The cavalry3 brigadier is naturally eager to have a battery attached to him permanently4, and considered as part of his brigade. Apart from the conviction that a battery always on hand and under his own orders will be of more value to him than one over which he has no direct control, there is the feeling that the battery rounds off his command, and makes it, in effect, a miniature army, complete with all modern conveniences. If the powers that be would only throw in a couple of armoured cars and a private aeroplane, the cavalry brigadier would be the happiest man on earth!
Most R.H.A. battery commanders will agree with the brigadiers. Attached to a brigade, the battery commander is freer and more independent, and gets, perhaps, more of the 'fun of the fair' and less of the drudgery5 than he does when acting6 as a divisional unit.
In spite of these opinions, however, the hard facts of this campaign go to prove that our guns invariably rendered more efficient aid to the cavalry they were supporting when employed under the orders of the divisional commander than when attached to brigades. The divisional commander must always know more[Pg 304] of the fortunes of the battle than any of his brigadiers, and is thus generally in the better position to decide where artillery support is most needed. Moreover, if each battery is attached to a brigade, and acting under the orders of a brigadier, each brigade can only receive the support of one battery. But there are occasions, in most engagements, when one brigade needs all the artillery support available, while another, in reserve, or not yet heavily engaged, requires none. If the control of the artillery is left to one individual, fire can be concentrated quickly in support of those brigades or regiments8 that are most in need of it, and no gun is ever idle. There were one or two lamentable9 instances, in the 1917 operations, of a brigade remaining in reserve all day with its attached battery sleeping peacefully beside it.
The actions of Summeil in the 1917 operations and of Kaukab in 1918 may be taken as fair illustrations of the employment of artillery as a divisional unit. That of Jisr Benat Yakub in 1918 was an example of the principle of attaching each battery to a brigade.
With the small, three-brigade cavalry division of the present day the former arrangement will practically always yield better results than the latter. Direct artillery liaison10 should, of course, be maintained between the divisional artillery commander and each brigade, if it is at all possible to do so.
Reserves.—There were, in the early days of the campaign, indications of an idea on the part of some commanders that a certain proportion of the artillery should be held in reserve, in the same way as a brigade or regiment7. This idea probably arose from the fact that one of the essential differences between artillery and other arms had been overlooked. When once a brigade or regiment has been committed to an attack, in a moving battle, and is in contact with[Pg 305] the enemy, it can seldom be easily withdrawn11 in order to be transferred to another part of the field. Guns, on the other hand, do not come into direct contact with the enemy—at least the gunners try their best to avoid doing so! They can, therefore, as a rule, be withdrawn without difficulty, if their services are required elsewhere. All guns in action may thus, in a sense, be said to be in reserve, since they can readily be moved to another part of the field if required. Except, therefore, for the purposes of conserving12 ammunition13, guns should rarely be unemployed14 during the progress of an action.
Artillery with Advance and Rearguards.—At the beginning of the campaign, most divisional commanders, when moving with one brigade as advance guard, allotted15 one battery to it. As the operations progressed, however, the view that a larger force of artillery might profitably accompany the advance guard began to gain ground. The experience of the whole campaign points to the conclusion that, in view of the small number of guns available in a cavalry division, two of the three batteries should normally accompany the advance guard brigade. The practice may be open to the objections that it makes the advance guard column unduly16 long, and that some risk is involved in leaving the main body so short of artillery. Both these objections appear, however, to be outweighed17 by the advantages of having a large proportion of the artillery in front. Whether the enemy's resistance is stubborn or feeble, artillery fire can assist in breaking it, and the greater the number of guns available, the quicker will that object be achieved, and the less delay will there be to the advance of the main body.
The battery or batteries with the advance guard[Pg 306] should, of course, march as far forward as is compatible with safety. Guns must always take longer than cavalry to move a given distance, and, if they are well to the front, no time will be lost in getting them into the only formation in which they are of any use, i.e. in action.
The divisional artillery commander should accompany the vanguard commander. When contact is established with the enemy, he is then on the spot, and able to make a personal reconnaissance at once, and decide, subject to the orders of the advance guard commander, how his guns can best and most quickly assist the cavalry. No time will then be lost in getting the guns into action. In the final series of operations, the enemy was in too demoralised a state for his action to form a very reliable guide in future wars, but it was found that vigorous artillery fire, delivered immediately after the first contact of our cavalry with his rearguards, invariably exercised a powerfully adverse18 effect on his morale19. The little action of Kaukab well exemplifies this fact.
The above remarks as to artillery with the advance guard apply with equal force, mutatis mutandis, to the artillery of a rearguard during a retirement20.
Escorts.—The campaign afforded few opportunities on our side to test the efficacy of artillery escorts. The action at Huj, however, in November 1917, was an excellent example of bad escort work on the part of the enemy. Our gunners have always maintained that the r?le of an escort is to obtain information rather than to afford protection. Guns on the march are vulnerable to a sudden attack, especially from cavalry; in action they are, or should be, well able to take care of themselves. If this contention21 is right, it follows that escorts need not be large, and should not be kept near the guns, but should patrol[Pg 307] the country in any quarter from which attack may be expected, search dead ground, woods, etc., and give early information to the guns of the approach of the enemy.
At Huj the enemy had two battalions22 of infantry23 and several machine guns disposed about his batteries, but he had not a single patrol pushed out to the east. Our cavalry were thus able to approach to within 800 yards of the position of the guns unseen and unsuspected. The result of the Turks' negligence24 was a severe disaster, and it is to be hoped that the lesson will not be thrown away on future commanders of artillery escorts in the British Army. The escort work in our cavalry in Palestine and Syria was almost invariably very good, especially amongst the Australians.
R.H.A. Howitzers.—Most officers, both of the R.H.A. and the cavalry, who served in Syria, agreed as to the desirability of having a few light howitzers attached to each cavalry division. Such a gun as the 3·7-inch mountain howitzer, if it could be mounted on a suitable field carriage, would be admirably adapted for use with cavalry. Had a few howitzers been available during the attack on Beersheba, the stone block-houses and the rocky sangars of Tel el Saba would soon have been rendered untenable by the enemy, and would not have delayed our advance as they did.
As to whether two guns in each six-gun battery should be replaced by howitzers, or a separate battery of four howitzers should be provided for each division, opinion varied25 amongst the gunners on the spot. The writer is strongly in favour of the latter alternative, as being simpler, and in conformity26 with the existing practice in field artillery.
Shrapnel and H.E.—The question of the best[Pg 308] proportions of shrapnel and high explosive shell to be carried in a horse artillery battery came under discussion at various times during the campaign, and opinions varied according to the nature of fighting in progress at the time. Amongst the rocks of the hill country, most battery commanders preferred a large preponderance of H.E., while, in open country, they wanted more shrapnel. One thing certain is that the Turks themselves dreaded27 the former far more than the latter. On several occasions enemy officer prisoners told the writer that they always had greater difficulty in getting their men to attack through H.E. shell fire than through shrapnel, even though, as they averred28, the latter invariably caused them more casualties than the former. As before remarked, the behaviour of the Turks was not a very reliable guide for future wars, but it is to be noted29 that the same aversion to H.E. shell was observed amongst the Germans, and even amongst our own troops.
There seems little doubt, therefore, that the moral effect of H.E. is much greater than that of shrapnel. If this be so, R.H.A. 13-pounder guns, whose lethal30 effect is so comparatively small, should be provided with a large proportion of it. The writer suggests, on the experience of this campaign, that the due proportion lies somewhere between 50 and 75 per cent. of the total ammunition carried.
General.—The batteries serving with the Desert Mounted Corps31, being Territorial32 units, had each only four guns. There is no doubt that cavalry divisions with four-gun batteries are seriously under-gunned, and it is satisfactory to note that, under the new Territorial War Establishments, all R.H.A. batteries are to have six guns.
Before leaving the subject of artillery, the writer[Pg 309] would draw attention to a fact that is often overlooked by cavalrymen. It is that, with the best will in the world, and the best of horsemanship and driving, guns cannot move as fast as cavalry. There were several instances during the campaign where a brigade, detached with a battery on some special duty, pushed along very fast for several miles, clashed with the enemy, and then reproached the gunners for not being on the spot to help. It is often forgotten that the artillery draught33 horse has to carry nearly the same weight as a cavalryman's and, at the same time, do his share in dragging along, 'over hill over dale, thorough bush, thorough briar,' a clumsy mass of steel weighing a ton and a half.
A consideration of this fact leads to the conclusion that, if guns are to keep up with cavalry when moving fast and far, certain advantages must be allowed them.
In the first place orders should reach the artillery early, in order to enable it to get on the move before the cavalry start, when the situation allows.
On the move, guns should march close to the head of the column. This order of march is also desirable from the fighting point of view, as has been pointed34 out above. The advisability of keeping the guns well to the front was generally recognised towards the end of the campaign, but, in the early days, there was a tendency to keep them too far back.
If there is a shortage of water or forage35, the artillery horses should be the last to suffer from it.
Though the writer happens to be a gunner, these remarks are not set down as a special appeal on behalf of the artillery, but in the belief that, only by giving to the guns some such special privileges, will they be able to do the work that is required of them. Horse guns are the servants of cavalry as field guns[Pg 310] are of infantry, but, unless the servant is adequately fed and looked after, he cannot serve his master properly.
Needless to say, if a cavalry commander considers that he can carry out the task assigned to him without the help of his guns, and time presses, he is perfectly36 justified37 in pushing on at once with his cavalry, and leaving the guns to follow as best they can, as was done, quite properly, by the 5th Cavalry Division when crossing the Carmel Range in September 1918.
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1
artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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vexed
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| adj.争论不休的；（指问题等）棘手的；争论不休的问题；烦恼的v.使烦恼( vex的过去式和过去分词 )；使苦恼；使生气；详细讨论 | |
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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permanently
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| adv.永恒地，永久地，固定不变地 | |
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drudgery
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| n.苦工，重活，单调乏味的工作 | |
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acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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lamentable
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| adj.令人惋惜的，悔恨的 | |
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liaison
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| n.联系，（未婚男女间的）暖昧关系，私通 | |
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withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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conserving
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| v.保护，保藏，保存( conserve的现在分词 ) | |
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ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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unemployed
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| adj.失业的，没有工作的；未动用的，闲置的 | |
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allotted
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| 分配，拨给，摊派( allot的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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unduly
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| adv.过度地，不适当地 | |
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outweighed
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| v.在重量上超过( outweigh的过去式和过去分词 )；在重要性或价值方面超过 | |
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adverse
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| adj.不利的；有害的；敌对的，不友好的 | |
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morale
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| n.道德准则，士气，斗志 | |
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retirement
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| n.退休，退职 | |
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contention
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| n.争论，争辩，论战；论点，主张 | |
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battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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negligence
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| n.疏忽，玩忽，粗心大意 | |
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varied
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| adj.多样的，多变化的 | |
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conformity
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| n.一致，遵从，顺从 | |
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dreaded
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| adj.令人畏惧的；害怕的v.害怕，恐惧，担心( dread的过去式和过去分词) | |
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averred
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| v.断言( aver的过去式和过去分词 )；证实；证明…属实；作为事实提出 | |
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noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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lethal
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| adj.致死的；毁灭性的 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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territorial
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| adj.领土的，领地的 | |
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draught
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| n.拉，牵引，拖；一网（饮，吸，阵)；顿服药量，通风；v.起草，设计 | |
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pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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forage
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| n.(牛马的)饲料，粮草；v.搜寻，翻寻 | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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