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APPENDICES APPENDIX I ADDITION TO THE REVISED EDITION OF “THE PHILOSOPHY OF FREEDOM,” 1918.
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Various criticisms on the part of philosophers with which this book met immediately upon its publication, induce me to add to this Revised Edition the following brief statement.

I can well understand that there are readers who are interested in the rest of the book, but who will look upon what follows as a tissue of abstract concepts which to them is irrelevant3 and makes no appeal. They may, if they choose, leave this brief statement unread. But in philosophy problems present themselves which have their origin rather in certain prejudices on the thinker’s part than in the natural progression of normal human thinking. With the main body of this book it seems to me to be the duty of every one to concern himself, who is striving for clearness about the essential nature of man and his relation to the world. What follows is rather a problem the discussion of which certain philosophers demand as necessary to a treatment of the topics of this book, because these philosophers, by their whole [358]way of thinking, have created certain difficulties which do not otherwise occur. If I were to pass by these problems entirely4, certain people would be quick to accuse me of dilettantism5, etc. The impression would thus be created that the author of the views set down in this book has not thought out his position with regard to these problems because he has not discussed them in his book.

The problem to which I refer is this: there are thinkers who find a particular difficulty in understanding how another mind can act on one’s own. They say: the world of my consciousness is a closed circle within me; so is the world of another’s consciousness within him. I cannot look into the world of another’s mind. How, then, do I know that he and I are in a common world? The theory according to which we can from the conscious world infer an unconscious world which never can enter consciousness, attempts to solve this difficulty as follows. The world, it says, which I have in my consciousness is the representation in me of a real world to which my consciousness has no access. In this transcendent world exist the unknown agents which cause the world in my consciousness. In it, too, exists my own real self, of which likewise I have only a representation in my consciousness. In it, lastly, exists the essential self of the fellow-man who confronts me. Whatever passes in the consciousness of my fellow-man corresponds to a reality in his transcendent essence which is [359]independent of his consciousness. His essential nature acts in that realm which, on this theory, is equally beyond consciousness. Thus an impression is made in my consciousness which represents there what is present in another’s consciousness and wholly beyond the reach of my direct awareness7. Clearly the point of this theory is to add to the world accessible to my consciousness an hypothetical world which is to my immediate1 experience inaccessible8. This is done to avoid the supposed alternative of having to say that the external world, which I regard as existing before me, is nothing but the world of my consciousness, with the absurd—solipsistic—corollary that other persons likewise exist only within my consciousness.

Several epistemological tendencies in recent speculation9 have joined in creating this problem. But it is possible to attain10 to clearness about it by surveying the situation from the point of view of spiritual perception which underlies11 the exposition of this book. What is it that, in the first instance, I have before me when I confront another person? To begin with, there is the sensuous12 appearance of the other’s body, as given in perception. To this we might add the auditory perception of what he is saying, and so forth13. All this I apprehend14, not with a passive stare, but by the activity of my thinking which is set in motion. Through the thinking with which I now confront the other person, the percept of him becomes, as it were, psychically15 transparent16. As my thinking [360]apprehends17 the percept, I am compelled to judge that what I perceive is really quite other than it appears to the outer senses. The sensuous appearance, in being what it immediately is, reveals something else which it is mediately2. In presenting itself to me as a distinct object, it, at the same time, extinguishes itself as a mere18 sensuous appearance. But in thus extinguishing itself it reveals a character which, so long as it affects me, compels me as a thinking being to extinguish my own thinking and to put its thinking in the place of mine. Its thinking is then apprehended19 by my thinking as an experience like my own. Thus I have really perceived another’s thinking. For the immediate percept, in extinguishing itself as sensuous appearance, is apprehended by my thinking. It is a profess20 which passes wholly in my consciousness and consists in this, that the other’s thinking takes the place of my thinking. The self-extinction21 of the sensuous appearance actually abolishes the separation between the spheres of the two consciousnesses. In my own consciousness this fusion22 manifests itself in that, so long as I experience the contents of the other’s consciousness, I am aware of my own consciousness as little as I am aware of it in dreamless sleep. Just as my waking consciousness is eliminated from the latter, so are the contents of my own consciousness eliminated from my perception of the contents of another’s consciousness. Two things tend to deceive us about the true facts. [361]The first is that, in perceiving another person, the extinction of the contents of one’s own consciousness is replaced not, as in sleep, by unconsciousness, but by the contents of the other’s consciousness. The other is that my consciousness of my own self oscillates so rapidly between extinction and recurrence23, that these alternations usually escape observation. The whole problem is to be solved, not through artificial construction of concepts, involving an inference from what is in consciousness to what always must transcend6 consciousness, but through genuine experience of the connection between thinking and perceiving. The same remark applies to many other problems which appear in philosophical24 literature. Philosophers should seek the road to unprejudiced spiritual observation, instead of hiding reality behind an artificial frontage of concepts.

In a monograph25 by Eduard von Hartmann on “The Ultimate Problems of Epistemology and Metaphysics” (in the Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, Vol. 108, p. 55), my Philosophy of Spiritual Activity has been classed with the philosophical tendency which seeks to build upon an “epistemological Monism.” Eduard von Hartmann rejects this position as untenable, for the following reasons. According to the point of view maintained in his monograph, there are only three possible positions in the theory of knowledge. The first consists in remaining true to the na?ve point of view, which regards objects of [362]sense-perception as real things existing outside the human mind. This, urges Von Hartmann, implies a lack of critical reflection. I fail to realise that with all my contents of consciousness I remain imprisoned26 in my own consciousness. I fail to perceive that I am dealing27, not with a “table-in-itself,” but only with a phenomenon in my own consciousness. If I stop at this point of view, or if for whatever reasons I return to it, I am a Na?ve Realist. But this whole position is untenable, for it ignores that consciousness has no other objects than its own contents. The second position consists in appreciating this situation and confessing it to oneself. As a result, I become a Transcendental Idealist. As such, says Von Hartmann, I am obliged to deny that a “thing-in-itself” can ever appear in any way within the human mind. But, if developed with unflinching consistency28, this view ends in Absolute Illusionism. For the world which confronts me is now transformed into a mere sum of contents of consciousness, and, moreover, of contents of my private consciousness. The objects of other human minds, too, I am then compelled to conceive—absurdly enough—as present solely29 in my own consciousness. Hence, the only tenable position, according to Von Hartmann, is the third, viz., Transcendental Realism. On this view, there are “things-in-themselves,” but consciousness can have no dealings with them by way of immediate experience. Existing beyond the [363]sphere of human consciousness, they cause, in a way of which we remain unconscious, the appearance of objects in consciousness. These “things-in-themselves” are known only by inference from the contents of consciousness, which are immediately experienced but for that very reason, purely30 ideal. Eduard von Hartmann maintains in the monograph cited above, that “epistemological Monism”—for such he takes my point of view to be—is bound to declare itself identical with one or other of the above three positions; and that its failure to do so is due only to its inconsistency in not drawing the actual consequences of its presuppositions. The monograph goes on to say: “If we want to find out which epistemological position a so-called Epistemological Monist occupies, all we have to do is to put to him certain questions and compel him to answer them. For, out of his own initiative, no Monist will condescend31 to state his views on these points, and likewise he will seek to dodge32 in every way giving a straight answer to our questions, because every answer he may give will betray that Epistemological Monism does not differ from one or other of the three positions. Our questions are the following: (1) Are things continuous or intermittent33 in their existence? If the answer is ‘continuous,’ we have before us some one of the forms of Na?ve Realism. If the answer is ‘intermittent,’ we have Transcendental Idealism. But if the answer is: ‘They are, on the [364]one hand, continuous, viz., as contents of the Absolute Mind, or as unconscious ideas, or as permanent possibilities of perception, but, on the other hand, intermittent, viz., as contents of finite consciousness,’ we recognise Transcendental Realism. (2) When three persons are sitting at a table, how many distinct tables are there? The Na?ve Realist answers ‘one’; the Transcendental Idealist answers ‘three’; but the Transcendental Realist answers ‘four.’ This last answer does, indeed, presuppose that it is legitimate34 to group together in the single question, ‘How many tables?’ things so unlike each other as the one table which is the ‘thing-in-itself’ and the three tables which are the objects of perception in the three perceivers’ minds. If this seems too great a licence to anyone, he will have to answer ‘one and three,’ instead of ‘four.’ (3) When two persons are alone together in a room, how many distinct persons are there? If you answer ‘two’—you are a Na?ve Realist. If you answer ‘four,’ viz., in each of the two minds one ‘I’ and one ‘Other,’ you are a Transcendental Idealist. If you answer ‘six,’ viz., two persons as ‘things-in-themselves’ and four persons as ideal objects in the two minds, you are a Transcendental Realist. In order to show that Epistemological Monism is not one of these three positions, we should have to give other answers than the above to each of these three questions. But I cannot imagine what answers [365]these could be.” The answers of the Philosophy of Spiritual Activity would have to be: (1) Whoever apprehends only what he perceives of a thing and mistakes these percepts for the reality of the thing, is a Na?ve Realist. He does not realise that, strictly35, he ought to regard these perceptual contents as existing only so long as he is looking at the objects, so that he ought to conceive the objects before him as intermittent. As soon, however, as it becomes clear to him that reality is to be met with only in the percepts which are organised by thinking, he attains36 to the insight that the percepts which appear as intermittent events, reveal themselves as continuously in existence as soon as they are interpreted by the constructions of thought. Hence continuity of existence must be predicated of the contents of perception which living thought has organised. Only that part which is only perceived, not thought, would have to be regarded as intermittent if—which is not the case—there were such a part. (2) When three persons are sitting at a table, how many distinct tables are there? There is only one table. But so long as the three persons stop short at their perceptual images, they ought to say: “These percepts are not the reality at all.” As soon as they pass on to the table as apprehended by thinking, there is revealed to them the one real table. They are then united with their three contents of consciousness in this one reality. (3) When two persons are alone [366]together in a room, how many distinct persons are there? Most assuredly there are not six—not even in the sense of the Transcendental Realist’s theory—but only two. Only, at first, each person has nothing but the unreal percept of himself and of the other person. There are four such percepts, the presence of which in the minds of the two persons is the stimulus37 for the apprehension38 of reality by their thinking. In this activity of thinking each of the two persons transcends39 the sphere of his own consciousness. A living awareness of the consciousness of the other person as well as of his own arises in each. In these moments of living awareness the persons are as little imprisoned within their consciousness as they are in sleep. But at other moments consciousness of this identification with the other returns, so that each person, in the experience of thinking, apprehends consciously both himself and the other person. I know that a Transcendental Realist describes this view as a relapse into Na?ve Realism. But, then, I have already pointed40 out in this book that Na?ve Realism retains its justification41 for our thinking as we actually experience it. The Transcendental Realist ignores the true situation in the process of cognition completely. He cuts himself off from the facts by a tissue of concepts and entangles42 himself in it. Moreover, the Monism which appears in the Philosophy of Spiritual Activity ought not to be labelled “epistemological,” but, if an epithet43 is wanted, [367]then a “Monism of Thought.” All this has been misunderstood by Eduard von Hartmann. Ignoring all that is specific in the argumentation of the Philosophy of Spiritual Activity, he has charged me with having attempted to combine Hegel’s Universalistic Panlogism with Hume’s Individualistic Phenomenalism (Zeitschrift für Philosophie, vol. 108, p. 71, note). But, in truth, the Philosophy of Spiritual Activity has nothing whatever to do with the two positions which it is accused of trying to combine. (This, too, is the reason why I could feel no interest in polemics44 against, e.g., the Epistemological Monism of Johannes Rehmke. The point of view of the Philosophy of Spiritual Activity is simply quite different from what Eduard von Hartmann and others call “Epistemological Monism.”)

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1 immediate aapxh     
adj.立即的;直接的,最接近的;紧靠的
参考例句:
  • His immediate neighbours felt it their duty to call.他的近邻认为他们有责任去拜访。
  • We declared ourselves for the immediate convocation of the meeting.我们主张立即召开这个会议。
2 mediately 806e80459c77df0ee0a0820a80764058     
在中间,间接
参考例句:
  • Im-mediately after a race, each swimmer has an ear pricked to test for lac-tic-acid levels. 赛后每个泳者耳朵立刻用针扎一下,验血浆乳酸浓度值。
3 irrelevant ZkGy6     
adj.不恰当的,无关系的,不相干的
参考例句:
  • That is completely irrelevant to the subject under discussion.这跟讨论的主题完全不相关。
  • A question about arithmetic is irrelevant in a music lesson.在音乐课上,一个数学的问题是风马牛不相及的。
4 entirely entirely     
ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地
参考例句:
  • The fire was entirely caused by their neglect of duty. 那场火灾完全是由于他们失职而引起的。
  • His life was entirely given up to the educational work. 他的一生统统献给了教育工作。
5 dilettantism d04ef87594f576b45ad9567a73f0f43a     
n.业余的艺术爱好,浅涉文艺,浅薄涉猎
参考例句:
  • Their exchange of views usually remained within the limits of a pensive dilettantism. 但是他们彼此的思想交流通常只局限在对于艺术趣味的一般性思考上。 来自辞典例句
6 transcend qJbzC     
vt.超出,超越(理性等)的范围
参考例句:
  • We can't transcend the limitations of the ego.我们无法超越自我的局限性。
  • Everyone knows that the speed of airplanes transcend that of ships.人人都知道飞机的速度快于轮船的速度。
7 awareness 4yWzdW     
n.意识,觉悟,懂事,明智
参考例句:
  • There is a general awareness that smoking is harmful.人们普遍认识到吸烟有害健康。
  • Environmental awareness has increased over the years.这些年来人们的环境意识增强了。
8 inaccessible 49Nx8     
adj.达不到的,难接近的
参考例句:
  • This novel seems to me among the most inaccessible.这本书对我来说是最难懂的小说之一。
  • The top of Mount Everest is the most inaccessible place in the world.珠穆朗玛峰是世界上最难到达的地方。
9 speculation 9vGwe     
n.思索,沉思;猜测;投机
参考例句:
  • Her mind is occupied with speculation.她的头脑忙于思考。
  • There is widespread speculation that he is going to resign.人们普遍推测他要辞职。
10 attain HvYzX     
vt.达到,获得,完成
参考例句:
  • I used the scientific method to attain this end. 我用科学的方法来达到这一目的。
  • His painstaking to attain his goal in life is praiseworthy. 他为实现人生目标所下的苦功是值得称赞的。
11 underlies d9c77c83f8c2ab289262fec743f08dd0     
v.位于或存在于(某物)之下( underlie的第三人称单数 );构成…的基础(或起因),引起
参考例句:
  • I think a lack of confidence underlies his manner. 我认为他表现出的态度是因为他缺乏信心。 来自《简明英汉词典》
  • Try to figure out what feeling underlies your anger. 努力找出你的愤怒之下潜藏的情感。 来自辞典例句
12 sensuous pzcwc     
adj.激发美感的;感官的,感觉上的
参考例句:
  • Don't get the idea that value of music is commensurate with its sensuous appeal.不要以为音乐的价值与其美的感染力相等。
  • The flowers that wreathed his parlor stifled him with their sensuous perfume.包围著客厅的花以其刺激人的香味使他窒息。
13 forth Hzdz2     
adv.向前;向外,往外
参考例句:
  • The wind moved the trees gently back and forth.风吹得树轻轻地来回摇晃。
  • He gave forth a series of works in rapid succession.他很快连续发表了一系列的作品。
14 apprehend zvqzq     
vt.理解,领悟,逮捕,拘捕,忧虑
参考例句:
  • I apprehend no worsening of the situation.我不担心局势会恶化。
  • Police have not apprehended her killer.警察还未抓获谋杀她的凶手。
15 psychically fc357bf48bf180a8211df7ef346ab03a     
adv.精神上
参考例句:
  • Shouldn't you psychically know when you're annoying someone? 难道你不知道你什么时候讨人厌吗? 来自电影对白
  • Auras can be seen physically, or sensed psychically, or both. 从身体上能够看见光环,或从心理上感觉到它,或者二者都可以。 来自互联网
16 transparent Smhwx     
adj.明显的,无疑的;透明的
参考例句:
  • The water is so transparent that we can see the fishes swimming.水清澈透明,可以看到鱼儿游来游去。
  • The window glass is transparent.窗玻璃是透明的。
17 apprehends 4bc28e491c578f0e00bf449a09250f16     
逮捕,拘押( apprehend的第三人称单数 ); 理解
参考例句:
  • A guilty man apprehends danger in every sound. 犯了罪的人对每一个声音都感到风声鹤唳。
  • The police maintain order in the city, help prevent crime, apprehends lawbreakers and directs traffic. 警察维持城市的秩序,协助防止犯罪,逮捕犯法者及指挥交通。
18 mere rC1xE     
adj.纯粹的;仅仅,只不过
参考例句:
  • That is a mere repetition of what you said before.那不过是重复了你以前讲的话。
  • It's a mere waste of time waiting any longer.再等下去纯粹是浪费时间。
19 apprehended a58714d8af72af24c9ef953885c38a66     
逮捕,拘押( apprehend的过去式和过去分词 ); 理解
参考例句:
  • She apprehended the complicated law very quickly. 她很快理解了复杂的法律。
  • The police apprehended the criminal. 警察逮捕了罪犯。
20 profess iQHxU     
v.声称,冒称,以...为业,正式接受入教,表明信仰
参考例句:
  • I profess that I was surprised at the news.我承认这消息使我惊讶。
  • What religion does he profess?他信仰哪种宗教?
21 extinction sPwzP     
n.熄灭,消亡,消灭,灭绝,绝种
参考例句:
  • The plant is now in danger of extinction.这种植物现在有绝种的危险。
  • The island's way of life is doomed to extinction.这个岛上的生活方式注定要消失。
22 fusion HfDz5     
n.溶化;熔解;熔化状态,熔和;熔接
参考例句:
  • Brass is formed by the fusion of copper and zinc. 黄铜是通过铜和锌的熔合而成的。
  • This alloy is formed by the fusion of two types of metal.这种合金是用两种金属熔合而成的。
23 recurrence ckazKP     
n.复发,反复,重现
参考例句:
  • More care in the future will prevent recurrence of the mistake.将来的小心可防止错误的重现。
  • He was aware of the possibility of a recurrence of his illness.他知道他的病有可能复发。
24 philosophical rN5xh     
adj.哲学家的,哲学上的,达观的
参考例句:
  • The teacher couldn't answer the philosophical problem.老师不能解答这个哲学问题。
  • She is very philosophical about her bad luck.她对自己的不幸看得很开。
25 monograph 2Eux4     
n.专题文章,专题著作
参考例句:
  • This monograph belongs to the category of serious popular books.这本专著是一本较高深的普及读物。
  • It's a monograph you wrote six years ago.这是你六年前写的的专论。
26 imprisoned bc7d0bcdd0951055b819cfd008ef0d8d     
下狱,监禁( imprison的过去式和过去分词 )
参考例句:
  • He was imprisoned for two concurrent terms of 30 months and 18 months. 他被判处30个月和18个月的监禁,合并执行。
  • They were imprisoned for possession of drugs. 他们因拥有毒品而被监禁。
27 dealing NvjzWP     
n.经商方法,待人态度
参考例句:
  • This store has an excellent reputation for fair dealing.该商店因买卖公道而享有极高的声誉。
  • His fair dealing earned our confidence.他的诚实的行为获得我们的信任。
28 consistency IY2yT     
n.一贯性,前后一致,稳定性;(液体的)浓度
参考例句:
  • Your behaviour lacks consistency.你的行为缺乏一贯性。
  • We appreciate the consistency and stability in China and in Chinese politics.我们赞赏中国及其政策的连续性和稳定性。
29 solely FwGwe     
adv.仅仅,唯一地
参考例句:
  • Success should not be measured solely by educational achievement.成功与否不应只用学业成绩来衡量。
  • The town depends almost solely on the tourist trade.这座城市几乎完全靠旅游业维持。
30 purely 8Sqxf     
adv.纯粹地,完全地
参考例句:
  • I helped him purely and simply out of friendship.我帮他纯粹是出于友情。
  • This disproves the theory that children are purely imitative.这证明认为儿童只会单纯地模仿的理论是站不住脚的。
31 condescend np7zo     
v.俯就,屈尊;堕落,丢丑
参考例句:
  • Would you condescend to accompany me?你肯屈尊陪我吗?
  • He did not condescend to answer.He turned his back on me.他不愿屈尊回答我的问题。他不理睬我。
32 dodge q83yo     
v.闪开,躲开,避开;n.妙计,诡计
参考例句:
  • A dodge behind a tree kept her from being run over.她向树后一闪,才没被车从身上辗过。
  • The dodge was coopered by the police.诡计被警察粉碎了。
33 intermittent ebCzV     
adj.间歇的,断断续续的
参考例句:
  • Did you hear the intermittent sound outside?你听见外面时断时续的声音了吗?
  • In the daytime intermittent rains freshened all the earth.白天里,时断时续地下着雨,使整个大地都生气勃勃了。
34 legitimate L9ZzJ     
adj.合法的,合理的,合乎逻辑的;v.使合法
参考例句:
  • Sickness is a legitimate reason for asking for leave.生病是请假的一个正当的理由。
  • That's a perfectly legitimate fear.怀有这种恐惧完全在情理之中。
35 strictly GtNwe     
adv.严厉地,严格地;严密地
参考例句:
  • His doctor is dieting him strictly.他的医生严格规定他的饮食。
  • The guests were seated strictly in order of precedence.客人严格按照地位高低就座。
36 attains 7244c7c9830392f8f3df1cb8d96b91df     
(通常经过努力)实现( attain的第三人称单数 ); 达到; 获得; 达到(某年龄、水平、状况)
参考例句:
  • This is the period at which the body attains maturity. 这是身体发育成熟的时期。
  • The temperature a star attains is determined by its mass. 恒星所达到的温度取决于它的质量。
37 stimulus 3huyO     
n.刺激,刺激物,促进因素,引起兴奋的事物
参考例句:
  • Regard each failure as a stimulus to further efforts.把每次失利看成对进一步努力的激励。
  • Light is a stimulus to growth in plants.光是促进植物生长的一个因素。
38 apprehension bNayw     
n.理解,领悟;逮捕,拘捕;忧虑
参考例句:
  • There were still areas of doubt and her apprehension grew.有些地方仍然存疑,于是她越来越担心。
  • She is a girl of weak apprehension.她是一个理解力很差的女孩。
39 transcends dfa28a18c43373ca174d5387d99aafdf     
超出或超越(经验、信念、描写能力等)的范围( transcend的第三人称单数 ); 优于或胜过…
参考例句:
  • The chemical dilution technique transcends most of the difficulties. 化学稀释法能克服大部分困难。
  • The genius of Shakespeare transcends that of all other English poets. 莎士比亚的才华胜过所有的其他英国诗人。
40 pointed Il8zB4     
adj.尖的,直截了当的
参考例句:
  • He gave me a very sharp pointed pencil.他给我一支削得非常尖的铅笔。
  • She wished to show Mrs.John Dashwood by this pointed invitation to her brother.她想通过对达茨伍德夫人提出直截了当的邀请向她的哥哥表示出来。
41 justification x32xQ     
n.正当的理由;辩解的理由
参考例句:
  • There's no justification for dividing the company into smaller units. 没有理由把公司划分成小单位。
  • In the young there is a justification for this feeling. 在年轻人中有这种感觉是有理由的。
42 entangles 6d30bed17e1c3a44bcc787a37b12a736     
v.使某人(某物/自己)缠绕,纠缠于(某物中),使某人(自己)陷入(困难或复杂的环境中)( entangle的第三人称单数 )
参考例句:
43 epithet QZHzY     
n.(用于褒贬人物等的)表述形容词,修饰语
参考例句:
  • In "Alfred the Great","the Great"is an epithet.“阿尔弗雷德大帝”中的“大帝”是个称号。
  • It is an epithet that sums up my feelings.这是一个简洁地表达了我思想感情的形容词。
44 polemics 6BNyr     
n.辩论术,辩论法;争论( polemic的名词复数 );辩论;辩论术;辩论法
参考例句:
  • He enjoys polemics, persuasion, and controversy. 他喜欢辩论、说服和争议。 来自辞典例句
  • The modes of propaganda are opportunistic and the polemics can be vicious. 宣传的模式是投机取巧的,诡辩是可恶性的。 来自互联网


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