Amman was the one really vulnerable point on the Hedjaz Railway. The Arabs had frequently destroyed portions of the line farther south, but such raids only resulted in interrupting the traffic for a few days at a time. Material for repair was available at every station, and long practice had brought the Turkish engineers to a high state of efficiency in restoring these temporarily damaged places. At Amman, however, the line ran over a[Pg 133] viaduct, and through a considerable tunnel. If these two works could be thoroughly6 destroyed, the resulting interruption of traffic might well be so prolonged as to compel the retirement7 of the whole of the enemy force in the Maan area. Such a prospect5 justified8 the acceptance of greater risks than General Allenby proposed to incur9.
The Turks were well aware that Amman was the Achilles' heel of the Hedjaz Expeditionary Force, and had provided for its protection as many troops as they could spare. The town itself, which lay immediately to the west of, and covering, the tunnel and viaduct, had been garrisoned10 and prepared for defence. An advanced defensive11 position had been established astride the Jericho-El Salt road, extending from El Haud to Shunet Nimrin, and a third position was in course of preparation on the east bank of the Jordan, opposite El Ghoraniyeh.
The Anzac Mounted Division, with the Camel Corps12 Brigade attached, and the 60th Division were detailed13 to carry out the raid, which had as its sole object the destruction of the viaduct and tunnel. The town of Amman, which is the principal Circassian settlement in Syria, lies some thirty miles east-north-east of the north end of the Dead Sea, and is connected with Jericho by an indifferent metalled road, passing through El Salt, which the Turks had constructed during the war. From the Jordan at El Ghoraniyeh, 1200 feet below the level of the sea, to Naaur, sixteen miles farther east, at the edge of the plateau on which Amman lies, the ground rises 4300 feet. Nearly the whole of this rise occurs in the last ten miles before Naaur is reached, and the intervening country is a maze14 of rocky hills, intersected by deep ravines, and traversed only by a few narrow footpaths15.
[Pg 134]
In the course of the ages the Jordan has cut a deep trough through the valley, varying in width from a few hundred yards to a mile or more, and lying about 100 feet below the general level of the surrounding country. The bottom of this trough is a flat plain covered with a dense16 jungle of tamarisk, and the banks are, in most places, perpendicular17. The present channel winds about down the trough, and is only about forty yards wide in normal weather, but the river is deep and very swift, and liable to a rapid rise after heavy rain.
The main watercourses descend18 from the hills on the east in a series of deep gorges19, which traverse the narrow strip of flat country between the foothills and the old channel, and form a succession of barriers to movement along this strip, north and south. Many of these gorges can only be crossed by a single track, which runs from near Beisan, fifteen miles south of Lake Tiberias, to El Ghoraniyeh.
The plan was for the 60th Division to force the passage of the river, drive the enemy from his position at Shunet Nimrin, and then advance up to Jericho-Amman road, as far as El Salt, which was to be seized and held. Meanwhile the rest of the cavalry20 and the Camel Brigade were to move direct on Amman by the tracks through Naaur and Ain el Sir. After blowing up the viaduct and tunnel at Amman, and destroying as much of the railway line as they could, they were to withdraw on the 60th Division, and the whole force would then recross the Jordan, leaving permanent bridgeheads on the east bank.
The operation was thus purely21 a raid. Our cavalry would again be engaged in a country that was at least as unsuited for mounted work as was[Pg 135] the Jud?an Range, of which we had already had such unfavourable experience. The only information available about the Amman hills, other than that of natives, which was always quite unreliable, was contained in a memorandum22 written for the Commander-in-Chief by two mission fathers who had spent many years in the country east of the Jordan and Dead Sea. This document was an admirable ethnographical and geographical23 treatise24, but, from the military point of view, which requires the utmost detail of description as regards the terrain25, it left much to be desired. It appeared, however, that cavalry might be expected to be able to move with some speed up the Naaur-Ain el Sir track to Amman, in fine weather, and thus carry out the necessary demolition26 on the railway, and make good their retreat, before the enemy should have time to reinforce his troops east of the Jordan.
During the night of the 21st of March a party of swimmers of the 60th Division succeeded, after many fruitless attempts, in getting a line across the Jordan at Makhadet Hajlah, some six miles south of El Ghoraniyeh, and bridge building began at once. Our infantry27 and engineers suffered severely28 from the enemy's fire, but the bridge was completed by eight in the morning, and by mid-day a brigade of infantry was over the river, and forcing its way through the dense tamarisk jungle on the east side.
Meanwhile, similar attempts to cross at El Ghoraniyeh during the night had been frustrated29 by the strength of the current. The efforts had to be abandoned during the daytime, owing to the activity of the enemy, but were renewed during the night of the 22nd. These attempts again failed, and it was not until the morning of the 23rd that a raft was got across here. At four o'clock in the morning a[Pg 136] regiment30 of the New Zealand Mounted Brigade crossed the river by the pontoon bridge at Makhadet Hajlah, and, galloping31 along the bank to the north, cleared the enemy from the east bank opposite Ghoraniyeh, thus facilitating the crossing of our infantry at that place. By mid-day this regiment had seized the high ground commanding El Ghoraniyeh, capturing about seventy prisoners and several machine guns.
They were followed across the Jordan by a regiment of the 1st A.L.H. Brigade, which cleared the enemy from the country south of Hajlah, and gained touch with a party of infantry which had crossed the Dead Sea in motor boats, and landed on the east bank of the river near its mouth.
By nightfall a second pontoon bridge had been thrown across the Jordan at Hajlah, and three more had been completed at Ghoraniyeh. The whole force detailed for the raid had safely crossed the river before daylight on the 24th.
As soon as it was light enough to see, the advance on Amman commenced. The 1st A.L.H. Brigade moved up to El Mandesi, about three miles north of Ghoraniyeh, to cover the left flank of the 60th Division during the attack on the enemy positions astride the Amman road, at El Haud and Shunet Nimrin. El Haud was captured about three in the afternoon, after hard fighting, and its possession enabled our infantry to turn the right flank of the enemy, who then retired32 on El Salt. A squadron of the New Zealanders pursued the Turks, followed by our infantry, but the bad state of the road, which the enemy blew up in several places as he retired, delayed the pursuit. The rest of the New Zealand Brigade moved on El Sir up the Wadi Jofet el Ghazlaniye. At nightfall our infantry had only succeeded in[Pg 137] advancing about four miles from Shunet Nimrin, and were in touch with the enemy astride the road.
Meanwhile the 2nd A.L.H. Brigade, followed by the Camel Corps, had been floundering up the Wadi Kefrein, south of the road, and reached Rujm el Oshir about half-past three in the afternoon. Here the track, such as it was, petered out altogether, and all wheeled transport had to be sent back, the ammunition33 being transferred to camels. This caused a long delay, and it was not till half-past nine at night that the march could be renewed. Heavy rain had fallen for several days prior to the commencement of the operations, and all the tracks were deep in mud.
Rain came on again during the night of the 24th, and continued during the whole of the next three days, accompanied by bitter cold. Under this downpour the tracks marked on the map revealed themselves for what they really were, the beds of mountain streams. Each of them was transformed into a rushing torrent34, carrying down rocks and mud in its course. Bad as they were, however, they formed the only possible lines of advance in this mountain country, and the cavalry had to make the best of them.
Pushing and pulling their shivering and exhausted35 animals up the track, the 2nd A.L.H. Brigade and the Camel Corps stumbled on in the rain and darkness all night. At half-past four next morning the head of the column reached Ain el Hekr, having taken just twenty-four hours to cover the sixteen miles from the Jordan. The whole day was spent in closing up the remainder of the column, and it was not till half-past seven in the evening that the last of the Camel Corps got in, having walked the whole way, pulling their camels after them.
As soon as they were in, the advance was continued,[Pg 138] via Naaur, in pouring rain. During this part of the march the way was not so steep as in the earlier part, but the alternate deep mud and slippery rock over which the track led caused endless delays, especially to the camels, and the force was soon strung out again over a length of many miles. At five on the morning of the 26th, the head of the column met the New Zealand Brigade at the cross tracks one mile east of El Sir. The New Zealanders had encountered similar difficulties of country and climate, and both men and horses were in an exhausted condition.
General Chaytor now received orders to push on at once, and seize Amman! But, as his men had been marching for three consecutive37 nights (including the move to the point of assembly west of the Jordan), under conditions of the utmost discomfort38 and fatigue39, he considered that they were in no state to make an attack on a strongly held position, even if it were possible to reach Amman before nightfall, which was extremely unlikely. He therefore asked, and received, permission to halt for twenty-four hours, and march on Amman next morning. Outposts were placed north, east, and south of El Sir, and strong patrols of the 2nd Brigade were sent out to reconnoitre northwards, as far as the El Salt-Amman road. These patrols encountered a body of the enemy near El Sweileh, and dispersed40 it, taking 170 prisoners. They also destroyed thirty German motor lorries and a car, which they found here, stuck fast in the mud.
While the Anzac Division was struggling towards El Sir on the 25th, the infantry of the 60th Division had been marching up the main road from Shunet Nimrin towards El Salt, with the 1st A.L.H. Brigade on their left flank, on the Wadi Arseniyet track. This brigade reached El Salt about six in the evening,[Pg 139] and was joined there, some two hours later, by a brigade of the 60th Division. A second infantry brigade arrived at midnight. The place had been evacuated41 by the enemy, in consequence of the threat to his rear caused by the advance of our cavalry to El Sir.
Our infantry were now quite as exhausted as the cavalry. They had been marching or fighting continually for three days and nights, over difficult mountain country, and in most inclement42 weather, and it was necessary to give them a day's rest. The first A.L.H. Brigade was directed to remain at El Salt, and patrol the country to the north and north-west of that place.
Thus, on the morning of the 27th, when the advance was resumed, the foremost troops of the raiding force were little more than two-thirds of the way to Amman. The delay had been of the utmost value to the Turks, who were hurrying up reinforcements by road and rail.
During the previous night General Chaytor had sent two small raiding parties, mounted on the freshest horses available, to try and blow up the Hedjaz Railway north and south of Amman, in order to entrap43 a considerable quantity of rolling stock which was reported to be in the station. The 2nd A.L.H. Brigade party made for the railway north of Amman, but encountered a body of Turkish cavalry, and was forced to turn back. The New Zealanders, who were directed south of the town, were more fortunate, and succeeded in reaching the railway at a point some seven miles south of Amman station. Having destroyed a considerable stretch of the line, they withdrew safely, and made their way back to El Sir.
This march, carried out at night, in unknown and[Pg 140] very difficult country, without guides or reliable maps, and into the heart of the enemy's country, was a striking example of the special qualities of the Australian and New Zealand Cavalry. Trained from the cradle in the art of finding their way in uncharted country, they have the bushman's almost uncanny sense of direction. Tireless as the wiry horses they breed and ride, possessed44 of a wonderful keenness of vision, alert, wary45 and supremely46 self-confident, they are the finest scouts47 in the world.
The advance on Amman was resumed on the 27th. Early in the morning a light car patrol arrived at Sweileh from El Salt, but could get no farther east, owing to the mud. General Chaytor, therefore, ordered the cars to remain at Sweileh, as a flank guard to his division during the attack on Amman. A brigade of infantry, with two mountain batteries, set out from El Salt at five in the morning, to march to the support of the Anzac Division. This brigade could not be expected at Amman till late at night, but it was hoped that the Anzac Division would be able to take the place before then. Unfortunately the delay to our troops caused by the rain had afforded time to the enemy both to improve his defence and to reinforce his garrison.
General Chaytor directed the New Zealand Brigade to cross the Wadi Amman, south-west of the town, and move against the high ground overlooking the town and station from the south. One battalion48 of the Camel Corps Brigade, acting49 on the right of the New Zealanders, was to destroy as much of the line as possible.
The 2nd A.L.H. Brigade was ordered to push forward to the railway north of Amman as quickly as possible, and cut the line, in order both to isolate50 the rolling stock in the station, and to delay the[Pg 141] arrival of possible reinforcements from the north. The brigade was then to attack the enemy positions from the north-west. The Camel Corps Brigade, less one battalion, was to attack from the west.
There was no divisional reserve. It was considered that the superior mobility51 of our cavalry and camelry would enable them to disengage from the fight, should such a course become necessary, and fall back on our infantry advancing from El Salt. Moreover, the difficulties of the country were so great that it was doubtful if a divisional reserve could have reached any distant part of the line that was hard pressed, in time to be of any service.
The three brigades set out from Ain el Sir at nine o'clock. All three were much impeded52 by difficulties of terrain. Deep mud alternated with stretches of wet and slippery rock, on which neither camels nor horses could get secure foothold. The camels suffered particularly severely. Designed by nature for work in the soft and yielding sand of the desert, they are more unfitted than any other animal to march over stony53 country, or through mud. Many of them fell and broke their legs, and had to be shot. Many more had already met the same fate during the awful climb up to the plateau from the Jordan Valley. In several places large morasses54 were encountered, and much precious time was wasted finding a way round these. The wadis, too, were deep and precipitous, particularly the Wadi Amman, which was impassable save in one or two places, and then only in single file.
The New Zealanders reached this wadi about half-past ten in the morning, and were delayed so long in crossing it that it was three in the afternoon before they reached the railway.
The Camel Corps Battalion then moved south[Pg 142] along the line, with a demolition party, blowing up the railway. While engaged on this work, they met an enemy train, steaming slowly over the very portion of the line that had been blown up by the New Zealanders the night before! The train was engaged with machine-gun fire, and withdrew. Our men then examined the line, and learnt a valuable lesson in the art of temporary destruction of a railway.
It was the custom at that time for our raiding parties, which could only carry a small quantity of explosives, and no tools suitable for carrying out a systematic55 destruction, to blow a piece out of each rail, by means of slabs57 of gun-cotton placed on each side of it. The gaps thus made were about a foot long. A length of several miles of line, in which each rail had a piece cut clean out of the middle, had the appearance of having been very thoroughly destroyed, and it was believed that the whole line would have to be relaid with new rails before it could be used. But the ingenious German engineers discovered that, if a hard-wood sleeper58 were pushed into each gap, with its end flush with the inner edge of the rail, trains could be run over the line at once, provided they were driven slowly.
As a result of this experience, Captain Brisbane, an engineer officer of the Australian Mounted Division, devised a better method, which consisted in attaching one slab56 of gun-cotton only to the outside of the rails at each joint59. When this was detonated, the fishplates were blown off, and the ends of the two rails were bent60 sharply inwards. Demolitions61 carried out by this method could only be repaired by relaying the line completely.[Pg 143][17]
While the New Zealanders had been searching for a crossing place over the wadi, the 2nd A.H.L. Brigade had pushed forward on the north-west, and got to within three miles of Amman, when it was heavily counter-attacked, about eleven o'clock, by a large force of the enemy, well supplied with artillery62. The attack was beaten off, after severe fighting, but more Turks appeared to the north of the brigade, and began to work round its left. General Ryrie had to form a defensive flank to meet this threat, and his advance was stopped. Meanwhile the Camel Brigade, advancing straight on Amman astride the Sweileh track, was held up by heavy machine-gun fire, on reaching the open ground west of the town, and could get no farther.
The New Zealanders fared no better. They were very heavily attacked when attempting to seize the high ground south of Amman, and forced to give ground. The Turks attacked repeatedly on the north, west and south, and in ever increasing numbers, and our small force was hard put to it to hold its own. It was soon obvious that no farther progress was possible. General Chaytor, therefore, ordered his brigades to hold their present positions as night outposts, till the arrival of the infantry, and to keep touch with the enemy by means of frequent patrols. The force was strung out over a wide front, lateral63 communication was very difficult, and only small, local reserves were available. Fortunately the Turks contented64 themselves with digging hard all night, and erecting65 rock sangars, and made no serious attempt to attack.
During the night a raiding party, consisting of a few men from the 2nd A.L.H. Brigade, succeeded in penetrating66 through the enemy in the dark, and blew up a two-arch bridge near Khurbet el Raseife, seven[Pg 144] miles north of Amman. The gallant67 little party returned safely before dawn, having done damage sufficient to interrupt traffic from the north for at least forty-eight hours. Before that period had expired, it was hoped that Amman would be in our hands.
Dawn found our weary troops cramped68 and stiff with their long night's vigil in the bitter cold. They had been marching and fighting for four days and nights, with only one night's rest, and had been wet through the whole time. The Turkish guns opened the ball soon after daylight, and shelled our positions intermittently69 during the morning.
About mid-day two battalions70 of infantry arrived from El Salt. They had been delayed at Sweileh, the previous night, in consequence of having marched into the middle of a sort of Belfast riot between the Circassians (Moslems) of Sweileh and the Christian71 Arabs of El Fuheis. With two separate wars thus going on in the same area, the situation appeared too obscure for farther advance, especially as both Circassians and Arabs showed a disposition72 to fire impartially73 on all who came within range, quite irrespective of their religion or politics. The column had, therefore, halted for the night.
General Chaytor had expected to be reinforced by a brigade of infantry during the previous night, and, in anticipation74 of its arrival, had issued orders for an attack soon after daylight. Though disappointed at receiving only two battalions, and those not till twelve hours later than he had expected, he decided75, in view of the urgency of the situation, to attack at once.
The infantry were pushed in between the Camel Corps and the 2nd A.L.H. Brigade, and ordered to advance with their right on the Sweileh-Amman[Pg 145] road. The attack commenced at two o'clock, and the whole line pressed forward vigorously, and got to within 1000 yards of the enemy positions in the centre, when a very heavy counter-attack was launched against the 2nd A.L.H. Brigade. The cavalry were pressed back some distance under the weight of this attack, thus exposing the left of the infantry. Intense machine-gun fire was now opened on the infantry and Camel Corps, who were on the edge of a bare, open plateau, which extends for some distance west of the town. Our attack was brought to a stop, and, as it was clearly impossible to make any farther progress in face of the strong enemy resistance, and as night was coming on, General Chaytor withdrew his force a little, to positions suitable for battle night outposts, and ordered them to hold on till next morning, when the remainder of the infantry brigade was expected up.
Desultory76 firing continued all night, but the enemy made no attack. Parties of the 2nd A.L.H. and New Zealand Brigades were active throughout the night, patrolling up to and across the railway, north and south of Amman. They were assisted by friendly Arabs, who spent the hours of darkness sniping at parties attempting to mend the bridge which had been blown up the previous night. Others co-operated with a troop of the New Zealand Brigade, to prevent any trains approaching Amman from the south.
The rest of the infantry brigade, accompanied by two mountain batteries, joined General Chaytor's force about mid-day on the 29th. We then had two brigades of cavalry, one of infantry, and the Camel Brigade at Amman; a cavalry brigade and an infantry brigade at El Salt, fifteen miles farther west; and a third brigade of infantry between Shunet Nimrin and[Pg 146] the bridgeheads on the Jordan. There were no troops available to increase this force.
During the morning, fresh enemy reinforcements reached Amman by rail from the north, and these troops immediately developed a strong attack against the left flank of our line. The 2nd A.L.H. Brigade drove off this attack, but the Turks repeatedly assaulted the position held by the brigade during the day, and gave our weary troops no rest.
Meanwhile a further complication had arisen, owing to a considerable body of the enemy from west of the Jordan having crossed the river at Jisr el Damieh, fifteen miles north of Ghoraniyeh, on the previous day, and commenced to advance up the track towards El Salt. On the morning of the 29th, the advance guard of this force, consisting of the Turkish 3rd Cavalry Division and two brigades of infantry, was beginning to make its pressure felt against our positions at El Salt. The 1st A.L.H. Brigade, supported by some field artillery, moved out to oppose it.
The rain had continued without abatement77 from the commencement of the operations, and the country was now in an almost impassable state. To add to our difficulties, the Jordan suddenly rose no less than nine feet during the morning of the 29th, and the flood water swept away all but one of our bridges. The approaches to the remaining bridge were under water, and it was evident that, if the river rose any higher, it, too, would be swept away, and our force east of the river would be cut off in the enemy's country.
It was clear that, if Amman was to be taken, there was no time to be lost. General Chaytor had intended to attack as soon as the infantry reinforcements had arrived, but, in view of their exhausted state, he decided, after consultation78 with the brigadier, General Da Costa, to put off the attack till dark.
[Pg 147]
Such men as could be spared from the fighting had been set to work repairing the road beyond El Salt, and, by the afternoon of the 29th, it was sufficiently79 restored to enable a battery of Horse Artillery to start for Amman from Shunet Nimrin.
The New Zealand Brigade, with one battalion of the Camel Corps on its right, was directed to seize Point 3039, a high hill about a mile south-east of Amman town, which commanded both the town and the station. This hill was strongly held by the enemy, who occupied two lines of entrenchments, one above the other, on the southern slopes. The Camel Corps Brigade and the infantry, moving respectively south and north of the El Salt road, were to attack the town and the old citadel80. The 2nd A.L.H. Brigade was instructed to make itself as offensive as possible on the north flank, so as to distract the enemy's attention from the movements of our troops farther south.
The advance began at two o'clock in the morning. It was very dark and raining hard, and the troops had great difficulty in keeping in touch and maintaining direction over the rocky ground. The New Zealanders, very skilfully81 led, evaded82 the enemy trenches83 at the bottom of the hill, and reached the second line, higher up the slope, which they attacked with the bayonet, and captured. When day broke the Turks in the trenches below were forced to surrender without firing a shot. The New Zealanders now got on to the top of 3039 at the southern end, where they were held up by intense machine-gun fire. The Turks followed up this fire with a determined84 counter-attack, just at dawn, which was beaten off, but only with the greatest difficulty.
Meanwhile the Camel Brigade and the infantry, in the centre, had met with success at first, having[Pg 148] captured the enemy's advanced trenches, with about 200 prisoners. About nine o'clock the Camel Brigade, then about 800 yards west of the main enemy position, came under heavy machine-gun fire from both flanks, especially from the north end of 3039, which the New Zealanders had been unable to take, and from the old citadel on the left front. At the same time the enemy launched a powerful counter-attack against the left flank of our infantry, in the gap between them and the 2nd A.L.H. Brigade. This attack was repulsed85, but the Turks maintained a continuous and heavy pressure against this flank all day, and our troops were barely able to hold their ground.
Fresh enemy reinforcements arrived from the north about ten o'clock, and immediately launched another violent attack on the New Zealand Brigade, which was clinging precariously86 to the southern edge of Hill 3039. The attack was repulsed, but only after prolonged and anxious fighting. The Somerset Battery R.H.A., which had left Shunet Nimrin the previous day, and had been marching for thirty hours, arrived just in time to take a decisive part in repelling87 this attack.
The enemy then directed an intense shell fire on the New Zealanders, and attacked the Camel Corps battalion on their right, with the evident intention of outflanking our troops on the hill. This attack was also beaten off, and, for the rest of the day, the Turks contented themselves with shelling the hill heavily, but did not succeed in dislodging the New Zealand Brigade.
Early in the afternoon the persistent88 enemy attacks against the left flank of our infantry ceased, probably as a result of a push forward made by the 2nd A.L.H. Brigade farther north. The infantry took[Pg 149] advantage of this respite89 to resume their dogged advance on the Amman town position. They pressed forward till they were held up by the deep fosse on the west side of the citadel. Here they came under a murderous machine-gun fire from both flanks. The few mountain guns with our force were quite inadequate90 to the task of keeping down this hostile fire, and could make no impression on the thick stone walls of the old citadel. Our infantry had to withdraw to shelter.
Fresh enemy troops continued to arrive from the north, and General Chaytor now reluctantly reported that he saw no hope of taking Amman with the force at his disposal, and that any further attempt would only entail91 useless loss of life. No reinforcements were available; indeed, during the day, a battalion of infantry had been ordered back from Amman to El Salt. This battalion was the only one that had not been engaged, and constituted the last of our reserves.
El Salt itself had been heavily attacked all day long. The enemy column that had crossed the Jordan, and advanced up the Jisr el Damieh track, drove in our advanced post on that side during the morning. The Turks continued to press their attack with the greatest determination from the west, north-west and north, and soon all our scanty92 reserves were involved. One battalion of infantry had been spared from the brigade that was covering the country from the Jordan to Shunet Nimrin, and one had been sent back from Amman, as already stated.
At four o'clock in the afternoon, our troops at Amman and El Salt were only just holding their own, and it was doubtful if they could do so much longer, in face of the constantly increasing strength of the[Pg 150] enemy. General Shea,[18] who was in command of the whole force, decided to withdraw. The troops at Amman were to move first, breaking off the action as soon as it was dark, and retiring along the Ain el Sir tracks.
As soon as darkness fell the New Zealand Brigade and the detached battalion of the Camel Corps disengaged, and fell back to the west bank of the Wadi Amman, where they held a line of posts to cover the withdrawal93 of the infantry and the Camel Corps Brigade. The infantry marched along the El Salt road, covered by the 2nd A.L.H. Brigade, as far as Sweileh, where they turned off towards El Sir, to avoid the fighting that was going on at El Salt. The New Zealanders held their position west of the wadi till the infantry had reached El Sir, and had a sharp action with the Turks, who had followed up closely. The enemy was finally repulsed at daybreak, and the New Zealanders then fell back slowly to Ain el Sir, which they reached in the evening. The retirement continued through the night, in the rain and darkness. Just as the rearguard troops of the New Zealand Brigade were moving out of El Sir, they were treacherously94 fired on by some of the local inhabitants. A troop was at once sent back into the village, and attacked a party of Arabs caught in the act of sniping at our men. Thirty of the natives were killed in the encounter, and this condign95 punishment had an instant effect. We had no more trouble from the local Arabs.
Meanwhile the fierce attacks on El Salt had continued all through the 31st, and it was not till eleven o'clock at night that the Turks finally drew off exhausted. During the night of the 1st of April,[Pg 151] our troops withdrew from the village unmolested, covered by the 1st A.L.H. Brigade, having destroyed all the enemy ammunition and stores there, and the whole force was safely across the Jordan by the evening of the 2nd.
The operations had lasted twelve days, and it had rained almost the whole time. The troops were without tents or shelter of any kind, and, for the last ninety hours of the operations, they had been marching and fighting continuously, without sleep or rest. The fighting, too, had been severe, and our casualties, about 1600 killed, wounded and missing, sufficiently heavy, considering the small size of our force, and the absence of any great artillery concentration against us.
The wounded suffered severely. The nearest hospital was at Jerusalem, separated from Amman by more than sixty miles of bad mountain road. From the firing line the wounded were taken in camel cacolets[19] to a motor ambulance relay station on the road between Amman and El Salt. The tortures of this mode of conveyance96 to a wounded man have to be experienced to be believed. When the animal, having received its double burden, rises with its peculiar97 jerk forward, it nearly pitches the patients out of the cacolets. Thereafter, each lurching step of the long, agonising march stretches the unhappy victims upon a species of rack comparable to that of a medi?val torture chamber98.
At the relay station, five miles east of El Salt, the wounded were transferred to ambulance motor cars, which ran them into El Salt. Here there was an advanced dressing99 station, where wounds were attended to, and then the victims were again loaded[Pg 152] into ambulances, and run down to the main dressing station at Shunet Nimrin. At this station they were taken over by a fresh relay of cars, which carried them as far as Jericho, if they were lucky. When the bridges were washed away, however, it was for a time unsafe for the cars to cross the one remaining bridge, and the men had to be carried across the river on stretchers, and put into cars on the west bank. At Jericho there was an operating unit for serious cases, and there is no doubt that this unit saved the lives of many by an immediate operation, who would almost certainly have died had they been sent straight on to Jerusalem. Another change of cars was made at Jericho, and another at Talaat el Dumm. And then at last the long nightmare of the journey ended in the blessed peace and comfort of a hospital in Jerusalem.
Nearly 2000 cases, including the sick, were evacuated in this way during the operations.
boat
German motor boat leaving Jerusalem for the Dead Sea.
(From an enemy photograph.)
grain
Turks loading grain from Moab for transport across the Dead Sea.
(From an enemy photograph.)
FOOTNOTES:
[17] At a demonstration100 given some months later by a small party of engineers specially36 trained by this officer, one mile of track was completely destroyed in ten minutes.
[18] Major-General Sir J.S.M. Shea, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., commanding the 60th Division.
[19] Canvas hammocks, stiffened101 with bamboo poles and slung102 one on each side of the camel, to take a man lying down.
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contemplated
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immediate
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4
prospects
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| n.希望，前途(恒为复数) | |
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prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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6
thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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7
retirement
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| n.退休，退职 | |
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justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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incur
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| vt.招致，蒙受，遭遇 | |
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garrisoned
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| 卫戍部队守备( garrison的过去式和过去分词 )； 派部队驻防 | |
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defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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detailed
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| adj.详细的，详尽的，极注意细节的，完全的 | |
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maze
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| n.迷宫，八阵图，混乱，迷惑 | |
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footpaths
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| 人行小径，人行道( footpath的名词复数 ) | |
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dense
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| a.密集的，稠密的，浓密的；密度大的 | |
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perpendicular
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| adj.垂直的，直立的；n.垂直线，垂直的位置 | |
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18
descend
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| vt./vi.传下来，下来，下降 | |
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19
gorges
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| n.山峡，峡谷( gorge的名词复数 )；咽喉v.（用食物把自己）塞饱，填饱( gorge的第三人称单数 )；作呕 | |
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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21
purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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22
memorandum
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| n.备忘录，便笺 | |
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23
geographical
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| adj.地理的；地区(性)的 | |
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24
treatise
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| n.专著；(专题)论文 | |
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25
terrain
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| n.地面，地形，地图 | |
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26
demolition
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| n.破坏,毁坏,毁坏之遗迹 | |
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27
infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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severely
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| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
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29
frustrated
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| adj.挫败的，失意的，泄气的v.使不成功( frustrate的过去式和过去分词 )；挫败；使受挫折；令人沮丧 | |
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regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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galloping
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| adj. 飞驰的, 急性的 动词gallop的现在分词形式 | |
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retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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torrent
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| n.激流，洪流；爆发，(话语等的)连发 | |
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exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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specially
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| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
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consecutive
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| adj.连续的，联贯的，始终一贯的 | |
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discomfort
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| n.不舒服，不安，难过，困难，不方便 | |
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fatigue
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| n.疲劳，劳累 | |
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dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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evacuated
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| 撤退者的 | |
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42
inclement
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| adj.严酷的，严厉的，恶劣的 | |
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43
entrap
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| v.以网或陷阱捕捉，使陷入圈套 | |
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44
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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wary
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| adj.谨慎的，机警的，小心的 | |
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supremely
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| adv.无上地，崇高地 | |
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47
scouts
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| 侦察员[机，舰]( scout的名词复数 )； 童子军； 搜索； 童子军成员 | |
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48
battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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isolate
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| vt.使孤立，隔离 | |
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51
mobility
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| n.可动性，变动性，情感不定 | |
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impeded
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| 阻碍，妨碍，阻止( impede的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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stony
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| adj.石头的，多石头的，冷酷的，无情的 | |
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morasses
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| n.缠作一团( morass的名词复数 )；困境；沼泽；陷阱 | |
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systematic
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| adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的 | |
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56
slab
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| n.平板，厚的切片；v.切成厚板，以平板盖上 | |
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slabs
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| n.厚板，平板，厚片( slab的名词复数 )；厚胶片 | |
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sleeper
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| n.睡眠者，卧车，卧铺 | |
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joint
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| adj.联合的，共同的；n.关节，接合处；v.连接，贴合 | |
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bent
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| n.爱好，癖好；adj.弯的；决心的，一心的 | |
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demolitions
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| n.毁坏，破坏，拆毁( demolition的名词复数 ) | |
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62
artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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63
lateral
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| adj.侧面的，旁边的 | |
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contented
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| adj.满意的，安心的，知足的 | |
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erecting
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| v.使直立，竖起( erect的现在分词 )；建立 | |
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penetrating
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| adj.（声音）响亮的，尖锐的adj.（气味）刺激的adj.（思想）敏锐的，有洞察力的 | |
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gallant
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| adj.英勇的，豪侠的；(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
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cramped
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| a.狭窄的 | |
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69
intermittently
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| adv.间歇地；断断续续 | |
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battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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71
Christian
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| adj.基督教徒的；n.基督教徒 | |
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72
disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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73
impartially
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| adv.公平地，无私地 | |
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74
anticipation
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| n.预期，预料，期望 | |
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75
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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76
desultory
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| adj.散漫的，无方法的 | |
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77
abatement
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| n.减(免)税，打折扣，冲销 | |
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78
consultation
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| n.咨询；商量；商议；会议 | |
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79
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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80
citadel
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| n.城堡；堡垒；避难所 | |
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81
skilfully
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| adv. (美skillfully)熟练地 | |
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82
evaded
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| 逃避( evade的过去式和过去分词 )； 避开； 回避； 想不出 | |
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83
trenches
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| 深沟，地沟( trench的名词复数 )； 战壕 | |
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84
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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85
repulsed
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| v.击退( repulse的过去式和过去分词 )；驳斥；拒绝 | |
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86
precariously
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| adv.不安全地；危险地；碰机会地；不稳定地 | |
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87
repelling
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| v.击退( repel的现在分词 )；使厌恶；排斥；推开 | |
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88
persistent
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| adj.坚持不懈的，执意的；持续的 | |
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89
respite
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| n.休息，中止，暂缓 | |
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90
inadequate
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| adj.(for,to)不充足的，不适当的 | |
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91
entail
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| vt.使承担，使成为必要，需要 | |
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92
scanty
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| adj.缺乏的，仅有的，节省的，狭小的，不够的 | |
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93
withdrawal
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| n.取回，提款；撤退，撤军；收回，撤销 | |
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94
treacherously
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| 背信弃义地； 背叛地； 靠不住地； 危险地 | |
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95
condign
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| adj.应得的，相当的 | |
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96
conveyance
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| n.(不动产等的)转让，让与；转让证书；传送；运送；表达；（正）运输工具 | |
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97
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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98
chamber
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| n.房间，寝室；会议厅；议院；会所 | |
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99
dressing
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| n.(食物)调料；包扎伤口的用品，敷料 | |
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100
demonstration
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| n.表明，示范，论证，示威 | |
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101
stiffened
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| 加强的 | |
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102
slung
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| 抛( sling的过去式和过去分词 )； 吊挂； 遣送； 押往 | |
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