THE PARADE GROUND AT POTSDAM.
The strain was indeed severe. Under it Frederick became more statesmanlike but not more humane7. After a course of the waters at Aix-la-Chapelle, he diverted himself as of old with literature and the society of wits. But he made no effort to improve his domestic life. His queen had retired8 to Sch?nhausen, a modest country-house in the dreary9 plain which lies on the north side of Berlin—a dwelling10 so remote that the swift expansion of recent years has not yet brought it within the city. The King’s thoughts ran already upon a bachelor establishment at Potsdam, the Sans Souci of later years, where he might escape from the society of his relations to enjoy that of his friends. For his subjects he attempted to provide few benefits beyond a codification11 of the law—little enough for one who had held out hope of a revolution in the art of kingship. It is true that he built the great Opera House at Berlin, that he lavished12 money upon actors and musicians, and that he endowed an Academy of Sciences. But he made French the only vehicle of learned and literary thought; and though Berlin might shine in Europe, the Prussian people gained little benefit thereby13.
The King even enjoyed for a time the society of Voltaire, at that time the King of Letters. The transaction is characteristic of the age. The brilliant130 Frenchman, having quarrelled with his peers at home, obtained from Louis XV. an informal commission to pry14 into the secrets of Prussia. Before leaving France, he vented15 his spleen in a parcel of epigrams upon Louis and his subjects, which he sent in all secrecy16 to his affectionate admirer, Frederick. The latter, thinking to close the doors of France to his guest and so to cage him at Berlin, published them all at Paris. Both betrayals failed. As a diplomat17 Voltaire extracted only banter18 from his patron and disciple19, while Frederick found that Louis XV. was indeed what Voltaire had termed him—“the most stupid of kings,” for the epigrams did not sting him.
Frederick’s wider experience of life, it is clear, had rather hardened his heart than softened20 it. As a king he had developed, faster doubtless than in time of peace, along the lines with which we are already familiar. He was still conspicuously22 energetic, imperious, and mercantile. His energy is the more striking by contrast with the habit of his contemporaries. Philip of Spain was sluggishly23 obeying his wife. Louis of France, whom Frederick termed a good man whose only fault was that he was King, was toying with mistresses, patronising sieges, and pointing out the faults in a policy which he was too indolent to cheek. Augustus of Saxony was sacrificing his armies lest he should be late for the opera. The Czarina Elizabeth has been described as “bobbing about in that unlovely whirlpool of intrigues24, amours, devotions, and strong liquor, which her history is.” In a word, the131 princes of Europe still in great part looked on their office as an inheritance to be enjoyed. Meanwhile, the King of Prussia was rising at dawn, reviewing troops, inspecting fortresses25, drafting and conning27 despatches, superintending his players, and constituting himself a judge of appeal for all his kingdom.
Whether judge, general, or stage-manager, he was always the King of Prussia, and his naturally imperious temper mounted higher day by day. His stern treatment of the Old Dessauer and the alienation28 of Schwerin have already been mentioned. In time of peace his ministers met with no greater forbearance. They were treated at best as clerks, and often as dogs. The faithful Podewils, who had just rendered priceless services to his master in the negotiations30 with Austria, presumed to suggest that the King should remain for a time in Silesia. “Attend to your own affairs, Sir,” was the reply, “and do not presume to dictate31 whether I ought or ought not to go. Negotiate as I order you, and do not be the weak tool of English and Austrian impudence32.” With the same imperious brutality33 Frederick wrote to the honourable34 nobleman who represented him at Vienna. “Do not forget, Sir, with what master you have to do, and if you take heed35 of nothing else, take heed for your head.”
As with his dependents, so with states weaker than his own, Frederick always played the dictator. To grace his new opera he had engaged the famous dancer Barberina, who was then at Venice. Her132 English lover persuaded her to break the contract and remain there and the Doge and Senate professed36 themselves powerless to interfere37. Frederick therefore seized a Venetian ambassador in Berlin and held him as a hostage, until the Venetians in their turn violated justice by sending Barberina a prisoner to Berlin.
With an imperiousness equal to that of his father Frederick combined the traditional Hohenzollern willingness to buy and sell. He failed to buy Silesia, but he succeeded in buying Glatz. The county of Glatz belonged to Bohemia, and in 1741 Frederick recognised Charles Albert as King of Bohemia. From him he purchased territory which the Bavarian had never possessed38 and which he could never hope to possess without foreign aid. The Prussians conquered the country and in 1742 Maria Theresa offered to cede39 it. Thereupon the King accepted from Austria what he had declared to belong to Bavaria and announced that he was no longer bound to pay the purchase money agreed upon.
Frederick seems to be still in all essentials the man whose development we have traced from his birth to his accession. He is tougher, as it were, in mind and body alike. He has thrown off the feeble health of his earlier years and the lust40 for mere41 adventure which possessed him in the twenties. But experience has only added to his trust in himself, to his belief that “negotiations without arms are music without instruments,” that war determines disputes, and that bravery and leadership133 determine war. His faith in prompt and decided42 action was never more conspicuous21 than in 1744, when on the death of its prince without lineal heirs, he seized Eastern Frisia. Hanover also had claims to the land, but nothing could withstand the speed with which the Prussians made this miniature Silesia their own and thus acquired in Emden an outlet43 on the North Sea.
Frederick’s schemes are, indeed, so daring, and his acts so swift and decisive, that many have believed—as he himself seems to have believed at the time—that he was gifted with almost superhuman insight and rose superior to human weakness. It may, therefore, be well to cite the words in which Professor Koser of Bonn, the greatest living authority upon the subject, has set down his impression of the King as he was at the end of the First Silesian War.
“To us he seems neither superhuman nor inhuman44, a man not ready made and complete, but still in process of growth. The cold ‘satanic’ calculator shows himself more than once a sanguine45 man, a man of impulse. Sometimes insolent46 and sometimes almost faint-hearted, he lets his bearing be easily decided by the impressions of the moment. In his haste and heat and lack of experience he makes plenty of mistakes, not only in war, but also in politics. He does not look far into the future, and sometimes, however near to his heart lies his good repute, he takes no thought for it in time to come. And as he himself later admits, he owes a great part of his successes to fortune and to chance. In one word, we grant plenty of what the King, grown more mature, has described as the ‘giddiness’ of his younger years.”
134 When Frederick, pleading that in shipwreck48 each must save himself, forsook49 his allies in the summer of 1742, he did so with certain definite intentions. He wished to give Prussia time to digest Silesia, and Europe time to accustom50 herself to Prussia. “The only question now,” he wrote to Podewils, “is to accustom the cabinets of Europe to see us in the position which this war has given us, and I believe that much moderation and much good temper towards all our neighbours will lead to that result.” The words breathe peace, but peace only so long as it was both safe and profitable for Prussia. “The safety of our new possessions,” he had just pointed51 out, “rests on a large and efficient army, a full treasury52, powerful fortresses and showy alliances which easily impose upon the world.” For a time, it is clear, the King intended to revert53 to the old policy of drilling men and saving money. But it seems equally clear that if all went well the question which Frederick propounded54 in 1740 would in due course present itself again. “When one has an advantage is he to use it or not?” Is it reasonable to suppose that the conqueror55 of Silesia would in future answer No?
For the present, however, while the Prussian system of government was being established in Silesia, Frederick scanned every rise and fall of the political barometer56. What he saw made him at first congratulate himself on having forsaken57 a losing cause before it was too late. Early in September, 1742, the Saxons quitted the war empty-handed, and it was evident that France repented58 of her share in it.135 Before the end of the year her troops had been driven out of almost all Bohemia, and in January, 1743, the death of Fleury deprived her of what unity59 in policy and administration she still possessed. Worse than all else, the Sea Powers now entered vigorously into the war. George II. was anxious to protect Hanover; Carteret and the English people longed to strike a blow at their natural enemy, France; and the importunity60 of England at length induced the Dutch to move.
Frederick, though he had arranged affairs in Russia to his liking61, had, therefore, every reason to fear lest Austria should grow strong enough to turn against himself. He was annoyed beyond measure by the news of King George’s lucky victory over the French at Dettingen on June 27, 1743. “The devil fly away with my uncle,” he wrote to Podewils. He declared that he would never hear the name of France again. “Noailles is beaten, and by whom? By people who do not understand how to draw up a line of battle, and who, in fact, did not draw one up.” Frederick’s disgust was only increased by the fact that his military criticism was well founded. Owing to George’s want of skill, Noailles had caught his army in a trap, from which it escaped only by calm courage and desperate fighting hand to hand. “I have tolerably well foreseen everything that has passed in Europe hitherto,” wrote the King of Prussia, “but for this blow I was not prepared.”
Dettingen and the fear of worse to follow impelled62 Frederick to take up arms anew. Early in September, 1743, he visited Wilhelmina at Baireuth136 and endeavoured in vain to organise63 a league of German princes to rescue the Emperor. The Austrian diplomats64 were more successful. In the same month, by a treaty made at Worms, they secured the definite alliance of England and Sardinia. Frederick noticed with some alarm that the Treaty of Berlin, which gave him Silesia, was not treated at Worms as indispensable to the future of Germany. In December a compact more distinctly menacing to Prussia, should she again interfere in the war, was concluded between Austria and Saxony.
Early in the new year (1744), therefore, Frederick turned unabashed to France. He offered to join her in a war which both parties should pledge themselves to continue until Bohemia should have been wrested65 from the Queen. The Emperor was to receive the greater part of the kingdom, but Prussia, as in 1742, claimed the four Bohemian circles east of the Elbe and also that fringe of Silesia which the Treaty of Berlin had left in Austrian hands. Early in June all was arranged. By the so-called union of Frankfort some share in the undertaking66 was promised by the Elector Palatine and the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel. But the substantial allies were, as in the earlier war, France, Prussia, and Bavaria. The general plan agreed upon was that France should cripple the Sea Powers by attacking the Netherlands and Hanover. If the result was to bring an Austrian army into Alsace, Frederick promised in his turn to cripple Austria by flinging eighty thousand men into Bohemia. In that case the French undertook to make another campaign in the East.
137 The motives67 which inspired Frederick to take action are so clear that there is no need to seek them in the solemn accusation68 against Austria which he gave to the world in August. He deemed it expedient69 to take up the attitude of a German patriot70, who, after exhausting the resources of negotiation29, was driven to repel71 by force the conspiracy72 of the Queen of Hungary against the constitution of the Empire.
“The race of those Germans of old, who for so many centuries defended their fatherland and their liberties against all the majesty73 of the Roman Empire, still survives, and will make the same defence to-day against those who dare to conspire74 against them.... In one word, the King asks for nothing and with him there is no question whatever of personal interests. His Majesty has recourse to arms only to restore liberty to the Empire, the sceptre to the Emperor and peace to Europe.”
Such was the Prussian account of the origin of the Second Silesian War.
Frederick again resorted to the method of simultaneous parley75 and stroke which had served so well when he seized Silesia. On the same day (August 7, 1744) that his ambassador at Vienna announced his crusade to rescue the Emperor, he himself astonished the Saxons by showing them the Emperor’s order to permit the passage of Prussian troops. It is characteristic of the tangled76 politics of the time that Prussia and Saxony remained technically77 at peace with each other while Frederick, as the Emperor’s servant, led sixty thousand men up the Elbe138 into Bohemia and Augustus, as the ally of the Queen of Hungary, sent twenty thousand men to act against him. For the moment Frederick profited by his speed. At the beginning of September he lay before Prague and joined forces with twenty thousand men whom Schwerin had brought from Silesia. Eighty thousand Prussians were thus assembled in the heart of Bohemia, and on September 16th they took the capital.
The appearance of success was, however, delusive78. Far from being panic-stricken by Frederick’s sudden spring, the scrupulous79 Queen rejoiced to see him break the treaty which gave him a title to Silesia. From every point of the compass she summoned forces to defend Bohemia. The army of Alsace recrossed the Rhine with great skill and marched eastwards80. They were undisturbed by the French, among whom Frederick’s treacheries were passing into a proverb:—se battre pour le roi de Prusse, to fight without reward. Clouds of irregular horse issued from Hungary. The Saxons were marching southwards. The people of Bohemia showed themselves hostile to the Prussians and assisted an Austrian army to maintain itself in the kingdom. What course, we may ask, was the wisest for a commander surrounded by so many dangers?
After the fall of Prague Frederick lay in the centre of Bohemia, a kingdom walled in by a quadrilateral of mountains. He held the north-eastern gates which led into Silesia. The south-western led into Bavaria, and through them the army of Alsace was soon to enter. But at the head of nearly139 80,000 men the King was vastly stronger than any single force that could be brought against him and his communications with Prussia were safe. There was therefore much to be said for a simple defensive81 policy. North-eastern Bohemia was the prize that Frederick hoped to gain by the war, and this he could have held like a second Silesia. Such a desertion of his allies would, however, have shocked public opinion, particularly in France, and Frederick admits that he shrank from it on that account.
The next best course, if some offensive movement must be made, would have been first to crush the army of Bohemia and then to hold the south-western gate against the army of Alsace. This course was advised by Schwerin and favoured by the King. But the fatal influence of Belleisle proved stronger than the promptings of common-sense. France was avenged82 for the treacheries of Klein Schnellendorf and Berlin when Frederick allowed himself to be persuaded to strike due south, in the hope of conquering Bohemia, opening communications with Bavaria, and cowing Vienna.
At first the plan prospered83. Several towns were captured for the Emperor, and by October 4, 1744, the Prussians had almost reached the frontier of Austria proper. Then they began to realise that they were the dupes of a mirage84. The armies of Bohemia and of Alsace had united in their rear and lay between them and Prague. They found themselves isolated85, ill fed, and worse informed. Swarms86 of light horse enveloped87 them, cutting off convoys88, scouts89, and messengers. Schwerin opened a line of140 retreat, but their recent conquests were lost with the garrisons90 which held them. The Austrians had found a soldier, Field-marshal Traun, and at his hands Frederick received painful lessons in the art of war. The King had already begun to negotiate. He thirsted for French co-operation and a pitched battle, but could obtain neither boon91. Traun, who was now superior in numbers, had no need to fight. He occupied unassailable positions to the north of Frederick’s force and left hunger, disease, and irregulars to do their work upon the enemy. Thus harassed92, the Prussian rank and file deserted93 by thousands, and many offered their services to Traun. Schwerin again took umbrage94 and withdrew from the campaign.
FREDERICK THE SECOND, KING OF PRUSSIA.
AFTER THE PAINTING BY F. BOCK.
Step by step the reluctant King was driven towards Silesia. Before the end of November it was plain that his whole enterprise must be abandoned. It was mid-December before the last detachments of some 40,000 men, the remnant of his 80,000, straggled across the mountains to the friendly walls of Glatz. Thanks to the determination of Maria Theresa, a postscript95 had yet to be added to the history of the campaign. In the spirit of her own Hungarians, who scorned to provide a commissariat because their forefathers96 had journeyed from Asia to the Land of the Five Rivers without one, the Queen dictated97 a winter assault upon Silesia. The Old Dessauer, whom Frederick had left in command, at length succeeded in clearing the province of anything like an Austrian army, but it was not till February that the Prussians were able141 to go into winter quarters. Thus a campaign which had begun with the conquest of Bohemia came to an end to the sound of Te Deums sung at Berlin for the deliverance of Silesia. Europe began to suspect that the sword of Traun had pricked98 the Prussian bubble.
The anxiety with which Frederick awaited the spring of 1745, when he must expect to have to fight in earnest for Silesia, was rendered more intense by a sudden change in the attitude of his allies. He had joined in the struggle with the expectation that Austria would be attacked by the French and hampered99 both by the war in Italy and by the forces of the Emperor. On January 20th, however, Charles Albert died, and the youth who succeeded him was soon beaten to his knees. By the Treaty of Füssen, in April, Austria and Bavaria agreed to ignore the past; and the latter for the first time guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction and promised to vote for the husband of Maria Theresa at the imperial election. The effect of this treaty upon Frederick’s position will be appreciated when it is borne in mind that the road from France to Austria passed through Bavaria, while the Austrian Netherlands, which France coveted100, lay at her very door. Thus it was easy to suspect that in the coming campaign Prussia would receive little effective help from France. Suspicion passed into certainty when Louis XV. elected to accompany his army in person.
The campaign of 1745 might therefore be expected to fall into two separate halves. In the Netherlands, France would be pitted against the Sea Powers and an142 Austrian contingent101, while in Silesia Austria would make a great effort against Prussia. At the same time the secondary struggle of Austria with Spain and France would go on in Italy, while French and Austrian corps102 would guard the Rhine. It is evident at a glance that the withdrawal103 of the French and Bavarians must greatly improve the prospects104 of Austria with regard to Silesia. And when (May, 1745) she was joined by Saxony, whose help all parties desired, in an undertaking to make no peace until Frederick should resign Silesia and Glatz to the one and part of his hereditary105 dominions106 to the other, the Queen might well be sanguine. Much of her advantage was, however, thrown away by an error common to Hapsburg rulers, who are wont107 to believe that no family is so fitted as their own for command. The invasion of Silesia was entrusted108 to Prince Charles of Lorraine, the nominal109 leader of the army in the previous year, while Traun, the real author of the Austrian success, was sent to watch the Imperial election at Frankfort. The consequence was that the Austrians did not move till May, and that they were worse generalled than the Prussians.
Meanwhile Frederick had been assiduous in preparing for war and in negotiating to avoid it. He was ready to put 80,000 foot and 30,000 horse into the field: but he had sued in vain for the alliance of Saxony and the aid of England and of Russia. The King, who in 1740 had offered millions to Maria Theresa and planned a partition of her dominions, must in 1745 implore110 Louis XV. for a subsidy111 to avert112 the partition of his own. But143 the danger to Prussia, though real, was not yet as overwhelming as her enemies believed. “Excellent bearskin to be slit113 into straps,” chuckles114 Frederick’s admirer, “only the bear is still on his feet.”
The King could still count upon two mighty115 allies,—upon his army, whose spirit had been restored by the successes of the Old Dessauer in the defence of Silesia, and upon himself. Both grew year by year more valuable. At this crisis, as events were soon to prove, Frederick’s spirit was worthy116 of the Queen herself. “I have made it a point of honour,” he wrote to Podewils on April 27, 1745, “to contribute more than any other to the aggrandisement of my House. I have played a leading part among the crowned heads of Europe. These are so many personal engagements which I have taken and which I am resolved to fulfil even at the cost of my fortune and my life.” Since the middle of March he had been making ready in Silesia, and in April he sent home directions for carrying on the government if Berlin should be in danger.
Next month he learned that his French allies, who were bent117 on capturing Tournay, had gained a great victory at Fontenoy (11th May, 1745). He received the news with mixed feelings. He had been striving to find words which might force into the mind of Louis XV. the truth that victories in the Netherlands would do nothing for the common cause in Germany. “We beg the King of France,” he wrote, “not to imagine that any efforts of his in Flanders can procure118 the least relief for the King of Prussia. If the Spaniards land in the Canary Islands,144 if the King of France takes Tournay, or if Thamas Kuli-Chan besieges119 Babylon it is all one,” since such feats120 could not influence the war in Bohemia and Moravia. Yet it was not disheartening to know that Dettingen had been avenged and that other foes121 of Austria could more than hold their own. With renewed hope, Frederick bent all his energies to the task of holding Silesia.
The King had learned much from Traun, and he was no longer compelled to consult the interests of his allies. He therefore avoided the mistakes of the former year. In 1745 his clear gaze penetrated122 the heart of the problem which he had to solve, and he followed the right course with the coolest daring. Silesia, he knew, was divided from the country of the enemy by a mountain rampart more than three hundred miles in length and pierced by many roads. Veiled by clouds of light horse, Prince Charles might choose any of these roads without betraying his choice to the army of defence. What Neipperg had accomplished123 when he entered Silesia in 1741 might be repeated by Prince Charles on a greater scale, and with less favour from fortune the Prussians might this time be crushed in detail. Frederick therefore drove sentiment from his breast, abandoned south-eastern Silesia to the Hungarians, and concentrated all his force in the neighbourhood of Neisse, a stronghold which the Prussians had made impregnable. His design was to admit the invaders124 to Silesia in the hope of catching125 them at a disadvantage and of destroying their enterprise at a blow.
145 The result was that, when the allies came, they came in the highest spirits. Their progress had been as fortunate as they could have hoped. First, as usual, troops of wild riders poured into Silesia from the south-east. They enjoyed the success which Frederick’s plan assured to them, and treason among his soldiers gave them Cosel, a fortress26 on the upper Oder. Then Prince Charles moved northward126 from K?niggr?tz into the mountains and 30,000 Saxons joined him on the way. On June 3, 1745, the combined army marched proudly down into the plain. Breslau lay little more than two days’ march to the north-east of them.
The fixed127 idea of Prince Charles was that Frederick would behave in 1745 as he had behaved in 1744; that is to say, that he would retreat. This delusion128 had been carefully fostered by the King. Discovering that one of the spies whom he kept in the Austrian camp was in fact selling Prussian secrets to the enemy, Frederick cleverly hinted to him that he was afraid of being cut off from Breslau. The spy informed Prince Charles, who readily gave credit to information which confirmed his previous belief. Frederick then ordered some repairs on the roads leading to the capital and supplied further proof of his intention, if any were needed, by leaving the passes unguarded. Prince Charles therefore emerged from the mountains in entire ignorance of the fact that he was to be attacked by a force of 70,000 men. The invaders encamped upon a plain some five miles broad and as flat as the field of Mollwitz, with the little town of Hohenfriedberg on the edge of the146 mountains to their rear, and Striegau, a place of greater size, on the hills before them. The Saxon vanguard, which had already been in contact with the enemy, was instructed to seize Striegau next morning, if the Prussians still ventured to hold it. “There can be no God in heaven,” said Prince Charles, “if we do not win this battle.”
Frederick’s camp lay almost at right angles to the line of the allies between Hohenfriedberg and Striegau. That night (June 3–4, 1745) the Prussians stole silently from their stations, crossed a stream which separated them from the enemy, and ranged themselves before him in line of battle. At dawn they began a general attack as furious as it was unexpected. The Saxons, always unfortunate in war, were the first to suffer, and their dogged resistance only increased their loss. The Austrian infantry129 stood firm, but their cavalry130 could no longer face the Prussians. Thus the Austrian centre and right wing, though favoured by the ground, could gain no advantage sufficient to compensate131 for the disasters of the Saxons on the left. Hohenfriedberg was a soldiers’ battle, and the decisive stroke was an irresponsible charge of the Baireuth dragoons, who dashed at the enemy through a dangerous gap in the Prussian line. The shock carried all before it. More than sixty standards were captured by this regiment132 alone. By eight o’clock in the morning the Austrians were in retreat towards the mountains and the invasion of Silesia was at an end.
The allied133 army fled so quickly, writes the historian of the Evangelical church at Hohenfriedberg,147 that little damage was done in the place, and the inhabitants were soon able to bear what succour they could to the wounded, who lay in thousands on the plain below. In about four hours’ fighting the victors had lost more than 4000 men killed or wounded, and the vanquished134 about 10,000. These figures do not, however, represent one tithe135 of the advantage which Frederick gained at Hohenfriedberg. He had reduced the allied army by some 25,000 men, of whom 7000 were prisoners and many more deserters. Every German army at that time included thousands of professional soldiers who fought for either side indifferently and preferred the victors’ pay to their pursuit. Thousands more fought against their will, and the retreat through mountains gave them an opportunity to slip away. For a month the Prussians hung in the rear of the allies and drove them as far as K?niggr?tz. Instead of his defensive attitude in Silesia, Frederick now took up a defensive-offensive in Bohemia, a plan which was as creditable to his strategy as the battle had been to his tactics. Above all other advantages he had gained this at Hohenfriedberg—that he could henceforth trust his cavalry. Worthless at Mollwitz, respectable at Chotusitz, at Hohenfriedberg they proved themselves superb. The panel which commemorates136 the victory in the Prussian Hall of Fame portrays137 the dragoons swooping138 down upon the white-clad infantry of Austria.
The triumph of Frederick the Warrior139 on this bloody140 fourth of June revealed interesting glimpses of Frederick the man. In his first transports of148 delight he hugged the French ambassador and astonished him by owning gratitude141 to God. “So decisive a defeat,” he informed his mother, “has not been since Blenheim.” He believed that the Queen would now come to terms, and wrote to Podewils that it must have softened the heart of Pharaoh. His delight found vent1 in music, and he composed his March of Hohenfriedberg. But soon the statesman reappeared. None of these ebullitions clouded his insight into the situation of affairs. He saw clearly that his aims of the year before were still impracticable, that what he needed was peace, and that his victory must have brought peace nearer by discouraging the enemy.
It is true that now, as so often before, Frederick underrated the firmness of the Queen. He was further disappointed by the unyielding attitude of Augustus, who possessed a dangerous patron in the Czarina. But England, the paymaster of the coalition142, had no stomach for a war of vengeance143 against Prussia. To her the Austrian alliance was merely an investment. It would be profitable only if it produced hard fighting against her real foes, the French. Fontenoy, where the Sea Powers had been left to do their own fighting, shook her faith in her Hapsburg ally, and the conduct of the Eastern campaign showed that the Queen’s thoughts centred on the recovery of the province which England had induced her to give up. At this juncture144 England herself was attacked. The invasion of the Pretender compelled her to recall her troops from the Continent and favoured the convention149 which was concluded at Hanover towards the end of August. By the Convention of Hanover, signed on the 26th August, 1745, Frederick a third time deserted the French. He promised to vote for Francis at the Imperial election on condition that Silesia should be guaranteed to him by all Europe, while George II. undertook to induce Austria to renew the Treaty of Berlin within six weeks.
The good offices of England, which as usual consisted in pressing the Queen to buy off her enemies, were entirely145 useless. At the end of August Austria and Saxony drew closer together, and on September 13th the House of Hapsburg regained146 its old prestige by the election of Francis as Emperor. Soon afterwards Frederick perceived that he had exhausted147 the supplies of north-eastern Bohemia and began to retire towards Silesia. By the end of September he had crossed the Elbe and encamped with 18,000 men at the foot of the mountains near the village of Soor. There something like his own man?uvre of Hohenfriedberg was practised upon him by Prince Charles with an army almost double the size of Frederick’s. Under cover of darkness the Austrians took up positions commanding the Prussian camp. Only the King’s swift grasp of the situation and the wonderful skill and speed of his troops averted148 a great disaster. In a five hours’ fight the Austrians were driven off, leaving more than 4000 men on the field and more than 3000 in the enemy’s hands. The number of Prussian casualties exceeded 3000—a heavy price to pay for bad scouting149. Frederick was, moreover, put to great inconvenience by150 the sack of his camp and the capture of his secretary, the silent, assiduous Eichel.
At Soor, Frederick gained a safe retreat to Silesia and a lesson to be careful in the future. But victory made him inattentive to the lesson. The behaviour of his men had been beyond all praise. They formed under fire; the cavalry charged up-hill and routed the enemy, and the infantry, though unsupported, attacked superior numbers and captured batteries. The King, not unnaturally150, began to believe that there was nothing which he and his soldiers could not accomplish. The result, in a future as yet far distant, was great glory mingled151 with great disaster.
During the winter months the Prussian rank and file gathered fresh laurels152. Once more Frederick believed that he had tamed the Queen and once more he found himself mistaken. As in every previous year of the Silesian wars, Maria Theresa ordered an attack upon her enemy in the winter. This of 1745 was threefold and the goal was not Breslau but Berlin. Prince Charles’s army was to march from Bohemia into Saxony and to join with the Saxons in a march to Frankfurt-on-Oder, while 10,000 men detached by Traun crossed Germany and seized Berlin. Enough of this elaborate plan was blabbed to the Swedish ambassador by the Saxon Premier153, Count Brühl, to put Frederick upon his guard. His own army had gone into winter quarters. A force under the Old Dessauer, which had been stationed for some time at Halle in readiness to spring at the throat of Saxony, was likewise laid up for the winter. Podewils and the Old Dessauer151 refused to credit a scheme at once so grandiose154 and so dangerous to the Saxons, who in case of failure would be left at the mercy of Prussia. The King, however, overruled them, rushed into Silesia, collected 35,000 men, marched for some days parallel with the unsuspecting Prince Charles, and on November 23, 1745, crushed his Saxon vanguard at Hennersdorf. At this blow the whole enterprise collapsed155. The Austrians retired into Bohemia, followed by Augustus and Count Brühl, who stubbornly rejected the Prussian overtures156 for peace.
Meanwhile the Old Dessauer, who had captured Leipzig, was making for Dresden under urgent orders to attack the Saxon force wherever he might find it. Four armies were at this time converging157 upon the capital. The Saxons under Count Rutowski, with whom were the Austrian contingent from the West, formed a force of 35,000 men and lay to the westward158 of the Elbe and of the city. The Old Dessauer, having secured Meissen, had provided a bridge across the river by which Frederick marching from the East could join him in case of need. But Prince Charles with 46,000 men was advancing towards Dresden from the side of Bohemia, and Frederick feverishly159 urged his veteran lieutenant160 to strike a speedy blow. If the allies were to join forces the war might be prolonged and it seemed likely that Russia would attack Prussia in the spring.
Prince Charles was in fact only five miles distant when, on December 15th, the Old Dessauer came upon Rutowski strongly posted at Kesselsdorf.152 “Heavenly Father,” prayed the old man in the hearing of his devoted161 soldiers, “graciously aid me this day: but if Thou shouldest not be so disposed, at least lend not Thy aid to those scoundrels the enemy, but passively await the issue.” The task of the infantry was even harder than that of capturing the batteries at Soor. Twice they were repulsed162 with a loss of nearly 1500 men out of 3600. But the usual impetuosity of armies not perfectly163 trained came to their aid. The Saxons in the intoxication164 of victory charged from the entrenchments, only to be routed by the Prussian horse. This proved the turning-point in a battle which cost Rutowski 3000 men killed and wounded and twice as many taken prisoner.
The Prussians lost some 4600 men, but they gained peace. Prince Charles fled once more into Bohemia and Dresden made no resistance. In the hour of triumph Frederick’s bearing was admirable. All through the winter campaign he had showered insults upon the Old Dessauer, a prince born the year after Fehrbellin and hero of well-nigh half a hundred battles and sieges. “My field-marshal is the only person who either cannot or will not understand my plain commands.” “You go as slowly as though you were determined165 to deprive me of my advantage.” Such were the royal words which had goaded166 the old man into attempting the impossible at Kesselsdorf, where he exposed himself recklessly and received three balls through his clothing. Now he enjoyed as ample amends167 as Frederick’s conception of the royal dignity permitted him to bestow168. On153 the day after the battle the King sprang from his horse at sight of him, advanced to meet him with doffed169 hat, embraced him, and accepted his guidance over the field.
At Dresden Frederick stayed eight days and showed himself anxious to please. He entered the city, it is true, as a conqueror, in a carriage drawn170 by eight horses, and he exacted a million thalers from the land. But he visited and honoured the children of Augustus, played a leading part in the society of the place, attended church and opera on Sunday, and in general acted with the utmost moderation.
In the existing political situation, such conduct was no less politic47 than humane. In spite of his triumph over the Saxons, Frederick’s position was far from secure. Augustus was only a recent recruit in the phalanx of kings arrayed against Prussia. Russia, his patron, had yet to be reckoned with. The army of Prince Charles was unbroken. Southern Silesia was flooded with Hungarians. Traun might yet leave the Rhine and revive the painful memories of 1744. In face of all these dangers Frederick had no reserves. His treasury was empty and the anger of the French at the Convention of Hanover forbade him to expect assistance from them. These considerations made him willing to name a low price for peace. Even when fleeing from Traun in 1744 he had demanded a part of Bohemia. Now after four victories he stipulated171 only that Austria should renew the Treaty of Berlin. Maria Theresa was thus confronted with the154 painful choice between abandoning, at least for the present, all hope of recovering Silesia and resigning the help of the Sea Powers, on which her hope of retaining Italy depended. The Saxon alliance had broken down, a negotiation with France was unsuccessful, and the Queen wisely consented to accept Frederick’s terms. At Dresden on Christmas Day, 1745, treaties were signed which restored peace to a great part of Germany and closed the Second Silesian War.
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1
vent
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| n.通风口，排放口；开衩；vt.表达，发泄 | |
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enquire
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| v.打听，询问；调查，查问 | |
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3
strenuous
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| adj.奋发的，使劲的；紧张的；热烈的，狂热的 | |
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toil
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| vi.辛劳工作，艰难地行动；n.苦工，难事 | |
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inundation
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| n.the act or fact of overflowing | |
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diplomacy
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| n.外交；外交手腕，交际手腕 | |
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humane
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| adj.人道的，富有同情心的 | |
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retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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dreary
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| adj.令人沮丧的，沉闷的，单调乏味的 | |
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dwelling
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| n.住宅，住所，寓所 | |
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codification
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| n.法典编纂，法律成文化；法规汇编 | |
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lavished
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| v.过分给予，滥施( lavish的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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13
thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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14
pry
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| vi.窥(刺)探，打听；vt.撬动(开，起) | |
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vented
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| 表达，发泄（感情，尤指愤怒）( vent的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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16
secrecy
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| n.秘密，保密，隐蔽 | |
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diplomat
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| n.外交官，外交家；能交际的人，圆滑的人 | |
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18
banter
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| n.嘲弄，戏谑；v.取笑，逗弄，开玩笑 | |
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disciple
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| n.信徒，门徒，追随者 | |
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20
softened
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| （使）变软( soften的过去式和过去分词 )； 缓解打击； 缓和； 安慰 | |
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21
conspicuous
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| adj.明眼的，惹人注目的；炫耀的，摆阔气的 | |
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22
conspicuously
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| ad.明显地，惹人注目地 | |
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23
sluggishly
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| adv.懒惰地；缓慢地 | |
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24
intrigues
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| n.密谋策划( intrigue的名词复数 )；神秘气氛；引人入胜的复杂情节v.搞阴谋诡计( intrigue的第三人称单数 )；激起…的好奇心 | |
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25
fortresses
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| 堡垒，要塞( fortress的名词复数 ) | |
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fortress
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| n.堡垒，防御工事 | |
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27
conning
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| v.诈骗，哄骗( con的现在分词 )；指挥操舵( conn的现在分词 ) | |
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28
alienation
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| n.疏远；离间；异化 | |
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29
negotiation
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| n.谈判，协商 | |
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30
negotiations
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| 协商( negotiation的名词复数 )； 谈判； 完成（难事）； 通过 | |
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31
dictate
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| v.口授；(使)听写；指令，指示，命令 | |
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32
impudence
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| n.厚颜无耻；冒失；无礼 | |
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33
brutality
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| n.野蛮的行为，残忍，野蛮 | |
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34
honourable
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| adj.可敬的；荣誉的，光荣的 | |
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35
heed
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| v.注意，留意；n.注意，留心 | |
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36
professed
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| 公开声称的，伪称的，已立誓信教的 | |
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37
interfere
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| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
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38
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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39
cede
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| v.割让，放弃 | |
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40
lust
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| n.性(淫)欲；渴(欲)望；vi.对…有强烈的欲望 | |
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41
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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42
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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43
outlet
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| n.出口/路；销路；批发商店；通风口；发泄 | |
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44
inhuman
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| adj.残忍的，不人道的，无人性的 | |
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45
sanguine
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| adj.充满希望的，乐观的，血红色的 | |
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46
insolent
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| adj.傲慢的，无理的 | |
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47
politic
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| adj.有智虑的；精明的；v.从政 | |
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48
shipwreck
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| n.船舶失事，海难 | |
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49
forsook
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| forsake的过去式 | |
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50
accustom
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| vt.使适应，使习惯 | |
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51
pointed
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| adj.尖的，直截了当的 | |
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52
treasury
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| n.宝库；国库，金库；文库 | |
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53
revert
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| v.恢复，复归，回到 | |
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54
propounded
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| v.提出（问题、计划等）供考虑[讨论]，提议( propound的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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55
conqueror
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| n.征服者，胜利者 | |
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56
barometer
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| n.气压表，睛雨表，反应指标 | |
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57
Forsaken
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| adj. 被遗忘的, 被抛弃的 动词forsake的过去分词 | |
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58
repented
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| 对（自己的所为）感到懊悔或忏悔( repent的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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59
unity
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| n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调 | |
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60
importunity
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| n.硬要，强求 | |
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61
liking
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| n.爱好；嗜好；喜欢 | |
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62
impelled
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| v.推动、推进或敦促某人做某事( impel的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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63
organise
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| vt.组织，安排，筹办 | |
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64
diplomats
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| n.外交官( diplomat的名词复数 )；有手腕的人，善于交际的人 | |
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65
wrested
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| （用力）拧( wrest的过去式和过去分词 )； 费力取得； （从…）攫取； （ 从… ） 强行取去… | |
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66
undertaking
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| n.保证，许诺，事业 | |
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67
motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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68
accusation
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| n.控告，指责，谴责 | |
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69
expedient
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| adj.有用的，有利的；n.紧急的办法，权宜之计 | |
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70
patriot
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| n.爱国者，爱国主义者 | |
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71
repel
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| v.击退，抵制，拒绝，排斥 | |
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72
conspiracy
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| n.阴谋，密谋，共谋 | |
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73
majesty
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| n.雄伟，壮丽，庄严，威严；最高权威，王权 | |
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74
conspire
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| v.密谋，（事件等）巧合，共同导致 | |
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75
parley
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| n.谈判 | |
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76
tangled
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| adj. 纠缠的，紊乱的 动词tangle的过去式和过去分词 | |
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77
technically
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| adv.专门地，技术上地 | |
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78
delusive
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| adj.欺骗的，妄想的 | |
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79
scrupulous
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| adj.审慎的，小心翼翼的，完全的，纯粹的 | |
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80
eastwards
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| adj.向东方（的），朝东（的）；n.向东的方向 | |
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81
defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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82
avenged
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| v.为…复仇，报…之仇( avenge的过去式和过去分词 )；为…报复 | |
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83
prospered
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| 成功，兴旺( prosper的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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84
mirage
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| n.海市蜃楼，幻景 | |
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85
isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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86
swarms
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| 蜂群，一大群( swarm的名词复数 ) | |
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87
enveloped
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| v.包围，笼罩，包住( envelop的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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88
convoys
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| n.（有护航的）船队( convoy的名词复数 )；车队；护航（队）；护送队 | |
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89
scouts
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| 侦察员[机，舰]( scout的名词复数 )； 童子军； 搜索； 童子军成员 | |
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90
garrisons
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| 守备部队，卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
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91
boon
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| n.恩赐，恩物，恩惠 | |
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92
harassed
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| adj. 疲倦的，厌烦的 动词harass的过去式和过去分词 | |
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93
deserted
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| adj.荒芜的，荒废的，无人的，被遗弃的 | |
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94
umbrage
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| n.不快；树荫 | |
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95
postscript
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| n.附言，又及；(正文后的)补充说明 | |
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96
forefathers
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| n.祖先，先人；祖先，祖宗( forefather的名词复数 )；列祖列宗；前人 | |
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97
dictated
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| v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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98
pricked
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| 刺，扎，戳( prick的过去式和过去分词 )； 刺伤； 刺痛； 使剧痛 | |
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99
hampered
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| 妨碍，束缚，限制( hamper的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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100
coveted
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| adj.令人垂涎的；垂涎的，梦寐以求的v.贪求，觊觎(covet的过去分词)；垂涎；贪图 | |
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101
contingent
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| adj.视条件而定的；n.一组，代表团，分遣队 | |
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102
corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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103
withdrawal
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| n.取回，提款；撤退，撤军；收回，撤销 | |
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104
prospects
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| n.希望，前途(恒为复数) | |
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105
hereditary
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| adj.遗传的，遗传性的，可继承的，世袭的 | |
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106
dominions
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| 统治权( dominion的名词复数 )； 领土； 疆土； 版图 | |
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107
wont
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| adj.习惯于；v.习惯；n.习惯 | |
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108
entrusted
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| v.委托，托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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nominal
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| adj.名义上的；(金额、租金)微不足道的 | |
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110
implore
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| vt.乞求，恳求，哀求 | |
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111
subsidy
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| n.补助金，津贴 | |
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112
avert
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| v.防止，避免；转移(目光、注意力等) | |
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113
slit
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| n.狭长的切口；裂缝；vt.切开，撕裂 | |
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114
chuckles
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| 轻声地笑( chuckle的名词复数 ) | |
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115
mighty
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| adj.强有力的；巨大的 | |
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worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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117
bent
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| n.爱好，癖好；adj.弯的；决心的，一心的 | |
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118
procure
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| vt.获得，取得，促成；vi.拉皮条 | |
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119
besieges
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| 包围，围困，围攻( besiege的第三人称单数 ) | |
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120
feats
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| 功绩，伟业，技艺( feat的名词复数 ) | |
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foes
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| 敌人，仇敌( foe的名词复数 ) | |
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122
penetrated
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| adj. 击穿的，鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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123
accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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invaders
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| 入侵者，侵略者，侵入物( invader的名词复数 ) | |
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125
catching
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| adj.易传染的，有魅力的，迷人的，接住 | |
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126
northward
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| adv.向北；n.北方的地区 | |
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127
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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delusion
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| n.谬见，欺骗，幻觉，迷惑 | |
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129
infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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130
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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131
compensate
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| vt.补偿，赔偿；酬报 vi.弥补；补偿；抵消 | |
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regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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allied
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| adj.协约国的；同盟国的 | |
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vanquished
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| v.征服( vanquish的过去式和过去分词 )；战胜；克服；抑制 | |
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tithe
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| n.十分之一税；v.课什一税，缴什一税 | |
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commemorates
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| n.纪念，庆祝( commemorate的名词复数 )v.纪念，庆祝( commemorate的第三人称单数 ) | |
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portrays
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| v.画像( portray的第三人称单数 )；描述；描绘；描画 | |
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138
swooping
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| 俯冲，猛冲( swoop的现在分词 ) | |
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139
warrior
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| n.勇士，武士，斗士 | |
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140
bloody
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| adj.非常的的；流血的；残忍的；adv.很；vt.血染 | |
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gratitude
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| adj.感激，感谢 | |
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142
coalition
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| n.结合体，同盟，结合，联合 | |
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143
vengeance
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| n.报复，报仇，复仇 | |
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juncture
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| n.时刻，关键时刻，紧要关头 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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regained
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| 复得( regain的过去式和过去分词 )； 赢回； 重回； 复至某地 | |
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exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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averted
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| 防止，避免( avert的过去式和过去分词 )； 转移 | |
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149
scouting
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| 守候活动，童子军的活动 | |
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unnaturally
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| adv.违反习俗地；不自然地；勉强地；不近人情地 | |
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151
mingled
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| 混合，混入( mingle的过去式和过去分词 )； 混进，与…交往[联系] | |
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152
laurels
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| n.桂冠，荣誉 | |
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153
premier
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| adj.首要的；n.总理，首相 | |
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154
grandiose
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| adj.宏伟的，宏大的，堂皇的，铺张的 | |
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collapsed
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| adj.倒塌的 | |
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156
overtures
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| n.主动的表示，提议；（向某人做出的）友好表示、姿态或提议( overture的名词复数 )；（歌剧、芭蕾舞、音乐剧等的）序曲，前奏曲 | |
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converging
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| adj.收敛[缩]的，会聚的，趋同的v.（线条、运动的物体等）会于一点( converge的现在分词 )；（趋于）相似或相同；人或车辆汇集；聚集 | |
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158
westward
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| n.西方，西部；adj.西方的，向西的；adv.向西 | |
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feverishly
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| adv. 兴奋地 | |
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160
lieutenant
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| n.陆军中尉，海军上尉；代理官员，副职官员 | |
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devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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repulsed
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| v.击退( repulse的过去式和过去分词 )；驳斥；拒绝 | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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intoxication
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| n.wild excitement;drunkenness；poisoning | |
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165
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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166
goaded
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| v.刺激( goad的过去式和过去分词 )；激励；（用尖棒）驱赶；驱使（或怂恿、刺激）某人 | |
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167
amends
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| n. 赔偿 | |
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168
bestow
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| v.把…赠与，把…授予；花费 | |
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169
doffed
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| v.脱去，（尤指）脱帽( doff的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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170
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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stipulated
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| vt.& vi.规定；约定adj.[法]合同规定的 | |
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