of the enemy troops, the campaign is of great value to the student of cavalry tactics, being, as it is, the only instance in modern war of cavalry operating on a large scale. It demonstrated once more the soundness of the principles laid down in our training manuals, which appear to be immutable23, in spite of aircraft and other devilish inventions of present day warfare.
The value of aeroplanes and armoured cars acting24 in conjunction with cavalry was very clearly brought out, notably25 in the final series of operations.
My thanks are due to Lieutenant-Colonel R.H. Osborne, D.S.O., M.C., 20th Hussars, cavalry instructor26 at the Staff College Camberley, for very kindly27 reading the manuscript, and for many valuable suggestions and corrections. Also to Major A.F. Becke, R.A., in charge of the Historical Section, W.D., for much help in studying war diaries and maps.
My thanks are also due to the many officers, too numerous to mention individually, who have very kindly lent me their private diaries, or given me information about obscure points. I have taken every care to make the narrative28 as accurate as possible, but, if any who read it notice inaccuracies, I shall be very grateful if they will point them out to me. I have also to thank those who have allowed me to use photographs taken by them as illustrations. A number of the photographs taken on the enemy side were obtained from Mr. C. Raad, photo[Pg xvi]grapher, of Jerusalem, who had secured the original negatives, and by whose permission they are reproduced in the book.
Lastly, I desire to thank Lieutenant-General Sir H.G. Chauvel, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., Commander of the Desert Mounted Corps29 throughout the campaign, for his help and encouragement, and for having very kindly written the preface to the book.
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1
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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philistine
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| n.庸俗的人；adj.市侩的，庸俗的 | |
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secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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vigour
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| （=vigor）n.智力，体力，精力 | |
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entrenched
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| adj.确立的，不容易改的(风俗习惯) | |
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warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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morale
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| n.道德准则，士气，斗志 | |
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deteriorated
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| 恶化，变坏( deteriorate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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considerably
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| adv.极大地；相当大地；在很大程度上 | |
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stiffened
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| 加强的 | |
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deterioration
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| n.退化；恶化；变坏 | |
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friction
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| n.摩擦，摩擦力 | |
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downwards
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| adj./adv.向下的（地），下行的（地） | |
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annihilated
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| v.（彻底）消灭( annihilate的过去式和过去分词 )；使无效；废止；彻底击溃 | |
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partially
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| adv.部分地，从某些方面讲 | |
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trenches
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| 深沟，地沟( trench的名词复数 )； 战壕 | |
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standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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inaccurate
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| adj.错误的，不正确的，不准确的 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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immutable
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| adj.不可改变的，永恒的 | |
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acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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notably
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| adv.值得注意地，显著地，尤其地，特别地 | |
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instructor
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| n.指导者，教员，教练 | |
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kindly
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| adj.和蔼的，温和的，爽快的；adv.温和地，亲切地 | |
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narrative
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| n.叙述，故事；adj.叙事的，故事体的 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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