The fall of Baghdad in March 1917 somewhat dashed these high hopes, it is true. But the Germans, to whom the city was, at the moment, of no more importance than any other dirty Eastern village, had little difficulty in persuading the Turks that its loss was a mere6 incident in the world war, which would be more than made good in the final, and glorious, peace terms. Nevertheless, the Turks insisted on making an effort to recapture the place, and for this purpose a special, picked force, known as the Yilderim,[Pg 2] or Lightning, Army Group, was in process of formation in northern Syria at this time. The command of this group had been entrusted7 to the redoubtable8 von Falkenhayn, who was at Aleppo, directing the training and organisation9 of the troops.
Comforted by highly coloured accounts of the efficiency and fighting value of this force, the Turks rapidly recovered from the effects of the loss of Baghdad. Bombastic10 articles, inspired by Potsdam, began to make their appearance in the Turkish press, chronicling the doings of the 'Lightning' armies. They were to recapture Baghdad, drive the British into the Persian Gulf11, and then march to the 'relief' of India. Afterwards the presumptuous12 little force that had dared to oppose the Turks' advance into their own province of Egypt would be dealt with in a suitable manner; Egypt would be delivered; and the Suez Canal, 'the jugular13 vein14 of the British Empire,' would be severed15.
Aided by such writings, and supported by German money, Pan-Islamic emissaries were busily engaged in every Moslem or partly Moslem country, stirring up the Faithful to sedition16 and revolt. India, Afghanistan, Persia, and Egypt were all in a state of suppressed excitement and unrest, and it is probable that one more British reverse in the East would have been sufficient to set all these countries in a blaze. The least imaginative can form some idea of the tremendous consequences that such an upheaval17 would have had upon the war in general. Yet the newspapers of that time show clearly that there was a considerable, and vociferous18, body of public opinion, both in England and in France, that regarded the Syrian and Mesopotamian campaigns as useless and extravagant19 'side-shows,' and clamoured insistently20 for the recall of the troops engaged in them.
[Pg 3]
Thus, both for the purpose of re-establishing our waning21 prestige in the East, and of silencing the mischievous22 agitation23 at home, it was imperative24 that a signal defeat should be inflicted25 on the Turks as soon as possible. The capture of Jerusalem, which city ranks only after Mecca and Stamboul among the holy places of Islam, would set a fitting seal upon such a defeat, and would be certain to create a profound impression upon Moslems the world over.
Jerusalem, therefore, became the political objective of the new British Commander-in-Chief. The strategical objective will be discussed later.
The situation in Palestine in the summer of 1917 was not, however, at first sight, very encouraging. Our two abortive26 attempts on Gaza had shown the German commanders the weak points in the Turkish defences, and they had set to work, with characteristic energy and thoroughness, to strengthen them. 'Gaza itself had been made into a strong, modern fortress27, heavily entrenched28 and wired, and offering every facility for protracted30 defence. The remainder of the enemy's line consisted of a series of strong localities, viz.: the Sihan group of works, the Atawineh group, the Abu el Hareira-Abu el Teaha trench29 system (near Sharia), and, finally, the works covering Beersheba. These groups of works were generally from 1500 to 2000 yards apart, except that the distance from the Hareira group to Beersheba was about four and a half miles.... By the end of October these strong localities had been joined up so as to form a practically continuous line from the sea to a point south of Sharia. The defensive31 works round Beersheba remained a detached system, but had been improved and extended.'[Pg 4][2]
The Turkish forces were thus on a wide front, the distance from Gaza to Beersheba being about thirty miles, but a well-graded, metalled road, which they had made just behind their line, connecting these two places, afforded good lateral32 communication, and any threatened point of their front could be very quickly reinforced.
From July onwards continual reinforcements of men, guns, and stores had arrived on the enemy's front, and he had formed several large supply and ammunition33 depots34 at different places behind his lines. He had also laid two lines of railway from the so-called Junction35 Station on the Jerusalem-Jaffa line, one to Deir Sineid, just north of Gaza, and the other to Beersheba, and beyond it to the village of El Auja,[3] on the Turko-Egyptian frontier, some twenty-five miles south-west of Beersheba. It was evident that the Turks intended to hold on to the Gaza-Beersheba line at all costs, in order to cover the concentration and despatch36 of the Yilderim Force to Mesopotamia.
This Junction Station was to be the strategical objective of our operations. From the junction a railway ran northwards, through Tul Keram, Messudieh, Jenin and Afule, to Deraa on the Hedjaz Railway, whence the latter line continued to Damascus, Aleppo, and the Baghdad Railway. With the junction in our hands, any enemy force in the Jud?an hills, protecting Jerusalem, would be cut off from all railway communication to the north, and would be compelled to rely for its supplies on the difficult mountain road between Messudieh and Jerusalem, or on the longer and still more difficult road from[Pg 5] Amman station on the Hedjaz Railway, thirty miles east of the Jordan, via Jericho to Jerusalem.
Our own position extended from the sea at Gaza to a point on the Wadi Ghuzze near El Gamli, some fourteen miles south-west of Sharia and eighteen miles west of Beersheba. The opposing lines thus formed a rough 'V,' with its apex37 at Gaza, where the lines were, in some places, only a couple of hundred yards apart. From here they diverged38 to El Gamli, which was about nine miles from the nearest part of the Turkish positions. The intervening space was watched by our cavalry39.
The right flank of our line being thus 'in the air' out in the desert, it was a comparatively easy matter for enemy spies, disguised as peaceful natives, to pass round it under cover of darkness, and approach our positions from the rear in daylight. Native hawkers, other than those with passes from the Intelligence Staff, were forbidden to approach our lines, but it was impossible to control all the natives in such a scattered40 area, and much can be seen, with the aid of a pair of field-glasses, from the top of a hill a mile away. There were also at least two very daring Germans, who several times penetrated41 our lines disguised as British officers. They were both exceedingly bold and resourceful men, and it is probable that they obtained a good deal of useful information, before they met the almost inevitable42 fate of spies.
Before the end of our time of preparation, however, methods were evolved to deal with this nuisance, and the enemy was kept in ignorance of our movements and intentions with that success which always attended the efforts of General Allenby in this direction. An enemy staff document, subsequently captured by us, and dated just prior to the commencement of the operations, stated that: 'An[Pg 6] outflanking attack on Beersheba with about one infantry43 and one cavalry division is indicated, but the main attack, as before, must be expected on the Gaza front.' How far wrong was this appreciation44 of the situation will be apparent later on. The same document also stated that we had six infantry divisions in the Gaza sector45, whereas at the time there were only three.
The Royal Air Force was an important factor in denying information to the enemy during the latter part of our time of preparation. One of the first things the Commander-in-Chief had done on his arrival at the front, was to re-equip the force completely. Hitherto the German Flying Corps46 had done what it liked in the air over our lines. For several months on end our troops had been bombed, almost with impunity47, every day. Our own pilots, starved alike of aeroplanes and of materials for repairs, gingerly man?uvring their antiquated48 and rickety machines, fought gallantly49 but hopelessly against the fast Taubes and Fokkers of the German airmen, and day by day the pitiful list of casualties that might have been so easily avoided grew longer.
In four months all this had changed. Our pilots, equipped with new, up-to-date and fast machines, met the Germans on level terms, and quickly began to obtain supremacy50 in the air. By the end of October this supremacy was definitely established, and the few enemy pilots who crossed our lines at that time flew warily51, ever on the look-out for one of our fighting machines.
The country occupied by the opposing armies varied52 considerably53 in character. The district near the coast consisted of a series of high dunes54 of loose, shifting sand, impassable for wheeled traffic. Farther east the ground became harder, but it was still sandy[Pg 7] and heavy going for transport. Eastwards55 again, towards Beersheba, the country changed to a wilderness56 of bare, rocky hills, intersected by innumerable wadis (dry river beds). These wadis were, for the most part, enclosed between limestone57 cliffs, sometimes 100 feet or more in height, and impassable except where the few native tracks crossed them. The whole of this part of the country was waterless, except for three very deep wells at Khalasa and one at Asluj (all of which had been destroyed by the Turks), and some fairly good pools in the Wadi Ghuzze at Esani and Shellal. In Beersheba itself there were seven good wells.
Northwards of the enemy's positions, between the Jud?an mountains and the sea, stretched the great plain of Philistia, a strip of rolling down-land fifteen to twenty miles wide, admirably suited for the employment of mounted troops.
The appointment of General Allenby, himself a cavalryman58, to the command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, presaged59 the employment of cavalry on a much larger scale than had hitherto been attempted. From his first study of the problem before him, the new Commander-in-Chief realised the predominant part that cavalry would play in the operations, and devoted60 himself, with his customary energy, to organising a force suitable for the work in prospect61.
For the advance across the Sinai Desert from the Suez Canal, a special force had been organised, under the command of Sir Philip Chetwode. This force, which was known as the Desert Column, consisted of the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division (which then included the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigades and the New Zealand Mounted Brigade), the 5th Mounted Brigade (Yeomanry), and the 42nd and 52nd Infantry Divisions.
[Pg 8]
The 2nd Mounted (Yeomanry) Division, which had arrived in Egypt in April 1915, had been sent to Gallipoli dismounted. After the evacuation of the peninsula, part of this division had been remounted. The 5th Mounted Brigade had taken part in the advance across Sinai, and other units of the division had been employed in the campaign against the Senussi, and in the Fayoum and other parts of Egypt. Most of these scattered units had been collected prior to the first battle of Gaza, and organised into two divisions of four brigades each, including a new brigade of Australian Light Horse (the 4th) which had been formed, partly out of Light Horsemen who had returned from Gallipoli, and partly out of reinforcements from Australia. General Allen by now remounted the remainder of the Yeomanry in Egypt, and formed out of them two new brigades. The ten brigades thus available were organised as a corps of three divisions: the Australian and New Zealand (1st and 2nd A.L.H. Brigades and the New Zealand Brigade), generally known as the Anzac Mounted Division; the Australian Mounted Division (3rd and 4th A.L.H. and 5th Mounted Brigades); and the Yeomanry Division (6th, 8th, and 22nd Mounted Brigades). The corps reserve consisted of the 7th Mounted Brigade, and the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade, while the (Indian) Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade[4] formed part of the Army troops. Only the Yeomanry Division and the 7th Mounted and Imperial Service Cavalry Brigades were at this time armed with swords.
It was originally intended to call this force the 2nd Cavalry Corps, but General Chauvel, who was appointed to command it, asked that the name of the Desert Column might be perpetuated62 in that[Pg 9] of the new force. It was accordingly named the Desert Mounted Corps.[5]
The infantry of the Expeditionary Force, largely augmented63 by troops in Egypt, was formed into two corps of three divisions each, the 20th under Sir Philip Chetwode, and the 21st commanded by Lieutenant-General Bulfin, with one other infantry division. The 20th Corps (10th, 53rd, and 74th Divisions, with the 60th Division attached) was in the eastern sector of our line, while the 21st Corps (53rd, 54th, and 75th Divisions) held the trenches64 opposite Gaza.[6]
The Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade was attached to the 21st Corps during the operations. This brigade had not yet seen any serious service, and its fighting qualities were rather an unknown factor. Later on in the campaign, however, all three regiments65 distinguished66 themselves greatly, and established a fine reputation for dash.
Our total forces numbered some 76,000 fighting men, of whom about 20,000 were mounted, with 550 guns. The enemy troops opposed to us consisted of nine Turkish divisions, organised in two armies, the VIIth and VIIIth, and one cavalry division, a total of about 49,000 fighting men, 3000 of whom were mounted, with 360 guns.[7] Our superiority in numbers, though considerable, thus fell short of the Napoleonic minimum for the attack of entrenched positions, but our large preponderance of cavalry promised great results, if we could succeed in driving the Turks out of their fortifications.
FOOTNOTES:
[2] General Allenby's despatch, dated 16th December 1917.
[3] The portion of the line between Beersheba and El Auja was raided by our cavalry in May 1917, and about thirty miles of the track destroyed, in order to prevent any attempted raid on our communications via the latter place.
[4] Raised and equipped by some of the ruling princes of India.
[5] See Appendix I. a.
[6] See Appendix I. b.
[7] The VIIth Army was commanded by the German General Kress von Kressenstein, and the VIIIth by Fevzi Pasha. The general staff of all the enemy formations was in the hands of the Germans. All ranks of the flying corps, heavy artillery67 and motor transport corps, and the officers of the engineer and supply services and of the railway administration were also Germans. There were a few German and Austrian infantry battalions68.
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ebb
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| vi.衰退，减退；n.处于低潮，处于衰退状态 | |
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invincibility
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| n.无敌，绝对不败 | |
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Moslem
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| n.回教徒，穆罕默德信徒；adj.回教徒的，回教的 | |
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bards
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| n.诗人( bard的名词复数 ) | |
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followers
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| 追随者( follower的名词复数 )； 用户； 契据的附面； 从动件 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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entrusted
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| v.委托，托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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8
redoubtable
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| adj.可敬的；可怕的 | |
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organisation
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| n.组织，安排，团体，有机休 | |
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bombastic
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| adj.夸夸其谈的，言过其实的 | |
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gulf
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| n.海湾；深渊，鸿沟；分歧，隔阂 | |
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presumptuous
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| adj.胆大妄为的，放肆的，冒昧的，冒失的 | |
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jugular
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| n.颈静脉 | |
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vein
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| n.血管，静脉；叶脉，纹理；情绪；vt.使成脉络 | |
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15
severed
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| v.切断，断绝( sever的过去式和过去分词 )；断，裂 | |
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sedition
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| n.煽动叛乱 | |
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upheaval
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| n.胀起，(地壳)的隆起；剧变，动乱 | |
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vociferous
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| adj.喧哗的，大叫大嚷的 | |
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19
extravagant
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| adj.奢侈的；过分的；(言行等)放肆的 | |
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insistently
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| ad.坚持地 | |
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21
waning
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| adj.（月亮）渐亏的，逐渐减弱或变小的n.月亏v.衰落( wane的现在分词 )；（月）亏；变小；变暗淡 | |
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22
mischievous
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| adj.调皮的，恶作剧的，有害的，伤人的 | |
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agitation
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| n.搅动；搅拌；鼓动，煽动 | |
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imperative
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| n.命令，需要；规则；祈使语气；adj.强制的；紧急的 | |
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inflicted
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| 把…强加给，使承受，遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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abortive
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| adj.不成功的，发育不全的 | |
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fortress
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| n.堡垒，防御工事 | |
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entrenched
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| adj.确立的，不容易改的(风俗习惯) | |
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trench
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| n./v.(挖)沟，(挖)战壕 | |
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protracted
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| adj.拖延的；延长的v.拖延“protract”的过去式和过去分词 | |
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defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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lateral
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| adj.侧面的，旁边的 | |
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ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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depots
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| 仓库( depot的名词复数 )； 火车站； 车库； 军需库 | |
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junction
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| n.连接，接合；交叉点，接合处，枢纽站 | |
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despatch
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| n./v.(dispatch)派遣；发送；n.急件；新闻报道 | |
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apex
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| n.顶点，最高点 | |
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diverged
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| 分开( diverge的过去式和过去分词 )； 偏离； 分歧； 分道扬镳 | |
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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penetrated
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| adj. 击穿的，鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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42
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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appreciation
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| n.评价；欣赏；感谢；领会，理解；价格上涨 | |
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sector
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| n.部门，部分；防御地段，防区；扇形 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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47
impunity
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| n.(惩罚、损失、伤害等的)免除 | |
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48
antiquated
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| adj.陈旧的，过时的 | |
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gallantly
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| adv. 漂亮地，勇敢地，献殷勤地 | |
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50
supremacy
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| n.至上；至高权力 | |
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51
warily
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| adv.留心地 | |
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52
varied
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| adj.多样的，多变化的 | |
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53
considerably
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| adv.极大地；相当大地；在很大程度上 | |
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54
dunes
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| 沙丘( dune的名词复数 ) | |
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55
eastwards
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| adj.向东方（的），朝东（的）；n.向东的方向 | |
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56
wilderness
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| n.杳无人烟的一片陆地、水等，荒漠 | |
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57
limestone
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| n.石灰石 | |
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58
cavalryman
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| 骑兵 | |
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59
presaged
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| v.预示，预兆( presage的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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60
devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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61
prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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62
perpetuated
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| vt.使永存（perpetuate的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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Augmented
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| adj.增音的 动词augment的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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64
trenches
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| 深沟，地沟( trench的名词复数 )； 战壕 | |
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regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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66
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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67
artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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