In the story of Prussia, 1740 inevitably3 suggests comparison with 1640, when the Great Elector likewise stood at the parting of the ways. Then and for years afterwards the choice had lain between existence and ruin; now it was between increase by natural growth and perhaps speedier increase by speculation4. For a century Prussia had seldom departed from a policy of thrift5 and autocracy6 at home84 and opportunism abroad. Would she now abandon it? Frederick’s early measures showed that he intended no sweeping7 changes in domestic politics. We may therefore postpone8 an examination of the system which he there pursued. For us he is at present only the lord of ninety thousand of the best-drilled troops in the world, entangled9 in no alliances and hampered10 by no fears. What choice would be for him the wisest?
Calm reflection on the situation of Europe in 1740 seems to show that Frederick’s strength was to sit still. Signs were abundant that the peace which had prevailed almost from his birth could not endure much longer. Apart from the problem of Austria, grave questions had arisen which not even a Walpole and a Fleury could settle otherwise than by the sword. France and England, it was felt, would soon resume the duel12 which the Peace of Utrecht had but interrupted, and would struggle for primacy in America and in the world. Spain and England were already at war, and Europe knew that the Bourbon Kings of Spain and France, who were uncle and nephew, were joined in close alliance. To strike at King George without crossing the sea France must aim at Hanover, and the sword of Frederick, the neighbour of Hanover, would be bid for by both sides. According to the convenient theory then current, a prince could hire out an army without committing his State to war, so that Frederick stood to gain much,—money, military glory, experience for his men, perhaps even territory for his House,—while he need stake nothing save that which he had85 long desired to hazard,—his own life and the lives of his soldiers.
A Hohenzollern was the last man in the world to undervalue what he might wish to sell. Frederick strove to persuade Europe that in him a new and greater Gustavus had appeared. He increased his army ostentatiously and bade his representative at Versailles speak of his active and impetuous way of thinking.
“You can say,” he continues, “that it is to be feared that this increase kindles13 a fire which may set all Europe in a blaze; that it is the way of youth to be adventurous14, and that the alluring15 visions of heroic fame may disturb and have disturbed the peace of countless16 nations in the world.”
The prospect17 of acquisitions in the Rhineland seemed first to engage his thoughts. In hopes of winning Berg he not only made overtures18 to France, but even invited the help of Russia. The fruit of these negotiations19 was small. Their significance, however, is great, since they showed that Frederick intended to choose his allies without regard to the tradition of his House in favour of Austria, and also that he would not shrink from favouring Muscovite development by employing Cossacks in Western Germany.
At the same time that he bargained in this spirit with foreign Powers, Frederick compelled his brother Germans to mark the change of accent which he was introducing into the old language of his House. Brandenburg had taken up the informal protectorate86 of the German Protestants when the Saxon Elector by becoming Romanist (1697) resigned it. Frederick William devised a safe but effective method of checking Romanist aggression21. If any German prince persecuted22 Protestants, the King of Prussia used forthwith to apply similar oppression to his own papist subjects. Thus, without stirring from Berlin, he stayed the hand of persecutors in the distant valleys of the Neckar and the Salzach. His son soon proved himself ready to go to greater lengths.
Claims and counter-claims as to territory had arisen between one of the great Romanist princes, the Archbishop of Mainz, and the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, the heir of one of the earliest champions of the Reformation. The former relied on his own troops and on those of neighbouring bishops24, while he also possessed25 the support of the Emperor, whose right to judge the case had been challenged by his opponent. The Landgrave appealed to the King of Prussia and to other princes of the Empire. Frederick’s reply was immediate26, emphatic27, and successful. “In case of need,” he wrote to his brother-Elector of Mainz, “we should not know how to refrain from affording to the aforementioned His Dilection the Lord Landgrave William the necessary protection and help against unlawful force and disturbance29.” At these words the hostile coalition30—Elector, bishops, and Emperor—melted away. The young King, it was apparent, had entered the field of German politics with éclat.
Equally peremptory31 and equally successful was Frederick’s verdict for his own claims in a dispute87 with the Bishop23 of Liège with regard to Herstal, a tiny barony lying on the Meuse to the westward32 of Aix-la-Chapelle. The inhabitants had resisted the officers of his father, who would gladly have sold Herstal to Liège, and the Bishop, who wished to buy but could not come to terms, had egged them on. Frederick, scorning the advice of his ministers, resolved to use his strength as a giant. From Wesel he sent the following ultimatum33 to the Bishop:
“Cousin! Knowing all the attacks that you have made upon my unquestionable rights over my free barony of Herstal, and how the seditious men of Herstal have been supported for some years in their detestable disobedience to me, I have ordered my privy-councillor Rambonnet to visit you on my behalf, to demand from you in my name a sincere and categorical explanation within the space of two days, whether you wish to protect the mutineers of Herstal in their abominable35 disorder36 and disobedience. In case you refuse, or delay that just reply which I demand of right, you will render yourself solely37 responsible before all the world for the consequences which your refusal will inevitably bring after it. I am, etc.”
“This is strong, this is lively,” cried the ambassadors at Berlin when they read it; “it is the language of Louis XIV.; it is a beginning which shows what we must expect some day from this prince.” Their prophecy was to be fulfilled sooner than they anticipated. In the meantime the new diplomacy38 won another triumph. The Bishop made no reply to the ultimatum and in a week’s time the Prussians, sowing apologies broadcast over Europe, seized his88 county of Hoorn. The apologies concluded with the assertion: “His Majesty39 will never put from him a just and reasonable arrangement with the said prince, as the sole end which his justice and moderation have in view in this affair, these two invariable principles being the pole-star of all his actions.” The “just and reasonable arrangement” proved to be the payment of two hundred thousand thalers to the King.
Frederick could therefore congratulate himself that within five months of his accession he had taught both Prussia and Europe that he was stronger than his father. It was clear that he was resolved not to be hoodwinked by man or woman. He had rejected the advice of his cautious ministers with the pleasantry that when they spoke41 of war they resembled an Iroquois talking of astronomy. The event had gone far towards silencing the taunt42 of Europe that “the Prussians never shoot,” and towards establishing the truth of Frederick’s well-known simile43, “The Emperor is an old phantom44 of an idol45 and has no longer any nerves.”
A king of Prussia with such a spirit as Frederick had already shown was not likely to rest long upon his oars46. But it was chance that determined47 the course that he was next to steer48. The Herstal treaty, which confirmed his second diplomatic victory, was signed on October 20th. Six days later a swift courier brought to Rheinsberg the news that on that same day the Emperor, Charles VI., had died. Frederick lay ill of fever. He defied his doctors, took quinine, and was well. He sent for89 his cautious minister Podewils and for the dauntless soldier Schwerin, and wrote to Voltaire:
“The least expected event in the world forbids me this time to open my soul to yours as is my wont49.... I believe that in June it will be powder, soldiers and trenches50 rather than actresses, ballets and theatres.... This is the moment of the entire transformation52 of the old system of politics: the stone is loosed which Nebuchadnezzar beheld53 when it rolled upon the image of four metals and destroyed it.”
Two days later he expressed himself with still greater confidence: “I am not going to Berlin, a trifle like the Emperor’s death does not demand great commotions54. All was foreseen, all was thought out in advance. So it is only a question of carrying out designs which I have long had in my mind.”
These designs were, in brief, so to use the political situation created by the death of Charles VI. as to add to Prussia the whole, or at least the north-western part, of the Hapsburg province of Silesia—the fertile basin of the upper Oder. In conception and in execution the idea was Frederick’s own. It is the pediment of his fame as a hero of his nation. All the world knows that the capture of Silesia converted Frederick the Second into Frederick the Great. It is therefore imperative55 that at this point, with judgment56 unclouded by the smoke of battle and the incense57 of victory, we should address ourselves to the double enquiry, Was it necessary? and Was it right? postponing58 but not evading59 the further question, Was it wise?
90
THE RATHHAUS IN BRESLAU.
FROM A STEEL ENGRAVING60.
The plea that Silesia was necessary to Prussia, that the existence of Prussia could only be prolonged or her people safeguarded or fed if Silesia were hers, may be dismissed at once. Necessity is the usual pillar of a claim to extend the area of dominion61 over lands lately rescued from barbarism. The Law of Nations declares that, when under such conditions two civilised states desire the same territory, one may further its claim by showing that without this addition the territory which it already has would be rendered worthless. But what might give a good title to Fashoda would be absurd if applied62 to Breslau. Frederick had himself investigated the subject nine years before when studying under Hille at Cüstrin. He then concluded that Silesia did Prussia commercial injury by exporting to her goods at lower rates than the merchants of Brandenburg could afford to take. This state of things, he and Hille thought, demanded a protective tariff63. It could not by any stretch of imagination dictate64 or justify65 the annexation66 of a province. Nor from a military point of view was there imperative necessity for acquiring Silesia. It was no doubt desirable for Prussia that she should avert67 future danger by thrusting a wedge between Saxony and Poland, and that more than one-fifth of the road from Vienna to Berlin, by way of Breslau, should be in Prussian hands. But no Prussian could maintain in 1740 that if Glogau and Breslau remained Austrian his state would be imperilled in the same sense as the German Empire would have been imperilled if Metz and Strasburg had remained French in 1871, or as the British Empire91 would be imperilled to-day if Pretoria and Johannesburg were still in hostile hands. The plea of hereditary69 right, not that of necessity, was put forward by Frederick as the basis of his claims. In 1740 the latter would have seemed equally absurd in law and in fact.
The second question, Was it right for Prussia to attempt to acquire Silesia for her own profit? may seem to have little claim to discussion by Frederick’s biographers, because considerations of right and wrong counted for little with Frederick himself. There seems to be no evidence that Frederick either in his public or private life practised the stale hypocrisies70 of truth and morality. What it seemed to him profitable to do, that he did; what it seemed to him profitable to say, that he said. “If there is anything to be gained by being honest, let us be honest; if it is necessary to deceive, let us deceive,” are his own words. In the case of Silesia, his avowal71 to Podewils, who urged that some legal claim could be furbished up, is sufficiently72 explicit73. On November 7th the King writes: “The question of right (droit) is the affair of the ministers; it is your affair; it is time to work at it in secret, for the orders to the troops are given.” Two days later he received the news of the death of the Empress of Russia, which was worth more to him than a thousand title-deeds. Russia had no clear rule of succession, and usually fell into anarchy74 at the demise75 of the Crown. Frederick could therefore strike southward with confidence that his flank was safe.
The question, Was it right? has, however, a deeper92 historical interest than that involved in the biography of a king of Prussia. Frederick’s indifference76 to all right renders it unnecessary to reflect in his case upon the spectacle of a good man cheerfully doing evil in the service of the State—of Sir Henry Wotton setting out with a jest “to lie abroad,” or of Cavour exclaiming, “If we did for ourselves what we do for Italy, what scoundrels we should be!” But it is to be borne in mind that in 1740 it was impossible to lay down with certainty the duty of a state towards its neighbours. The standard of right and wrong for states in their dealings with one another was not yet fixed77. Nearly a quarter of a century later it was possible for Frederick to write, “The jurisprudence of sovereigns is commonly the right of the stronger.” But Maria Theresa was taught that sovereigns must rule their peoples as branches of one Christian78 family.
Hitherto the old idea that a state was the property—the estate—of the king had not lost all its influence. Even in England, which was already the leader of the world in politics, the dynasty elected by the nation had great weight in determining foreign policy. Without the knowledge of any Englishman, William III. had committed England to the partition of Spain, and in defiance79 of most Englishmen George II. was soon to commit her to the defence of the Pragmatic Sanction. But if England was not yet wholly free from the ancient notion, much more did Austria and Prussia, bundles of Hapsburg and Hohenzollern lands, resemble the estates of their rulers.
From this two consequences followed, vital in that day, almost incomprehensible in ours. It was, in the93 first place, a maxim80 universally accepted among the rulers of the Continent that the inhabitants of a province had little or no share in choosing their overlord. They might possess rights, even the right not to be divided between several lords, but they could be sold or exchanged or given away by one overlord to another without their own desire or even consent. This maxim was accepted to the full by both Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns, whose fortunes had been made by the union of family estates, and who never hesitated to barter81 those estates to advance their own fortunes. Thus the fact that a province would be happier under an overlord who professed82 the same religion with itself would, according to the ideas prevalent in 1740, afford no good reason for change. Religious oppression by a ruler, it was universally admitted, entitled other rulers to interfere83. But religious differences between ruler and ruled gave no such right.
In so far, then, as States still resembled estates, the relations between them varied84 according to the personal character of their kings and princes. The nation ruled by an honourable85 king observed its engagement strictly86, at whatever inconvenience to itself. If a State evaded87 its engagements the king’s honour was held to have been tarnished88. Unfortunately for Europe, this theory had been shaken, if not shattered, by the reign of Louis XIV. The Apollo of France, the cynosure89 of the Christian world, the king who was the very fount of honour and in person the very pattern of chivalry90, had in his dealings with the Dutch and the Germans shown himself a94 kinsman91 of Machiavelli and of Bismarck. His conspicuous92 severance93 of political from personal morality shook the faith of the world, and in the corrupt94 generation which followed Louis XIV. and nurtured95 Frederick even the standard of personal morality sank low.
At the death of Charles VI., therefore, men were perplexed96 about the source of law as between State and State. It seemed no longer sufficient to trust in princes, and yet what new code could be set up? Frederick’s attack upon Silesia struck a deadly blow at the remnant of the old system. His whole career was to influence the new profoundly.
In answer to our two first questions it would therefore appear that the attack upon Silesia was not dictated97 to Frederick by hard necessity, and that, tried by the old standard of honour between princes, it was clearly wrong. The third question—Was it wise?—is of a different order, for it is far from certain that the wisdom or folly98 of Frederick’s act has been sufficiently tested by time. A safe step towards the truth, indeed, is to examine the international situation and calculate Frederick’s chances of success, as a statesman would compute99 them from the facts which lay before him in 1740. First of all, however, we must account for the fact that Frederick, who was only the third Hohenzollern to wear a crown, found himself in a position to assail100 the dynasty which had held for centuries the foremost place in Germany.
The House of Hapsburg, perhaps to a greater extent than any other of the ruling families in Europe, lay under the spell of its own past. This was due in95 part to its native pride and sluggish101 blood, in part to its long association with the oldest and most dignified102 institution of the Christian world—the Holy Roman Empire. From 1438 onwards the descendants of Rudolf of Hapsburg had been chosen in unbroken sequence to fill the office which entitled its possessor to style himself Lord of the World. The radiance of old Rome had gilded103 Vienna for so long a time that it seemed to have transfigured the race that reigned104 there. Thus the Hapsburgs grew proud with a pride which no other House could rival, and no Hapsburg was prouder than Charles VI., the Anglo-Austrian candidate in the War of the Spanish Succession. His pride was fatal, for it banished105 him from the world of fact. He could never comprehend how Europe could leave off fighting to make him King of Spain, nor how the King of Prussia, who served him with towel and basin as Grand Chamberlain of the Empire, could cherish aims and aspirations106 which conflicted with his own. Pompous107 ceremonies and parchments made up so large a part of his own life that he came to believe that they expressed realities. Hence he made the cardinal108 error of his life. He committed the future of his House to the Pragmatic Sanction. Domestic economy was beneath his notice. While Frederick William was crying out because his son’s tutors permitted an item “for the housemaids at Wusterhausen,” to appear in the accounts, dishonest stewards109 were debiting110 the Emperor with twelve buckets of the best wine for the Emperor’s bath and two casks of old Tokay for Her Majesty’s parrots. When96 Charles VI. died the treasury111 was almost empty; the army seemed to have passed away with Prince Eugene; the ministers were blunderers of seventy and the sovereign a woman of twenty-three.
Maria Theresa had, however, much in her favour. Though untried in affairs of State, it was certain that her birth, her beauty, her piety112, her courage, her wifely devotion, and her unfailing goodness of heart would win the affection of her subjects. And the realm of the Hapsburgs needed only loyalty113 to be strong. Its broad and smiling provinces could furnish inexhaustible supplies of men and food, and the rank and file had proved their courage in a hundred wars. Besides, after all the trouble and sacrifices of Charles VI., in what quarter could immediate danger arise? The rulers of Bavaria, Saxony, Spain, and Sardinia had each a claim to some part of his inheritance, but they could each and all be confuted or bought off. A miscellaneous empire like that of the Hapsburgs could never be wholly free from such disputes. What might well give confidence for the future was the fact that France, so long the moving spirit of Europe and the implacable foe114 of Austria, had in 1738 given to the Pragmatic Sanction the most ample guarantee that the wit of man could devise. What her king had then undertaken, her all-powerful minister had lately confirmed. In January, Fleury had written to the Emperor:
“The King will observe with the most exact and inviolable fidelity115 the engagements which he has made with you, and if I may speak of myself after a name so97 worthy116, I venture to flatter myself that my pacific intentions are well enough known for it to be supposed that I am very far from thinking of setting Europe on fire.”
Both King and Cardinal were sincere, and the best proofs of their sincerity117 were the signs of coming strife118 between them and England. It was clearly to the interest of France that they should keep their pledge.
If she had nothing to fear from France, Maria Theresa had everything to hope from Prussia. It is hardly necessary to say that Frederick William, the devoted119 vassal120 of the Emperor, had been among the first to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction. His son, so Austrian statesmen might argue, had to thank the Emperor for protection when he lay in prison, for secret supplies of money, for experience in the field, above all for admission by way of marriage to the outer circle of the Imperial family itself. Now he expressed himself in terms which convinced the consort121 of the Queen, Francis of Lorraine, that his attitude towards the young couple was that of a father. Francis even flattered himself with expectations of Prussian support in his candidature for the office of Emperor. Although the Austrian resident at Berlin wrote towards the end of October, 1740, that the gossips spoke of dangerous designs upon a portion of Silesia, and although, on November 19th, Maria Theresa gave utterance122 to a fear that the price of Prussian protection would be a slice of her hereditary dominions123, still no one at Vienna had the least suspicion of the blow that Frederick was preparing.
98 What was hidden from the victims was hidden also from Europe and from Berlin. Till the end of November, the only clear fact was that Prussia was arming fast. Envoys124 besieged125 Podewils and the King, and even Voltaire journeyed to Rheinsberg in the hope of piercing the veil. All their efforts were vain. The conviction that Silesia was in danger gathered strength, but no one could be sure that Frederick would move at all, or that if he moved it would not be towards the Rhine. He astutely126 feinted in the direction of Berg by strengthening the garrisons128 in Cleves and repairing the roads to the West. At the same time he toiled130 hard to baffle official curiosity at home and abroad and to feel the pulses of the Powers, especially that of France. Wilhelmina, who saw her brother revelling131 in the social pleasures of Rheinsberg, had no idea of what was in the wind.
At last, when secrecy132 was no longer profitable, the King’s design was allowed to appear. On November 29th, the English ambassador wrote from Berlin that the project of invading Silesia was as good as avowed133. Frederick had yet to meet and to brave the Marquis di Botta, who came from Vienna on a special mission to the Prussian Court and encountered the stream of troops flowing towards Silesia. At their meeting the King dropped the mask of friendship. “I am resolved,” he said in effect, “to safeguard my rights over parts of Silesia by occupying it. Yield it to me and I will support the throne of Maria Theresa and procure134 the imperial crown for her husband.” “Impossible for us,” urged the99 Austrian, “and for you, criminal in the eyes of all Europe.” Argument was plainly futile135, and both fell to threats. “The Prussian troops make a handsomer show than the Austrian,” said Botta, “but ours have smelt136 powder.” “The Prussian troops will prove themselves as brave as they are handsome,” replied the King. Three days later, on December 12th, he attended a masquerade in the apartments of the Queen, questioned the French ambassador with regard to the disposition137 of Fleury, and afterwards supped in public. To the last moment the routine of pleasure was performed.
Next morning Frederick set out for Silesia. He had first to shake off two lads of fourteen and ten, his brothers Henry and Ferdinand, the youngest colonels in his army, who seized the skirts of his coat and begged him to take them to the war. A day’s drive brought him to Frankfurt-on-Oder, and between Frankfurt and the frontier of Silesia was encamped an army of 19,000 men with seventy-four guns. The heart of the despot not yet twenty-nine years old beat high with lust138 of adventure and with confidence of success. On the evening of December 16th, he wrote to Podewils from Silesian soil:
“I have crossed the Rubicon with waving banners and resounding139 music; my troops are full of good-will, the officers ambitious and our generals consumed with greed for fame; all will go as we wish and I have reason to promise myself all possible good from this undertaking140.... I will either perish or have honour from it.”
Frederick’s next step was to issue to the world100 a document, of which one thousand copies had been printed in deepest secrecy exactly a month before. This was designed to reassure141 the people of Silesia as to the intentions of the King of Prussia. It was dated December 1st and gave out that a general war was threatening, in which Silesia, “our safeguard and outwork,” would be involved and the security of Prussia threatened. To avert this peril68 the King saw himself compelled to despatch142 troops to Silesia.
“This is by no means intended to injure Her Majesty of Hungary, with whom and with the worshipful House of Austria we rather most eagerly desire to maintain the strictest friendship and to promote their true interest and maintenance according to the example of our glorious forefathers143 in our realm and electorate144. That such is our sole intention in this affair, time will show clearly enough, for we are actually in course of explanation and agreement with Her Majesty.”
Commentary on this profession, if not sufficiently supplied by Frederick’s interviews with Botta, was afforded two days after his entry into Silesia. Then for the first time a Prussian representative, Borcke, informed the rulers of Austria of his master’s proceedings. Shamefaced and without hope of success, he began the unwelcome task by offering to the Archduke Francis his master’s guarantee for the Hapsburg lands in Germany, a place in the Prussian alliance with England, Holland, and Russia, his vote at the Imperial election, and a loan of two million florins. Then he named the price—the cession40 of all Silesia. “Rather the Turks before Vienna,” cried101 the Archduke, “rather the Netherlands to France, rather any concession146 to Bavaria and Saxony.” And when he grew calmer and spoke of negotiation20, the door opened and Maria Theresa asked whether her husband was there.
Next day the subject was broached147 anew by a more Olympian plenipotentiary, Oberhofmarschall Gotter, who had arrived after Borcke’s message was made known. He found Vienna stirred to its depths and the English ambassador declaring that if such a thing were done Frederick would be excommunicated from the society of Governments. None the less he took the high tone and strove to intimidate148 the pliable149 Archduke.
“‘I bear,’ he said, ‘in one hand safety for the House of Austria and in the other, for Your Highness, the Imperial crown. The treasures of the King my master are at the service of the Queen, and he brings her the succour of his allies, England, Holland and Russia. As a return for these offers and as compensation for the peril which he incurs150 by them, he asks for all Silesia, and will take no less. The King’s resolve is immovable. He has the will and the power to possess himself of Silesia, and if it be not offered to him with a good grace these same troops and treasures will be given to Saxony and Bavaria, who are asking for them.’”
Gotter’s words seem to strike the keynote of the Silesian adventure. His silence as to legal claim throws into strange relief the preposterous151 character of the moral claim which he advances. Saxony and Bavaria had made no overtures to Frederick, and102 Frederick, as soon became apparent, was willing to accept much less than the whole of Silesia. The spirit of Maria Theresa breathed in the calm and dignified reply of the Archduke. Her high-minded confidence in Providence152, her allies, her people, and herself blunted all the weapons of Prussia—the threats and cajolings addressed to the sovereign and the three hundred thousand thalers offered to the ministers. Austria declared that the invasion must cease or she would not even negotiate. Thereupon Gotter and Borcke joined their voices to the loud and unceasing chorus of remonstrance153 with which Prussia and Europe assailed154 the ears of Frederick in vain.
The young King’s firmness may be ascribed in part to an overweening confidence in his own talents and in part to the favourable155 progress of his enterprise. He knew himself to be a cleverer man than his father and he had boundless156 faith in prompt and decided157 action. His success in the affairs of Mainz and Herstal could not but have augmented158 his self-esteem. The sight of the well-found and eager army which a word from him had assembled filled him with a sense of omnipotence159. He declared that it must not be said that the King of Prussia marched with a tutor at his elbow. The minister of France, who admitted his great power of becoming what he wished, smiled maliciously160 at what he wished to become.
“Fully convinced of his superiority in every department, he already thinks himself a clever statesman and a great general. Alert and masterful, he always decides103 upon the spot and according to his own fancy. His generals will never be anything but adjutants, his councillors anything but clerks, his finance-ministers anything but tax-gatherers, his allies among the German princes anything but his slaves.”
Frederick’s whole career is a vindication161 of this estimate.
Already, both in Silesia and in Europe, good progress had been made. No Austrian armies disputed Frederick’s advance, for Charles VI’s grandiose162 projects had denuded163 his home provinces of troops. The natural defences of Silesia, too, were all on the wrong side. Mountains formidable though by no means impassable screened it from loyal Bohemia and loyal Moravia, and thus blocked the direct paths to Vienna. Only a few hills and streams barred an attack from the side of Saxony and no natural obstacle intervened between Breslau and Berlin. The strong portal looking towards Prussia was Glogau, which closed the Oder, the great natural highway of Silesia. Breslau, the capital, a city which Frederick could praise as the finest in Germany, was too big to be a fortress164 by nature and too independent to be made one by art. In the main Protestant, and therefore ill-disposed towards Austrian rule, it stood firmly upon its right to provide for its own defence and refused to receive a garrison129. Glogau was therefore the only formidable fortress in Lower Silesia, the half of Silesia where Protestant feeling was strongest and which was most exposed to the Prussian invasion. The south-eastern half, Upper Silesia, contained two other strong places of104 high importance—Brieg, which commanded the upper Oder, and Neisse, which secured the backdoor of the province towards Austria. But Glogau, Brieg, and Neisse were all ill-supplied and undermanned. Without a field army to use them as bases and supports they could not oppose a serious obstacle to the army of the King.
THE BOARD OF FINANCES AT NEISSE.
FROM A STEEL ENGRAVING.
Frederick’s worst foe, indeed, was the weather, which tested the endurance of the Prussians and found it great. Torrents165 of rain fell from the eighteenth of December to the twentieth.
“Waters all out,” says Carlyle of the latter day, “bridges down, the country one wild lake of eddying166 mud. Up to the knee for many miles together; up to the middle for long spaces; sometimes even up to the chin or deeper, where your bridge was washed away. The Prussians marched through it, as if they had been slate167 or iron.... Ten hours some of them were out, their march being twenty or twenty-five miles; ten to fifteen was the average distance come.”
Their unshaken discipline was the trophy168 of Frederick William and the best omen51 for the adventure of his son. On December 22d he knocked at the door of Silesia and was not dismayed at finding it shut. Wallis, the Governor of the province, had thrown himself into Glogau, had worked manfully to make it defensible, and now stood firm. Without siege-guns Frederick could hardly hope to take the place, and for a few days his own command was brought to a standstill. He summoned the reserve under the younger Prince of Anhalt-Dessau to join him at105 Glogau and used the delay to organise169 a system by which Silesia should feed his troops for the future, but should feed them with the minimum of inconvenience and waste. Meanwhile the enterprise continued to be fortunate. On December 27th Schwerin and the right wing surprised Liegnitz, an industrial town within sight of the western wall of mountains, and on the same day the Young Dessauer brought the reserve to Glogau and set Frederick free. “Thou wilt170 shortly see Silesia ranked in the list of our provinces,” wrote the King. “Religion and our brave soldiers will do the rest.”
In Silesia and in Europe alike the philosopher-king counted much on religion. He cheerfully accepted the r?le of Protestant hero assigned him by the people, first of Berlin, then of Silesia, and finally of England. Never was this r?le more serviceable than in his dealings with Breslau. Leaving the Young Dessauer to blockade Glogau, he pressed on to the capital and, aided by the frost, accomplished171 the journey of seventy miles in three days. Much display of friendship and a little sharp practice sufficed to win the city, and Frederick, gracious and debonair172, entered it in great state. Thus in three weeks from his departure from Berlin the King destroyed the Austrian civil government of Silesia. Half the province lay almost passive in his grasp, and he had secured a base for the conquest of the other half.
The remainder of the month of January, 1741, was spent in pressing home the advantage already won. The smaller towns, Ohlau, which would be useful as106 a base till Brieg could be acquired, Ottmachau, and Namslau, capitulated one by one. It was true that the activity of the young Austrian general, Browne, produced an ever-increasing disposition to resist, and that Glatz, hedged in by hills, defied the besiegers. But the area under Prussian control was steadily173 increased. Brieg was masked as Glogau had been, and Neisse, after a futile bombardment of four days, was treated in the same way. Schwerin was set free to drive Browne through the mountains into Moravia and to lead the army into winter quarters. On the 29th of January, Frederick returned to Berlin and plunged174 with zest175 into the whirlpool of diplomacy which had been stirred to its depths by his adventure.
Great as was his trust in resolute176 action and in accomplished facts, he could not disguise from himself the truth that on one side his calculations had broken down. Austria, inspired by a Queen whose high soul it was not in Frederick’s power to measure, was not one whit177 nearer to compliance178 with his demands. Russia, as he foresaw, was likely to do little to help her, but the action of the Western Powers was less easy to calculate. Frederick felt sure of one thing above all else—that under no circumstances would France and England be on the same side. He therefore devoted himself to the task of winning the alliance of one and the neutrality of the other.
Frederick’s simultaneous courtship of two Powers whose latent enmity to each other was beginning to reappear throws valuable light on his diplomatic methods and upon his regard for the truth.
107
“A veracious179 man he was, at all points,” says Frederick’s greatest biographer; “not even conscious of his veracity180; but had it in the blood of him; and never looked upon ‘mendacity’ but from a very great height indeed. He does not, except where suitable, at least he never should, express his whole meaning, but you will never find him expressing what is not his meaning. Reticence181, not dissimulation182.... Facts are a kind of divine thing to Frederick; much more so than to common men; this is essentially183 what Religion I have found in Frederick.”
By his verdict that Frederick was a “veracious” man and his seizure184 of Silesia a righteous act, Carlyle robs the story of his life of half its value. The plain meaning of the facts which he adduces seems to be that he was an astute127 man, careless of truth and right. Hence we may enquire185 with keen interest, How far can such means lead to lasting186 success? In deference187 to a great name, however, two of Frederick’s letters may be placed side by side. It will then be unnecessary to recur188 to this ungracious topic. From this time forward it will be assumed that the reader has formed his own opinion of Frederick’s truthfulness189.
So soon as he realised that his negotiation with Austria might break down, Frederick turned to France. On January 5, 1741, he wrote to Fleury from Breslau:
“My dear Cardinal, I am deeply impressed by all the assurances of friendship which you give me and I will always reply to them with the same sincerity. It depends only upon you, by favouring the justice of my title108 to Silesia, to make eternal the bonds which will unite us. If I did not make you a sharer in my plans at first it was through forgetfulness rather than for any other reason. It is not everyone who is as unfettered amid his work as yourself, and to Cardinal Fleury alone is it granted to think of and to provide for everything.”
And in sending the letter he added:
“I ask nothing better than a close union with His Most Christian Majesty, whose interests will always be dear to me, and I flatter myself that he will have no less regard for mine.”
At the same time he was making proposals for a close union with the natural enemy of France. In the same month, January, 1741, he addressed the following sentences to George II.:
“My Brother! I am delighted to see that I have not deceived myself in placing confidence in Your Majesty.
“As I have had no alliance with anyone I have not been able to open my mind to anyone; but as I see Your Majesty’s good intentions I regard you as already my ally, from whom I ought in future to have nothing secret or concealed190. Far from desiring to disturb Europe, I demand only that heed191 be paid to the justice of my uncontestable rights. I place unbounded confidence in Your Majesty’s friendship and in the common interests of Protestant princes, which require that those oppressed for their religion should be succoured. The tyranny under which the Silesians have groaned192 is frightful193, and the barbarity of the Catholics towards them inexpressible. If the Protestants lose me they have no other resort.
109 “If Your Majesty desires to attach to yourself a faithful ally of inviolable constancy, this is the time: our interests, our religion, our blood is the same, and it would be sad to see ourselves acting194 against each other: it would be still more grievous to oblige me to concur195 in the great plans of France, which I intend to do only if I am compelled.”
The question of alliances was still unsettled on February 19th, when Frederick again left Berlin for the scene of war. Prussia might be doomed196 to act alone; her safety lay in her own right hand. New armies were set on foot, but a skirmish at Baumgarten, in which he narrowly escaped capture, proved to Frederick that the Austrians were moving and that his own troops were not all that could be desired. Nor was the Prussian strategy above criticism. The Old Dessauer, the father of the army, held up his hands in horror at the dispositions197 of Schwerin. Weak detachments were cantoned everywhere and the mountain-passes not secured, although Neisse, Brieg, and Glogau were still Austrian, and the Prussians would be at the mercy of an army entering Silesia from the Bohemian side.
But soon the King’s spirits, which had been depressed198 by the danger of a European coalition against him, were raised and the military situation greatly improved by a brilliant feat199 of the Young Dessauer. Glogau, Frederick had been pleased to decree, must be taken. At midnight on March 8th-9th, therefore, a combined assault was made with that perfect organisation200 and cool courage which110 already distinguished201 the Prussian infantry202. In an hour the work was done, at a speed which made the loss on each side the merest trifle. Frederick could congratulate his lieutenant203 on “the prettiest military stroke that has been done in this century,” and himself on the acquisition of an open highroad to Breslau. The capital now became a safe central storehouse for the Prussians, and its value as a base of operations was greatly enhanced by the gain of control over the Oder. So far as Glogau itself was concerned, it may be convenient to remark that the work had never to be done a second time. In a wall near the northern portal may be seen a stone inscribed204 F. R. 1741—a token of Prussian sovereignty which from that day to this has suffered no erasure205.
The next task was to secure Neisse, the Glogau of Upper Silesia. The problem was complicated by the fact that the Austrians had succeeded in flinging a thousand men into the fortress, and that a relieving army under Marshal Neipperg was known to be on its way from Vienna. Frederick therefore determined to turn the blockade into an active siege, while one covering army was established to the westward., and Schwerin received orders to concentrate another to the south-east. The detachments were being called in for this purpose when the King had to acknowledge a surprise which led to the first pitched battle of the war and which might have ruined his whole enterprise. While Schwerin was carefully shutting the south-eastern gate of Silesia in Neipperg’s face, the marshal passed him on his right111 and, by a creditable march over roads supposed to be impracticable, arrived at Neisse on April 5th. The advantage of this bold move was soon apparent. Frederick and Schwerin, who had been within an ace11 of capture, were also marching northwards, but they were separated from their friends by the river Neisse and by a superior force of the enemy. Neipperg was strong in cavalry208 and longed to follow up his advantage by crushing the Prussians in detail.
Frederick was saved, however, by Neipperg’s ignorance of the strength and position of his foes209. With a force of less than sixteen thousand men, the marshal’s plain duty was to use his temporary superiority in numbers by meeting the enemy in the field and striving to destroy him. Failing in this, he might make for Ohlau and the magazine. But after crossing the Neisse, he lost touch with Frederick’s force and believed himself to be between hostile armies on the north and south-east. Snow and rain hampered his movements and chilled his men. He therefore abandoned the initiative, and on April 9th sat down within sight of friendly Brieg to await events. He was right in supposing that a Prussian force lay to the south-east of him. It was the army of Frederick and Schwerin, which had received reinforcements from all sides. It was three times as strong as he believed it could be, and it was within five miles of his camp. He was wrong, however, in supposing that a stronger force lay to the north in Ohlau. Ohlau was weak and Frederick was hastening thither210 to save his heavy artillery211 and magazine. Neipperg lay right across his path and112 a battle was inevitable212. It would soon be proved whether the Prussian troops were indeed as brave as they were handsome, or whether Europe was right in thinking that Prussia would pay dear for the presumption213 of her King.
Frederick realised the importance of the crisis. For two days, it is said, he could neither eat nor sleep. On April 8th he wrote to his brother and heir, Prince Augustus William, bidding him farewell if the next day should be his last. In that event he commended to his care four of his friends, “those whom in life I have loved the most,” as well as two of his servants. The next day, however, proved tempestuous214 and the Prussian attack was postponed215 till April 10th. Then the morning sun shone out upon a plain hardened by frost and covered to a depth of two feet with snow. The Prussian baggage was packed at five o’clock, and by nine the whole force had silently taken rank. An hour later, the march northward207 began, the army pressing slowly through the snow towards Ohlau, and feeling for the enemy who lay across their path. At last the vanguard surprised an Austrian outpost, captured twenty men, and learned that Neipperg lay encamped in and about Mollwitz, a village less than two miles ahead.
How twenty-two thousand men could have approached so close to the enemy unperceived, it is hard to understand. Neipperg, it is true, did not expect to be attacked. There was some screen of woods between the Prussians and Mollwitz, and the country-folk were Protestants who volunteered113 information only to the Prussians. But the day was clear and the scene as flat as the parade-ground at Potsdam; the Austrians were particularly well supplied with scouts216 and their general’s avowed plan was to shape his course according to the movements of his opponents. None the less it was in fact not till after ten o’clock that he received the alarm, and by that time the Prussians were methodically ranking themselves for battle. Had the same opportunity come to Frederick later in life, he would, as he himself declares, have flung troops upon Mollwitz and the neighbouring villages and put the Austrians to flight before they could form. But in this first fight every traditional precaution was carefully observed, “the faithful apprentice-hand,” says Carlyle, “still rigorous to the rules of the old shop.”
While Neipperg was bustling217 and hurrying to collect his army from three villages and to draw it up in front of Mollwitz, the Prussians were man?uvring into place as though they were on parade. Two long lines were formed across the plain. These were three hundred paces apart, so that if the front were pierced, which was hardly supposed possible, the rear could fire their flintlocks without massacring their comrades. Heavy guns to the front, cavalry on the wings, were the orders, and, as the enemy were superior in cavalry, Frederick copied an expedient218 of the great Gustavus by placing two regiments219 of grenadiers between the squadrons of horse on either wing. At length all was ready, and at midday the Prussian cannonade began, galling220 the114 Austrian cavalry and as yet unanswerable by the Austrian guns.
Neipperg had ordered the cavalry to wait till a general advance could be made. But the left wing, refusing to be shot down like dogs, suddenly defied their officers and dashed at the Prussian right. They lost all formation, but they found a foe unschooled in their tactics. First pistol-shot, then a stroke with a sabre as sharp as a razor right at the head of the enemy’s horse, finally, as horse and man went down, a thrust from the rear at the rider—such an attack was beyond the experience of the Prussian cavalry, and they could not stand against it. As often as Austrian horse met Prussian on the day of Mollwitz they gained an easy victory. They captured some of the guns, plundered221 the baggage, tore several gaps in the line, and drove the King himself in headlong flight from his first battle.
PLAN OF MOLWITZ, APRIL 10, 1741.
For some time Frederick was driven helplessly here and there amid his ruined cavalry in a fight which was unlike anything that he had ever seen and which he was impotent to control. His generals begged him to quit the field. To his inexperienced eye all seemed lost, and at last Schwerin confirmed his fears. “There is still hope,” said this tried captain to his sovereign, “but in case of the worst it would be well if your Majesty in person would bring troops from Ohlau and Strehlen.” Bewildered and despairing, the King turned his back on the wreck222 of all his hopes and fled far to the south-east. Distancing many of his attendants in a swift ride of more than thirty miles, he arrived at Oppeln on the115 Oder, only to be repulsed223 by the unexpected fire of a party of Austrian hussars who had seized the town and who captured some of his worse-mounted companions. To this check, for he then doubled back towards his army, he owed the fact that at the close of a ride of nearly fifty miles he received the news of victory without delay.
When Frederick left the field it was about four o’clock. The havoc224 in the Prussian ranks had been wrought225 by unsupported charges of horse. Schwerin could still count upon his infantry, which in the midst of the whirlwind had stood firm as a rock and by sheer steadiness and speed of firing had tumbled masses of cavalry into ruin. His first act was to send to the Young Dessauer, who commanded the second line, an exhortation226 to do his duty and to keep his men from firing volleys into the backs of their comrades. The Young Dessauer, who hated Schwerin, replied that he needed no judge save the King and that he would do his duty without any reminders227.
After this exchange of courtesies, Schwerin braced228 himself to the task of retrieving229 the day. He assured his infantry that the King was well, that no battle could be won or lost by cavalry alone, and that he placed his trust in them. He then ordered his right wing forward against the Austrian infantry. These were raw levies230 and gave signs of unsteadiness before the Prussians came within range. Range, in days of weak powder and clumsy muskets231, was some forty-five paces, and the sight of the enemy bearing down upon them, shoulder to shoulder, was too much116 for undisciplined men to face. Neipperg drew supports from his right, but even his victorious232 cavalry soon refused to face the fire which was poured in by men perfectly233 trained and furnished with the iron ramrods invented by the Old Dessauer. The Austrian infantry, which was able at the best to fire less than half as fast as the enemy, hid trembling one behind another and tried to endure a torment234 to which they could not reply. As the sun was sinking Schwerin pressed his advantage home. With sounding music and waving banners, in irresistible235 advance, the Prussian left swept down upon the weakened Austrian right. Neipperg saw that the battle was lost. He retreated first behind Mollwitz then, seeing that his men would not stand, round the Prussian left and eventually to Neisse.
Except that his magazine was saved and that he was soon able to capture Brieg, Frederick derived236 little immediate military advantage from what he describes as “one of the rudest battles fought within the memory of man.” The chief profit of Neipperg’s march had evaporated before the battle, at the moment when Frederick and Schwerin became superior in numbers. In spite of Mollwitz the Austrian army remained on Silesian soil, and it was better placed near Neisse than near Brieg. In killed and wounded each side had lost about 4500 men, nearly one-fourth of the combatants engaged. And in spite of Frederick’s hoarded237 millions and well-filled regiments, it was clear that, if the contest were to remain a duel between himself and Maria Theresa alone, the size and natural wealth of Austria must117 tell in the long run. After Mollwitz, Frederick would still have been glad to accept Lower Silesia as the price of his alliance with Austria and a contribution to her exchequer238.
Prussia’s greatest gain from Mollwitz was increase of prestige. Though her cavalry did not regain239 their nerve for many a day, her infantry, the backbone240 of the army, had proved that it was indeed as brave as it was handsome. Frederick never alluded241 to his own departure from the field. In later life he accustomed himself to inaugurate the Prussian military year by celebrating the anniversary of the triumph which he had not seen. Every fifth of April the Guards were twice ordered to the charge and dismissed with the words, “Thus did your forefathers at Mollwitz.” The traditional Austrian contempt for Prussia had received its first signal rebuke242. The story survives among the villagers of Mollwitz that when the call to arms disturbed one of Neipperg’s officers at dinner he called to the landlord to keep the dishes hot. “We will come back soon,” he promised, “but we have to go and dust the Prussians’ jackets for them.”
Victory in the field reconciled Prussian opinion to Frederick’s Silesian adventure, but this was a small gain in comparison with its effect on opinion in Europe, especially in France. At the Court of Louis XV. the party opposed to Fleury and to peace had been gathering243 strength day by day. Hot-headed men and women, blind to the true interests of their country, could see in Austria only the hereditary enemy from whom lands and laurels244 were to be won.118 Chief among them was Marshal Belleisle, a man who conceived great schemes and advocated them with eloquence245 and charm. His plan was that France should ally herself with Prussia, procure the Imperial crown for Charles Albert of Bavaria, and, in spite of all her pledges to support the Pragmatic Sanction, endow both the Bavarian and Saxon claimants with Austrian lands. Having thus humbled246 Austria and made the fortunes of Austria’s rivals, France might gain the Netherlands and Luxemburg for herself and dictate to a divided Germany for ever.
Before Mollwitz, Belleisle had progressed with this policy so far as to be entrusted247 with a mission to the Diet which assembled at Frankfort to elect an Emperor. Frederick’s victory encouraged all the enemies of the Hapsburgs and thus lightened the task of Belleisle. In May, 1741, Charles Albert accepted the r?le marked out for him, and early next month the King of Prussia, despairing of an alliance with England, came to terms with France. By a treaty signed at Breslau in the deepest secrecy, he agreed to renounce248 his claims to Jülich-Berg, and undertook to vote for Charles Albert at the Diet. France in return guaranteed him in the possession of Lower Silesia, and undertook to safeguard Prussia by sending an army to support Charles Albert within two months and by stirring up Sweden to make war on Russia. The coalition against Austria gathered strength as it proceeded, and with the exception of the English and the Dutch no nation hesitated to desert the Pragmatic Sanction.
The idea with which Frederick began the Silesian119 adventure was at length realised. He had, as he anticipated, stirred up general confusion, amid which the strong man who knew his own mind could hardly fail to carry off some spoils. To France, as the moving spirit, he was all gratitude249 and devotion. But his real design henceforward was to leave his confederates to subdue250 Austria, while he himself devoted all his powers to grasping what Prussia could hope to retain. What he gained from Belleisle’s work was made manifest in the summer and autumn of 1741. While the Bavarians and French were advancing in triumph down the Danube towards Vienna, the Austrians could take no thought for Silesia. Frederick, therefore, had leisure to train his cavalry and consolidate251 his conquest. He treacherously252 destroyed the municipal independence of Breslau, which he had bound himself to preserve, but did little actual fighting. Neisse, protected by Neipperg’s army, seemed still too strong to be attacked.
Meanwhile the extreme peril of Maria Theresa’s throne forced the Queen to make trial of desperate remedies. By throwing herself upon the generosity253 of the Hungarians, the traditional rebels against her House, she more than doubled the force at her disposal. Her endeavour to purchase France was futile, but a hint from Frederick was now enough to inaugurate negotiations with Prussia. Early in October these issued in the famous convention of Klein Schnellendorf. In deep secrecy, for Fleury had written that the King of Prussia was false in everything, even in his caresses254, and the French ambassador kept a watchful255 eye upon his movements,120 Frederick met Neipperg at a castle in the neighbourhood of Neisse. Each was accompanied by one companion, while the English ambassador, Lord Hyndford, who had arranged the interview, acted as clerk and witness. There Frederick, who had just written to Belleisle a letter full of encouragement, sold his allies for his own profit. It was agreed that after a sham145 siege of Neisse the Austrians should evacuate256 Silesia, and that Prussia should become neutral in fact though not in show. To Neipperg, whose army would now be free to act against the French in Bohemia, Frederick gave wise counsel for the campaign. “Unite all your troops, then strike home before they can strike you.” If the Austrians should succeed, Frederick might join them; if not, he would be compelled to look to himself. To deceive the French, the English ambassador was to report him as deaf to all propositions. If any word of the convention got abroad, the King declared he would deny all and regard all as void.
This conspiracy257 against Frederick’s allies was punctiliously258 carried into effect so long as it was profitable to Prussia. For fifteen days Neisse submitted to a bombardment and two hundred cannon-shot were fired off by either side. After seven days Neipperg’s army made off, attended by a Prussian corps259 in seeming pursuit, and at the time appointed the strong fortress was surrendered. On the very same day the King accepted a treaty for the partition of Austria. The Prussians then, as arranged, went into winter quarters in Upper Silesia, which Austria was eventually to retain, and from time to121 time sham skirmishes took place to hoodwink the French.
At the beginning of November the King left Neisse for Berlin, pausing on his way to view the scenes of all his triumphs. At Brieg and Glogau he inspected the fortifications, but at Breslau he drove in state to the grand old Rathaus and received the homage260 of Lower Silesia, the province secretly ceded261 to him at Klein Schnellendorf. The ceremony was immediately followed by the reorganisation of the Government in Church and State. The province was simply made Prussian, with absolute religious equality, heavy but not harsh taxation262, and a regular system of conscription.
At Klein Schnellendorf Frederick had hinted that if the Austrians were not successful in Bohemia they could not expect him to do more than stand neutral. The event soon showed what he meant. Before the end of November Prague was stormed in brilliant fashion by the Bavarians, French, and Saxons. Frederick’s allies had succeeded where he expected them to fail. He at once proclaimed his intention of standing263 by the winning side. “My fingers itch206 for brilliant and useful action on behalf of my dear Elector,” he wrote to Belleisle. He broke all the provisions of the convention of Klein Schnellendorf and derided264 the suggestion that such a pact265 could ever have existed. “Should I be so foolish as to patch up a peace with enemies who hate me in their hearts, and in whose neighbourhood I could enjoy no safety?” the King demanded. “The true principles of the policy of my House demand a close122 alliance with France.” Such was the substance of the argument which Frederick addressed to Fleury.
Lord Hyndford, however, had witnessed all that passed at Klein Schnellendorf, and would not allow England to be duped by lies. Frederick therefore told him frankly266 that he intended to set the convention at defiance. The allies, he showed, had 150,000 men against Austria’s 70,000 and could do with her what they would. If she published the convention she would only expose her own folly, and perhaps she would not be believed. Then, besides treating Upper Silesia as his own and laying hands on the adjoining county of Glatz, he ordered the conquest of Moravia. Ere the year was out Schwerin was in Olmütz, the chief town of the North, and it seemed as though the allies would filch267 yet another province from the Queen. “Alas!” wrote the philosopher-king on one occasion to Voltaire, “trickery, bad faith and double-dealing are the leading feature of most of the men who are at the head of the nations and who ought to set them an example.”
Never was the fortitude268 of Maria Theresa more needed or more illustrious than in these winter months. The earlier gleams of light—Vienna spared and Frederick bought off—only made yet more black the clouds which now gathered over her throne. Her father had flattered himself that he bequeathed to her the support of united Europe. Within a year of his death the greater part of Europe was leagued to despoil269 her. France, Spain, Bavaria, Prussia, Saxony, the Elector Palatine, the123 Elector of Cologne formed the coalition, and the accession of Sardinia was the prelude270 to a severe struggle on the side of Italy. The loss of Bohemia almost without a blow made the Queen well-nigh forgetful of Silesia until the perfidy271 of Frederick opened the former wound anew. At the same time a revolution at St. Petersburg extinguished for the time being the Austrian influence in Russia and thereby272 increased the King’s security. Then came the attack upon Moravia, and before the end of January, 1742, the Imperial crown passed from the Hapsburg family by the election of the head of a rival House—Charles Albert of Bavaria.
Amid all these disasters, however, the courage of the young Queen, rooted as it was in her belief that right must triumph, remained unshaken. She organised new armies and inspired them with her own spirit. Before the resurgent might of Austria the new-made Emperor sank into impotence. Within a month of his election the Queen recovered her cities on the Danube and overran the hereditary lands of the Bavarian. Et C?sar et nihil laughed the wags. What would his allies, France, Prussia, and Saxony, do to relieve him?
The position of affairs may be simply stated. Two Austrian armies were in the field, one conquering Bavaria, the other protecting it against an attack from the side of Bohemia, where the allies were still masters of Prague. If this second army were driven back by a superior force, the first would be recalled to support it. Thus Bavaria and Bohemia, the actual and the pretended inheritance of Charles Albert,124 would be freed from the Austrians together. At the same time the French in Bohemia would be relieved from the fear of being outnumbered and attacked, and the Saxons would have the simplest march possible—straight into Bohemia by the natural highroad of the Elbe. Every military consideration thus summoned Frederick to join in clearing the kingdom of Austrian troops. But this plan promised no special advantage for the King of Prussia and it opened no market in which he might barter his allies. With infinite labour he therefore secured the adoption273 of another, in which these defects were remedied. This was that he should lead the Saxon army into Moravia to assist the Prussians in conquering the province, and in thus creating a diversion which, he maintained, would aid the Emperor as well as any other.
The Saxons reluctantly left their country with no force, save the French, to guard its frontier against the Austrian army of Bohemia. Frederick was therefore secure against treason on his flank and could again stir the waters of politics in full confidence that his House would gain some profit. Moravia might become to Silesia what Silesia had now become to Brandenburg—a dependency and an outwork. Or if this was too much to hope for, he as conqueror274 of Moravia might at least dictate to Vienna the surrender of a Silesia augmented by cuttings from the Bohemian kingdom, of which Frederick regarded the Emperor or the Queen as lawful28 sovereign exactly according to his convenience at the moment. At the worst Moravia might125 pass to the Saxon House, which was a weaker and therefore a safer neighbour than the Hapsburg.
All these calculations were falsified by events. The invasion of Moravia was a far more difficult task than the invasion of Silesia. Instead of a level and fertile country inhabited in part by Protestant well-wishers, Frederick found a rugged275 desert whose people hated the Prussians and did them every mischief276 in their power. He devastated277 the land by way of penalty, and dragged the grumbling278 Saxons through clouds of guerillas to Brünn, the capital, where he induced them to join him in a siege. As leader of a composite army, however, he was no longer served with the prompt and unquestioning obedience34 which the unmixed Prussian forces had displayed.
Brünn made a stout279 resistance and Prince Charles was deputed to march to its relief. At this point the heroism280 of the Queen seemed to be rewarded by a sudden change of fortune. Frederick tried once more to sacrifice his allies to his own profit, but in vain. England, now guided by Carteret in place of Walpole, was actively281 supporting Maria Theresa. Sardinia deserted282 the coalition against her. At Vienna, men regained283 a confidence which was heightened by the news from the North. Prince Charles feinted against the French in Bohemia and Frederick dismissed the Saxons to help them. This was but the first step towards the abandonment of the whole venture. After a toilsome retreat and countless skirmishes, the exhausted284 Prussians crossed safely into Bohemia before the end of April and126 again the negotiators were set to work. Once more they failed and the Prussians found themselves between Prague and the army of Prince Charles, which was now making thither from Moravia.
A conflict was inevitable. It took place at Chotusitz, near the Elbe, within three marches of Prague, on May 17, 1742. This battle is remarkable285 not only because seven thousand men fell in three hours, but also because it is the first victory actually won by Frederick himself. His imperious temper had cost him the services of Schwerin, the hero of Mollwitz, while the Old Dessauer had been rebuked286 for disobedience and sent to the rear. But the Prussian infantry were as steady as at Mollwitz, the cavalry, who suffered terribly, much better, and the King proved that he could seize the moment for decisive action on the field as well as in the cabinet. Four thousand Prussians fell, but casualties, captures, and desertion reduced Prince Charles’s force of thirty thousand by one-half.
The victory of Chotusitz assisted Frederick once more to abandon his allies. It added force to the diplomacy of England, whose policy was to help Austria a great deal against the French, but not at all against the Prussians. While the English ambassadors were urging the Queen to submit to the loss of Silesia, the Austrian troops pressed the French hard in Bohemia and thus forced Frederick to hurry on a peace. Within four weeks of Chotusitz, victor and vanquished287 had come to terms. Frederick withdrew from the war and received all Silesia except a fringe on the south-west, as well as127 the county of Glatz in full sovereignty for ever. On July 28th these terms were embodied288 in the Treaty of Berlin, which closed the First Silesian War. In twenty months, at a cost of two pitched battles, Frederick had added to Prussia sixteen thousand square miles of fertile land and a million and a quarter of inhabitants—a greater prize than any that his ancestors had won. He was not yet thirty-one years of age.
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proceedings
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reign
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speculation
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thrift
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autocracy
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sweeping
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postpone
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| v.延期，推迟 | |
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9
entangled
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| adj.卷入的；陷入的；被缠住的；缠在一起的v.使某人（某物/自己）缠绕，纠缠于（某物中），使某人（自己）陷入（困难或复杂的环境中）( entangle的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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hampered
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| 妨碍，束缚，限制( hamper的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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ace
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| n.A牌；发球得分；佼佼者；adj.杰出的 | |
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12
duel
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| n./v.决斗；(双方的)斗争 | |
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13
kindles
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| （使某物）燃烧，着火( kindle的第三人称单数 )； 激起（感情等）； 发亮，放光 | |
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adventurous
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| adj.爱冒险的；惊心动魄的，惊险的，刺激的 | |
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15
alluring
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| adj.吸引人的，迷人的 | |
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16
countless
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| adj.无数的，多得不计其数的 | |
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17
prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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18
overtures
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| n.主动的表示，提议；（向某人做出的）友好表示、姿态或提议( overture的名词复数 )；（歌剧、芭蕾舞、音乐剧等的）序曲，前奏曲 | |
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19
negotiations
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| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
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20
negotiation
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| n.谈判，协商 | |
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21
aggression
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| n.进攻，侵略，侵犯，侵害 | |
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22
persecuted
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| （尤指宗教或政治信仰的）迫害(~sb. for sth.)( persecute的过去式和过去分词 )； 烦扰，困扰或骚扰某人 | |
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23
bishop
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| n.主教，（国际象棋）象 | |
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24
bishops
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| （基督教某些教派管辖大教区的）主教( bishop的名词复数 )； （国际象棋的）象 | |
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25
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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26
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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27
emphatic
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| adj.强调的，着重的；无可置疑的，明显的 | |
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28
lawful
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| adj.法律许可的，守法的，合法的 | |
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29
disturbance
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| n.动乱，骚动；打扰，干扰；(身心)失调 | |
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30
coalition
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| n.结合体，同盟，结合，联合 | |
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31
peremptory
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| adj.紧急的，专横的，断然的 | |
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32
westward
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| n.西方，西部；adj.西方的，向西的；adv.向西 | |
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33
ultimatum
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| n.最后通牒 | |
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34
obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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35
abominable
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| adj.可厌的，令人憎恶的 | |
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36
disorder
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| n.紊乱，混乱；骚动，骚乱；疾病，失调 | |
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37
solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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38
diplomacy
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| n.外交；外交手腕，交际手腕 | |
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39
majesty
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| n.雄伟，壮丽，庄严，威严；最高权威，王权 | |
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40
cession
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| n.割让，转让 | |
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41
spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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42
taunt
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| n.辱骂，嘲弄；v.嘲弄 | |
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43
simile
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| n.直喻，明喻 | |
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44
phantom
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| n.幻影，虚位，幽灵；adj.错觉的，幻影的，幽灵的 | |
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45
idol
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| n.偶像，红人，宠儿 | |
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46
oars
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| n.桨，橹( oar的名词复数 )；划手v.划（行）( oar的第三人称单数 ) | |
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47
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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48
steer
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| vt.驾驶，为…操舵；引导；vi.驾驶 | |
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49
wont
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| adj.习惯于；v.习惯；n.习惯 | |
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50
trenches
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| 深沟，地沟( trench的名词复数 )； 战壕 | |
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51
omen
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| n.征兆，预兆；vt.预示 | |
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52
transformation
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| n.变化；改造；转变 | |
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53
beheld
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| v.看，注视( behold的过去式和过去分词 )；瞧；看呀；（叙述中用于引出某人意外的出现）哎哟 | |
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54
commotions
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| n.混乱，喧闹，骚动( commotion的名词复数 ) | |
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55
imperative
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| n.命令，需要；规则；祈使语气；adj.强制的；紧急的 | |
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56
judgment
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| n.审判；判断力，识别力，看法，意见 | |
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57
incense
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| v.激怒；n.香，焚香时的烟，香气 | |
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58
postponing
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| v.延期，推迟( postpone的现在分词 ) | |
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59
evading
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| 逃避( evade的现在分词 )； 避开； 回避； 想不出 | |
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60
engraving
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| n.版画；雕刻（作品）；雕刻艺术；镌版术v.在（硬物）上雕刻（字，画等）( engrave的现在分词 )；将某事物深深印在（记忆或头脑中） | |
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61
dominion
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| n.统治，管辖，支配权；领土，版图 | |
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62
applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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63
tariff
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| n.关税，税率；(旅馆、饭店等)价目表，收费表 | |
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64
dictate
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| v.口授；(使)听写；指令，指示，命令 | |
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65
justify
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| vt.证明…正当(或有理)，为…辩护 | |
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66
annexation
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| n.吞并，合并 | |
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67
avert
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| v.防止，避免；转移(目光、注意力等) | |
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68
peril
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| n.(严重的)危险；危险的事物 | |
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69
hereditary
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| adj.遗传的，遗传性的，可继承的，世袭的 | |
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70
hypocrisies
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| n.伪善，虚伪( hypocrisy的名词复数 ) | |
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71
avowal
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| n.公开宣称，坦白承认 | |
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72
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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73
explicit
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| adj.详述的，明确的；坦率的；显然的 | |
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74
anarchy
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| n.无政府状态；社会秩序混乱，无秩序 | |
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75
demise
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| n.死亡；v.让渡，遗赠，转让 | |
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76
indifference
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| n.不感兴趣，不关心，冷淡，不在乎 | |
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77
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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78
Christian
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| adj.基督教徒的；n.基督教徒 | |
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79
defiance
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| n.挑战，挑衅，蔑视，违抗 | |
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80
maxim
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| n.格言，箴言 | |
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81
barter
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| n.物物交换，以货易货，实物交易 | |
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82
professed
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| 公开声称的，伪称的，已立誓信教的 | |
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83
interfere
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| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
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84
varied
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| adj.多样的，多变化的 | |
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85
honourable
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| adj.可敬的；荣誉的，光荣的 | |
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86
strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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87
evaded
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| 逃避( evade的过去式和过去分词 )； 避开； 回避； 想不出 | |
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88
tarnished
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| （通常指金属）（使）失去光泽，（使）变灰暗( tarnish的过去式和过去分词 )； 玷污，败坏 | |
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89
cynosure
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| n.焦点 | |
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90
chivalry
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| n.骑士气概，侠义；（男人）对女人彬彬有礼，献殷勤 | |
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91
kinsman
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| n.男亲属 | |
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92
conspicuous
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| adj.明眼的，惹人注目的；炫耀的，摆阔气的 | |
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93
severance
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| n.离职金；切断 | |
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94
corrupt
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| v.贿赂，收买；adj.腐败的，贪污的 | |
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95
nurtured
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| 养育( nurture的过去式和过去分词 )； 培育； 滋长； 助长 | |
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96
perplexed
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| adj.不知所措的 | |
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97
dictated
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| v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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98
folly
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| n.愚笨，愚蠢，蠢事，蠢行，傻话 | |
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99
compute
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| v./n.计算，估计 | |
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100
assail
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| v.猛烈攻击，抨击，痛斥 | |
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101
sluggish
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| adj.懒惰的，迟钝的，无精打采的 | |
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102
dignified
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| a.可敬的，高贵的 | |
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103
gilded
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| a.镀金的，富有的 | |
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104
reigned
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| vi.当政，统治（reign的过去式形式） | |
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105
banished
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| v.放逐，驱逐( banish的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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106
aspirations
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| 强烈的愿望( aspiration的名词复数 )； 志向； 发送气音； 发 h 音 | |
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107
pompous
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| adj.傲慢的，自大的；夸大的；豪华的 | |
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108
cardinal
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| n.(天主教的)红衣主教；adj.首要的，基本的 | |
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109
stewards
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| （轮船、飞机等的）乘务员( steward的名词复数 )； （俱乐部、旅馆、工会等的）管理员； （大型活动的）组织者； （私人家中的）管家 | |
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110
debiting
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| v.记入（账户）的借方( debit的现在分词 ) | |
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111
treasury
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| n.宝库；国库，金库；文库 | |
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112
piety
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| n.虔诚，虔敬 | |
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113
loyalty
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| n.忠诚，忠心 | |
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114
foe
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| n.敌人，仇敌 | |
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115
fidelity
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| n.忠诚，忠实；精确 | |
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116
worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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117
sincerity
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| n.真诚，诚意；真实 | |
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118
strife
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| n.争吵，冲突，倾轧，竞争 | |
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119
devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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120
vassal
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| n.附庸的；属下；adj.奴仆的 | |
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121
consort
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| v.相伴；结交 | |
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122
utterance
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| n.用言语表达，话语，言语 | |
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123
dominions
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| 统治权( dominion的名词复数 )； 领土； 疆土； 版图 | |
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124
envoys
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| 使节( envoy的名词复数 )； 公使； 谈判代表； 使节身份 | |
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125
besieged
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| 包围，围困，围攻( besiege的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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126
astutely
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| adv.敏锐地；精明地；敏捷地；伶俐地 | |
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127
astute
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| adj.机敏的，精明的 | |
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128
garrisons
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| 守备部队，卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
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129
garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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130
toiled
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| 长时间或辛苦地工作( toil的过去式和过去分词 )； 艰难缓慢地移动，跋涉 | |
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131
revelling
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| v.作乐( revel的现在分词 )；狂欢；着迷；陶醉 | |
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132
secrecy
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| n.秘密，保密，隐蔽 | |
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133
avowed
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| adj.公开声明的，承认的v.公开声明，承认( avow的过去式和过去分词) | |
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134
procure
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| vt.获得，取得，促成；vi.拉皮条 | |
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135
futile
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| adj.无效的，无用的，无希望的 | |
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136
smelt
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| v.熔解，熔炼；n.银白鱼，胡瓜鱼 | |
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137
disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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138
lust
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| n.性(淫)欲；渴(欲)望；vi.对…有强烈的欲望 | |
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139
resounding
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| adj. 响亮的 | |
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140
undertaking
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| n.保证，许诺，事业 | |
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141
reassure
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| v.使放心，使消除疑虑 | |
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142
despatch
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| n./v.(dispatch)派遣；发送；n.急件；新闻报道 | |
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143
forefathers
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| n.祖先，先人；祖先，祖宗( forefather的名词复数 )；列祖列宗；前人 | |
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144
electorate
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| n.全体选民；选区 | |
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145
sham
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| n./adj.假冒(的)，虚伪(的) | |
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146
concession
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| n.让步，妥协；特许(权) | |
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147
broached
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| v.谈起( broach的过去式和过去分词 )；打开并开始用；用凿子扩大（或修光）；（在桶上）钻孔取液体 | |
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148
intimidate
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| vt.恐吓，威胁 | |
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149
pliable
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| adj.易受影响的；易弯的；柔顺的，易驾驭的 | |
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150
incurs
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| 遭受，招致，引起( incur的第三人称单数 ) | |
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151
preposterous
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| adj.荒谬的，可笑的 | |
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152
providence
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| n.深谋远虑，天道，天意；远见；节约；上帝 | |
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153
remonstrance
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| n抗议，抱怨 | |
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154
assailed
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| v.攻击( assail的过去式和过去分词 )；困扰；质问；毅然应对 | |
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155
favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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156
boundless
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| adj.无限的；无边无际的；巨大的 | |
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157
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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158
Augmented
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| adj.增音的 动词augment的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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159
omnipotence
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| n.全能，万能，无限威力 | |
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160
maliciously
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| adv.有敌意地 | |
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161
vindication
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| n.洗冤，证实 | |
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162
grandiose
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| adj.宏伟的，宏大的，堂皇的，铺张的 | |
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163
denuded
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| adj.[医]变光的，裸露的v.使赤裸( denude的过去式和过去分词 )；剥光覆盖物 | |
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164
fortress
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| n.堡垒，防御工事 | |
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165
torrents
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| n.倾注；奔流( torrent的名词复数 )；急流；爆发；连续不断 | |
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166
eddying
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| 涡流，涡流的形成 | |
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167
slate
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| n.板岩，石板，石片，石板色，候选人名单；adj.暗蓝灰色的，含板岩的；vt.用石板覆盖，痛打，提名，预订 | |
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168
trophy
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| n.优胜旗，奖品，奖杯，战胜品，纪念品 | |
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169
organise
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| vt.组织，安排，筹办 | |
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170
wilt
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| v.(使)植物凋谢或枯萎；(指人)疲倦，衰弱 | |
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171
accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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172
debonair
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| adj.殷勤的，快乐的 | |
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173
steadily
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| adv.稳定地；不变地；持续地 | |
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174
plunged
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| v.颠簸( plunge的过去式和过去分词 )；暴跌；骤降；突降 | |
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175
zest
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| n.乐趣；滋味，风味；兴趣 | |
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176
resolute
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| adj.坚决的，果敢的 | |
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177
whit
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| n.一点，丝毫 | |
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178
compliance
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| n.顺从；服从；附和；屈从 | |
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179
veracious
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| adj.诚实可靠的 | |
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180
veracity
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| n.诚实 | |
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181
reticence
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| n.沉默，含蓄 | |
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182
dissimulation
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| n.掩饰，虚伪，装糊涂 | |
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183
essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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184
seizure
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| n.没收；占有；抵押 | |
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185
enquire
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| v.打听，询问；调查，查问 | |
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186
lasting
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| adj.永久的，永恒的；vbl.持续，维持 | |
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187
deference
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| n.尊重，顺从；敬意 | |
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188
recur
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| vi.复发，重现，再发生 | |
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189
truthfulness
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| n. 符合实际 | |
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190
concealed
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| a.隐藏的，隐蔽的 | |
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191
heed
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| v.注意，留意；n.注意，留心 | |
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192
groaned
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| v.呻吟( groan的过去式和过去分词 )；发牢骚；抱怨；受苦 | |
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193
frightful
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| adj.可怕的；讨厌的 | |
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194
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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195
concur
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| v.同意，意见一致，互助，同时发生 | |
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196
doomed
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| 命定的 | |
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197
dispositions
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| 安排( disposition的名词复数 )； 倾向； （财产、金钱的）处置； 气质 | |
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198
depressed
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| adj.沮丧的，抑郁的，不景气的，萧条的 | |
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199
feat
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| n.功绩；武艺，技艺；adj.灵巧的，漂亮的，合适的 | |
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200
organisation
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| n.组织，安排，团体，有机休 | |
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201
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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202
infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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203
lieutenant
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| n.陆军中尉，海军上尉；代理官员，副职官员 | |
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204
inscribed
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| v.写，刻( inscribe的过去式和过去分词 )；内接 | |
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205
erasure
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| n.擦掉，删去；删掉的词；消音；抹音 | |
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206
itch
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| n.痒，渴望，疥癣；vi.发痒，渴望 | |
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207
northward
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| adv.向北；n.北方的地区 | |
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208
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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209
foes
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| 敌人，仇敌( foe的名词复数 ) | |
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210
thither
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| adv.向那里；adj.在那边的，对岸的 | |
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211
artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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212
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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213
presumption
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| n.推测，可能性，冒昧，放肆，[法律]推定 | |
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214
tempestuous
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| adj.狂暴的 | |
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215
postponed
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| vt.& vi.延期，缓办，（使）延迟vt.把…放在次要地位；[语]把…放在后面（或句尾）vi.（疟疾等）延缓发作（或复发） | |
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216
scouts
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| 侦察员[机，舰]( scout的名词复数 )； 童子军； 搜索； 童子军成员 | |
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217
bustling
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| adj.喧闹的 | |
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218
expedient
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| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
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219
regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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220
galling
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| adj.难堪的,使烦恼的,使焦躁的 | |
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221
plundered
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| 掠夺，抢劫( plunder的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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222
wreck
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| n.失事，遇难；沉船；vt.(船等)失事，遇难 | |
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223
repulsed
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| v.击退( repulse的过去式和过去分词 )；驳斥；拒绝 | |
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224
havoc
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| n.大破坏，浩劫，大混乱，大杂乱 | |
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225
wrought
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| v.引起；以…原料制作；运转；adj.制造的 | |
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226
exhortation
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| n.劝告，规劝 | |
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227
reminders
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| n.令人回忆起…的东西( reminder的名词复数 )；提醒…的东西；（告知该做某事的）通知单；提示信 | |
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228
braced
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| adj.拉牢的v.支住( brace的过去式和过去分词 )；撑牢；使自己站稳；振作起来 | |
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229
retrieving
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| n.检索（过程），取还v.取回( retrieve的现在分词 )；恢复；寻回；检索（储存的信息） | |
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230
levies
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| （部队）征兵( levy的名词复数 )； 募捐； 被征募的军队 | |
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231
muskets
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| n.火枪，（尤指）滑膛枪( musket的名词复数 ) | |
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232
victorious
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| adj.胜利的，得胜的 | |
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233
perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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234
torment
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| n.折磨；令人痛苦的东西(人)；vt.折磨；纠缠 | |
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235
irresistible
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| adj.非常诱人的，无法拒绝的，无法抗拒的 | |
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236
derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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237
hoarded
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| v.积蓄并储藏（某物）( hoard的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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238
exchequer
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| n.财政部；国库 | |
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239
regain
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| vt.重新获得，收复，恢复 | |
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240
backbone
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| n.脊骨，脊柱，骨干；刚毅，骨气 | |
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241
alluded
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| 提及，暗指( allude的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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242
rebuke
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| v.指责，非难，斥责 [反]praise | |
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243
gathering
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| n.集会，聚会，聚集 | |
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244
laurels
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| n.桂冠，荣誉 | |
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245
eloquence
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| n.雄辩；口才，修辞 | |
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246
humbled
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| adj. 卑下的，谦逊的，粗陋的 vt. 使 ... 卑下，贬低 | |
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247
entrusted
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| v.委托，托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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248
renounce
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| v.放弃；拒绝承认，宣布与…断绝关系 | |
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249
gratitude
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| adj.感激，感谢 | |
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250
subdue
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| vt.制服，使顺从，征服；抑制，克制 | |
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251
consolidate
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| v.使加固，使加强；(把...)联为一体，合并 | |
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252
treacherously
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| 背信弃义地； 背叛地； 靠不住地； 危险地 | |
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253
generosity
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| n.大度，慷慨，慷慨的行为 | |
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254
caresses
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| 爱抚，抚摸( caress的名词复数 ) | |
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255
watchful
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| adj.注意的，警惕的 | |
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256
evacuate
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| v.遣送；搬空；抽出；排泄；大(小)便 | |
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257
conspiracy
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| n.阴谋，密谋，共谋 | |
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258
punctiliously
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259
corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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260
homage
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| n.尊敬，敬意，崇敬 | |
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261
ceded
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| v.让给，割让，放弃( cede的过去式 ) | |
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262
taxation
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| n.征税，税收，税金 | |
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263
standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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264
derided
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| v.取笑，嘲笑( deride的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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265
pact
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| n.合同，条约，公约，协定 | |
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266
frankly
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| adv.坦白地，直率地；坦率地说 | |
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267
filch
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| v.偷窃 | |
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268
fortitude
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| n.坚忍不拔；刚毅 | |
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269
despoil
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| v.夺取，抢夺 | |
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270
prelude
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| n.序言，前兆，序曲 | |
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271
perfidy
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| n.背信弃义，不忠贞 | |
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272
thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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273
adoption
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| n.采用，采纳，通过；收养 | |
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274
conqueror
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| n.征服者，胜利者 | |
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275
rugged
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| adj.高低不平的，粗糙的，粗壮的，强健的 | |
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276
mischief
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| n.损害，伤害，危害；恶作剧，捣蛋，胡闹 | |
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277
devastated
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| v.彻底破坏( devastate的过去式和过去分词)；摧毁；毁灭；在感情上（精神上、财务上等）压垮adj.毁坏的；极为震惊的 | |
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278
grumbling
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| adj. 喃喃鸣不平的, 出怨言的 | |
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280
heroism
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| n.大无畏精神，英勇 | |
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281
actively
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| adv.积极地，勤奋地 | |
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282
deserted
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| adj.荒芜的，荒废的，无人的，被遗弃的 | |
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283
regained
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| 复得( regain的过去式和过去分词 )； 赢回； 重回； 复至某地 | |
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284
exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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285
remarkable
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| adj.显著的，异常的，非凡的，值得注意的 | |
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286
rebuked
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| 责难或指责( rebuke的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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287
vanquished
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| v.征服( vanquish的过去式和过去分词 )；战胜；克服；抑制 | |
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288
embodied
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| v.表现( embody的过去式和过去分词 )；象征；包括；包含 | |
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