The operations as a whole divided themselves naturally into three main parts, in each of which the fighting would be of a totally different character. First, the attack and capture of the enemy's entrenched6 positions from Beersheba to the sea. This was primarily an infantry7 operation. Secondly8, the pursuit of the enemy over the plain of Philistia, culminating in the capture of Junction9 Station, and the consequent isolation10 of any enemy force endeavouring to cover Jerusalem. This was to be the cavalry11's opportunity. And lastly, the advance through the Jud?an hills, and the capture of the Holy City.
For obvious reasons only the first part of these[Pg 11] operations could be thought out in detail beforehand. The plan for this phase was as follows:—
1. To seize Beersheba and the high ground to the north and north-west of it, by a combined attack of cavalry and infantry, thus throwing open the left flank of the main enemy position at Hareira and Sharia. After the fall of Beersheba the cavalry would thus all be concentrated on the right flank of our forces, ready to pursue the enemy when driven from the remainder of his positions. The possession of Beersheba would, it was hoped, give us the necessary water to enable us to maintain our cavalry on this flank till the conclusion of the second phase of the attack.
2. To deliver the main infantry attack against the enemy's open left flank at Hareira, and endeavour to roll up his line from east to west.
3. In order to deceive the enemy up to the last moment as to the real point of our main attack, to pin him to his positions, and to draw reinforcements away from his left flank, an attack, preceded by a week's bombardment, was to be launched on the Gaza defences twenty-four to forty-eight hours previous to 2.
As the attack on Beersheba necessitated12 a march of some seventy miles on the part of the cavalry, who were to attack from the east, and of about twenty for the infantry, over unknown country, a great deal of preliminary work was required. The water supply had to be developed, tracks and the crossing places of wadis improved and marked on the maps, and the enemy positions south and west of Beersheba most carefully reconnoitred. It was also very desirable that all commanders should gain some knowledge of the country over which they were to lead their troops.
[Pg 12]
To these ends our line was organised as follows:—
A permanent position, strongly entrenched and wired, was constructed from the sea at Gaza to Shellal on the Wadi Ghuzze, and held by infantry. From Shellal a lightly entrenched line extended to El Gamli, and this was held by one cavalry division, which also supplied the outposts and patrols in the wide 'no man's land' at this end of the line. A second cavalry division was held in support in the neighbourhood of Abasan el Kebir, and the third was in reserve, resting, on the seashore near Tel el Marrakeb. These divisions relieved one another every month.
The cavalry divisions in the line and at Abasan lived in bivouacs made of light, wooden hurdles13, covered with grass mats, and erected14 over rectangular pits dug in the ground. These bivouac shelters gave fair cover from the sun, and the pits afforded some protection from enemy bombs. The division on the seashore was accommodated in tents.
The two former divisions had to be ready at all times to move out to battle at half an hour's notice, and much of the training was directed towards cutting down the time taken to turn out in 'marching order.' The division in the line had plenty of work to do, with daily outposts, extended patrol work, and the long reconnaissances undertaken every fortnight, so that the training was confined to the periods spent at Abasan.
As the operations were to take place in the late summer, and, it was hoped, would be concluded before the winter rains set in, no great provision against cold and wet was called for. Blankets and greatcoats were, therefore, not to be carried. Each man was provided with a pair of officers' pattern saddle-wallets, in which he carried three days'[Pg 13] rations2 (including the iron ration3) of bully15 beef, biscuit, and groceries, besides the few articles of clothing he was allowed to take. Two nose-bags on each saddle carried 19 lb. of grain (two days' forage16 on the marching scale). A third day's forage was carried in limbered G.S. wagons18, three to each regiment19. The divisions were, therefore, self-supporting for three days, without recourse to their divisional trains. The latter, during the subsequent operations, did not accompany their divisions, but acted as carriers between them and the advanced ration dumps established by the corps20' lorry column each day. One other L.G.S. wagon17 was allowed per regiment for technical stores, cooking utensils21, etc. All entrenching22 tools were carried on pack animals.
In order to test the mobility23 of the troops, it was the custom for each divisional commander, during the period when his division was in the Abasan area, to issue from time to time a surprise order for the troops to turn out ready for operations, and rendezvous24 by brigades or regiments25 in stated places, where they were carefully inspected. These orders were generally issued in the early morning, and, as no hint of them was ever given beforehand, even to the Staff, they constituted a real test of mobility. The time taken by each unit to turn out was noted26 by Staff officers, and the keenest rivalry27 sprang up between the divisions and the different units of each division to make the best showing. Ration and store wagons were packed each night, nose-bags filled after the last feed and tied on the saddles, and all harness and saddlery laid out in order behind the horses. The men's wallets were kept packed permanently28, the rations in them being renewed from time to time, when the old ones were consumed. The record ultimately went to one of the Horse Artillery29[Pg 14] batteries, which turned out complete in full marching order, with all its ammunition30, rations, and stores correct, in eleven minutes from the receipt of the order.
About once a fortnight the cavalry division that was in the line made a reconnaissance towards Beersheba, the other two divisions closing up to Shellal and Abasan respectively. Moving out in the afternoon, the division would march all night, and occupy a line of posts on the high ground west of Beersheba by dawn next morning. Behind this line of protecting posts the infantry corps and divisional commanders, and innumerable lesser31 fry, disported32 themselves in motor cars and on horseback. The senior corps commander and his staff used to be irreverently referred to as the 'Royal Party,' a flippant term which may be excused by the tedium33 and discomfort34 of the operations.
After seeing the last of the infantry commanders safely away, the cavalry used to withdraw, and march back to Shellal during the night. The reconnaissances thus entailed35 two nights and a day of almost continual movement and watchfulness36, without any sleep or rest, during which time it was not uncommon37 for regiments to cover seventy miles or more. Apart from the fatigue38 occasioned by thirty-six hours of constant anxiety and hard work, the absence of water caused severe hardship to the horses and no little discomfort to their riders. No water for horses was available from the afternoon of the day on which the division moved out till the evening of the following day, when, as a rule, they got a drink at Esani on the way back to Shellal. The men started with full bottles, and got one refill from the regimental water-carts.
The day was made up of a series of petty annoy[Pg 15]ances. The scattered39 squadrons were invariably bombed by the enemy, generally with effect, and the Turks' light guns, brought out to concealed40 positions, from which they had previously41 registered all the high ground, wadi crossings, etc., added to the general discomfort by their continual, galling42 shell fire. Many of the crossings in this part of the country consisted of a narrow, stony43 cleft44 in the rock sides of the wadi, down which troops could only move in very narrow formation, often only in single file. When, as sometimes happened, a whole brigade of cavalry had to cross by one of these narrow drifts, while the bed of the wadi was being swept by shrapnel and high explosive shell the whole time, tempers were apt to get short. We on our side could rarely spare an aeroplane to observe for one of our own batteries, and so were seldom able to locate the hostile guns. The inability to reply effectively increased the exasperation45 caused by their fire. Many of the surrounding natives had been armed by the Turks and stirred up against us, and, though they never succeeded in causing us any casualties, their hostility46 added to the general insecurity, and increased the need for watchfulness.
For the rest, the country was a desert of blistering47 rocks and stones, the temperature ranged up to 110 degrees in the shade (of which there was none save that cast by the bodies of men and horses), and the flies were innumerable and persistent48. It was with a sigh of heartfelt relief that the troops saw the last of the motor cars of the 'Royal Parties' disappear in a cloud of dust to the north-west, and received the welcome order to withdraw and march back to Shellal through the cool night.
There was, however, one never-failing amusement to be got out of these reconnaissances. This came[Pg 16] on the following day, when we intercepted49 the Turkish wireless50 communiqué on its way to the Berlin press. These communiqués never varied51 in their description of the operations. 'The enemy made a determined52 attack on Beersheba with about seventy squadrons supported by artillery.' This was the invariable formula. 'After heavy fighting, the hostile forces were defeated and driven right back to their original positions, having suffered important losses!' One imagines that even the simple Berliner must have become, at last, somewhat sceptical of these regular, fortnightly victories.
The result of this series of reconnaissances to the west and south-west of Beersheba was that every general officer who was to lead troops over this area gained a very thorough knowledge of the country, which was of the highest value in the subsequent operations. The sappers attached to the cavalry divisions also took advantage of the reconnaissances to reconnoitre for water at Khalasa and Asluj, where they subsequently repaired the wells that had been destroyed by the Turks, and to develop the supply at Esani in the Wadi Ghuzze. They also improved and marked many of the wadi crossings, and made route surveys of the whole area.
Our line of communications, at this time, consisted of a broad-gauge railway, which had been laid by the Royal Engineers across the 130 miles of desert from Kantara on the Suez Canal to Deir el Belah, about eight miles south of Gaza. The railhead of this line had followed close behind the Desert Column during its advance across Sinai. After the occupation of El Arish, the doubling of the railway track had been taken in hand, and, by the end of September 1917, the double track extended as far[Pg 17] as Deir el Belah. During September and October a branch line was laid from this place to Shellal, where it was carried over the Wadi Ghuzze, here some 800 yards wide and sixty feet deep, on a fine trestle bridge built by British and Australian Sappers. Work was then continued towards Karm, whence a narrow-gauge line was to be run out to Beersheba, as soon as that place was in our hands.
In order to relieve the railway of some of its heavy traffic, to enable it to bring up stores for the 'Big Push,' a sea-borne supply line from Port Said to Deir el Belah was organised by the Royal Navy during September. All the supplies for the 21st Corps, which held the coastal53 sector54 of our line, were then carried by sea, and landed in surf boats on the coast. The shipping55, convoying, and landing of stores were admirably carried out by the Navy, under great difficulties.
Towards the end of October these long and careful preparations were completed, and the troops began to move unobtrusively to their concentration areas, leaving their old camps standing56, in order to deceive enemy aircraft. So well were these large troop movements concealed, that, up to the moment when our attack was launched, the enemy believed that we had six infantry divisions still in the Gaza sector and only one in the eastern sector. This apparent disposition57 of our troops confirmed him in his mistaken opinion that our main attack would be delivered against Gaza, and caused him to concentrate most of his available reserves behind the western portion of his line, a fact which contributed materially to our success in the subsequent operations.
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1
vigour
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| （=vigor）n.智力，体力，精力 | |
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rations
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| 定量( ration的名词复数 )； 配给量； 正常量； 合理的量 | |
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ration
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| n.定量(pl.)给养，口粮；vt.定量供应 | |
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4
withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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5
prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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entrenched
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| adj.确立的，不容易改的(风俗习惯) | |
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infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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8
secondly
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| adv.第二，其次 | |
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junction
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| n.连接，接合；交叉点，接合处，枢纽站 | |
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isolation
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| n.隔离，孤立，分解，分离 | |
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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12
necessitated
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| 使…成为必要，需要( necessitate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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13
hurdles
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| n.障碍( hurdle的名词复数 )；跳栏；（供人或马跳跃的）栏架；跨栏赛 | |
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14
ERECTED
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| adj. 直立的，竖立的，笔直的 vt. 使 ... 直立，建立 | |
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15
bully
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| n.恃强欺弱者，小流氓；vt.威胁，欺侮 | |
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16
forage
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| n.(牛马的)饲料，粮草；v.搜寻，翻寻 | |
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17
wagon
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| n.四轮马车，手推车，面包车；无盖运货列车 | |
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18
wagons
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| n.四轮的运货马车( wagon的名词复数 )；铁路货车；小手推车 | |
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regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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utensils
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| 器具，用具，器皿( utensil的名词复数 )； 器物 | |
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entrenching
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| v.用壕沟围绕或保护…( entrench的现在分词 )；牢固地确立… | |
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23
mobility
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| n.可动性，变动性，情感不定 | |
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24
rendezvous
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| n.约会，约会地点，汇合点；vi.汇合，集合；vt.使汇合，使在汇合地点相遇 | |
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regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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26
noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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rivalry
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| n.竞争，竞赛，对抗 | |
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permanently
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| adv.永恒地，永久地，固定不变地 | |
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29
artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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31
lesser
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| adj.次要的，较小的；adv.较小地，较少地 | |
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32
disported
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| v.嬉戏，玩乐，自娱( disport的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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tedium
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| n.单调；烦闷 | |
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discomfort
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| n.不舒服，不安，难过，困难，不方便 | |
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35
entailed
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| 使…成为必要( entail的过去式和过去分词 )； 需要； 限定继承； 使必需 | |
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watchfulness
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| 警惕，留心； 警觉（性） | |
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37
uncommon
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| adj.罕见的，非凡的，不平常的 | |
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38
fatigue
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| n.疲劳，劳累 | |
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39
scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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40
concealed
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| a.隐藏的，隐蔽的 | |
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41
previously
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| adv.以前，先前（地） | |
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42
galling
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| adj.难堪的,使烦恼的,使焦躁的 | |
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43
stony
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| adj.石头的，多石头的，冷酷的，无情的 | |
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44
cleft
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| n.裂缝；adj.裂开的 | |
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45
exasperation
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| n.愤慨 | |
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46
hostility
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| n.敌对，敌意；抵制［pl.］交战，战争 | |
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47
blistering
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| adj.酷热的；猛烈的；使起疱的；可恶的v.起水疱；起气泡；使受暴晒n.[涂料] 起泡 | |
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48
persistent
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| adj.坚持不懈的，执意的；持续的 | |
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49
intercepted
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| 拦截( intercept的过去式和过去分词 )； 截住； 截击； 拦阻 | |
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50
wireless
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| adj.无线的；n.无线电 | |
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51
varied
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| adj.多样的，多变化的 | |
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52
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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53
coastal
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| adj.海岸的，沿海的，沿岸的 | |
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54
sector
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| n.部门，部分；防御地段，防区；扇形 | |
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55
shipping
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| n.船运（发货，运输，乘船） | |
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56
standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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