Taking advantage of this weakening of the Turkish forces opposed to him, the Emir Feisal renewed his attempts on Maan, and, during the first half of April, successfully destroyed a considerable portion of the railway both north and south of it, and even captured an outwork of the town itself, within two miles of the main positions.
Apart from the help given to the Arabs, the raid had resulted in a loss to the enemy of nearly 1000 prisoners and of all his ammunition4 and stores at El Salt. His losses in killed and wounded were estimated to have been not less than 1700.
Moreover the bridgehead which had been established across the Jordan at Ghoraniyeh was maintained and improved, and, a little later on, another bridge was thrown over the river some four miles farther north, at the mouth of the river Auja.
These bridges were a perpetual menace to the Turks across the Jordan, and caused them great un[Pg 154]easiness. On April 11th they made a determined5 attack on the Ghoraniyeh bridgehead simultaneously6 with an attack by German troops on our positions west of the Jordan, north of the Wadi el Auja. The bridgehead was held at the time by the 1st A.L.H. Brigade, and the Auja positions by the 2nd A.L.H. Brigade and the Camel Corps7. Both attacks were pressed vigorously throughout the day, but ended in the complete defeat of the enemy, who left some 500 dead on the two positions, and over 100 prisoners in our hands.
Towards the end of April preparations were begun for a second raid across the Jordan. After the failure of his attack on the Ghoraniyeh bridgehead, the enemy had largely increased his forces east of the river, and had improved and strengthened his entrenched8 position at Shunet Nimrin. At the end of April he had about 8000 troops occupying this position. General Allenby determined to try to cut off and destroy this force, and, if successful, to hold El Salt till the Arab forces could advance and relieve our troops.
The great German offensive in France in March and April resulted in the force in Palestine being called upon to send to Europe every man and gun that could be spared. Thus, during April, the Yeomanry Division and two infantry10 divisions, besides ten other infantry battalions11 and a number of siege batteries and machine gun companies, were withdrawn13 from the line, and embarked14 for France. These troops were replaced by Indian regiments16, the Yeomanry by Indian cavalry17 from France, and the infantry partly by the Lahore Division from Mesopotamia, and partly by untrained native troops from India.[Pg 155][20]
It was originally intended that the raid should take place about the middle of May, when the reorganisation had been completed, and the full strength of the Desert Mounted Corps would have been available. A necessary part of the raid, however, was the co-operation of the powerful Beni Sakhr tribe of Arabs, numbering some 7000 fighting men, which was at that time in the district round Madeba, about twelve miles east of the north end of the Dead Sea. Towards the end of April this tribe reported that their supplies would be exhausted18 by the 4th of May, and that they would then have to move to their summer grazing grounds farther south. The Commander-in-Chief therefore decided19 to attack at once, without waiting for the arrival of the Indian troops, though, in doing so, he was compelled to carry out the operations with a considerably20 smaller force than would have been the case if he had been able to wait another fortnight.
Thus the troops available for the raid consisted only of the Anzac and Australian Mounted Divisions, with two brigades of the 60th Division, and the (Indian) Imperial Service Cavalry and Infantry Brigades.
There was good reason for the employment of this large proportion of cavalry in an operation that was to be carried out in country most unsuited for mounted work.
General Allenby was always reluctant to keep his mounted troops in the trenches21, if he could avoid doing so. Cavalry are most uneconomical troops in trench9 warfare22, since at least a quarter of them are occupied caring for the horses, and consequently are not available for the firing line. Moreover, while employed in the line, they are deprived of the opportunity of training for mounted work, and their horses[Pg 156] generally lose condition, since there are not enough men to look after them properly.
When, however, the three cavalry divisions were not used in the trenches, there were barely sufficient troops left to hold our long line securely, and very few infantry could be spared for extraneous23 enterprises. Moreover, though he would not put his cavalry into the line, if he could help it, the Commander-in-Chief had no intention of allowing them to grow rusty24 for lack of active operations. He was a firm believer in the old prize-ring adage25 that the best training for a fight is fighting.
The enemy's position ran north and south, astride the Jericho-Amman road, just west of Shunet Nimrin, his left resting on the deep gorge26 of the Wadi Kefrein, and his right flank thrown back in a half circle across the Wadi Arseniyat track to El Haud. Both flanks were protected by detachments of cavalry. From Shunet Nimrin two roads led back to Amman; the metalled road through El Salt, and the more direct track through El Sir. The former was the only one available for wheeled traffic, but the latter had been considerably improved by the Turks since our last raid into Gilead. The plan was for the infantry to attack this position from the west, with the New Zealand Mounted Brigade on their right flank, while the rest of the cavalry, moving along the east bank of the Jordan as far as Umm el Shert and Jisr el Damieh, turned into the hills up the tracks from these two places, and captured El Salt, thus cutting the road to Amman. The Beni Sakhr Arabs undertook to hold the Ain el Sir track. With their only two lines of reinforcement or retreat thus closed, there appeared to be a good prospect27 of capturing or destroying the enemy forces at Shunet Nimrin.
In order to prevent the enemy from transferring[Pg 157] troops from the east to the west bank of the Jordan at Jisr el Damieh, as he had done during the previous raid, one brigade of cavalry, the 4th A.L.H., was directed to seize the Turkish bridge at that place if possible. If, however, it proved too strong to be taken, the brigade was to take up a position covering the track to El Salt, and endeavour to prevent the enemy crossing the river.
Our force crossed the Jordan on the night of the 29th of April, and by dawn the cavalry were through the scrub on the east bank, and advancing up the narrow plain between the river and the mountains, led by the 4th A.L.H. Brigade. The 1st and 2nd A.L.H. Brigades were attached to the Australian Mounted Division during the operations.
The 5th Mounted Brigade, followed by the 2nd A.L.H., turned off up the Umm el Shert track, and made for El Haud, while the 3rd A.L.H. Brigade turned up the track from Jisr el Damieh towards El Salt.
The 4th A.L.H. Brigade, followed by the 1st, in reserve, continued its march towards the bridge, and was fired on, just after dawn, from a prominent hill on the east bank about 6000 yards north-east of Umm el Shert, known to us as Red Hill. The 1st A.L.H. Regiment15 (1st Brigade) was directed against this hill, and the 4th Brigade passed to the east of it, and reached Jisr el Damieh about six o'clock. The 11th Regiment was at once sent forward to seize the bridgehead, but found the Turks in great force and strongly entrenched, and was unable to dislodge them. A further attempt to drive in the bridgehead also failed, and it was evident that the brigade was not strong enough to carry out the task. Red Hill, however, fell to the 1st Regiment about mid-day, after some sharp fighting, and the 4th A.L.H. Brigade[Pg 158] then took up a position facing north-west about 2000 yards west of the foothills, and covering the Jisr el Damieh-El Salt track, from the Nahr el Zerka to a point about half a mile south of the track, with the 1st Regiment on Red Hill. It was supported by the three R.H.A. batteries of the Australian Mounted Division.
Early in the afternoon, columns of enemy troops were observed marching down to the west bank of the Jordan. They were engaged by our batteries and dispersed28, disappearing among the broken ground on the far side of the river. It was not known at the time that the Turks had a pontoon bridge between Red Hill and El Damieh. It was towards this bridge that they were advancing, avoiding the one at El Damieh, which they knew to be under observation by our troops, and within range of our guns and machine guns.
At three o'clock the 1st A.L.H. Brigade was directed by the Corps to follow the rest of the cavalry towards El Salt, by the Umm el Shert track, leaving only one squadron on Red Hill.
Meanwhile our infantry had attacked the Shunet Nimrin positions on the west, and captured the advanced works, but were unable to make any farther progress, in face of greatly superior numbers of the enemy.
The 3rd A.L.H. Brigade, pushing very fast up the track from Jisr el Damieh, approached El Salt late in the afternoon, and was held up by fire from some enemy works covering the town on the north-west. The 9th and 10th Regiments attacked these works at once, and stormed them with the bayonet after a stiff fight. As soon as the position was taken, the 8th Regiment, which had been held in reserve under cover, mounted and galloped29 into the town, which[Pg 159] was full of enemy troops. The Turks, surprised by this sudden charge, fought without cohesion30, and the hustling31 tactics of the Australians broke up all attempts at reorganisation. By seven in the evening the whole place was in our hands, with some three hundred prisoners, a large number of machine guns, and all the papers and documents of the Turkish IVth Army headquarters, which was located in the town. The commander of the army, indeed, only just made good his escape. One regiment picketed32 the approaches of the town on the north, while the position was being cleared and the prisoners collected.
A squadron of the 8th Regiment pursued the enemy some distance down the Amman road, and captured a considerable number of prisoners. On its return, about eleven o'clock at night, the 10th Regiment was sent out along the road in the dark, to make good the junction33 of the Amman-Ain el Sir roads, some seven miles east of El Salt. The enemy was located in position astride the road at Ain Hemar, just west of the junction, and, as it was impossible to ascertain34 his strength in the darkness, the regiment threw out pickets35, and remained facing the Turks till daylight.
The 5th Mounted and the 2nd and 1st A.L.H. Brigades, with the headquarters of the Australian Mounted Division and two mountain batteries, were overtaken by night on the Umm el Shert track. They had to lead their horses in single file up a very steep goat path, and made but slow progress. The head of the column reached El Salt early in the morning of the 1st of May, and the 2nd Brigade at once pushed on along the Amman road to Ain Hemar, drove off the small force of Turks there, and occupied the road junction. The 3rd Brigade held an outpost line north-west and north of El Salt, and the 1st[Pg 160] Brigade a similar line to the west, astride the El Shert track. The three brigades thus formed a cordon36 round El Salt on the east, north, and west. The 5th Brigade was ordered to move down the main road towards Shunet Nimrin, and attack the enemy's rear vigorously.
Meanwhile, down in the valley, the 4th A.L.H. Brigade was in difficulties. All night long the enemy had been crossing the river unseen, by the pontoon bridge mentioned above. About half-past seven in the morning some 4000 Turkish infantry deployed37 from the broken ground east of the Jordan, and advanced in open order, with their right flank directed on the gap between the left of the 4th Brigade and Red Hill. When the 1st Brigade had been withdrawn the previous evening, leaving only one squadron on the hill, General Grant had sent a squadron from the 11th Regiment to reinforce it, and had ordered two armoured cars which he had with him to watch the gap. One of these cars was put out of action very soon by a direct hit from a Turkish shell, but the other remained in action, and did much to stem the first rush of the Turks, until it was forced to retire, owing to casualties and lack of ammunition.
Our three batteries at once opened a rapid and accurate fire on the advancing Turks. They were immediately engaged by enemy batteries on the west bank of the Jordan, and heavily shelled, but continued in action, and caused severe casualties to the enemy.
Simultaneously with the attack from the west, about 1000 Turkish infantry and 500 cavalry, who had made their way up the Nahr el Zerka, debouched from the river bed, and attacked the right flank of the 4th Brigade. This attack was driven off, after[Pg 161] a very sharp fight, but the Turks still continued to advance over the open ground from the west. At nine o'clock their forward lines had been annihilated38 by our fire, and they fell back a little, taking cover in some broken ground.
For about an hour there was a lull39 in the fighting. At ten o'clock a large body of the enemy, that had evidently worked south along the bed of the Jordan, suddenly appeared in the open, and swept over Red Hill, overwhelming the little garrison there. The remnants of our two squadrons withdrew to the broken ground south and south-east of the hill.
Immediately afterwards, the Turks attacked again along the whole line, rushing forward recklessly, shouting 'Allah! Allah! Allah!' Our small force, outnumbered by five to one, and hampered40 by its horses in the difficult country, was gradually forced back to the east against the hills, fighting desperately41 every step of the way. The right flank was driven back across the El Damieh-El Salt track, and the enemy entered the foothills north of the track, and began to work round to the rear. At the same time parties of Turks began to push southwards, between the left flank of the 4th Brigade and the remnants of the Red Hill garrison, now clinging grimly to their position south of the hill. Two troops, all that could be spared, were sent out to try and check this movement long enough to allow the right flank of the brigade to be withdrawn. The brigade headquarters and every man of 'B' Battery H.A.C. that could be spared from the service of the guns were also thrown into the fight. This little handful of men fought heroically, but hopelessly, against the ever advancing waves of the enemy, and at last was pushed back across our line of retreat to the south.
When his right flank was turned, General Grant,[Pg 162] realising the impossibility of holding on any longer in the face of such odds42, had ordered a retirement43 to a shorter line farther south, covering the Umm el Shert track. The right flank regiment was to retire first, followed by the regiment in the centre, and the line was to be re-formed, east and west across the valley, just north of Red Hill.
The brigade was now, however, in a very difficult position. Our troops had been forced back till they were facing due west, with their backs to the tangled44 maze45 of rocky hills, impassable for cavalry and guns. Some of the Turks were across their line of retreat to the south, though only in small numbers as yet. Others were working round the right flank of the brigade. All along the line our troops were hotly engaged at close quarters. To withdraw to a flank under such conditions was a very hazardous46 operation, but it appeared to offer the only chance of extricating47 the brigade from its desperate situation.
Two regiments of the New Zealand Mounted Brigade, which had been co-operating in the attacks on the Shunet Nimrin positions from the south, had been despatched to the assistance of the 4th Brigade, but they had fifteen miles of bad ground to cover, and could not possibly arrive in time to save the position. The most they could hope to do was to form a rallying point for the 4th Brigade to fall back upon.
The 4th A.L.H. Regiment, on the right flank, held on till the enemy closed to within 200 yards, in a desperate effort to cover the retirement of our guns. 'A' Battery H.A.C. was in this sector48 of the line, the Notts Battery R.H.A. near the centre, and 'B' Battery H.A.C. at the south end. The position of the two northernmost batteries was quite hopeless. Driven back to the verge49 of the impassable hills, they[Pg 163] were in action in the open in the front line, and the only way of retreat feasible for wheeled vehicles was to the south, down the line of our troops, and in full view of the enemy at a few hundred yards distance.
Nevertheless the two batteries fought steadily50 on, attempting the impossible task of retiring by sections to the left flank. Each time a Turkish attack broke and melted away before their fire, the enemy dead lay a little closer to our guns. Each time a short retirement was made, the heavy pressure of the enemy pushed the guns farther into the hills; and each time there were fewer men and horses to move them. At last they were forced into a position from which there was no way out, and here they made a final stand, fighting till all their ammunition was exhausted, and the Turks were within two or three hundred yards on three sides of them. Even then a last effort was made to find a way out, but the teams were mown down by machine-gun fire, and the guns had to be abandoned. The remaining men and horses scrambled51 up the hills to the east, and succeeded in reaching the Wadi el Retem. The Australian troopers accompanied them, fighting grimly and silently, as an old dog fox, run into by the hounds, turns on his pursuers, slashing52 right and left, and dies with his teeth locked in a hound.
'B' Battery H.A.C., having a shorter distance to go, succeeded in retiring to the south, through the enemy, and came into action again near the Umm el Shert track, to cover the withdrawal of the rest of our troops. During its retirement a gun was overturned in the bottom of a deep wadi, and had to be abandoned. A party of men, under an officer, descended53 into the ravine, and made a fine effort to right the gun and get it away; but the Turks appeared on the banks above, and opened fire on[Pg 164] them with machine guns, killing54 nearly all the horses, and the attempt had to be abandoned.
Scrambling55 hurriedly through the foothills, our troops reassembled on the new position about mid-day, and took up a line along the south side of a small wadi, facing north, with Red Hill, which was occupied by the enemy, slightly to their left rear. General Chaytor, of the Anzac Division, now arrived in a motor, and assumed command. He at once decided to make a further retirement to a position immediately north of, and covering, the Umm el Shert track. This withdrawal was carried out successfully, with the assistance of the two New Zealand regiments, and a line was established along the Wadi el Retem, from the Jordan, to the foothills. Three times during the day the enemy attacked this position in a most determined manner, but the line stood fast, and each attack was repulsed56 with heavy losses to the Turks. When night fell, the vital Umm el Shert track, which was now the only way of communication with El Salt, was still open. Late in the afternoon touch was established with the 1st A.L.H. Brigade in the hills.
While the 4th Brigade was fighting desperately to keep open our communications with El Salt, the infantry were heavily engaged in another attack on the enemy's position at Shunet Nimrin. Fighting continued all day, but very little headway was made. Our light field guns could make no impression on the rock-hewn trenches of the Turks, and the wire, protected and partly concealed57 by the innumerable boulders58 in front of the positions, could not be effectively cut.
In spite of the weakness of our force, and the strength of the enemy's position, the attack might have been successful had the Beni Sakhr carried out[Pg 165] their part of the bargain. Unfortunately, either through cowardice59 or treachery, they played us false, and never put in an appearance at all. Consequently the track through Ain el Sir remained open to the enemy, and, towards evening, reinforcements began to arrive at Shunet Nimrin by this road.
The 5th Mounted Brigade had set out from El Salt, soon after dawn, to co-operate with our infantry by attacking the enemy's rear about El Howeij. So great were the difficulties of the country, however, that it was not till nearly one o'clock that the brigade got in touch with the enemy, near the road bridge at El Howeij. The Turks were in great force, and strongly entrenched, and the 5th Brigade was unable to make much headway. The 1st A.L.H. Brigade was ordered to assist by attacking the enemy's flank farther west, at El Haud, while still guarding the El Shert track. Little progress was made during the day, and, as soon as darkness fell, the 2nd A.L.H. Brigade was withdrawn from Ain Hemar, and sent to the assistance of the 5th. Orders were sent to these two brigades that the 60th Division would attack Shunet Nimrin and El Haud at dawn on the 2nd, and that they were to co-operate in this attack by endeavouring to seize the high ground about Arkub el Khaluf.
In view of the precarious60 position of the 4th A.L.H. Brigade, down in the valley, the 1st Brigade was ordered to employ its whole strength in protecting the Umm el Shert track from all directions, and to keep touch with the 4th. These dispositions61 left only the 3rd Brigade to protect El Salt on the east, north, and north-west.
Our cavalry were now in a very precarious position. The strong force at Shunet Nimrin barred the main road, and the Wadi Arseniyat track, on the[Pg 166] south-west. The Turkish 3rd Cavalry Division and part of an infantry division, having cleared our troops from their line of advance from Jisr el Damieh, were advancing on El Salt from the north-west; and a third force was closing in on the east from Amman. The only line of supply or retreat still open was by the difficult Umm el Shert track.
Ammunition and food were running short, and fresh supplies had to be sent up to El Salt before morning. No vehicles could get up the Umm el Shert track, and, as the journey had to be done in the night, camels were equally out of the question. Each of the cavalry regiments had at this time a few donkeys, which were used by cooks and batmen, who did not usually accompany their units into action. About 200 of these were collected at Ghoraniyeh in the evening, loaded with ammunition and stores, and sent off in charge of a subaltern of the gunners.
Marching all night, they succeeded in reaching El Salt, which was then being hotly attacked by the enemy, on the morning of the 2nd, delivered their sorely needed ammunition, and returned safely to Ghoraniyeh. The distance covered on the double journey was forty miles, over an appalling62 country, and with the prospect of stumbling into the enemy at any moment. The men of the convoy63 had had no sleep for the two previous nights, and, being cavalrymen, were unaccustomed to marching. That they carried out their task in the face of such difficulties, with no greater mishap64 than the loss of a number of donkeys, which strayed from their half-dead drivers on the way back, is a fine tribute to the hardihood and determination of the men and the skill of the young officer in charge.
The 60th Division began the attack before dawn,[Pg 167] but made very slow progress up the rocky steeps of Shunet Nimrin, in face of the strong force of Turks, well posted on the heights above. The 5th Mounted Brigade commenced its advance on the Turkish right flank at El Howeij about eight o'clock, having been delayed in coming to grips with the enemy, owing to the extreme difficulty of the country. Even after the advanced troops of the brigade had engaged, it was estimated that the attack would take three hours to develop. At half-past ten, however, the whole brigade was in action against the first objective, the Howeij bridge position. The 2nd Brigade, which had farther to go, had not yet reached El Haud.
Early in the morning, the enemy column that had advanced from El Damieh, after driving in the 4th Brigade, reached El Salt, and developed a strong attack on the position held by part of the 3rd Brigade, north-west of the village. Under the weight of this attack, our line was pressed back a little, and, at eleven o'clock, a regiment from the 1st Brigade had to be despatched to the aid of the 3rd. Half an hour later a second regiment was withdrawn from the 1st Brigade, for the same purpose. The donkey convoy, carrying 100,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition and about 300 rounds for the mountain batteries, arrived at a most critical moment. The 3rd Brigade machine guns, which had almost been reduced to silence, awoke again, and the Turkish attack was temporarily driven back.
Just at this time, the brigadiers of the 2nd and 5th Brigades telephoned to El Salt that the country was so difficult that they saw no prospect of gaining their objectives before dark. General Hodgson directed them to push on as fast as they could, and attack the enemy with the utmost vigour65, in order[Pg 168] to assist our infantry in their attempt on the western slopes of the Shunet Nimrin positions.
Half an hour later General Kelly, commanding the 5th Brigade, reported his left flank in danger from a force of the enemy at El Fuheis, south of El Salt. This was most disquieting66 news. With a large force of Turks attacking El Salt on the north and north-west, and another force reported advancing on the east from Amman, General Hodgson had no troops to spare for defence on the south side. The cavalry were labouring under the inevitable67 disadvantage of having a quarter of their number occupied in holding the horses of the remainder, since all fighting in such country had to be done on foot. A whole brigade of cavalry was, therefore, barely equivalent in rifle strength to a single infantry battalion12.
There was a gap of five miles of jagged, mountain country between the small force at El Salt and the 5th Brigade, which was fully3 occupied at El Howeij, and it appeared probable that the enemy troops at El Fuheis might penetrate68 through this gap. In that case the position of the 5th Brigade, and probably also of the 2nd, would be hopeless. General Hodgson, however, could send no help. The only chance lay in driving in the enemy's flank at El Howeij and El Haud, and thus giving our infantry the opportunity to assault Shunet Nimrin from the west with some prospect of success. He ordered the 5th and 2nd Brigades to push on at all costs.
Half an hour later, however, the advance of the enemy force from Amman had become so threatening that he telephoned to the Corps Commander, asking if the attack of these two brigades could be stopped, in order that he might have them in hand for the defence of El Salt. Our infantry at this time were closely engaged on the west of Nimrin, fighting their[Pg 169] way desperately up the hills, and there still appeared to be a chance of carrying the position, provided the cavalry continued to press against the enemy's right flank. General Chauvel, therefore, decided that the attack of the 2nd and 5th Brigades must be continued, but allowed one regiment of the 2nd to be withdrawn for the defence of El Salt. Shortly afterwards he consented to a second regiment being withdrawn from this brigade. This left only the 5th Brigade, already reduced in strength by casualties, and one regiment of the 2nd Brigade, to carry on the action at El Howeij.
By two o'clock these troops had progressed, with infinite difficulty and no little loss, to the edge of a tributary69 of the Wadi Nimrin, just north of El Howeij. At half-past two the 1st Brigade was ordered to send another regiment at once to join the two regiments of the 2nd Brigade at El Salt, who were hard pressed. There was now only one regiment of the 1st Brigade left on the west side of the village, and this was the only regiment of the force in the line not in action with the enemy. The 3rd Brigade, holding a line north-west and north of El Salt, was heavily engaged all along the line. Two regiments of the 2nd and one of the 1st Brigade were fighting on the north-east and east, and the remaining regiment of the 1st was in divisional reserve in the village.
At half-past four General Kelly reported that he was unable to advance at all. A body of Turkish cavalry was threatening his left flank and rear, and he was anxious about his led horses. General Hodgson had no troops to spare, and indeed was hard put to hold his own at El Salt. He directed General Kelly, while protecting his flank and rear as best he could with the 6th A.L.H. Regiment (2nd Brigade),[Pg 170] to put in his reserve regiment in one last attack on El Howeij. If this attack failed, he was to remain in contact with the enemy, and attract as much attention as possible.
General Kelly formed a defensive70 left flank with the 6th A.L.H. Regiment, and threw in his reserve regiment to the attack. Scrambling painfully up the steep, rocky slope, the three regiments struggled forward with the utmost gallantry, against a murderous fire. Worn out by three days and nights of continuous marching and fighting, reduced by casualties, and with no supports to give their attack depth, they had no chance of reaching the enemy's position. The Turks, strong in numbers, and well posted in trenches and behind sangars, swept the slope with a hail of bullets, through which our little force could make no headway. The attack failed completely. The brigade re-formed, and took up a fire position on the north side of the wadi, facing the Turks.
On the west the attack of our infantry had also failed, and, in the evening, our troops drew off a little, and remained in observation of the Turks during the night. The enemy had been greatly reinforced at Shunet Nimrin during the day, and it was now clear that the operations would have to be abandoned. The problem was how to withdraw the cavalry from the mountains. All day long the Turks had been closing in on El Salt from the east, north, and north-west. From midnight onwards the enemy's fire had been very heavy on the front of the 2nd Brigade, and, in the early hours of the morning, his troops had worked up to within fifty yards of the 3rd Brigade at Kefr Huda. At the first sign of dawn on the 3rd, a squadron from this brigade made a desperate bayonet charge on this force. The[Pg 172] Australians crashed into the Turks, just as they were massing for an assault, fighting like tigers, and drove them back more than half a mile, killing over a hundred of them.
map
Diagram illustrating71 the situation on the 3rd. of May 1918.
This charge relieved the pressure on the north side for a little while, but another large enemy force now appeared on the Amman road to the east, and at once attacked the 2nd Brigade. Our troops were forced back by the weight of the attack, and, for a time, it looked as if our line would be broken. The situation was cleared by the action of Major Shannon, commanding the 8th A.L.H. Regiment (3rd Brigade), which was temporarily attached to the 2nd Brigade. He despatched a single troop, all that he could spare, with instructions to work round the Turks' right flank, unseen by the enemy if possible, and charge them from the rear. This desperate expedient72 was completely successful. The troop succeeded in getting behind the Turks just as they were preparing for another attack, and charged them with the bayonet, while the remainder of the 8th Regiment attacked in front. There were only twenty-five men in the troop, but they swung into the enemy with magnificent dash and a great deal of noise, and the sudden and unexpected attack from behind so disconcerted the Turks that they were thrown into confusion. The 8th Regiment, charging in front at the same time, completed the discomfiture73 of the enemy troops, who were driven back disorganised, and left 300 prisoners in our hands.
This success held up the enemy's offensive for some time, but, about seven o'clock, the Turks were seen to be again massing for an attack, and it became necessary to withdraw the 6th A.L.H. Regiment from El Howeij to support the 3rd Brigade. Shortly afterwards the 5th Brigade was called on to send a[Pg 173] regiment to El Salt. The remaining two regiments, a mere74 handful of men, were directed to watch the rear of our force at El Salt, and endeavour to prevent the enemy from advancing up the road from Shunet Nimrin. Our infantry on the west assisted in this task by keeping up a sharp fire fight.
Arrangements were now put in hand to evacuate75 the wounded and such of the camel transport as was not required with the fighting troops, down the El Shert track, preparatory to the withdrawal of the whole force. Camels are slow and obstinate76 beasts, even in their native desert. Moving in single file down the precipitous goat path to Umm el Shert, they made barely half a mile an hour. Frightened by the slippery rocks, their feet cut and bruised77 by the sharp stones of the path, groaning78 and protesting in the manner of camels at every step, the unwieldy beasts lurched perilously79 down the track. Every now and then one of them would stop short, blocking the way for those behind it, and refuse obstinately80 to move on. What the wounded men in the cacolets must have suffered during this terrible journey can scarcely be imagined. It was past mid-day before the last camel had cleared El Salt.
Since the failure of their first attacks in the morning, the enemy troops had maintained a heavy fire on our positions east and north of the town, but had made no further serious attempt at an assault. Parties of them were, however, working round to the south, and the situation was becoming increasingly grave.
At half-past twelve a force of about 3000 Turkish infantry was observed advancing up the El Damieh track, the head of the column being then about three miles from El Salt. Two hours later this force had deployed, and was attacking the 3rd Brigade. At the same time the enemy renewed his pressure on[Pg 174] the east. As the wounded were now well on their way down to the valley, the Corps Commander ordered General Hodgson to withdraw to a position south-west of El Salt, covering the El Shert track. As soon as this withdrawal began, the enemy pushed forward, and engaged our troops most severely81. One of our posts on the north-west was driven in, but, before any counter-attack could be organised, a message was received from Corps Headquarters ordering the cavalry to withdraw altogether from the hills, if able to do so.
The 1st Brigade was now in position across the El Shert track, south-west of El Salt, and facing east. The remainder of the force withdrew through this line, by regiments, after dark, and marched down the track during the night. As they could only move in single file, daylight found them strung out for several miles along the path. The evacuation of El Salt was completed by half-past two in the morning, but the Turks did not discover this fact till dawn. They at once pushed on through the village to attack the 1st Brigade. At the same time enemy guns heavily shelled the rearguard of the brigade, and several hostile aeroplanes bombed our troops in the defile82, causing a number of casualties. The Turks continued to press the 1st Brigade rearguard till it was three miles west of El Salt, when they drew off, evidently fearing to venture farther towards our troops in the valley.
By half-past ten the whole of our force was clear of the hills, and moving in extended order down the valley towards El Ghoraniyeh, covered by the 4th A.L.H. Brigade and part of the New Zealand Brigade. These two brigades had been in action almost continuously since they had taken up the position covering the Umm el Shert track on the 1st. They had,[Pg 175] however, succeeded in repelling83 all attacks, with heavy losses to the enemy. On the evening of the 3rd the Turks, abandoning the attempt to break our line in the valley, had withdrawn to the north, and followed their comrades towards El Salt. The dogged fighting of the 4th Brigade and the New Zealanders had saved the situation. Had they given way, the Turks would have reached the Umm el Shert track, and the whole of our cavalry force in the hills must then, almost certainly, have fallen into the hands of the enemy.
By nightfall the whole of our force had withdrawn behind a brigade of infantry which had been brought across the Jordan from the west to form an extended bridgehead. During the night the troops recrossed the river, and the force was all safely on the west bank before morning on the 5th. The Ghoraniyeh bridgehead was restored, and the Australian Mounted Division took over the left sector of the Jordan Valley defences, along the river Auja, including a new bridge and bridgehead which had been thrown across the Jordan, at its junction with the Auja, during the operations. The Anzac Mounted Division took over the right sector of the valley defences, including the Ghoraniyeh bridgehead.
Although the raid had failed in its primary object, which was the destruction of the enemy force at Shunet Nimrin, it had not been altogether unsuccessful. In the first place the Turks had been very roughly handled, and, besides having many of their troops killed and wounded, had lost nearly 1000 prisoners. The really important result of the operations, however, lay in the fact that the raid finally convinced the enemy that, in our next general advance, our cavalry would be directed on Amman and Deraa Junction.
[Pg 176]
Under the influence of this idea, he was led to place practically the whole of his IVth Army east of the Jordan, which was thus separated by the river, with its deep and difficult channel, from the remainder of his forces in the Jud?an Hills. It was this fact that enabled us, in the following September, to envelop84 and completely destroy the VIIth and VIIIth Armies, before the IVth Army could intervene.
jordan
The River Jordan at Ghoranigeh.
road
Shunet Nimrin and the Amman Road. Looking east, towards the positions held by the enemy.
FOOTNOTES:
[20] See Appendix I. a for composition of Desert Mounted Corps after the reorganisation.
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1
withdrawal
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| n.取回，提款；撤退，撤军；收回，撤销 | |
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garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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5
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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simultaneously
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| adv.同时发生地，同时进行地 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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8
entrenched
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| adj.确立的，不容易改的(风俗习惯) | |
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trench
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| n./v.(挖)沟，(挖)战壕 | |
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10
infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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12
battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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13
withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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14
embarked
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| 乘船( embark的过去式和过去分词 )； 装载； 从事 | |
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15
regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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17
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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18
exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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19
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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considerably
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| adv.极大地；相当大地；在很大程度上 | |
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21
trenches
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| 深沟，地沟( trench的名词复数 )； 战壕 | |
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22
warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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23
extraneous
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| adj.体外的；外来的；外部的 | |
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24
rusty
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| adj.生锈的；锈色的；荒废了的 | |
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25
adage
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| n.格言，古训 | |
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26
gorge
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| n.咽喉，胃，暴食，山峡；v.塞饱，狼吞虎咽地吃 | |
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27
prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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28
dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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29
galloped
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| （使马）飞奔，奔驰( gallop的过去式和过去分词 )； 快速做[说]某事 | |
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30
cohesion
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| n.团结，凝结力 | |
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31
hustling
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| 催促（hustle的现在分词形式） | |
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32
picketed
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| 用尖桩围住（picket的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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33
junction
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| n.连接，接合；交叉点，接合处，枢纽站 | |
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34
ascertain
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| vt.发现，确定，查明，弄清 | |
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pickets
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| 罢工纠察员( picket的名词复数 ) | |
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36
cordon
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| n.警戒线，哨兵线 | |
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deployed
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| （尤指军事行动）使展开( deploy的过去式和过去分词 )； 施展； 部署； 有效地利用 | |
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38
annihilated
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| v.（彻底）消灭( annihilate的过去式和过去分词 )；使无效；废止；彻底击溃 | |
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39
lull
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| v.使安静，使入睡，缓和，哄骗；n.暂停，间歇 | |
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40
hampered
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| 妨碍，束缚，限制( hamper的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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41
desperately
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| adv.极度渴望地，绝望地，孤注一掷地 | |
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42
odds
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| n.让步，机率，可能性，比率；胜败优劣之别 | |
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43
retirement
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| n.退休，退职 | |
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44
tangled
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| adj. 纠缠的，紊乱的 动词tangle的过去式和过去分词 | |
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45
maze
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| n.迷宫，八阵图，混乱，迷惑 | |
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46
hazardous
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| adj.(有)危险的，冒险的；碰运气的 | |
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47
extricating
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| v.使摆脱困难，脱身( extricate的现在分词 ) | |
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48
sector
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| n.部门，部分；防御地段，防区；扇形 | |
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49
verge
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| n.边，边缘；v.接近，濒临 | |
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50
steadily
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| adv.稳定地；不变地；持续地 | |
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51
scrambled
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| v.快速爬行( scramble的过去式和过去分词 )；攀登；争夺；（军事飞机）紧急起飞 | |
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52
slashing
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| adj.尖锐的；苛刻的；鲜明的；乱砍的v.挥砍( slash的现在分词 )；鞭打；割破；削减 | |
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53
descended
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| a.为...后裔的，出身于...的 | |
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54
killing
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| n.巨额利润；突然赚大钱，发大财 | |
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55
scrambling
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| v.快速爬行( scramble的现在分词 )；攀登；争夺；（军事飞机）紧急起飞 | |
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56
repulsed
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| v.击退( repulse的过去式和过去分词 )；驳斥；拒绝 | |
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57
concealed
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| a.隐藏的，隐蔽的 | |
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58
boulders
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| n.卵石( boulder的名词复数 )；巨砾；（受水或天气侵蚀而成的）巨石；漂砾 | |
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59
cowardice
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| n.胆小，怯懦 | |
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60
precarious
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| adj.不安定的，靠不住的；根据不足的 | |
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61
dispositions
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| 安排( disposition的名词复数 )； 倾向； （财产、金钱的）处置； 气质 | |
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62
appalling
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| adj.骇人听闻的，令人震惊的，可怕的 | |
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63
convoy
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| vt.护送，护卫，护航；n.护送；护送队 | |
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64
mishap
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| n.不幸的事，不幸；灾祸 | |
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65
vigour
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| （=vigor）n.智力，体力，精力 | |
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66
disquieting
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| adj.令人不安的，令人不平静的v.使不安，使忧虑，使烦恼( disquiet的现在分词 ) | |
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67
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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68
penetrate
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| v.透(渗)入；刺入，刺穿；洞察，了解 | |
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69
tributary
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| n.支流；纳贡国；adj.附庸的；辅助的；支流的 | |
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70
defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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71
illustrating
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| 给…加插图( illustrate的现在分词 )； 说明； 表明； （用示例、图画等）说明 | |
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72
expedient
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| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
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73
discomfiture
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| n.崩溃；大败；挫败；困惑 | |
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74
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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75
evacuate
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| v.遣送；搬空；抽出；排泄；大(小)便 | |
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76
obstinate
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| adj.顽固的，倔强的，不易屈服的，较难治愈的 | |
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77
bruised
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| [医]青肿的，瘀紫的 | |
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78
groaning
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| adj. 呜咽的, 呻吟的 动词groan的现在分词形式 | |
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79
perilously
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| adv.充满危险地，危机四伏地 | |
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80
obstinately
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| ad.固执地，顽固地 | |
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81
severely
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| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
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82
defile
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| v.弄污，弄脏；n.(山间)小道 | |
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83
repelling
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| v.击退( repel的现在分词 )；使厌恶；排斥；推开 | |
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84
envelop
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| vt.包，封，遮盖；包围 | |
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