The appointment of Whitgift to the Archbishopric of Canterbury had been avowedly5 made by the Queen (September 1583) for the purpose of repairing the effects of Grindal’s leniency7, and bringing the Nonconformists to obedience8; “to hold a strait rein9, to press the discipline of his Church, and recover his province to uniformity.” He had set about his work with a thoroughness which brought upon him a storm of reproach from ministers, and greatly embittered10 the controversies11 within the Church.[492] Burghley felt strongly on the question of uniformity, as involving obedience to the law; but Whitgift’s[388] methods were too severe even for him, and produced from him more than one rebuke12. He was the referee13 of all parties—Puritans, Churchmen, and Catholics appealed to him as their friend—and he strove to hold the balance fairly, whilst deprecating extreme views on each side. Leicester and Knollys were ceaseless in the attacks upon the prelates, and Whitgift’s violence made it difficult for Burghley to defend him. In one of his letters to the Archbishop he says, “I am sorry to trouble your Grace, but I am more troubled myself, not only with many private petitions of ministers recommended by persons of credit as being peaceable persons in their ministry14, but yet more with complaints to your Grace and colleagues, greatly troubled; but also I am now daily charged by Councillors and public persons to neglect my duty in not staying your Grace’s proceedings16, so vehement17 and general against ministers and preachers, as the Papists are thereby18 encouraged, and ill-disposed subjects animated20, and her Majesty21’s safety endangered.”
Now that the Puritan party had the upper hand, Burghley’s proverbial middle course was not strong enough for his colleagues, and they determined22 to deal with Prelacy and Papacy at the same time. The first thing was to pack the new Parliament, and in this Leicester laboured unblushingly. Sir Simon D’Ewes’ Journal sets forth23 the great number of blank proxies24 sent to the Earl; and if his letter to the electors of Andover is typical, this is not to be wondered at. He boldly asks them to send him “your election in blank, and I will put in the names.” Another letter from the Privy25 Council to Lord Cobham[493] directs him to obtain the nomination26 of all the members for the Cinque Ports. Parliament met at the end of November, and a formal complaint of the Puritan and Nonconformist ministers was presented to[389] the House of Commons, which, after reducing the number of its articles from thirty-four to sixteen, it adopted and laid before the House of Lords. Whitgift and his colleagues fought hard, cautiously aided by Burghley and the Queen, who, when she afterwards dismissed Parliament, roundly scolded the members for interfering27 with her religious prerogative28; and the only effect of the complaints was to enable Burghley to exert pressure upon the prelates to allay29 their zeal30.
The attack of the militant Protestants against the Catholics, however, was more effectual, although even that was somewhat palliated by Lord Burghley’s moderation. It was evident now that the Catholic League abroad and its instruments would stick at nothing. Father Creighton, the priest who had played so prominent a part in the abortive31 plans of D’Aubigny, Mendoza, and the Jesuits, had been captured with some of his brother seminarists, and the rack had torn from them confirmation32 of the desperate plans of which the Throgmorton conspiracy33 had given an inkling. Leicester and his party had aroused Protestant horror of such projects to fever heat. At his instance an association had been formed, pledged by oath to defend the Queen’s life or to avenge34 it, and to exclude for ever from the throne any person who might benefit by the Queen’s removal. Mary Stuart somewhat naturally regarded the last clause as directed against herself, and endeavoured to take the sting from it by offering her own qualified35 adhesion to the association, which, however, was declined.
When the association was legalised by a bill in Parliament, the Queen (Elizabeth), under Burghley’s influence, sent a message to the House, abating36 some of the objectionable features, and reconciling it with the rules of English equity37. No penalties were to accrue39 before the persons accused had been found guilty by a regular[390] commission, and Mary and her heirs were excused from forfeiture41, unless Elizabeth were assassinated42.
The new bill against Catholics was easily passed, under feelings such as those prevailing43 in the House and the country, and the enactment44 was regarded as a natural retort to the promulgation45 of the Papal bulls in favour of revolution in England. All native Jesuits and seminarists found in England after forty days were to be treated as traitors47, and it was felony to shelter or harbour them. English students or priests abroad were to be forced to return within six months and take the oath of supremacy49, or incur50 the penalty for high treason; and many similar provisions were made, by which the world could see that the militant Protestants of England had picked up the gage51 thrown down by Philip and the Pope. Henceforward it was to be war to the knife until one side or the other was vanquished52, and Lord Burghley’s astute53 policy of balance and compromise was cast into the background after a quarter of a century of almost unbroken success.[494]
Almost the only dissenting54 voice in the House of Commons against the penal38 bill was that of Dr. William Parry, member for Queenborough. In a violent and abusive speech, he said that the House was so evidently biassed57 that it was useless to give it the special reasons he had for opposing the bill, but would state them to the Queen alone. This was considered insulting to the House, and he was committed to the charge of the sergeant-at-arms, but was released by the Queen and Council the following day. The events which followed form one of the unsolved riddles58 of history. Parry was a man of bad[391] character, who for years had been one of Burghley’s many spies upon the English refugees on the Continent. He appears, however, to have been esteemed59 more highly by the Treasurer60 than such instruments usually are.
When young Anthony Bacon was sent on his travels to France, his uncle, Burghley, specially61 instructed him to cultivate the acquaintance of Dr. Parry. Leicester complained to the Queen of this, and the Lord Treasurer undertook that his nephew should not be shaken either in loyalty62 or religion by his acquaintanceship with Parry.[495] After the latter returned to England in 1583 he was elected member of the Parliament of the following year, after having persistently63 but unsuccessfully begged a sinecure65 office from Burghley. From his first arrival he had been full of real or pretended plots for the assassination66 of the Queen, which he professed67 to have discovered on the Continent. He was, like all men of his profession, an unprincipled scamp, and made these secret disclosures the ground for ceaseless demands for reward. He was disappointed and discontented, as well as vain and boastful, and overshot the mark. In one of his interviews with the Queen he produced a somewhat doubtfully worded letter of approval from the Papal Secretary of State, Cardinal69 Como,[496] which, he said, referred to a pretended project undertaken by him (Parry) for the murder of the Queen. He talked loosely to Charles Neville and other Catholics of this plot as a real one, and six weeks[392] after his escapade in Parliament was arrested and lodged70 in jail. At first he would admit nothing, but the fear of the rack, or some other motive71, produced from him a full and complete confession72 of a regular plan—once, he said, nearly executed—for killing73 Elizabeth; but before sentence he vehemently74 retracted75, and appealed to the knowledge of the Queen, Burghley, and Walsingham that he was innocent. But if they possessed76 this knowledge they never revealed it, and Parry died the revolting death of a traitor46, clamouring to the last that Elizabeth herself was responsible for his sacrifice.
It cannot be doubted that Parry was an agent provocateur, and great question arises as to the reality of the crime for which he was punished. I have found no trace in the Spanish correspondence of his having been a tool of Mendoza or Philip, such as exists in the cases of Throgmorton, Babington, and others; and I consider that the evidence generally favours the idea that he was deliberately77 caught in his own lure78, and sacrificed in order to aggravate79 the anti-Catholic fervour in the country, and secure the passage of the penal enactments80. In one particular I dissent55 from nearly every historian who has written on the subject. All fingers point at Lord Burghley as the author of the plan. I look upon it as being the work of Leicester, Knollys, and Walsingham. It was they, and not Burghley, who were anxious to strengthen the fervent81 Protestant party. It was they, and not Burghley, who were forcing the penal enactments through the Parliament they had packed. The Treasurer could hardly have been blind to what was going on, but he could not afford to champion Parry. The latter, a venal82 scoundrel known to be in Burghley’s pay, but discontented with his patron, was doubtless bought by Leicester to play his part in Parliament, and afterwards to confess the Catholic plot on[393] the assurance of pardon, with the object of blackening the Catholics, and perhaps, by implication, Burghley as well.
That Leicester’s friends were at the time seeking to represent the Lord Treasurer as against the Protestant cause is clear from several indignant letters written by Burghley himself. “If they cannot,” he says, “prove all their lies, let them make use of any one proof wherewith to prove me guilty of falsehood, injustice83, bribery84 or dissimulation85 or double-dealing86 in Council, either with her Majesty or with her Councillors. Let them charge me on any point that I have not dealt as earnestly with the Queen to aid the afflicted87 in the Low Countries to withstand the increasing power of the King of Spain, the assurance of the King of Scots to be tied to her Majesty with reward, yea, with the greatest pension that any other hath. If in any of these I am proved to be behind or slower than any in a discreet88 manner, I will yield myself worthy89 of perpetual reproach as though I were guilty of all they use to bluster90 against me. They that say in rash and malicious91 mockery that England is become Regnum Cecilianum may use their own cankered humour.” In July of the same year he writes in similar strain to Sir Thomas Edmunds:[497] “If you knew how earnest a course I hold with her Majesty, both privately92 and openly, for her to retain the King of Scots with friendship and liberality, yea, and to retain the Master of Gray and Justice-Clerk, with rewards to continue their offices, which indeed are well known to me to be very good, you would think there could be no more shameful93 lies made by Satan himself than these be; and finding myself thus maliciously94 bitten with the tongues and pens of courtiers here, if God did not comfort me, I had cause to fear murdering hands or poisoning points; but God is my keeper.”
[394]
The more or less hollow negotiations95 for the liberation of Mary, and for the association of her son with herself in her sovereign rights, had dragged on intermittently97 for years. Burghley himself has set forth the reasons for the successive failures;[498] in each case the discovery of some fresh plot in her favour. The serious set of conspiracies98 brought to light in 1584 had caused her removal from the mild custody99 of Burghley’s friend, Lord Shrewsbury, to that of the rigid100 Puritan, Sir Amyas Paulet, at Tutbury. In her troubles the captive Queen, like every one else, appealed to Burghley, and especially in the matter of the reckless accusations101 of immorality102 brought by the Countess of Shrewsbury and her Cavendish sons against her husband and Mary.[499]
Burghley’s kindness in this matter, and his attempts to soften103 the fresh severity of the Queen’s captivity104, had not only persuaded Mary’s agents that he was her friend,[500] but had given to Leicester and his party an excuse for spreading rumours105 to the Treasurer’s detriment107. At an inopportune time, Nau, Mary’s French secretary, had gone to London with new plans of associated sovereignty; but almost simultaneously108 the Master of Gray had arrived as James’s Ambassador. He was easily bought by the English Government, as we have seen, with the full approval of Burghley;[501] and on his return to Scotland promptly109 caused the rejection110 by the Lords of Nau’s project in favour of Mary. It was never on the question of securing the Scots by bribery to the English interest that Burghley was remiss111. It was open war with Spain that he always opposed.
In the meanwhile the toils112 were closing round the unhappy[395] Mary. She had now thrown herself entirely113 into the arms of Spain; and the Guises114 were being gradually but steadily116 forced into the background by Philip, as being likely to frustrate117 his plans, by claiming for their kinsman118, James Stuart, the succession of England after his mother. Every letter to and from Tutbury was intercepted119 by Paulet. Morgan, Charles Paget, Robert Bruce, and others, in their communications with Mary, laid bare her hopes and their intrigues120.[502] If any doubts had previously121 existed as to the intentions of Spain and the Queen of Scots, they could exist no longer. The only question for England was how best to withstand the combination against her. Here, as usual, Burghley was at issue with the now dominant122 party of militant Protestants; and equally, as usual, his opposition123 was cautious and indirect. Leicester and his friends were for open operations against Spain both in the Netherlands and on the high seas, and for helping124 Henry III. to withstand the Guises; whilst the Treasurer preferred to stand on the defensive125, and keep as much money in hand as possible.[503] Elizabeth rarely required urging to parsimony126, and by appealing to her weakness Burghley was able for a time to moderate the plans of the other party.
But events were too strong for him. Mainly by his influence Leicester had been restrained since 1580 from subsidising a great expedition against Philip in favour of the Portuguese127 Pretender, Don Antonio; but in the spring of 1585 the treacherous128 seizure129 of English ships in Spain had aroused the English to fury. Drake’s great expedition of twenty-nine ships was fitted out, and general reprisals130 authorised. Never was an expedition[396] more popular than this, for the English sailors were aching for a fight with foes132 they knew they could beat, and Burghley’s cautions were scouted133. Drake’s fleet sailed in September, doubtful to the last moment whether the Queen would not be prevailed upon to stay it;[504] and by sacking Santo Domingo and ravaging134 Santiago and Cartagena almost without hindrance135, demonstrated the ineffective clumsiness of Philip’s methods. Leicester and the war-party were now almost unrestrained; for the Lord Treasurer made the best of it, and confined his efforts to minimising the cost of the new policy as much as possible, and suggesting caution to the Queen.
The Commissioners136 from the States continued to urge the Queen to assume the sovereignty of the Netherlands, and to govern the country, either directly or through a nominee137; but this was a responsibility which neither she nor Burghley cared to accept. At length, after much hesitation138 on the part of the Queen, Sir John Norris was sent with an English force of 5000 men to take possession of the strong cautionary places offered by the Hollanders, and Leicester was designated to follow as Lieutenant139-General of the Queen’s forces (September 1585).
Elizabeth approached the business with fear and trembling. It was a departure from Burghley’s safe and tried policy, and was involving her in large expenditure140. She distrusted rebels and popular governments; she did not like to send away her best troops in a time of danger, and she railed often and loudly at Leicester and Walsingham for dragging her into such a pass. Only a day after Leicester’s appointment she changed her mind and bade him suspend his preparations. “Her pleasure is,” wrote Walsingham, “that you proceed no further until you speak with her. How this cometh about I know not.[397] The matter is to be kept secret. These changes here may work some such changes in the Low Countries as may prove irreparable. God give her Majesty another mind, … or it will work both hers and her best affected141 subjects’ ruin.”[505] To this Leicester wrote one letter of submission142 to be shown to the Queen, and the other for Walsingham’s own eye, full of indignation. “This,” he says, “is the strangest dealing in the world.… What must be thought of such an alteration143? I am weary of life and all.”
Elizabeth had, however, gone too far now to retire, and Leicester’s journey went forward. But it is plain to see that whilst he was making his preparations to act as sovereign on his own account, the Queen, influenced by Burghley, was drafting his instructions in a way that strictly144 limited his power for harm, and minimised her responsibility towards Spain. Leicester was directed to “let the States understand that whereby their Commissioners made offer unto her Majesty, first of the sovereignty of those countries, which for sundry145 respects she did not accept; secondly146, under her protection to be governed absolutely by such as her Majesty would appoint and send over as her Lieutenant. That her Majesty, although she would not take so much upon her as to command them in such absolute sort, yet unless they should show themselves forward to use the advice of her Majesty … she would think her favours unworthily bestowed147 upon them.”
This must have been gall148 and wormwood for Leicester, for in his own notes he lays down as his guiding principles, “First, that he have as much authoryte as the Prince of Orange had; or any other Captain-General hath had heretofore: second, that there be as much allowance by the States for the said Governor as the[398] Prince had, with all offices apportenaunt.”[506] He had infinite trouble in getting money from the Queen, and went so far as to offer to pledge his own lands to her as security; but at last, in December, all was ready, and Leicester foolishly went to Holland with his vague ambitions, leaving Burghley in possession at home. It is plain from his beseeching149 letter of farewell to the Lord Treasurer that he recognised the danger. He prays him earnestly not to have any change made in the plans agreed upon, and to provide sufficient resources for the sake of the cause involved and for the Queen’s honour. “Hir Majesty, I se, my lord, often tymes doth fall into myslyke of this cause, and sondry opinions yt may brede in hir withal, but I trust in the Lord, seeing hir Highness hath thus far resolved, and gone also to this far executyon as she hath, and that myne and other menne’s poor lives are adventured for hir sake, that she will fortify151 and mainteyn her own action to the full performance that she hath agreed on.”[507] Burghley was very ill at the time, unable to rise from his couch, but in answer to the Earl’s appeal he assured him that he would consider himself “accursed in the sight of God” if he did not strive earnestly to promote the success of the expedition.
The Lord Treasurer was, of course, sincere in his desire to prevent the collapse152 of the Protestant cause in the Netherlands, for he had never ceased for years to insist that the quietude of England mainly depended upon it. Where he differed from Leicester was in his determination, if possible, to avoid such action as would lead to an open breach153 with Spain. Before even Leicester landed at Flushing he had begun to quarrel with the Dutchmen, and in a fortnight was intriguing154 to obtain an offer of the sovereignty of the[399] States for himself. The offer was made, and modestly refused at first; but on further pressure Leicester accepted the sovereignty, as he had intended to do from the first (January 1586). The rage of Elizabeth knew no bounds. This would make her infamous155, she said, to all the world. Leicester was timid at the consequences of the step he had taken, and made matters worse by delaying for weeks to write explanations to the angry Queen. Walsingham and Hatton did their best, but very ineffectually, to appease156 her. Burghley in a letter to Leicester (7th February) assured him that he too had done so, and that he himself approved of his action, and hoped to “move her Majesty to alter her hard opinion.” As we have seen, Burghley’s opposition was seldom direct, and it may be accepted as probable that he mildly deprecated the Queen’s anger against her favourite; but a remark in a letter (17th February) from Davison, who was sent by Leicester to explain and extenuate157 his act to the Queen,[508] seems to show that the Lord Treasurer’s advocacy had not been so earnest as he would have had Leicester to believe.
The Queen had ordered Heneage to go to Holland post-haste, to command Leicester openly to abandon his new title; but from the 7th February till the 14th, whilst Heneage’s harsh instructions were being drafted, Burghley was diplomatically absent from court, and the pleading of Walsingham and Hatton had no softening158 effect upon the Queen. On the 13th February, Davison at length[400] arrived with Leicester’s excuses. The Queen railed and stormed until he was reduced to tears. She refused at first to receive Leicester’s letter or to delay Heneage’s departure. Burghley arrived the next day, and Davison writes on the 17th that he “had successfully exerted himself to convince the Lord Treasurer that the measures adopted were necessary, and that his Lordship had urged the Queen on the subject.”
The only effect of Burghley’s persuasion159, however, was to obtain for Heneage discretion160 to withhold161, if he considered necessary, the Queen’s letter to the States, and to save Leicester from the degradation162 of a public renunciation. Burghley had thus done his best to preserve Leicester’s friendship and gratitude163; but, after all, it was his policy, and not that of Leicester, that was triumphant164. Heneage was a friend of the Earl’s, and on his arrival in Holland delayed action; but the Queen was not to be appeased165. She had, she said, been slighted, and her commission exceeded, and would send no money till her instructions were fulfilled. Confusion and danger naturally resulted, and Leicester’s friends redoubled their efforts to save him. Burghley himself assured Leicester (31st March) that he had threatened to resign his office unless she changed her course. “I used boldly such language in this matter, as I found her doubtful whether to charge me with presumption166, which partly she did, or with some astonishment167 of my round speech, which truly was no other than my conscience did move me, even in amaritudine anima. And then her Majesty began to be more calm than before, and, as I conceived, readier to qualify her displeasure.”[509]
When the Queen saw that Heneage and Leicester were construing168 her leniency into acquiescence169 of the Earl’s action, she blazed out again; and when Burghley[401] begged her to allow Heneage to return and explain the circumstances, “she grew so passionate170 in the matter that she forbade me to argue more;” and herself wrote a letter to Heneage containing these words: “Do as you are bidden, and leave your considerations for your own affairs; for in some things you had clear commandment, which you did not do, and in others none, which you did.” At the urgent prayer of the States, however, representing the danger to the cause which a public deposition171 of Leicester would bring about, the Queen finally allowed matters to rest until they could devise some harmless way out of the difficulty.
Throughout the whole business Burghley almost ostentatiously acted the part of Leicester’s friend. It was a safe course for him to take, for the Queen was so angry that he could keep the good-will of Leicester and the Protestants, and yet be certain of the ultimate failure of his opponent. As soon as the States understood Leicester’s position, and had realised his incompetence172, they were only too anxious to be rid of him; and throughout his inglorious government Burghley could well speak in his favour, for it must have been evident that the Earl was working his own ruin, and that his position was untenable. One curious feature in the matter is that both Burghley and Walsingham hinted to Leicester that the Queen was being influenced by some one underhand. “Surely,” writes the Secretary, “there is some treachery amongst ourselves, for I cannot think she would do this out of her own head;” and the gossip of the court pointed68 at Ralegh, who wrote to Leicester[510] vigorously protesting against the calumny173.
There were, however, wheels within wheels in Elizabeth’s court. Two of her Councillors were Spanish spies, Ralegh was Burghley’s partisan174, the Conservative party[402] in favour of friendship with the House of Burgundy was not dead, and, notwithstanding all that has been written, it may be fairly assumed that the decadence176 of Leicester and the militant Protestant party during the Earl’s absence in Holland did not take place without some secret prompting from Lord Burghley.
In the meanwhile the plans for the invasion of England were gradually maturing in Philip’s slow mind. The raid of Drake’s fleet upon his colonies, and Leicester’s assumption of the sovereignty of the Netherlands, had at last convinced Philip, after nearly thirty years of hesitancy, that England must be coerced177 into Catholicism, or Spain must descend178 from its high estate. So long as the elevation179 of Mary Stuart meant a Guisan domination of England, with shifty James as his mother’s heir, it had not suited Philip to squander180 his much needed resources upon the overthrow181 of Elizabeth; but by this time Guise115 was pledged to vast ambitions in France, which could only be realised by Philip’s help. The Jesuits and English Catholics had persuaded the Spaniard that he would be welcomed in England, whilst a Scot or a Frenchman would be resisted to the death. Most of Mary’s agents, too, had been bribed182 to the same side, and Mendoza in Paris was her prime adviser183 and mainstay. Various attempts were made by the Scottish Catholics and Guise’s friends to manage the subjugation184 of England over the Scottish Border; but though Philip affected to listen to their approaches, and used them as a diversion, his plan was already fixed—England must be won by Spaniards in Mary’s name, and be held thenceforward in Spanish hands. Mary was ready to agree to anything, and at the prompting of Philip’s agents she disinherited her son (June 1586) in favour of the King of Spain. Morgan, Paget, and others had at last succeeded in reopening communication[403] with Mary, who had now lost all hope of release except by force. A close alliance between England and James VI. had been agreed to: she knew that no help would come from her son or his Government; and her many letters to Charles Paget, to Mendoza, and to Philip himself, leave no doubt whatever that she was fully64 cognisant of the plans for the overthrow, and perhaps murder, of Elizabeth, in order that she, Mary, might be raised by Spanish pikes to the English throne.[511]
In May 1586 the priest Ballard had seen Mendoza in Paris, and had sought the countenance185 of Spain for the assassination of Elizabeth; and in August the matter had so far progressed as to enable Gifford to give to Mendoza full particulars of the vile186 plan. There was, according to his account, hardly a Catholic or schismatic gentleman in England who was not in favour of the plot; and though Philip always distrusted a conspiracy known to many, he promised armed help from Flanders if the Queen were killed. Mendoza, when he saw Gifford, recommended that Don Antonio, Burghley, Walsingham, Hunsdon, Knollys, and Beale should be killed; but the King wrote on the margin187 of the letter, “It does not matter so much about Cecil, although he is a great heretic, but he is very old, and it was he who[404] advised the understandings with the Prince of Parma, and he has done no harm. It would be advisable to do as he [i.e. Mendoza] says with the others.”[512]
The folly188 of Babington and his friends almost passes belief. They seem to have been prodigal189 of their confidences, and to have had no apprehension190 of treachery. Babington’s own letter to Mary setting forth in full all the plans in favour of “his dear sovereign” (6th July) was handed immediately by the false agent Gifford to Walsingham. No move was made by Walsingham, except to send the clever clerk Phillips to Chartley to decipher all intercepted letters on the spot, and so to avoid delay in their delivery, which might arouse the suspicion of the conspirators191. Surrounded by spies and traitors, but in fancied security, the unhappy Queen involved herself daily deeper in the traps laid for her; approved of Babington’s wild plans, and made provision for her own release, whilst Walsingham watched and waited. When the proofs were incontestable, and all in the Secretary’s hands, the blow fell. On the 4th August Ballard was arrested, Babington and the intended murderer Savage192 a day or so afterwards, and Mary Stuart’s doom193 was sealed. She was hurried off temporarily to Tixhall; Nau and Curll were placed under arrest, the Queen’s papers seized, and her rooms closely examined. Amias Paulet was a faithful jailer, and he did his work well. “Amyas, my most faithful, careful servant,” wrote Elizabeth, “God reward thee treblefold for the most troublesome charge so well discharged. If you knew, my Amyas, how kindly194, besides most dutifully, my grateful heart accepts and[405] prizes your spotless endeavours and faultless actions, your wise orders and safe regard, performed in so dangerous and crafty195 a charge, it would ease your travail196 and rejoice your heart.… Let your wicked murderess know how with hearty197 sorrow her vile deserts compel these orders, and bid her from me ask God’s forgiveness for her treacherous dealing.” Elizabeth and her ministers rightly appreciated the great peril198 which she had escaped, and from the first it was recognised by most of them that Mary had forfeited200 all claim to consideration at their hands.[513]
It is usually assumed by a certain class of writers that Mary was unjustly hounded to her death, mainly by the personal enmity of Lord Burghley. Nothing, in reality, is more distant from the truth. A most dangerous conspiracy against the government and religion of England had been discovered, in which she was a prime mover. Her accomplices201 rightly suffered the penalty of their crime,[514] and it was due to justice and to the safety of the country that the mainspring of the conspiracy should be disabled for further harm. But still the matter was a delicate and dangerous one, for Catholics were numerous in England, and the great Catholic confederacy abroad was ready to take any advantage which a false step on the part of Elizabeth might give them. As we have seen, moreover, the feelings of the Queen[406] of England herself with regard to the sacredness of anointed sovereigns was strong, and no more difficult problem had ever faced the Government than how to dispose of their troublesome guest in a way that should in future safeguard England from her machinations, whilst respecting the many susceptibilities involved. As usual in moments of difficulty, Elizabeth turned to her aged19 minister,[515] and as a result of a long private conference with him the question was submitted to the Privy Council. The Catholic members advocated only a further stringency202 in Mary’s imprisonment203. Leicester was in favour of solving the difficulty by the aid of poison,[516] whilst Burghley, followed by Walsingham and others, proposed a regular judicial204 inquiry205, which was now legally possible by virtue206 of the Act of Association passed by Parliament in the previous year. A commission was consequently issued on the 6th October for the trial of Mary, containing the names of forty-six of the principal peers and judges, and all the Councillors, but only after some bickering207 between the Queen and Burghley with regard to the style to be given to Mary and other details.[517]
Before this point had been reached, however, measures had been taken to test the feeling of foreign powers on the subject. Diplomatic relations had ceased between Spain and England; but as soon as the Babington conspiracy[407] was discovered, Walsingham impressed upon Chateauneuf, the French Ambassador, that the Spaniards were at the bottom of it, and that it was directed almost as much against the King of France as against Elizabeth herself. The Ambassador himself was a strong Guisan,[518] and personally was an object of odium and suspicion to the excited Londoners; but his master’s hatred208 of the Guises and dread209 of their objects was growing daily, and when Madame de Montpensier prayed Henry to intercede210 for the protection of Mary, she obtained but a cold answer;[519] and no official step by the French was taken in her favour at the time, except as a matter of justice Elizabeth was requested that she might have the assistance of counsel. It was clear, therefore, that Henry III. would not go to war for the sake of his sister-in-law.
Mary was removed to Fotheringay for trial on the 6th October, and on the following day Paulet and Mildmay delivered to her Elizabeth’s letter, informing her of the charges against her, and the tribunal to which she was to be submitted. She indignantly refused to acknowledge Elizabeth’s right to place her, an anointed sovereign, upon her trial; but she denied all knowledge and complicity in the murder plot. This was the safest attitude she could have assumed, although the proofs against her already in the hands of Elizabeth were overwhelming;[520][408] and the arguments of Burghley and Lord Chancellor211 Bromley failed to alter Mary’s determination. This was embarrassing, and in the face of it Elizabeth wrote to Burghley[521] instructing him that, although the examination might proceed, no judgment212 was to be delivered until she had conferred with him. At the same time she wrote to Mary a letter of mingled213 threats and hope, with the object of changing her attitude towards the tribunal. This, added to the persuasions214 of Hatton, succeeded in the object,[522] and Mary, unfortunately for her, retreated from her unassailable position.
On the 14th, two days afterwards, the tribunal sat in the great hall of Fotheringay Castle, and Mary, almost crippled with rheumatism215, painfully hobbled to her place, supported by her Steward216, Sir Andrew Melvil. On the right of the Lord Chancellor sat Lord Burghley. That the proceedings against Mary, in which he had from the first taken an active part, were in his opinion necessary for the safety of England, is clear from his many letters upon the subject; but it is equally evident that if he could decently have avoided personal identification with them he would have been better pleased. His letters to Popham, the Attorney-General, show that he wished to be absent from the trial; but as he wrote at the time to Sir Edward Stafford, the English Ambassador in France, “I was never more toiled217 than I have been of late, and yet am, with services that here do multiply daily; and whosoever scapeth I am never spared. God give me grace.”
Much of the obloquy218 that has been unjustly cast upon him in the matter of Mary Stuart arises from his inveterate219 habit of putting everything in writing, which other men did not do. For instance, the draft of the whole case, or, as he puts it, “the indignities220 and wrongs done and[409] offered by the Queen of Scots to the Queen,” is in his handwriting,[523] and the letters to the Queen detailing the progress of events at Fotheringay are sent from him, whilst Elizabeth’s instructions through Davison are all addressed to Walsingham and Burghley. But it must be remembered that he was the Queen’s most trusted and experienced Councillor, and the existence of records written by or to him does not show that he was more eager than the rest for the sacrifice of the Scottish Queen.
Mary defended herself with consummate221 ability before a tribunal almost entirely prejudiced against her. She was deprived of legal aid, without her papers, and in ill health; and, according to modern notions, the procedure against her was unjust in the extreme. Once she turned upon Walsingham and denounced him as the contriver222 of her ruin, but soon regained223 her composure; and in her argument with Burghley, with respect to the avowals of Babington and her Secretaries, reached a point of touching224 eloquence225 which might have moved the hearts, though it did not convince the intellects, of her august judges.[524] But her condemnation226 was a foregone conclusion; and although the sentence was not pronounced until the return of the Commission to Westminster (October 25), Mary left the hall of Fotheringay practically a condemned228 felon48 on the 15th.
But it was one thing to condemn227 and another thing to execute. Here Elizabeth’s scruples229 again assailed230[410] her. The two Houses of Parliament addressed her on the 12th November, begging that for the sake of the realm and her own safety the sentence might be carried into effect. At no point of her career was the profound duplicity of Elizabeth more resorted to than now. She had evidently determined that Mary must die, which is of itself not surprising; but she was equally determined that, if she could help it, no blame should personally attach to her for having disregarded the privileges of a crowned head. After much pretended sorrow and repudiation231 of any desire for revenge, but at the same time setting forth a careful recapitulation of Mary’s offences, she complained of Parliament for passing the Act which made it necessary for her to pronounce sentence of death on a kinswoman, and said she must take time for prayer and contemplation before she could give an answer to the petition. A few days afterwards she besought232 the Houses to consider again whether some other course could not be adopted instead of executing Mary, but she was assured by them that there was “no other sound and assured means” than that which they had formerly233 recommended (18th November). Her next address to the Houses was still more hypocritical. After infinite talk of her mercy, her goodness, and her hatred of bloodshed, even for her own safety, she ended enigmatically: “Therefore if I should say I would not do what you request, it might be peradventure more than I thought, and to say I would do it might perhaps breed peril of what you labour to preserve, being more than in your own wisdoms and discretions would seem convenient.”[525]
Several days before this, Mary’s sentence had been communicated to her by Lord Buckhurst and Beale. She was dignified234 and courageous235, rejoiced that she was to die, as she said, for the Catholic faith, and again[411] affirmed that she had taken no part in the plot for the murder of Elizabeth, which was doubtless true so far as active participation236 or direction was concerned. Her letters written immediately afterwards to Mendoza[526] and the Duke of Guise[527] are conceived in the same spirit, and appear to entertain no expectation of mercy. The Spaniards, however, were more hopeful, and ascribed to Burghley a deep scheme for selling Mary’s life to France, in exchange for concessions237 to English interests.
The arrangements for the invasion of England by a great fleet from Spain were now so far advanced as to be impossible of concealment238, and the English Government were actively239 adopting measures of defence and reprisal131. Under the transparent240 pretext241 of aiding Don Antonio, English armed ships were hounding Spanish commerce from the seas and harrying242 Spanish settlements; the English troops under Leicester, and the Scots under the Master of Gray, were fighting Spaniards in Holland, and the English militant Protestant party had now supplanted243 Burghley’s policy on all sides. But still the cautious old statesman patiently worked in his own way to minimise the dangers with which his political opponents had already surrounded the Queen. There were two things only that he could do, namely, once more to endeavour to disarm244 Spain by making a show of friendship, and to sow discord245 between France and Spain; and both these things he did. One of Ralegh’s privateers had captured Philip’s governor of Patagonia, the famous explorer and navigator, Sarmiento; and almost simultaneously with the passing of Mary’s sentence, Ralegh was invited to bring his prisoner to Cecil House for a private conference. Sarmiento was flattered and made much of,[412] and received his free release on condition of his taking to Spain messages from Burghley and Ralegh suggesting a friendly arrangement between the countries. Ralegh, indeed, went so far as to offer—whether sincerely or not does not affect the question—two of his ships for Philip’s service, and for many weeks sympathetic messages found their way secretly from the Lord Treasurer and Sir Walter to Spain and Flanders.[528]
At the same time Sir Henry Wotton was sent to Paris with certified246 copies of Mary’s will in favour of Philip, and of her correspondence with Mendoza. “He is instructed to point out how much she depended upon your Majesty, and how shy she was of France.”[529] This was exactly the course most likely to alienate247 Henry III. from Spain and his sister-in-law; and although he tardily248 sent Pomponne de Bellièvre to remonstrate249 with Elizabeth, the Spaniards and Guisans, at all events, never believed in the sincerity250 of his protests.[530] Mendoza writes: “Elizabeth has given orders that directly Bellièvre arrives in England the rumour106 is to be spread that the Queen of Scots is killed, in order to discover how he takes it. Bellièvre, however, is forewarned of it, and has his instructions what[413] to say when he hears it. It is a plan of Cecil’s arising out of a desire (as I wrote to your Majesty) to sell to the French on the best terms they can what they do not dream of carrying out. The English and French will have no difficulty in agreeing on the point, because the King and his mother are very well pleased that the Queen of Scots should be kept alive, though a prisoner, in order to prevent the succession of your Majesty to the English throne; whilst the English see plainly that the many advantages accruing251 to them from keeping the Queen of Scots a prisoner would change into as many dangers if they made away with her.”[531]
On the 6th December public proclamation of Mary’s sentence was made in London amidst signs of extravagant252 rejoicing on the part of the populace. The next day Bellièvre delivered a long speech to the Queen, in which he made no attempt to deny Mary’s guilt40, but appealed to Elizabeth’s magnanimity, and proposed guarantees from France to insure Mary’s future harmlessness. The Queen repeated bitterly her grievances253 against Mary, and replied that the life of Mary was incompatible254 with her own safety; and Lord Burghley, in a subsequent interview with the Frenchman, repeated more emphatically the same idea. Shortly afterwards, at the renewed request of Bellièvre and Chateauneuf, Elizabeth ungraciously consented to grant a respite255 of twelve days to Mary to enable the Ambassadors to communicate with their master. But Henry III. himself was now in a hopeless condition. “Such is the confusion of the court, the vacillation256 of the King, and the jealousy257, hatred, and suspicion of the courtiers, that decisions are adopted and abandoned at random258.… The King is trying to draw closer to the Queen of England, which is[414] the principal object of Bellièvre’s mission.”[532] The only reply, therefore, sent to Bellièvre and Chateauneuf from France was a pedantic259 and wordy appeal to Elizabeth’s mercy, which must have convinced her that she need fear nothing from the French.[533]
Notwithstanding the first movement of indignation on the part of James also, it soon became clear that selfish reasons would confine his action to protest. This is not altogether to be wondered at. He had been informed that Mary had disinherited him, and told De Courcelles, the French Ambassador, that he knew “she had no more good-will towards him than towards the Queen of England.” The Master of Gray, at his side, too, was the humble260 servant of England, and the traitor, Archibald Douglas, represented him in the English court. On pressure from France, however, James sent Sir William Keith, another English partisan, to intercede for his mother, or at least to induce Elizabeth to delay the execution until a fitting embassy from him might be sent. Elizabeth hectored and stormed at James’s threatening letters; but when she became calmer she granted the twelve days’ respite already referred to. The Master of[415] Gray and Sir Robert Melvil subsequently arrived at the English court and were equally unsuccessful.[534] Melvil undoubtedly261 did his best, and Elizabeth threatened his life in consequence; but the Master of Gray’s advocacy went no further than he knew would please the English Government.
It is certain that Elizabeth herself had decided262 that Mary should die, if the execution could be carried out without uniting France and Spain against her, and especially if she herself could manage to escape personal opprobrium263. Of Lord Burghley’s personal opinion on the matter it is extremely difficult to judge. He is generally represented by historians as being the prime enemy and persecutor264 of the unhappy woman, which he certainly was not. He was a cautious man and took his stand behind legal forms; but the slightest slackness on his part was represented by Leicester and his friends as a desire to curry265 favour with Mary. He, the Howards, Crofts, and the other conservatives were, as usual, desirous of staving off the rupture266 with Spain, but dared not appear for a moment to favour so unpopular a cause as that of Mary. The truth of this view is partly shown by the revelations of Sir Edward Stafford, the English Ambassador in Paris, a great friend of Burghley’s and a paid agent of Spain. Stafford told Charles Arundell in January that Burghley had written that Bellièvre had not acted so cleverly as they had expected, and if that he (Burghley) had not prompted him he would have done worse still.[416] “He was advised to ask for private audience without Chateauneuf, and was closeted with the Queen, who was accompanied by only four persons. What passed at the interview was consequently not known; but that he (Cecil) could assure him (Stafford) that the Queen of Scotland’s life would be spared, although she would be kept so close that she would not be able to carry on her plots as hitherto. This is what I have always assured your Majesty was desired by the Queen of England, as well as the King of France. Cecil also says that, although he has constantly shown himself openly against the Queen of Scots, Leicester and Walsingham, his enemies, had tried to set the Queen against him by saying that he was more devoted267 to the Queen of Scotland than any one. But she (Elizabeth) had seen certain papers in her (Mary’s) coffers that told greatly against Leicester, and the Queen had told the latter and Walsingham that they were a pair of knaves268, and she saw plainly now that, owing to her not having taken the advice of certain good and loyal subjects of hers, she was in peril of losing her throne and her life, by burdening herself with a war which she was unable to carry on. She said if she had done her duty as Queen she would have had them both hanged.”[535]
By this and several similar pronouncements it would appear that Burghley, true to his invariable method, was still by indirect and cautious steps endeavouring to lead the Queen back to the moderate path from which Leicester, Walsingham, and the militant Protestants had diverted her; and that, very far from being the mortal enemy of Mary, he would probably have saved her if he could have done it with perfect harmlessness to himself, and have insured the future security of the Queen[417] and Government. But whilst the Queen was very slowly being influenced by the Catholics and Conservatives near her, events were precipitated269 and Mary paid the last penalty. There is no space in this work to tell in detail the obscure and much debated story of the issue of the warrant for Mary’s execution;[536] but a summary glance at Burghley’s share in it cannot be excluded in any biography of the statesman. Soon after the proclamation of the sentence (6th December 1586) Elizabeth herself directed Burghley to draft the warrant for the execution. He did so, and sent for Secretary Davison—Walsingham being absent from illness—and informed him that as he, Burghley, was returning to London, the court then being at Richmond, he would leave the draft with Davison that it might be engrossed270 and presented to the Queen for signature. When Davison laid the document before the Queen she told him to keep it back for the present. Six weeks passed without anything more being done, and Leicester in the interval271 complained to Davison, in Burghley’s presence, of his remissness272 in not again laying the document before the Queen.
The Master of Gray left London at the end of January, and on the 1st February Lord Admiral Howard told the Queen that there was much disquieting273 talk in the country with regard to attempts to be made for the rescue of Mary, &c.[537] Elizabeth then requested Howard to send for Davison and direct him to lay the warrant before her for signature. The Secretary accordingly carried the warrant to the Queen, who was full of smiles and amiability274, and asked him what he had there. Davison told her, and she signed the warrant, explaining[418] to him whilst doing so, that she had hitherto delayed it for the sake of her own reputation. Then, with a joke, she handed the signed warrant back to him, and, according to Davison, bade him carry it at once to the Lord Chancellor, have it sealed with the great seal as privately as possible, and send it away to the Commissioners, so that she should hear no more about it.
Elizabeth afterwards, however, swore that she had given him no such instructions. As he was leaving, Elizabeth directed him to call on Walsingham, who was confined to his house by illness, and to tell him what had been done. She then spoke275 bitterly of Amias Paulet for not having made the warrant unnecessary, and hinted to Davison that he might write to Paulet again suggesting the poisoning of Mary. This Davison demurred276 at doing, as he knew that it would be fruitless, and he did not relish277 the task, but promised to mention it to Walsingham. The Secretary’s story is that he went straight to Lord Burghley and showed him and Leicester the warrant, repeating the Queen’s directions. He then proceeded to Walsingham House; and the result of his visit is seen in a memorandum278 (dated the next day, 2nd February) in Walsingham’s hand, annotated279 by Lord Burghley, laying down the steps to be taken for immediately carrying the warrant into effect.[538] The fullest details, even for the burial, are set forth, and at the end it is directed that “the Lords and court are to give out that there will be no execution.”
Thus far Davison’s statement has been followed; but there is at Hatfield (part iii., No. 472) a rough draft in Lord Burghley’s handwriting, which, in view of the date upon it, 2nd February, throws rather a new light[419] upon the matter, and proves that, unknown to Davison, Lord Burghley and the rest of the Council were accomplices of the Queen in her intention of subsequently repudiating280 her orders and ruining her Secretary, and that the tragi-comedy was not played by Elizabeth alone, but by her grave Councillors as well. The draft document is in the name of the Council, and sets forth the reasons that had moved them to despatch281 the warrant without further consulting the Queen; “and yet we are now at this time most sorry to understand that your Majesty is so greatly grieved with this kind of proceeding15, and do most humbly282 beseech150 your Majesty,” &c. This, be it remembered, is dated the 2nd February, before the warrant had been sent off or the Queen even knew it had been sealed.
Early in the morning of the 2nd the Queen sent Killigrew to Davison, directing him not to go to the Lord Chancellor until he had seen her. When he entered her presence she asked him, to his surprise, whether he had had the warrant sealed, and he informed her that he had. Why so much haste? she asked; to which he replied that she had told him to use despatch. He then inquired if she wished the warrant executed. Yes, she said; but she did not like the form of it, for it threw all the responsibility upon her, and again suggested poison as the best way out of her difficulty.
All this made Davison suspicious, and he went to Hatton and told him that he feared the intention was subsequently to disavow him. He would, he said, take no more responsibility, but would go at once to Lord Burghley. This he did, and the latter summoned the Privy Council for next day; whilst he, Burghley, busied himself in drafting the letters to the Commissioners, the Earls of Kent and Shrewsbury. The next morning[420] (3rd February) the Council met in Lord Burghley’s room, and the Lord Treasurer laid the whole matter before them, repeating Davison’s story, and recommending that the warrant should be despatched without further reference to the Queen. This was agreed to, and the instructions and warrant were sent the same night (Friday, 3rd February) to the Commissioners, Burghley himself handing the document to Beale to carry down into the country.
The next morning when Davison entered the Queen’s room at Greenwich she was chatting with Ralegh, and told the Secretary that she had dreamed the previous night that the Queen of Scots was executed, which made her very angry. It was a good thing, she said, that Davison was not near her at the time. This frightened Davison, and he asked her whether she really did not wish the warrant executed. With an oath she said she did, but again repeated what she had said the previous day about the responsibility, and “another way of doing it.” A day or so afterwards, Davison informed the Queen that Paulet had indignantly refused Walsingham’s suggestion to poison Mary, whereupon she broke into complaints of the “daintiness of these precise fellows,” and violently denounced people who professed to love and defend her, but threw all responsibility upon her.
On the 8th February the tragedy of Fotheringay was consummated283, and in the afternoon of the 9th young Talbot brought the news to London. Lord Burghley at once summoned Davison, and after consulting with Hatton and others, it was decided not to tell the Queen suddenly. When she learnt it later in the day the well-prepared blow fell upon Davison. The Queen pretended to be infuriated, swore that she had never intended to have the warrant divulged284, and whilst[421] blaming all the Councillors,[539] threw most of the onus285 upon Davison. The Council advised him to retire from court, and he was soon afterwards cast into the Tower and degraded from his office. After a long and tedious trial and a painful imprisonment, he was condemned to a fine sufficient to ruin him, and thenceforward lived in poverty and obscurity. The Earl of Essex fought manfully in his favour whilst he lived, but Lord Burghley and the rest of the Councillors were too strong for him, and the man they had ruined was never allowed to raise his head again.[540]
That Burghley and the other principal Councillors were parties to the plot, and that the Queen’s anger with them was assumed, is also seen by a memorandum in Burghley’s handwriting at Hatfield,[541] dated 17th February, headed “The State of the Cause as it ought to be[422] conceived and reported concerning the Execution done upon the Queen of Scots,” in which the Queen’s version is adopted, and all the blame thrown upon Davison and the Council. Even before this was written the affair was so reported to Burghley’s friend Stafford in Paris, in order that this version might be spread on the Continent. Charles Arundell, in conveying the news from Stafford to Mendoza, says that Burghley was absent through illness,[542] and that the execution was carried through by Davison, “who is a terrible heretic,” and the rest of Mary’s enemies. This is perhaps the blackest stain that rests upon Burghley’s name. We have seen before that he was not generous or magnanimous in his treatment of others when his own interests were at stake; and the sacrifice of Davison would probably appear to him a very small price to pay for helping Elizabeth out of a difficult position, and maintaining his own favour.
Although we have seen that the Lord Treasurer from motives286 of policy had been forced to take a prominent part in the condemnation and execution of Mary, it cannot be supposed that the position of affairs at the time was agreeable to him. The wars in Flanders, the persecution287 of English Protestants in Spain, the reprisals of Drake and the privateers, and the Catholic plots in the interests of Mary had aroused a strong Protestant war feeling in the country. Leicester and his friends had the popular voice on their side, and Burghley and the Conservatives could only very cautiously and tentatively endeavour to stay the impetus288 with which the country[423] was rushing towards a national war with the strongest power in Christendom. The great Armada was in full preparation, and the ports of Italy, Flanders, Spain, and Portugal rang with the sound of arms. Don Antonio once more was welcomed in England, to be used as a stalking-horse, this being Lord Burghley’s last hope of levying289 war without national responsibility.
But though there was much talk about Don Antonio, and Spanish spies in England continued to report that the great fleet under Drake was to be employed in his interests, its real object was to render impossible, at least for that year, the junction290 of Philip’s naval291 forces in Lisbon. Thanks to the efforts of Burghley and his party, an elaborate pretence292 was kept up of the expedition being a private one; but it was really controlled and organised by government officers, and the second in command, Borough56, was a Queen’s admiral, sent avowedly to place a check upon Drake, and to prevent him from going too far in his open attack upon Spain. Drake’s instructions were “to prevent or withstand any enterprise as might be attempted against her Highness’s dominions293, and especially by preventing the concentration of Philip’s squadrons;” and he was to distress294 the ships as much as possible, both in the havens295 themselves and on the high seas. Drake arrived in Plymouth from the Thames on the 23rd March, and in a week of incessant296 energy had everything ready. The secret of his intentions was well kept, and Mendoza’s many spies could only tardily report the loose gossip of the streets. Sir Edward Stafford assured his Spanish paymaster that no living soul but the Queen and the Lord Treasurer knew what the design was to be.
Leicester was now at Buxton (April 1587), shortly to start on another visit to Flanders, and in his absence Burghley’s influence, both Ralegh and Hatton being on[424] his side, as well as Crofts and the Catholics, overshadowed that of Walsingham and Knollys. Drake seems to have feared the consequence of this, and hurried his departure from Plymouth (2nd April). He was only just in time, for as soon as he had gone a courier came in hot haste with orders from the Council, which now meant Burghley, strictly limiting Drake’s action:[543] “You shall forbear to enter forcibly into any of the said King’s ports or havens, or to offer any violence to any of his towns or shipping297 within harbour, or to do any act of hostility298 on land.”
This was exactly what Drake had foreseen. The ship sent after him with the orders failed to reach him, and the great seaman299 went on his way. But, as usual with Drake, the official drag on the wheel had to be overcome. Off Cape199 St. Vincent, Borough recited to the Admiral the conditions under which the Queen’s ships accompanied him, evidently expecting that he would not confine his operations to preventing the concentration of the Spanish squadrons. But Drake was on his own element now, and sailed straight to Cadiz, as some people had shrewdly expected he meant to do from the first.[544] Borough warned him not to exceed the Queen’s orders, and was placed under arrest for his pains; and unopposed, Drake sailed into Cadiz harbour, to the dismay of the astounded300 Spaniards. He plundered302, burned, and sank all the ships in port, destroyed the stores, and then quietly sailed out again unmolested. He did damage to the extent of a million ducats (though Philip wrote that[425] he felt the insolence303 of the act more than the material damage), and if he had cared to disobey the Queen’s orders further he might have stopped the Armada for good by burning the ships in Lisbon, for they had neither guns nor men on board to protect them. But he knew now that the peace party in the Council were busy arranging with Parma’s envoy304 for the meeting of a conference, and doubtless thought he had gone far enough in his brilliant disobedience.
The indispensable Andrea de Looe had arrived in London from the Prince of Parma immediately after Drake sailed, and was soon deep in negotiation96 with Burghley with the object of arranging a meeting of Peace Commissioners. When he had returned to Brussels with the proposals, news came of Drake’s daring raid. De Looe then wrote a long letter to Burghley (11th July), pointing out how much the cause of peace was injured by such acts of aggression305. Burghley’s answer[545] (28th July) perfectly306 defines his position towards Drake’s action. After professing307 the Queen’s desire for peace, and readiness to send her Commissioners to Flanders if the Duke of Parma will suspend hostilities308 (before the Sluys), he says: “True it is, and I avow6 it upon my faith, her Majesty did send a ship expressly with a message by letters charging him (Drake) not to show any act of hostility before he went to Cadiz, which messenger, by contrary winds, could never come to the place where he was, but was constrained309 to come home, and hearing of Sir Fras. Drake’s actions, her Majesty commanded the party that returned to be punished, but he acquitted310 himself by oath of himself and all his company. And so unwitting, yea unwilling311, to her Majesty those actions were committed by Sir Fras. Drake, for the which her Majesty is greatly offended with him; and now also for[426] bringing home of a rich ship that came out of the East Indies.”[546] And then, as some counterbalance to these enormities, Lord Burghley sets forth once more the various grievances of England against Spain.
Whilst the elaborate and frequently insincere negotiations for peace were being laboriously312 pursued for many months, Lord Burghley’s other standing175 policy was not neglected, namely, that of causing jealousy between France and Spain. Henry III. was now in mortal fear of Guise, and was ready to listen to English and Huguenot suggestions that Philip’s conquest of England would be followed by a Guisan dynasty under Spanish patronage313 in France. All the French influence at the Vatican was exercised to procure314 the conversion315 of James Stuart and the opposition of Spanish aims, and before the end of the year Lord Burghley had the satisfaction of seeing that Henry III. and his clever mother in no case would aid Philip to subjugate316 England.
Elizabeth, in the meanwhile, was assailed by doubts and fears, and periodical fits of penuriousness317 in the midst of her danger, which drove her Councillors to despair. Stafford told Mendoza that “Cecil writes that the Queen is so peevish318 and discontented that it was feared she would not live long. Her temper is so bad that no Councillor dares to mention business to her, and when even he (Cecil) did so, she had told him that she had been strong enough to lift him out of the dirt, and was able to cast him down again. He (Cecil) was of opinion that the Councillors might be divided into three classes—those who wished to come to terms with Spain, those who desired a close friendship with France, and those who wanted to stand aloof319 from both, whilst enriching themselves with plunder301. He (Cecil) was neither a[427] Spaniard nor a Frenchman, but wished the Queen to be friendly with both powers. King Henry, under whom the country was powerful and tranquil320, thought he was doing a great thing when he was able to make war with France when he had an alliance with Spain; and now it happened that the French were as desirous of being friendly as the English were, and he urges the Ambassador to hasten the conclusion of an agreement.”[547]
But whilst he was writing amiably321 for the French, he took care, on the other hand, to make the most of the peace negotiations with Spain, and thus to cause Henry to be the more anxious for England’s friendship. The old statesman was thus cautiously and slowly going on his traditional way, hopeless though he must have been of the final result as regarded keeping peace with Spain. The long-continued preparations of the Armada were rapidly approaching completion; the Pope had been cajoled into promising322 funds unwillingly323 to aid Philip’s aims; the English Catholic refugees were eagerly awaiting the harvest of their efforts; the great, cumbrous machine for crushing England was already in motion, and no efforts of diplomacy324 could stop it.
But yet Burghley did his best. The war and plunder party, as usual, checked him at every turn; but early and late, through constant pain and sickness, family trouble[548] and public disappointment, he struggled on in[428] the way he had marked out for himself so many years before—to divide England’s possible enemies, and keep the peace with Spain so long as was humanly possible. The Queen was full of qualms325 and misgivings326; swaying now to one side, now to another, and abusing in turn both the party of peace and the advocates of war. “The Queen has been scolding the Lord Treasurer greatly for the last few days, for having neglected to disburse327 money for the fleet,” wrote a Spanish spy in November; and a few days afterwards, when she was alarmed at the delay in Parma’s reply, she flew into a tremendous rage with Burghley, “upon whom she heaped a thousand insults,” for having induced her to negotiate for peace whilst the enemy completed his preparations. “She told the Treasurer he was old and doting328; to which he replied that he knew he was old, and would gladly retire to a church to pray for her.” But the old minister gave the Queen as good as she brought, and in vigorous words pointed out in detail that her present dangers arose entirely from her neglect of his advice and the imprudence of his opponents in the Council.[549] But the next day came Parma’s answer, and the Queen was all smiles again towards Burghley and the peacemakers.
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1 militant | |
adj.激进的,好斗的;n.激进分子,斗士 | |
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2 paramount | |
a.最重要的,最高权力的 | |
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3 discredit | |
vt.使不可置信;n.丧失信义;不信,怀疑 | |
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4 vestiges | |
残余部分( vestige的名词复数 ); 遗迹; 痕迹; 毫不 | |
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5 avowedly | |
adv.公然地 | |
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6 avow | |
v.承认,公开宣称 | |
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7 leniency | |
n.宽大(不严厉) | |
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8 obedience | |
n.服从,顺从 | |
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9 rein | |
n.疆绳,统治,支配;vt.以僵绳控制,统治 | |
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10 embittered | |
v.使怨恨,激怒( embitter的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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11 controversies | |
争论 | |
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12 rebuke | |
v.指责,非难,斥责 [反]praise | |
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13 referee | |
n.裁判员.仲裁人,代表人,鉴定人 | |
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14 ministry | |
n.(政府的)部;牧师 | |
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15 proceeding | |
n.行动,进行,(pl.)会议录,学报 | |
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16 proceedings | |
n.进程,过程,议程;诉讼(程序);公报 | |
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17 vehement | |
adj.感情强烈的;热烈的;(人)有强烈感情的 | |
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18 thereby | |
adv.因此,从而 | |
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19 aged | |
adj.年老的,陈年的 | |
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20 animated | |
adj.生气勃勃的,活跃的,愉快的 | |
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21 majesty | |
n.雄伟,壮丽,庄严,威严;最高权威,王权 | |
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22 determined | |
adj.坚定的;有决心的 | |
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23 forth | |
adv.向前;向外,往外 | |
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24 proxies | |
n.代表权( proxy的名词复数 );(测算用的)代替物;(对代理人的)委托书;(英国国教教区献给主教等的)巡游费 | |
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25 privy | |
adj.私用的;隐密的 | |
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26 nomination | |
n.提名,任命,提名权 | |
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27 interfering | |
adj. 妨碍的 动词interfere的现在分词 | |
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28 prerogative | |
n.特权 | |
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29 allay | |
v.消除,减轻(恐惧、怀疑等) | |
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30 zeal | |
n.热心,热情,热忱 | |
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31 abortive | |
adj.不成功的,发育不全的 | |
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32 confirmation | |
n.证实,确认,批准 | |
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33 conspiracy | |
n.阴谋,密谋,共谋 | |
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34 avenge | |
v.为...复仇,为...报仇 | |
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35 qualified | |
adj.合格的,有资格的,胜任的,有限制的 | |
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36 abating | |
减少( abate的现在分词 ); 减去; 降价; 撤消(诉讼) | |
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37 equity | |
n.公正,公平,(无固定利息的)股票 | |
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38 penal | |
adj.刑罚的;刑法上的 | |
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39 accrue | |
v.(利息等)增大,增多 | |
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40 guilt | |
n.犯罪;内疚;过失,罪责 | |
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41 forfeiture | |
n.(名誉等)丧失 | |
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42 assassinated | |
v.暗杀( assassinate的过去式和过去分词 );中伤;诋毁;破坏 | |
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43 prevailing | |
adj.盛行的;占优势的;主要的 | |
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44 enactment | |
n.演出,担任…角色;制订,通过 | |
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45 promulgation | |
n.颁布 | |
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46 traitor | |
n.叛徒,卖国贼 | |
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47 traitors | |
卖国贼( traitor的名词复数 ); 叛徒; 背叛者; 背信弃义的人 | |
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48 felon | |
n.重罪犯;adj.残忍的 | |
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49 supremacy | |
n.至上;至高权力 | |
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50 incur | |
vt.招致,蒙受,遭遇 | |
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51 gage | |
n.标准尺寸,规格;量规,量表 [=gauge] | |
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52 vanquished | |
v.征服( vanquish的过去式和过去分词 );战胜;克服;抑制 | |
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53 astute | |
adj.机敏的,精明的 | |
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54 dissenting | |
adj.不同意的 | |
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55 dissent | |
n./v.不同意,持异议 | |
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56 borough | |
n.享有自治权的市镇;(英)自治市镇 | |
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57 biassed | |
(统计试验中)结果偏倚的,有偏的 | |
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58 riddles | |
n.谜(语)( riddle的名词复数 );猜不透的难题,难解之谜 | |
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59 esteemed | |
adj.受人尊敬的v.尊敬( esteem的过去式和过去分词 );敬重;认为;以为 | |
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60 treasurer | |
n.司库,财务主管 | |
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61 specially | |
adv.特定地;特殊地;明确地 | |
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62 loyalty | |
n.忠诚,忠心 | |
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63 persistently | |
ad.坚持地;固执地 | |
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64 fully | |
adv.完全地,全部地,彻底地;充分地 | |
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65 sinecure | |
n.闲差事,挂名职务 | |
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66 assassination | |
n.暗杀;暗杀事件 | |
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67 professed | |
公开声称的,伪称的,已立誓信教的 | |
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68 pointed | |
adj.尖的,直截了当的 | |
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69 cardinal | |
n.(天主教的)红衣主教;adj.首要的,基本的 | |
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70 lodged | |
v.存放( lodge的过去式和过去分词 );暂住;埋入;(权利、权威等)归属 | |
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71 motive | |
n.动机,目的;adv.发动的,运动的 | |
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72 confession | |
n.自白,供认,承认 | |
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73 killing | |
n.巨额利润;突然赚大钱,发大财 | |
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74 vehemently | |
adv. 热烈地 | |
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75 retracted | |
v.撤回或撤消( retract的过去式和过去分词 );拒绝执行或遵守;缩回;拉回 | |
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76 possessed | |
adj.疯狂的;拥有的,占有的 | |
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77 deliberately | |
adv.审慎地;蓄意地;故意地 | |
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78 lure | |
n.吸引人的东西,诱惑物;vt.引诱,吸引 | |
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79 aggravate | |
vt.加重(剧),使恶化;激怒,使恼火 | |
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80 enactments | |
n.演出( enactment的名词复数 );展现;规定;通过 | |
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81 fervent | |
adj.热的,热烈的,热情的 | |
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82 venal | |
adj.唯利是图的,贪脏枉法的 | |
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83 injustice | |
n.非正义,不公正,不公平,侵犯(别人的)权利 | |
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84 bribery | |
n.贿络行为,行贿,受贿 | |
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85 dissimulation | |
n.掩饰,虚伪,装糊涂 | |
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86 dealing | |
n.经商方法,待人态度 | |
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87 afflicted | |
使受痛苦,折磨( afflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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88 discreet | |
adj.(言行)谨慎的;慎重的;有判断力的 | |
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89 worthy | |
adj.(of)值得的,配得上的;有价值的 | |
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90 bluster | |
v.猛刮;怒冲冲的说;n.吓唬,怒号;狂风声 | |
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91 malicious | |
adj.有恶意的,心怀恶意的 | |
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92 privately | |
adv.以私人的身份,悄悄地,私下地 | |
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93 shameful | |
adj.可耻的,不道德的 | |
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94 maliciously | |
adv.有敌意地 | |
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95 negotiations | |
协商( negotiation的名词复数 ); 谈判; 完成(难事); 通过 | |
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96 negotiation | |
n.谈判,协商 | |
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97 intermittently | |
adv.间歇地;断断续续 | |
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98 conspiracies | |
n.阴谋,密谋( conspiracy的名词复数 ) | |
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99 custody | |
n.监护,照看,羁押,拘留 | |
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100 rigid | |
adj.严格的,死板的;刚硬的,僵硬的 | |
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101 accusations | |
n.指责( accusation的名词复数 );指控;控告;(被告发、控告的)罪名 | |
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102 immorality | |
n. 不道德, 无道义 | |
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103 soften | |
v.(使)变柔软;(使)变柔和 | |
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104 captivity | |
n.囚禁;被俘;束缚 | |
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105 rumours | |
n.传闻( rumour的名词复数 );风闻;谣言;谣传 | |
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106 rumour | |
n.谣言,谣传,传闻 | |
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107 detriment | |
n.损害;损害物,造成损害的根源 | |
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108 simultaneously | |
adv.同时发生地,同时进行地 | |
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109 promptly | |
adv.及时地,敏捷地 | |
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110 rejection | |
n.拒绝,被拒,抛弃,被弃 | |
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111 remiss | |
adj.不小心的,马虎 | |
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112 toils | |
网 | |
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113 entirely | |
ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
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114 guises | |
n.外观,伪装( guise的名词复数 )v.外观,伪装( guise的第三人称单数 ) | |
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115 guise | |
n.外表,伪装的姿态 | |
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116 steadily | |
adv.稳定地;不变地;持续地 | |
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117 frustrate | |
v.使失望;使沮丧;使厌烦 | |
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118 kinsman | |
n.男亲属 | |
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119 intercepted | |
拦截( intercept的过去式和过去分词 ); 截住; 截击; 拦阻 | |
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120 intrigues | |
n.密谋策划( intrigue的名词复数 );神秘气氛;引人入胜的复杂情节v.搞阴谋诡计( intrigue的第三人称单数 );激起…的好奇心 | |
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121 previously | |
adv.以前,先前(地) | |
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122 dominant | |
adj.支配的,统治的;占优势的;显性的;n.主因,要素,主要的人(或物);显性基因 | |
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123 opposition | |
n.反对,敌对 | |
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124 helping | |
n.食物的一份&adj.帮助人的,辅助的 | |
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125 defensive | |
adj.防御的;防卫的;防守的 | |
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126 parsimony | |
n.过度节俭,吝啬 | |
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127 Portuguese | |
n.葡萄牙人;葡萄牙语 | |
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128 treacherous | |
adj.不可靠的,有暗藏的危险的;adj.背叛的,背信弃义的 | |
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129 seizure | |
n.没收;占有;抵押 | |
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130 reprisals | |
n.报复(行为)( reprisal的名词复数 ) | |
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131 reprisal | |
n.报复,报仇,报复性劫掠 | |
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132 foes | |
敌人,仇敌( foe的名词复数 ) | |
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133 scouted | |
寻找,侦察( scout的过去式和过去分词 ); 物色(优秀运动员、演员、音乐家等) | |
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134 ravaging | |
毁坏( ravage的现在分词 ); 蹂躏; 劫掠; 抢劫 | |
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135 hindrance | |
n.妨碍,障碍 | |
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136 commissioners | |
n.专员( commissioner的名词复数 );长官;委员;政府部门的长官 | |
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137 nominee | |
n.被提名者;被任命者;被推荐者 | |
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138 hesitation | |
n.犹豫,踌躇 | |
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139 lieutenant | |
n.陆军中尉,海军上尉;代理官员,副职官员 | |
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140 expenditure | |
n.(时间、劳力、金钱等)支出;使用,消耗 | |
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141 affected | |
adj.不自然的,假装的 | |
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142 submission | |
n.服从,投降;温顺,谦虚;提出 | |
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143 alteration | |
n.变更,改变;蚀变 | |
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144 strictly | |
adv.严厉地,严格地;严密地 | |
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145 sundry | |
adj.各式各样的,种种的 | |
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146 secondly | |
adv.第二,其次 | |
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147 bestowed | |
赠给,授予( bestow的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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148 gall | |
v.使烦恼,使焦躁,难堪;n.磨难 | |
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149 beseeching | |
adj.恳求似的v.恳求,乞求(某事物)( beseech的现在分词 ) | |
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150 beseech | |
v.祈求,恳求 | |
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151 fortify | |
v.强化防御,为…设防;加强,强化 | |
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152 collapse | |
vi.累倒;昏倒;倒塌;塌陷 | |
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153 breach | |
n.违反,不履行;破裂;vt.冲破,攻破 | |
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154 intriguing | |
adj.有趣的;迷人的v.搞阴谋诡计(intrigue的现在分词);激起…的好奇心 | |
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155 infamous | |
adj.声名狼藉的,臭名昭著的,邪恶的 | |
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156 appease | |
v.安抚,缓和,平息,满足 | |
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157 extenuate | |
v.减轻,使人原谅 | |
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158 softening | |
变软,软化 | |
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159 persuasion | |
n.劝说;说服;持有某种信仰的宗派 | |
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160 discretion | |
n.谨慎;随意处理 | |
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161 withhold | |
v.拒绝,不给;使停止,阻挡 | |
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162 degradation | |
n.降级;低落;退化;陵削;降解;衰变 | |
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163 gratitude | |
adj.感激,感谢 | |
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164 triumphant | |
adj.胜利的,成功的;狂欢的,喜悦的 | |
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165 appeased | |
安抚,抚慰( appease的过去式和过去分词 ); 绥靖(满足另一国的要求以避免战争) | |
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166 presumption | |
n.推测,可能性,冒昧,放肆,[法律]推定 | |
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167 astonishment | |
n.惊奇,惊异 | |
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168 construing | |
v.解释(陈述、行为等)( construe的现在分词 );翻译,作句法分析 | |
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169 acquiescence | |
n.默许;顺从 | |
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170 passionate | |
adj.热情的,热烈的,激昂的,易动情的,易怒的,性情暴躁的 | |
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171 deposition | |
n.免职,罢官;作证;沉淀;沉淀物 | |
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172 incompetence | |
n.不胜任,不称职 | |
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173 calumny | |
n.诽谤,污蔑,中伤 | |
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174 partisan | |
adj.党派性的;游击队的;n.游击队员;党徒 | |
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175 standing | |
n.持续,地位;adj.永久的,不动的,直立的,不流动的 | |
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176 decadence | |
n.衰落,颓废 | |
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177 coerced | |
v.迫使做( coerce的过去式和过去分词 );强迫;(以武力、惩罚、威胁等手段)控制;支配 | |
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178 descend | |
vt./vi.传下来,下来,下降 | |
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179 elevation | |
n.高度;海拔;高地;上升;提高 | |
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180 squander | |
v.浪费,挥霍 | |
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181 overthrow | |
v.推翻,打倒,颠覆;n.推翻,瓦解,颠覆 | |
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182 bribed | |
v.贿赂( bribe的过去式和过去分词 );向(某人)行贿,贿赂 | |
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183 adviser | |
n.劝告者,顾问 | |
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184 subjugation | |
n.镇压,平息,征服 | |
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185 countenance | |
n.脸色,面容;面部表情;vt.支持,赞同 | |
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186 vile | |
adj.卑鄙的,可耻的,邪恶的;坏透的 | |
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187 margin | |
n.页边空白;差额;余地,余裕;边,边缘 | |
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188 folly | |
n.愚笨,愚蠢,蠢事,蠢行,傻话 | |
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189 prodigal | |
adj.浪费的,挥霍的,放荡的 | |
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190 apprehension | |
n.理解,领悟;逮捕,拘捕;忧虑 | |
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191 conspirators | |
n.共谋者,阴谋家( conspirator的名词复数 ) | |
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192 savage | |
adj.野蛮的;凶恶的,残暴的;n.未开化的人 | |
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193 doom | |
n.厄运,劫数;v.注定,命定 | |
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194 kindly | |
adj.和蔼的,温和的,爽快的;adv.温和地,亲切地 | |
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195 crafty | |
adj.狡猾的,诡诈的 | |
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196 travail | |
n.阵痛;努力 | |
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197 hearty | |
adj.热情友好的;衷心的;尽情的,纵情的 | |
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198 peril | |
n.(严重的)危险;危险的事物 | |
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199 cape | |
n.海角,岬;披肩,短披风 | |
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200 forfeited | |
(因违反协议、犯规、受罚等)丧失,失去( forfeit的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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201 accomplices | |
从犯,帮凶,同谋( accomplice的名词复数 ) | |
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202 stringency | |
n.严格,紧迫,说服力;严格性;强度 | |
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203 imprisonment | |
n.关押,监禁,坐牢 | |
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204 judicial | |
adj.司法的,法庭的,审判的,明断的,公正的 | |
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205 inquiry | |
n.打听,询问,调查,查问 | |
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206 virtue | |
n.德行,美德;贞操;优点;功效,效力 | |
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207 bickering | |
v.争吵( bicker的现在分词 );口角;(水等)作潺潺声;闪烁 | |
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208 hatred | |
n.憎恶,憎恨,仇恨 | |
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209 dread | |
vt.担忧,忧虑;惧怕,不敢;n.担忧,畏惧 | |
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210 intercede | |
vi.仲裁,说情 | |
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211 chancellor | |
n.(英)大臣;法官;(德、奥)总理;大学校长 | |
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212 judgment | |
n.审判;判断力,识别力,看法,意见 | |
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213 mingled | |
混合,混入( mingle的过去式和过去分词 ); 混进,与…交往[联系] | |
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214 persuasions | |
n.劝说,说服(力)( persuasion的名词复数 );信仰 | |
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215 rheumatism | |
n.风湿病 | |
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216 steward | |
n.乘务员,服务员;看管人;膳食管理员 | |
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217 toiled | |
长时间或辛苦地工作( toil的过去式和过去分词 ); 艰难缓慢地移动,跋涉 | |
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218 obloquy | |
n.斥责,大骂 | |
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219 inveterate | |
adj.积习已深的,根深蒂固的 | |
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220 indignities | |
n.侮辱,轻蔑( indignity的名词复数 ) | |
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221 consummate | |
adj.完美的;v.成婚;使完美 [反]baffle | |
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222 contriver | |
发明者,创制者,筹划者 | |
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223 regained | |
复得( regain的过去式和过去分词 ); 赢回; 重回; 复至某地 | |
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224 touching | |
adj.动人的,使人感伤的 | |
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225 eloquence | |
n.雄辩;口才,修辞 | |
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226 condemnation | |
n.谴责; 定罪 | |
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227 condemn | |
vt.谴责,指责;宣判(罪犯),判刑 | |
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228 condemned | |
adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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229 scruples | |
n.良心上的不安( scruple的名词复数 );顾虑,顾忌v.感到于心不安,有顾忌( scruple的第三人称单数 ) | |
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230 assailed | |
v.攻击( assail的过去式和过去分词 );困扰;质问;毅然应对 | |
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231 repudiation | |
n.拒绝;否认;断绝关系;抛弃 | |
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232 besought | |
v.恳求,乞求(某事物)( beseech的过去式和过去分词 );(beseech的过去式与过去分词) | |
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233 formerly | |
adv.从前,以前 | |
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234 dignified | |
a.可敬的,高贵的 | |
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235 courageous | |
adj.勇敢的,有胆量的 | |
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236 participation | |
n.参与,参加,分享 | |
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237 concessions | |
n.(尤指由政府或雇主给予的)特许权( concession的名词复数 );承认;减价;(在某地的)特许经营权 | |
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238 concealment | |
n.隐藏, 掩盖,隐瞒 | |
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239 actively | |
adv.积极地,勤奋地 | |
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240 transparent | |
adj.明显的,无疑的;透明的 | |
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241 pretext | |
n.借口,托词 | |
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242 harrying | |
v.使苦恼( harry的现在分词 );不断烦扰;一再袭击;侵扰 | |
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243 supplanted | |
把…排挤掉,取代( supplant的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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244 disarm | |
v.解除武装,回复平常的编制,缓和 | |
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245 discord | |
n.不和,意见不合,争论,(音乐)不和谐 | |
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246 certified | |
a.经证明合格的;具有证明文件的 | |
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247 alienate | |
vt.使疏远,离间;转让(财产等) | |
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248 tardily | |
adv.缓慢 | |
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249 remonstrate | |
v.抗议,规劝 | |
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250 sincerity | |
n.真诚,诚意;真实 | |
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251 accruing | |
v.增加( accrue的现在分词 );(通过自然增长)产生;获得;(使钱款、债务)积累 | |
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252 extravagant | |
adj.奢侈的;过分的;(言行等)放肆的 | |
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253 grievances | |
n.委屈( grievance的名词复数 );苦衷;不满;牢骚 | |
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254 incompatible | |
adj.不相容的,不协调的,不相配的 | |
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255 respite | |
n.休息,中止,暂缓 | |
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256 vacillation | |
n.动摇;忧柔寡断 | |
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257 jealousy | |
n.妒忌,嫉妒,猜忌 | |
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258 random | |
adj.随机的;任意的;n.偶然的(或随便的)行动 | |
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259 pedantic | |
adj.卖弄学问的;迂腐的 | |
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260 humble | |
adj.谦卑的,恭顺的;地位低下的;v.降低,贬低 | |
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261 undoubtedly | |
adv.确实地,无疑地 | |
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262 decided | |
adj.决定了的,坚决的;明显的,明确的 | |
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263 opprobrium | |
n.耻辱,责难 | |
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264 persecutor | |
n. 迫害者 | |
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265 curry | |
n.咖哩粉,咖哩饭菜;v.用咖哩粉调味,用马栉梳,制革 | |
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266 rupture | |
n.破裂;(关系的)决裂;v.(使)破裂 | |
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267 devoted | |
adj.忠诚的,忠实的,热心的,献身于...的 | |
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268 knaves | |
n.恶棍,无赖( knave的名词复数 );(纸牌中的)杰克 | |
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269 precipitated | |
v.(突如其来地)使发生( precipitate的过去式和过去分词 );促成;猛然摔下;使沉淀 | |
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270 engrossed | |
adj.全神贯注的 | |
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271 interval | |
n.间隔,间距;幕间休息,中场休息 | |
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272 remissness | |
n.玩忽职守;马虎;怠慢;不小心 | |
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273 disquieting | |
adj.令人不安的,令人不平静的v.使不安,使忧虑,使烦恼( disquiet的现在分词 ) | |
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274 amiability | |
n.和蔼可亲的,亲切的,友善的 | |
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275 spoke | |
n.(车轮的)辐条;轮辐;破坏某人的计划;阻挠某人的行动 v.讲,谈(speak的过去式);说;演说;从某种观点来说 | |
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276 demurred | |
v.表示异议,反对( demur的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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277 relish | |
n.滋味,享受,爱好,调味品;vt.加调味料,享受,品味;vi.有滋味 | |
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278 memorandum | |
n.备忘录,便笺 | |
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279 annotated | |
v.注解,注释( annotate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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280 repudiating | |
v.(正式地)否认( repudiate的现在分词 );拒绝接受;拒绝与…往来;拒不履行(法律义务) | |
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281 despatch | |
n./v.(dispatch)派遣;发送;n.急件;新闻报道 | |
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282 humbly | |
adv. 恭顺地,谦卑地 | |
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283 consummated | |
v.使结束( consummate的过去式和过去分词 );使完美;完婚;(婚礼后的)圆房 | |
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284 divulged | |
v.吐露,泄露( divulge的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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285 onus | |
n.负担;责任 | |
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286 motives | |
n.动机,目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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287 persecution | |
n. 迫害,烦扰 | |
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288 impetus | |
n.推动,促进,刺激;推动力 | |
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289 levying | |
征(兵)( levy的现在分词 ); 索取; 发动(战争); 征税 | |
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290 junction | |
n.连接,接合;交叉点,接合处,枢纽站 | |
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291 naval | |
adj.海军的,军舰的,船的 | |
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292 pretence | |
n.假装,作假;借口,口实;虚伪;虚饰 | |
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293 dominions | |
统治权( dominion的名词复数 ); 领土; 疆土; 版图 | |
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294 distress | |
n.苦恼,痛苦,不舒适;不幸;vt.使悲痛 | |
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295 havens | |
n.港口,安全地方( haven的名词复数 )v.港口,安全地方( haven的第三人称单数 ) | |
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296 incessant | |
adj.不停的,连续的 | |
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297 shipping | |
n.船运(发货,运输,乘船) | |
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298 hostility | |
n.敌对,敌意;抵制[pl.]交战,战争 | |
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299 seaman | |
n.海员,水手,水兵 | |
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300 astounded | |
v.使震惊(astound的过去式和过去分词);愕然;愕;惊讶 | |
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301 plunder | |
vt.劫掠财物,掠夺;n.劫掠物,赃物;劫掠 | |
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302 plundered | |
掠夺,抢劫( plunder的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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303 insolence | |
n.傲慢;无礼;厚颜;傲慢的态度 | |
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304 envoy | |
n.使节,使者,代表,公使 | |
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305 aggression | |
n.进攻,侵略,侵犯,侵害 | |
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306 perfectly | |
adv.完美地,无可非议地,彻底地 | |
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307 professing | |
声称( profess的现在分词 ); 宣称; 公开表明; 信奉 | |
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308 hostilities | |
n.战争;敌意(hostility的复数);敌对状态;战事 | |
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309 constrained | |
adj.束缚的,节制的 | |
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310 acquitted | |
宣判…无罪( acquit的过去式和过去分词 ); 使(自己)作出某种表现 | |
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311 unwilling | |
adj.不情愿的 | |
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312 laboriously | |
adv.艰苦地;费力地;辛勤地;(文体等)佶屈聱牙地 | |
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313 patronage | |
n.赞助,支援,援助;光顾,捧场 | |
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314 procure | |
vt.获得,取得,促成;vi.拉皮条 | |
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315 conversion | |
n.转化,转换,转变 | |
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316 subjugate | |
v.征服;抑制 | |
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317 penuriousness | |
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318 peevish | |
adj.易怒的,坏脾气的 | |
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319 aloof | |
adj.远离的;冷淡的,漠不关心的 | |
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320 tranquil | |
adj. 安静的, 宁静的, 稳定的, 不变的 | |
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321 amiably | |
adv.和蔼可亲地,亲切地 | |
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322 promising | |
adj.有希望的,有前途的 | |
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323 unwillingly | |
adv.不情愿地 | |
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324 diplomacy | |
n.外交;外交手腕,交际手腕 | |
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325 qualms | |
n.不安;内疚 | |
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326 misgivings | |
n.疑虑,担忧,害怕;疑虑,担心,恐惧( misgiving的名词复数 );疑惧 | |
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327 disburse | |
v.支出,拨款 | |
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328 doting | |
adj.溺爱的,宠爱的 | |
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