What profit would Leuthen bring to Prussia? was Frederick’s first thought after the glorious fifth of December, and may well be ours. He himself was worn and ill. In the excitement of victory he had closed the long day of Leuthen with a jest. Pressing on to the castle of Lissa, he found it full of Austrian officers. “Bonjour, Messieurs,” cried the King, suddenly appearing out of the darkness, “can you find room for me?” But reaction and depression followed the strain of 1757. “If the year upon which I am entering,” he wrote on his birthday (January 24, 1758), “is to be as cruel as that which is at an end, I hope it will be my last.”
Every kind of anxiety, public and private alike, pressed at the same time upon the hero of Rossbach and Leuthen. His brother, Augustus William, for whom a chance bullet might at any moment clear the throne, had not yet succumbed1 under the burden252 of disgrace, and wearied Frederick with complaints and acid congratulations. His brother-in-law, Ferdinand of Brunswick, was stricken with fever, and the King’s mind was full of vague fears which he confessed but could not account for. Upon his sister, Wilhelmina, who had more need of it, he lavished2 sympathy and encouragement in a flood of tender messages.
“I am delighted that you are having some music and a little dissipation,” he writes, early in the new year; “believe me, dear Sister, there is nothing in life that can console us but a little philosophy and the fine arts.... I swear to give thanks to Heaven on the day when I can descend3 from the tight-rope on which I am forced to dance.”
If we must choose a simile4 from the circus to describe Frederick during this war, he might be likened to an acrobat5 juggling6 with five bomb-shells at once. Of three, the Swedes, the Russians, and the Imperialists, he had not yet felt the full weight, and with a supreme7 effort he had flung the French and the Austrians high into the air. What would be his task in 1758?
While he harvested the fruits of Leuthen without pause Frederick permitted himself to hope that his victory would bring peace. After the fall of Breslau on December 19, 1757, he estimated the Austrian losses and found them overwhelming. He even gave out that at a sacrifice of less than 4000 Prussians killed and wounded, he had reduced the enemy’s force by 47,707 men. He was still gathering9 in prisoners253 and deserters every day. Before the year was out he could assure Prince Henry that, according to sound opinion, Prince Charles’s army consisted of no more than 13,000 foot and 9000 horse. “If this does not lead to peace,” writes Frederick on December 21st, “no success in war will ever pave the way thither10.” A week later he is still hopeful, “but even if one were sure of it, we must none the less labour to make our position formidable, since force is the only argument that one can use with these dogs of Kings and Emperors.” Leuthen indeed gave Maria Theresa another opportunity to prove her constancy and courage. Frederick made overtures11 to her for peace, but she refused to engage in any negotiation12 apart from her allies. Early in January, 1758, the King became aware that Austria whatever it might cost her, was determined13 on another campaign.
Gradually the prospect14 grew clearer. Almost beyond the hopes of the Queen her alliance with France survived the double shock of Rossbach and Leuthen. At the beginning of February Louis promised to send 24,000 men into Bohemia. Since his encounter with Soubise, Frederick regarded the French as brigands15 rather than warriors17, but their onset18 compelled him to place a sturdy watch-dog in the West. This part was played by Ferdinand of Brunswick, who drove them across the Rhine before March was over. Another foe19, the Swedes, were even less considerable. Frederick jeered20 at them as “cautious people who run away eighty miles so as not to be taken,” and assured his sister, the Queen of Sweden, of his254 willingness to grant them peace. So long as France was willing to pay subsidies21, however, the Swedes were willing to provide 30,000 men. They still occupied their “bastion,” Pomerania, in force, and therefore Lehwaldt must still act as the Ferdinand of the North. The King himself proposed to astonish Europe by his dealings with the Austrians and Imperialists. From his ally he might look for the same assistance as in the previous year. He laboured in vain to persuade the Sea Powers that the Protestant cause and their own interests demanded that they should attack France with their own troops. But in April Pitt undertook to furnish an annual subsidy22 of ￡670,000, and for four years the money was punctually paid.
Map for the SILESIAN AND SEVEN YEARS WARS
G. P. Putnam’s Sons, London & New York.
With Silesia at his back, the French and Swedes held in check, and England in close alliance, Frederick’s prospects23 for the campaign of 1758 might seem almost brilliant. He had some 206,000 men under arms. Ready money was not plentiful24, but Frederick procured25 it in a thoroughly26 Prussian fashion—unscrupulous but practical. His own subjects he spared so far as possible. At times indeed he treated even them in the manner of his father. In January, 1758, the merchants of Breslau answered “Impossible” to a royal demand that they should advance 300,000 thalers to the Jews who had charge of the coinage. Frederick’s minister reported the fact, adding that the Jews enjoyed no credit in the mercantile world. The King’s annotation27, scrawled28 in German on the back of the report, is still treasured in the archives pf the General Staff at Berlin, It runs as follows:255 “I will cook something for the President if he don’t get the money out of those merchants at once without arguing.”
In general, however, with the exception of a few loans, no new demands were made upon the ill-lined purses of the Prussians. Indirectly29, of course, they felt the burden of the war. The coin with which the State supplied them was debased and therefore purchased less goods. The pensions of those who had served the King in the past, but could serve him no longer, were left unpaid30 or paid only in paper. But the chief granary of the Prussian army was, whenever possible, the territory of the enemy. The second great source of supplies consisted in those countries which the fortune of war had placed in their hands. “Mark well the contributions of Mecklenburg,” was Frederick’s order to General Dohna. “Take hostages, and threaten the Duke’s bailiffs with fire and plundering31 to make them pay promptly32.” But by far the heaviest burden fell upon the Saxons. Besides systematically33 draining them of cash, Frederick resorted to what he termed “reprisals34” at their expense whenever “the allies of the King of Poland” pillaged35 any of his dominions36. Men who were thus made scapegoats37 for the sins of half Europe betrayed with seasonable treachery the allegiance which the King of Prussia had compelled them to swear against their will.
In 1758, however, Frederick allowed the notorious disaffection of the Saxons to fetter38 him no more than the armies of France and Sweden. He had a great plan of campaign, and he began to execute it256 with a speed and secrecy39 which no one in the world could equal. On March 15th he left Breslau. Within five weeks he had captured Schweidnitz, the sole fortress40 in Silesia which remained Austrian, and was making for Moravia in order to besiege41 Olmütz. The Austrians, he argued, must relieve it and might be vanquished42 in a battle in which he would have choice of ground. Olmütz could then be taken and Vienna threatened. This would compel the enemy to concentrate in defence of the capital. Prince Henry would thus be free to swoop43 down from Dresden upon Bohemia and to erase44 the traces of Kolin.
Frederick’s idea was brilliant, and for a time success waited upon his arms. Daun, who, to the great profit of the Austrians, had replaced Prince Charles in the chief command, continued to fortify45 Bohemia against the attack which he expected from the East. On May 3rd Frederick reached Olmütz. Consternation46 reigned47 at Vienna, but for eight weeks the cautious Daun did not venture to disturb the siege. Till the last day of June all went well. Then came what the King frankly48 terms a terrible contretemps. At Domst?dtl a convoy49 of some 4000 waggons50 from Neisse was destroyed by General Laudon, who made himself a great name by a victory which cost Zieten’s command at least 2400 men. The Prussians were thus deprived of the supplies which were indispensable to their success.
Frederick recognised at once that the siege must be abandoned, and with it his whole enterprise. He admitted that he had lost the superiority over the257 Austrians which he had gained in 1757. Threatening to imprison51 and cashier officers who should make faces or say that all was lost, he slipped cleverly past Daun’s left into Bohemia, and for a month remained there at his ease. Then he sped swiftly northward52. On August 22, 1758, he was at Cüstrin dictating53 a fresh testament54 on the eve of the encounter with a new and gigantic foe.
In estimating Frederick’s prospects for the campaign of 1758, no account has yet been taken of Russia. The action of the Muscovite forces was proverbially uncertain and of necessity slow. It was possible that they would not influence the main struggle at all, or that Frederick’s plan of aggression55 in the South would be accomplished56 before they had time to become formidable. Since the New Year, however, storm-clouds had been massing to the north-eastward. It is fortunately no part of our task to peer behind them into the dark secrets of the Russian court. Suffice it to say that Elizabeth still lived, and that so long as she remained on the throne peace with Prussia was impossible. Her armies might be ill-found and her ministers corrupt57, but it would be strange if the mistress of Russia proved too weak to wound Frederick in his ill-guarded flank beyond the Oder.
Fermor received the chief command of an army 34,000 strong. In January, 1758, he overran Ost-Preussen and forced the inhabitants to swear fealty58 to the Czarina. In February K?nigsberg was illuminated59 in honour of Russian royalty60. Frederick avenged61 the first offence by reprisals upon the258 Saxons, the second by withdrawing his favour for ever from the polluted province. His power of self-restraint is attested63 by the fact that he attempted nothing by way of rescue. He calculated dispassionately that Fermor’s advance would at best be slow, that a broad expanse of barren Polish territory separated the invader65 from the rest of the Prussian dominions, and that offensive action in the South was more likely to be profitable than defensive66 in the North. K?nigsberg had been a Russian city for more than three months when Frederick dashed into Moravia.
The danger, however, grew greater throughout the summer months. The Muscovite tide rolled slowly across Poland into Frederick’s dominions east of the Oder. Europe now had an opportunity of learning something of the nature of the society which Peter the Great had brought within her pale. In the Russian army, as in the nation, the highest classes were men of honour when not too sorely tried, but the lowest were filthy67 savages68, who made the country a desert and tortured and burned men and women alike. What the rank and file might be, Frederick had yet to learn. But that his trusted field-marshal, Keith, gave him timely warning, he might well have been pardoned for his belief that Fermor’s unseasoned horde70 would not face the heroes of Leuthen led by himself, the foremost captain in the world.
As the King sped towards his old prison, Cüstrin, the trembling peasants came in crowds to kiss the hem8 of his coat. He found the fortress unharmed,259 but the defenceless town reduced to ashes by Fermor’s bombs. The Russians, more than 40,000 strong, lay on the eastern side of the Oder, having an open road to Poland, but all others barred by swamps and rivers. Before Frederick’s arrival, Dohna, with perhaps a third of their numbers, the waters of the Oder, and the walls of Cüstrin had been the only defences of Berlin. Now, however, the Prussians were some 36,000 strong and as much superior to their foes71 in mobility72 as were Drake and Hawkins to the Spanish Armada. Fermor was short of supplies. He could not go forward and had hundreds of miles of desert at his rear. Was the time at the King’s disposal so scanty73 that he could not starve, harry74, and crush the enemy without the sacrifice of more than a few hundred Prussian lives?
Frederick was, however, in no mood for a war of strategy. He had published his fixed75 resolve to conquer or die. He was impatient to return to Silesia, where he had left 40,000 men under Charles of Brandenburg-Schwedt. He was still more impatient to annihilate76 the bloody77 vagabonds, who, he wrote, were burning villages every day and committing horrors which made Nature groan78. In the spirit of Leuthen, though perhaps without like need, he resolved to attack Fermor without an hour’s delay. Knowing every inch of the dismal79 country-side, he swiftly planned a massacre80 that should avenge62 the past and safeguard the future. The Russians had abandoned the siege of Cüstrin and taken up a position so sheltered by the Oder and its tributary81, the Mietzel, that Fermor believed it to be unassailable.260 Frederick crossed the Oder some miles below Cüstrin, marched right round their camp, and prepared to hurl82 them into the waters in which they trusted for defence.
The plan seems a sound one only on the supposition that Keith’s opinion was ill-founded and that the Russians would not show fight. They had much in their favour. They were a national army, roused to enthusiasm by the benedictions83 of a mob of orthodox popes. They outnumbered the enemy and were far better furnished with cannon85. In cavalry86, it is true, Frederick had a great advantage, but this was discounted by the Russian formation in dense87 masses, which cavalry could hardly hope to pierce. Above all, the King provided his opponents with the best possible argument against running away when he left them no road by which to run. With no alternative save drowning or suffocation88, the Russians chose to die where they stood, but to sell their lives dear.
PLAN OF ZORNDORF, AUGUST 25, 1758.
These conditions made the battle fought near Zorndorf on August 25, 1758, one of the bloodiest89 of the whole war. It was in great part a desperate hand-to-hand struggle, kept up with mutual90 fury until the Russians were cut to pieces. According to the Prussian histories, Seydlitz, the matchless dragoon, refused point-blank to obey Frederick’s order to advance on the Russian guns. When and where needed, he replied, he would be at hand with his men. “After the battle,” came the King’s message, “you will answer for it with your head.” “After the battle,” answered the imperturbable261 general, “my head will be at the service of the King.” He justified91 his insubordination by twice charging at the enemy on his own initiative. He thereby92 saved the day, and, instead of being cashiered, was embraced by his delighted master. But when the issue had once been decided93 by sheer rage maintained for ten hours, some of the Prussian infantry94 showed themselves equally insubordinate and less successful. It seems not the least strange feature of this chaotic95 death-grapple that in an attack upon an army strongly posted the cavalry should have formed the chief factor in Frederick’s success.
Success, though much qualified96, Frederick might indeed fairly claim. Fermor, it is true, bivouacked on the field, fought again, though languidly, next day, sent off bulletins of victory, and retired97 unmolested a week later. His troops had endured the Prussian whirlwind with a steadfastness98 beyond all praise. But of the 30,000 killed and wounded nearly two-thirds were his, and Frederick had achieved, though at a great cost, his prime object of securing his dominions on the eastern side.
Against a new foe the King had displayed once more those qualities which readers of his history have by this time learned to regard as characteristic of him. He had been brave, secret, and masterful, swift to plan and to carry out, tireless in body and teeming99 in brain. He had at the same time proved himself exacting100, overbearing, and rash, adroit101 at supplying the need of the moment rather than far-sighted and sagacious in providing for the future. Though he accepted victory and defeat like a philosopher, there262 was too much of the despot, both in what he exacted from his troops and in what he expected from his foes. In this, though in this alone, it seemed as though the common infirmity of the overpowerful had at last assailed103 a Hohenzollern, and that Frederick had lost something of his power of seeing facts as they are. All the torrents104 of Prussian blood wasted at Prague, at Kolin, and at Zorndorf had not swept away his belief that Prussians led by himself could carry out any order that he chose to give.
It is chiefly these virtues105 and foibles of the King that shape the story of the remaining months of the campaign. While he was on the banks of the Oder the Austrians and Imperialists had begun the reconquest of Saxony and Silesia. Frederick by speed and cleverness saved both, but his conceit106 doomed107 nearly nine thousand of his army to wounds, captivity108, or death.
First, by wonderful marches, he snatched Dresden from the jaws109 of Daun. The cautious general took up a strong position, which barred Frederick’s road to Silesia, where the Austrians were besieging110 Neisse. Having failed to tempt64 him to battle, Frederick next stole round his army, but Daun retorted with a similar man?uvre and encamped near Hochkirch with some 65,000 men. On October 10th, Frederick with less than half the number actually insisted upon occupying an untenable position hard by. His generals, among whom were the Young Dessauer, Seydlitz, and Zieten, remonstrated111 with him in vain. Next day Keith arrived and spoke112 his mind quite frankly:263 “If the Austrians leave us quiet in a position like this, they deserve to be hanged.” “It is to be hoped that they fear us more than the gallows,” rejoined the King, and planned a flank attack on Daun, who, he believed, was about to retreat into Bohemia. The result was that before daybreak, on October 14, 1758, the Prussian camp was surprised. Five generals, Keith among them, perished. Frederick’s obstinate113 foolhardiness cost him more than one-fourth of his army, with more than a hundred guns and much material of war. Kolin, Domst?dtl, and Hochkirch, three victories over the King of Prussia within sixteen months, formed a splendid chaplet for a general whose forte114 was caution. The Pope was said to have rewarded Daun with a consecrated115 hat and sword.
“It may be safely reckoned,” so the King informed the Berlin public a week later, “that our loss does not exceed 3000 men.... These disasters are sometimes inevitable116 in the great game of chance which we call war.” The hour of disaster had again proved Frederick superior to the shrewdest blows of Fate. At the moment when the Austrians, creeping through the darkness, began to butcher his men in their tents, he proved himself once more a hero. Disdaining117 to order a retreat, he extricated118 his army from its terrible position and formed a new line only half a league to the rear. Daun, who had lost more than 6000 men, entrenched119 himself on the field, and was soon plying102 his old trade of circumspectly120 hanging upon the skirts of the foe. Within ten days of the battle Frederick robbed him264 of the fruits of victory by marching round him once more. He flung himself between Daun and the besiegers of Neisse, and Silesia was saved.
Daun’s counterstroke was, as was almost inevitable, an invasion of Saxony while Frederick’s back was turned. He alarmed Dresden, but was once more frustrated121 by Prussian speed. Frederick hurried back in time to save both Saxony and its capital. In mid-December he went into winter quarters at Breslau, master of dominions as broad as when he had quitted the city nine months before.
PLAN OF HOCHKIRCH, OCTOBER 14, 1758.
In those months he had, however, lost much that cannot be marked upon the map. Faithful officers by hundreds, trained soldiers by thousands, hard-wrung thalers by millions had been sacrificed, and nothing but glory and a respite122 had been gained. No lands outside Ost-Preussen were as yet conquered by foreign kings, but many had been wasted by foreign armies, and some, at the dictate123 of urgent need, by their own defenders124. These losses weighed upon Frederick, whose task it was to gather men and money for next year. But as a man he had cause for more poignant125 grief, for Death had knocked hard at the door of his own household. The loss of his heir, Augustus William, once his father’s favourite, now the victim of Frederick’s cruelty, probably afflicted126 him only because Prince Henry avenged it by refusing to see him except on business. But the death of Wilhelmina, who died on the eve of Hochkirch, was the most crushing calamity127 of his life. “Great God, my Sister of Baireuth!” scrawled the afflicted King as postscript128 to a brief despatch129 in265 cipher130 to his brother Henry. The message is more pregnant than much fine writing. “The death of Her Highness the Margravine of Baireuth embarrasses me with regard to His Majesty131 the King more than all war matters,” wrote the faithful Eichel from Dresden on the day after Frederick received the news, “since I can judge how highly afflicting132 and crushing it must be to him. Councillor Coeper writes to me yesterday that although every care was taken to prepare His Majesty gradually for sad tidings it has none the less made an indescribably great impression upon him, and he does not believe that deeper woe133 is possible.” “If my head had within it a lake of tears it would not be enough for my grief,” sighed the King to another mourner, Keith’s brother, when the hard fighting and marching came to an end.
After three campaigns the war had now, at the close of the year 1758, reached what may be called a chronic134 state. Thrice had Frederick lunged at the heart of his enemies and each time they had parried the thrust. At Vienna alone could the coalition135 receive a mortal wound. St. Petersburg, Stockholm, and Paris were equally out of reach, and the States of the Empire might be squeezed and harried136 for ever without terminating the war. If the Prussians failed to dictate peace at Vienna, their one hope must be that they might defend themselves until some of the hostile Powers should change their minds. Their opponents, too, felt the strain of prolonged and unprofitable war. It was true that they had not to strain themselves like the nation whose266 very existence was at stake, but neither Russia nor Austria nor France knew the secret of Prussian thrift137. The time might come when even Elizabeth and the Pompadour would confess that the game was no longer worth the candle. The French, in particular, were not all blind to the fact that they were losing their Empire to England in order to gratify the spite of the King’s mistress against the King of Prussia. Would they hold to the Austrian alliance even for another year?
The event falsified the hopes of Frederick. With some relaxation138 of intimacy139, the Austro-French league was renewed, and the King perceived that he must henceforward hold Prussia like a huge beleaguered140 fortress. Five Powers were still encamped upon his frontiers and ready to break in upon him. Like all resolute141 garrisons142, therefore, the Prussians had recourse to sallies, and some of these met with much success. By sudden forays Henry and Ferdinand destroyed the magazines that were being formed by the Austrians and Imperialists and so retarded143 the invasion of Prussia, which could not proceed without them. Mere144 partisan145 inroads like these were, however, insufficient146 to prevent Daun from taking up a strong position at Mark-Lissa, with Bohemia at his back and Saxony and Silesia open on either hand. There he menaced Frederick while the Russian host once more drew near to the Oder, overthrowing147 as it came a Prussian force which had been sent into Poland to destroy its magazines and pen it in the swamps of the Vistula.
The story of this Polish campaign throws much267 light on the strength and weakness of the Prussian army. Rightly neglecting the lesser149 danger in order to make adequate head against the greater, the King had sent against the Russians the force which usually defended the North against the Swedes. The rank and file were good, but without leadership they could accomplish nothing. “Your Polish campaign deserves to be printed as an eternal example of what every intelligent officer must avoid. You have done every silly thing which can be done in war and nothing whatever that an intelligent man can approve. I tremble to open my letters.” Such were the concluding words of a long indictment150 which Frederick addressed to their commander, General Wobersnow.
Nothing but the royal presence, it seemed, could save the situation. The King himself was not yet free to leave Daun. He therefore invented a deputy-king, and despatched General Wedell to Poland “with the powers of a Dictator in Roman times.” Twelve curt151 instructions were drafted for his guidance. He was “(4) to forbid lamentation152 and depreciatory153 talk among the officers on pain of dismissal. (5) To disgrace also those who cry out on every occasion that the enemy is too strong. (6) First to check the enemy by occupying a good position. (7) Then to attack in my own fashion.” From the King’s own lips Wedell received the order to fight the Russians whenever he should find them, and officers and men alike were commanded to obey him as though he were indeed the King. But Frederick was never sanguine154 that these attempts to win a268 Russian Leuthen by proxy155 would succeed. His instructions were followed to the letter, and within four days he was condoling156 with the Dictator upon the disaster of Kay (July 23, 1759), where the Prussians lost more than 8000 men killed and wounded. Nothing could now hold back Soltykoff and his Russians from the Oder, and across the Oder lay Frederick’s helpless capital.
But worse was yet in store. The Russians, for all their numbers and their greed, were ill-fed, irresolute157, and slow. They dreaded158 the victor of Zorndorf and they were determined not to be the catspaw of their allies. If only they could be kept at a distance from the Austrians they might starve before they could agree upon the next step in advance. From Kay to Mark-Lissa is some ninety miles as the crow flies, and the Oder and Frederick’s army lay between. To strengthen the barrier the King was prepared even to leave Saxony almost without defence. He summoned Henry to observe Daun while he himself made “cruel and terrible marches” through the burning sand towards Wedell in the North. So severe was the strain that he passed six of the torrid nights without sleep. But he was racing159 a fleet adversary—Laudon, the hero of Domst?dtl and probably the best partisan soldier in the world. Knowing that he had served ten years in the Russian army, Daun now detached him with 36,000 men to allay160 Soltykoff’s suspicions of the Austrians and to speed his coming. Frederick disturbed the march, but started too late to stop it altogether. When Laudon found the Russians269 at Frankfurt he was still master of nearly 20,000 men.
This reinforcement vastly increased the effectiveness of Soltykoff’s army as a fighting force. The Russians were well furnished with guns, and their infantry had proved its toughness at Zorndorf. But their cavalry was bad and Laudon added to it some 6000 men, well-mounted and well-trained. None the less he was received with extreme discourtesy. The Russians abused him because he brought no supplies. They refused to cross the Oder unless Daun’s whole army should appear. Until fresh orders from St. Petersburg produced some change of tone, Laudon felt certain that they were on the eve of retreat. Then came the news that the King of Prussia was upon them and the voice of discord161 was hushed.
Frederick had set himself a harder task than the destruction of Fermor on the banks of the Oder in 1758. Only overwhelming necessity made him give battle. He suspected that an Austrian detachment was threatening his capital. “I believe that Hadik means Berlin,” he wrote, “and I am obliged to make haste here to parry his blow in time. A lost soul in purgatory162 is not in a more wretched situation than I am.” In mere numbers, it is true, the disparity between the combatants was not much greater than at Zorndorf. Frederick had now nearly 50,000 men against a composite force of about 68,000, but of the enemy nearly one-quarter were light horse, who in the shock of battle counted for next to nothing.
270 In quality and in position, however, his army was worse off than before, while the enemy was much better. In the previous year he had led seasoned troops whose ranks had been purged163 by incessant164 marches under a scorching165 sun to join the army of Dohna, which was at least unbeaten and unwearied. Their meeting had provoked one of Frederick’s best-remembered sayings: “Your men have made themselves wonderfully smart; mine look like grass-devils, but they can bite.” Now, however, a great part of his command consisted of troops mishandled by Wobersnow and decimated by the Russians at Kay. It was unlikely that they would fight like the victors of Leuthen.
PLAN OF KUNERSDORF, AUGUST 12, 1759.
Nor was Frederick favoured by the ground. The most casual glance at the two fields is sufficient to show that Kunersdorf, the scene of the bloody drama of August 12, 1759, presented difficulties such as the assailant at Zorndorf never had to overcome. The allies were again encamped on the right bank of the Oder, and were now separated by the broad river from the town of Frankfurt. To march round their position was far more arduous166 than at Zorndorf. Their left wing was shielded by impassable morasses167, and the right by forest. Behind them lay a fortress commanding a well-bridged river, before them a tangled168 mass of sand-hills, woods, and lakes which seemed to have been designed by nature to impede169 an attacking force and which was now made still more formidable by art. This position, even if the 16,000 irregulars be ignored, was held by some 40,000 Russians, now veterans in271 western warfare170, aided by 13,000 of the flower of the Austrian army under a captain worthy171 to cross swords with Frederick himself.
On the other hand, the King had still Seydlitz, but such men as Wedell could ill supply the place of Schwerin, the Old Dessauer, and Keith. Some of his troops were men who had fled before the Russians every year, at Gross-J?gersdorf, at Zorndorf, and at Kay, and whom he could not even trust. Owing to the difficulties of the ground and the King’s impatience172, most of the Prussians went into action suffering under privations that would have well-nigh killed ordinary men. They lacked food and drink. After two nights without sleep they must drag themselves and their accoutrements through a man?uvre of nine hours’ duration, now tugging173 cannon through pine-woods, now clambering over sand-hills under the broiling174 August sun. Then at noon they were ordered to attack an enemy more numerous than themselves who was resting quietly behind entrenchments in ground of his own choosing.
That they accomplished what they did proves that the Prussians were heroes. Frederick’s design was, as at Zorndorf, to cross the Oder below the Russian camp, to march round it, and then to strike. But the barren waste east of Frankfurt was to him unfamiliar175 country. At Leuthen and at Zorndorf he had profited greatly by his knowledge of the field. But at Kunersdorf he knew neither the difficulties of the ground nor the extent to which, in one most important particular, those272 difficulties had been surmounted176 by the enemy. When he scanned their position from the north-east before completing his plan of attack, he could discern Laudon’s force encamped in a seemingly isolated177 peninsula in the great marsh69 which protected the left. He was informed that Laudon and Soltykoff could communicate only by a roundabout way. Not till the issue of the day was dubious178 did he learn that a new causeway connected the Austrians with the main body of the enemy, and the error proved fatal. Twice in his life Frederick paid dear for imperfect information, but the price of the blunder at Prague was a trifle by the side of the price paid here.
The beginning of the fray179 was such as to make the end a doubly crushing blow to the King. After long and toilsome preparations it seemed as though victory was assured. When the Prussian van went into action they advanced like fresh men and turned the Russians out of their entrenchments at the point of the bayonet. A second onslaught, better supported, took the enemy in flank and by two o’clock the Russian left was beaten, with a loss of seventy guns. Frederick sent off a courier to carry the tidings of victory to Berlin. The third attack, however, made on difficult ground in the face of cannon at 800 yards and musketeers at fifty, did not succeed until the Prussian infantry had been decimated and its strength almost spent. At this point Frederick’s generals cried “Enough”; but the King, as at Hochkirch, preferred his own opinion. Once more the Prussians stormed forward and for the273 fourth time they annihilated180 the Russian line. If one knoll181 more, the Spitzberg, and the battery upon it were taken, the victory, it seemed, would be complete.
But at this crisis Laudon intervened to save the battery and the day. His grenadiers climbed the knoll when the Prussians were still 150 paces from the top, and drove them back with a volley of case-shot. Frederick ordered up his artillery182, but the heavy guns stuck fast in the sand and light field-pieces were of no avail. In the agony of the moment the King lost his head and ordered the cavalry to storm the Spitzberg. As at Zorndorf, Seydlitz declined to sacrifice his troops to a blunder, but this time Frederick was deaf to the voice of reason. He repeated the order and was obeyed. Seydlitz was wounded and his superb squadrons shattered, without the smallest gain. A crushing countercharge headed by Laudon completed the ruin of the Prussian horse, and thenceforward the allies were the attacking side.
Frederick, almost beside himself, continued to demand victory from his men, and the infantry, though it could not go forward, held its ground against the Russians. Laudon, however, contrived183 the coup184 de grace. At about five o’clock he suddenly hurled185 a fresh Austrian host upon the heroes who had been fifteen hours under arms. The overthrow148 was complete. Frederick, who sought death in vain, was borne from the field by a party of his own hussars. Amid the chaos186 he wrote a terse187 note in French to inform his capital that the274 game was up. “My coat is riddled188 with balls; two horses were killed under me; it is my misfortune to be still alive. Our loss is great; not 3000 men out of 48,000 are with me. At this moment all are in flight and I am no longer master of my troops.”
The King’s first thought was that he himself was crushed and that therefore Prussia was ruined. There was indeed good reason for his despair. Even if Soltykoff should allow him to recross the Oder and to rally the remnants of his army he dared not hope to save Berlin. He had fought at Kunersdorf in the belief that an Austrian force under Hadik was advancing towards his capital from the south. If he now attacked Hadik he must expose his rear to the victors of Kunersdorf; if he stood firm against them, Hadik would take him in flank. “Only a miracle could save us,” wrote the Secretary of State.
The downfall of his country seemed inevitable and Frederick was resolved not to witness it. For years he had carried poison. Before using it he spent two days in arranging his affairs. On the plea of a severe illness, he entrusted189 the army to General Finck and gave directions that it should swear allegiance to the son of Augustus William. He advised the well-to-do citizens of Berlin to fly to Hamburg, the Government to make Magdeburg their asylum190, and Schmettau, the commandant at Dresden, to surrender on good terms if he saw no means of succour when attacked.
Frederick’s life-drama, it seemed, was played out,275 but the curtain did not fall. The allies, who had bought victory dear, made no move, and on the fourth day after the battle the King was himself again. “All my troops have done wonders,” had been his words when he gave up hope. Now he sent a new version to the same correspondent, Finckenstein. “The victory was ours, when suddenly my wretched infantry lost courage. The silly fear of being carried off to Siberia turned their head and there was no stopping them.” His loss at Kunersdorf amounted to at least 18,500 men, but he found himself master of an army 20,000 strong. They were, he said, not to be compared with the worst troops of former years, but he prepared to sacrifice them and himself for the defence of the capital, and awaited Soltykoff on the river Spree.
A letter to Prince Henry written on August 16, 1759, shows the temper of the Prussian Leonidas.
“The moment that I sent you word of our mishap191 everything seemed desperate. Do not think that the danger is not still very great, but be assured that until my eyes are closed I will sustain the State, as is my duty. A case that I had in my pocket was smashed by a shot, but saved my leg. We are all in tatters; there is hardly anyone who has not had two or three balls through his clothes or his hat. But we would cheerfully sacrifice our wardrobe, if that were all.”
Despite these signs of reviving courage, Frederick felt with tenfold intensity192 what he expressed years afterwards when he said that after Kunersdorf the enemy had only to give him the finishing stroke.276 Yet it is highly characteristic of him that already his thoughts ran upon another battle. To carry on defensive warfare, he argued, the support of a fortress was indispensable. But he had only Cüstrin and Spandau to choose from, and to sit down near either would be to sacrifice Berlin. Desperate evils, he held, needed desperate remedies, and he would court Fortune sword in hand. Eight days after Kunersdorf he hoped soon to have 33,000 men in his camp, but he protested that he feared them more than the enemy. “I count on the firmness and honesty of Pitt, and it is on him alone that we can at this juncture193 base some hope.”
Frederick expected day by day the catastrophe194 of Prussia. Yet the only direct result of Kunersdorf was that for a time he lost a great part of Saxony. Early in September Dresden was wrested195 from him by the motley army of the Empire, which was accounted the most despicable member of the coalition. Schmettau had acted too mechanically in following the King’s counsels of despair. But the Swedes, though their opponents had withdrawn196, failed to strike south. The French, who had set out in earnest to conquer Hanover, were routed at Minden by Ferdinand of Brunswick on August 1, 1759. They were driven headlong through the narrow gorge197 at the spot where the Weser cleaves198 the bulwark199 of hills which guards the northern plain, and thus before the day of Kunersdorf Frederick knew that he had nothing to fear on the western side. But how, it may well be wondered, could Daun and Soltykoff, with 120,000 men at their disposal and277 only half the number against them, neglect to follow up their victory? The sequel even suggests that Frederick’s desperate measures beyond the Oder had been superfluous200. Prussia was far weaker than before, yet she did not fall. The King was crippled, Austrians and Russians were now massed into one unbroken force, triumph at Dresden followed triumph at Kunersdorf, yet they accomplished nothing.
Their opponents, it is true, were tacticians of the first rank. Prince Henry, by wonderful marches, evaded201 Daun, and Frederick, returning to the Oder, frustrated all Soltykoff’s efforts to gain Silesia. It was, moreover, beyond the power of Daun to furnish the Russians with supplies, and if their ally did not supply them they refused point-blank to proceed. But the chief cause of Prussia’s salvation202 was that victory, though it united the armies of her enemies, could not unite their interests. Russians and Austrians remained as before separate armies with divergent interests to consult. At no time did Frederick draw greater profit than after Kunersdorf from the fact that Prussia was one and her opponents many.
Soon Berlin breathed freely and even Breslau felt safe. Before October was at an end Soltykoff was marching home, while Daun was struggling to save Dresden at least from Prince Henry’s reconquest of Saxony. The Te Deums ceased at Vienna and dejection reigned there. Daun’s sluggishness203 in aggressive action extinguished the renown204 due to his triumphs of defence. His wife dared not show herself in public. At court the story ran that she opened a package addressed to the Field-marshal,278 and discovered that some wag had mocked his sluggishness by sending him a night-cap.
At this juncture, however, it would have been well for Prussia if her King’s activity had been less superhuman. Flushed with the triumph of his strategy and confident of the devotion of Pitt, he had the audacity205 to demand that compensation for Prussia should be the basis of negotiation for peace. During the greater part of October, 1759, he was tormented206 by gout and fever. He spent his enforced leisure in writing an essay on Charles XII., the Madman of the North, a warrior16 who would have prized the bloody afternoon of Kunersdorf far more than the strategy which drove Soltykoff empty-handed from Silesia. Then, when the Russian peril207 had vanished, Frederick set out in a litter for Saxony. “I am very weak, but although still a cripple, I will do all that my feebleness allows me to attempt,” he wrote on November 4th. His heart beat high with the hope of repeating the miracles of 1757, and of regaining208, by a new Leuthen, all that had been lost during the summer, and peace.
“I make them carry me like the relics209 of a saint,” wrote the King after the first day’s journey. Though sleepless210 and crippled, he concocted211 daily bulletins to Prince Henry in the spirit of a schoolboy. Since it had been noised abroad that Daun had received the papal benediction84 he had more than ever been the butt212 of Frederick’s jests. Now, to create “a favourable213 impression on the mind of the blessed creature and his council,” he bids his brother announce his little escort as 4000 strong, and sends a list of279 the regiments214 of which it may be said to consist. “Daun and his Austrians shall not perceive that I have the gout,” he boasted.
Two days later, on November 14th, he took over the command. Pleased that Daun paid him the compliment of retreating, he ordered Finck to pursue. All the general’s objections were overruled, and he took refuge in wooden obedience215 to the letter of the King’s orders. “In a few days,” Frederick wrote on the 17th, “we shall reap the fruit of this disposition216.” In four the royal prophecy was fulfilled, but the harvester was Daun. Finck’s command, some 15,000 strong, with seventy guns, was entangled217 in the hills south of Dresden. Believing themselves to be surrounded by thrice their number, the Prussians laid down their arms at Maxen (November 21, 1759).
The blow was more crushing than Kunersdorf, for the whisper now sped through the world that the Prussians were turning cowards. Eichel confessed that his heart was so full of bitterness and chagrin218 that it was quite out of his power that day to write anything in cipher. The King, who had boasted to Voltaire that he would despatch his next letter from Dresden, complained bitterly that ill-luck pursued him all his days. He strove to atone219 for his over-confidence by exertion220, and for many weeks kept the field, defying the stern winter. He thereby averted221 an Austrian reconquest of Saxony, but the gates of Dresden never opened to him again. The Prussian cause and the Prussian King, thought the world, were failing together. “If you saw me, you280 would scarcely know me again,” Frederick wrote to Voltaire. “I am old, broken, grayheaded, wrinkled. I am losing my teeth and my gaiety.” Yet this dejected veteran alone kept together the Prussian army. That army was the sole bulwark of the State. If Frederick had in truth lost health, skill, and fortune, what hope was left to Prussia?
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1
succumbed
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| 不再抵抗（诱惑、疾病、攻击等）( succumb的过去式和过去分词 )； 屈从； 被压垮； 死 | |
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lavished
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| v.过分给予，滥施( lavish的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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descend
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| vt./vi.传下来，下来，下降 | |
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simile
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| n.直喻，明喻 | |
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acrobat
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| n.特技演员，杂技演员 | |
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6
juggling
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| n. 欺骗, 杂耍(=jugglery) adj. 欺骗的, 欺诈的 动词juggle的现在分词 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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hem
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| n.贴边，镶边；vt.缝贴边；(in)包围，限制 | |
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gathering
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| n.集会，聚会，聚集 | |
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thither
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| adv.向那里；adj.在那边的，对岸的 | |
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overtures
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| n.主动的表示，提议；（向某人做出的）友好表示、姿态或提议( overture的名词复数 )；（歌剧、芭蕾舞、音乐剧等的）序曲，前奏曲 | |
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negotiation
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| n.谈判，协商 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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prospect
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| n.前景，前途；景色，视野 | |
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brigands
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| n.土匪，强盗( brigand的名词复数 ) | |
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warrior
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| n.勇士，武士，斗士 | |
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warriors
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| 武士，勇士，战士( warrior的名词复数 ) | |
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onset
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| n.进攻，袭击，开始，突然开始 | |
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foe
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| n.敌人，仇敌 | |
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jeered
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| v.嘲笑( jeer的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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subsidies
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| n.补贴，津贴，补助金( subsidy的名词复数 ) | |
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subsidy
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| n.补助金，津贴 | |
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prospects
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| n.希望，前途(恒为复数) | |
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plentiful
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| adj.富裕的，丰富的 | |
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procured
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| v.（努力）取得， （设法）获得( procure的过去式和过去分词 )；拉皮条 | |
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thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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annotation
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| n.注解 | |
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scrawled
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| 乱涂，潦草地写( scrawl的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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indirectly
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| adv.间接地，不直接了当地 | |
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unpaid
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| adj.未付款的，无报酬的 | |
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plundering
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| 掠夺，抢劫( plunder的现在分词 ) | |
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promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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systematically
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| adv.有系统地 | |
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reprisals
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| n.报复（行为）( reprisal的名词复数 ) | |
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pillaged
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| v.抢劫，掠夺( pillage的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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dominions
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| 统治权( dominion的名词复数 )； 领土； 疆土； 版图 | |
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scapegoats
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| n.代人受过的人，替罪羊( scapegoat的名词复数 )v.使成为替罪羊( scapegoat的第三人称单数 ) | |
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fetter
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| n./vt.脚镣，束缚 | |
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secrecy
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| n.秘密，保密，隐蔽 | |
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40
fortress
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| n.堡垒，防御工事 | |
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41
besiege
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| vt.包围，围攻，拥在...周围 | |
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42
vanquished
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| v.征服( vanquish的过去式和过去分词 )；战胜；克服；抑制 | |
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43
swoop
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| n.俯冲，攫取；v.抓取，突然袭击 | |
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44
erase
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| v.擦掉；消除某事物的痕迹 | |
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45
fortify
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| v.强化防御，为…设防；加强，强化 | |
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46
consternation
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| n.大为吃惊，惊骇 | |
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47
reigned
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| vi.当政，统治（reign的过去式形式） | |
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48
frankly
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| adv.坦白地，直率地；坦率地说 | |
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49
convoy
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| vt.护送，护卫，护航；n.护送；护送队 | |
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50
waggons
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| 四轮的运货马车( waggon的名词复数 )； 铁路货车； 小手推车 | |
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51
imprison
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| vt.监禁，关押，限制，束缚 | |
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52
northward
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| adv.向北；n.北方的地区 | |
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53
dictating
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| v.大声讲或读( dictate的现在分词 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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54
testament
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| n.遗嘱；证明 | |
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55
aggression
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| n.进攻，侵略，侵犯，侵害 | |
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56
accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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57
corrupt
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| v.贿赂，收买；adj.腐败的，贪污的 | |
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58
fealty
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| n.忠贞，忠节 | |
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59
illuminated
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| adj.被照明的；受启迪的 | |
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60
royalty
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| n.皇家，皇族 | |
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61
avenged
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| v.为…复仇，报…之仇( avenge的过去式和过去分词 )；为…报复 | |
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62
avenge
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| v.为...复仇，为...报仇 | |
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63
attested
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| adj.经检验证明无病的，经检验证明无菌的v.证明( attest的过去式和过去分词 )；证实；声称…属实；使宣誓 | |
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64
tempt
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| vt.引诱，勾引，吸引，引起…的兴趣 | |
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invader
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| n.侵略者，侵犯者，入侵者 | |
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66
defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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filthy
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| adj.卑劣的；恶劣的，肮脏的 | |
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savages
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| 未开化的人，野蛮人( savage的名词复数 ) | |
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marsh
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| n.沼泽，湿地 | |
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70
horde
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| n.群众，一大群 | |
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foes
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| 敌人，仇敌( foe的名词复数 ) | |
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72
mobility
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| n.可动性，变动性，情感不定 | |
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73
scanty
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| adj.缺乏的，仅有的，节省的，狭小的，不够的 | |
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74
harry
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| vt.掠夺，蹂躏，使苦恼 | |
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75
fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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76
annihilate
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| v.使无效；毁灭；取消 | |
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77
bloody
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| adj.非常的的；流血的；残忍的；adv.很；vt.血染 | |
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78
groan
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| vi./n.呻吟，抱怨；(发出)呻吟般的声音 | |
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dismal
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| adj.阴沉的，凄凉的，令人忧郁的，差劲的 | |
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80
massacre
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| n.残杀，大屠杀；v.残杀，集体屠杀 | |
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81
tributary
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| n.支流；纳贡国；adj.附庸的；辅助的；支流的 | |
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82
hurl
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| vt.猛投，力掷，声叫骂 | |
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83
benedictions
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| n.祝福( benediction的名词复数 )；（礼拜结束时的）赐福祈祷；恩赐；（大写）（罗马天主教）祈求上帝赐福的仪式 | |
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84
benediction
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| n.祝福；恩赐 | |
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85
cannon
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| n.大炮，火炮；飞机上的机关炮 | |
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86
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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87
dense
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| a.密集的，稠密的，浓密的；密度大的 | |
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88
suffocation
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| n.窒息 | |
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89
bloodiest
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| adj.血污的( bloody的最高级 )；流血的；屠杀的；残忍的 | |
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90
mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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91
justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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92
thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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93
decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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94
infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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95
chaotic
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| adj.混沌的，一片混乱的，一团糟的 | |
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96
qualified
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| adj.合格的，有资格的，胜任的，有限制的 | |
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97
retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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98
steadfastness
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| n.坚定，稳当 | |
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99
teeming
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| adj.丰富的v.充满( teem的现在分词 )；到处都是；（指水、雨等）暴降；倾注 | |
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100
exacting
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| adj.苛求的，要求严格的 | |
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101
adroit
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| adj.熟练的，灵巧的 | |
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102
plying
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| v.使用（工具）( ply的现在分词 )；经常供应（食物、饮料）；固定往来；经营生意 | |
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103
assailed
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| v.攻击( assail的过去式和过去分词 )；困扰；质问；毅然应对 | |
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104
torrents
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| n.倾注；奔流( torrent的名词复数 )；急流；爆发；连续不断 | |
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105
virtues
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| 美德( virtue的名词复数 )； 德行； 优点； 长处 | |
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106
conceit
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| n.自负，自高自大 | |
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107
doomed
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| 命定的 | |
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108
captivity
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| n.囚禁；被俘；束缚 | |
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109
jaws
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| n.口部；嘴 | |
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110
besieging
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| 包围，围困，围攻( besiege的现在分词 ) | |
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111
remonstrated
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| v.抗议( remonstrate的过去式和过去分词 )；告诫 | |
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112
spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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113
obstinate
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| adj.顽固的，倔强的，不易屈服的，较难治愈的 | |
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114
forte
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| n.长处，擅长；adj.(音乐)强音的 | |
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115
consecrated
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| adj.神圣的，被视为神圣的v.把…奉为神圣，给…祝圣( consecrate的过去式和过去分词 )；奉献 | |
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116
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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117
disdaining
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| 鄙视( disdain的现在分词 )； 不屑于做，不愿意做 | |
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118
extricated
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| v.使摆脱困难，脱身( extricate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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119
entrenched
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| adj.确立的，不容易改的(风俗习惯) | |
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120
circumspectly
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| adv.慎重地，留心地 | |
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121
frustrated
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| adj.挫败的，失意的，泄气的v.使不成功( frustrate的过去式和过去分词 )；挫败；使受挫折；令人沮丧 | |
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122
respite
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| n.休息，中止，暂缓 | |
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123
dictate
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| v.口授；(使)听写；指令，指示，命令 | |
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124
defenders
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| n.防御者( defender的名词复数 )；守卫者；保护者；辩护者 | |
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125
poignant
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| adj.令人痛苦的，辛酸的，惨痛的 | |
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126
afflicted
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| 使受痛苦，折磨( afflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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127
calamity
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| n.灾害，祸患，不幸事件 | |
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128
postscript
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| n.附言，又及；(正文后的)补充说明 | |
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129
despatch
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| n./v.(dispatch)派遣；发送；n.急件；新闻报道 | |
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130
cipher
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| n.零；无影响力的人；密码 | |
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131
majesty
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| n.雄伟，壮丽，庄严，威严；最高权威，王权 | |
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132
afflicting
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| 痛苦的 | |
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133
woe
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| n.悲哀，苦痛，不幸，困难；int.用来表达悲伤或惊慌 | |
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134
chronic
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| adj.(疾病)长期未愈的，慢性的；极坏的 | |
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135
coalition
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| n.结合体，同盟，结合，联合 | |
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136
harried
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| v.使苦恼( harry的过去式和过去分词 )；不断烦扰；一再袭击；侵扰 | |
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137
thrift
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| adj.节约，节俭；n.节俭，节约 | |
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138
relaxation
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| n.松弛，放松；休息；消遣；娱乐 | |
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139
intimacy
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| n.熟悉，亲密，密切关系，亲昵的言行 | |
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140
beleaguered
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|
| adj.受到围困[围攻]的；包围的v.围攻( beleaguer的过去式和过去分词)；困扰；骚扰 | |
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141
resolute
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| adj.坚决的，果敢的 | |
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142
garrisons
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| 守备部队，卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
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143
retarded
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| a.智力迟钝的，智力发育迟缓的 | |
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144
mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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145
partisan
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| adj.党派性的；游击队的；n.游击队员；党徒 | |
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146
insufficient
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|
| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
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147
overthrowing
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| v.打倒，推翻( overthrow的现在分词 )；使终止 | |
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148
overthrow
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| v.推翻，打倒，颠覆；n.推翻，瓦解，颠覆 | |
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149
lesser
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| adj.次要的，较小的；adv.较小地，较少地 | |
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150
indictment
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| n.起诉；诉状 | |
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151
curt
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| adj.简短的，草率的 | |
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152
lamentation
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| n.悲叹，哀悼 | |
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153
depreciatory
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| adj.贬值的，蔑视的 | |
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154
sanguine
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| adj.充满希望的，乐观的，血红色的 | |
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155
proxy
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| n.代理权，代表权；（对代理人的）委托书；代理人 | |
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156
condoling
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| v.表示同情，吊唁( condole的现在分词 ) | |
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157
irresolute
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| adj.无决断的，优柔寡断的，踌躇不定的 | |
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158
dreaded
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| adj.令人畏惧的；害怕的v.害怕，恐惧，担心( dread的过去式和过去分词) | |
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159
racing
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| n.竞赛，赛马；adj.竞赛用的，赛马用的 | |
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160
allay
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| v.消除，减轻(恐惧、怀疑等) | |
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161
discord
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| n.不和，意见不合，争论，（音乐）不和谐 | |
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162
purgatory
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| n.炼狱；苦难；adj.净化的，清洗的 | |
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163
purged
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| 清除（政敌等）( purge的过去式和过去分词 )； 涤除（罪恶等）； 净化（心灵、风气等）； 消除（错事等）的不良影响 | |
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164
incessant
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| adj.不停的，连续的 | |
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165
scorching
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| adj. 灼热的 | |
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166
arduous
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| adj.艰苦的，费力的，陡峭的 | |
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167
morasses
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| n.缠作一团( morass的名词复数 )；困境；沼泽；陷阱 | |
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168
tangled
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| adj. 纠缠的，紊乱的 动词tangle的过去式和过去分词 | |
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169
impede
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| v.妨碍，阻碍，阻止 | |
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170
warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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171
worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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172
impatience
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| n.不耐烦，急躁 | |
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173
tugging
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| n.牵引感v.用力拉，使劲拉，猛扯( tug的现在分词 ) | |
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174
broiling
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| adj.酷热的，炽热的，似烧的v.（用火）烤（焙、炙等）( broil的现在分词 )；使卷入争吵；使混乱；被烤（或炙） | |
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175
unfamiliar
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| adj.陌生的，不熟悉的 | |
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176
surmounted
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| 战胜( surmount的过去式和过去分词 )； 克服（困难）； 居于…之上； 在…顶上 | |
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177
isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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178
dubious
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| adj.怀疑的，无把握的；有问题的，靠不住的 | |
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179
fray
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| v.争吵；打斗；磨损，磨破；n.吵架；打斗 | |
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180
annihilated
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|
| v.（彻底）消灭( annihilate的过去式和过去分词 )；使无效；废止；彻底击溃 | |
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181
knoll
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| n.小山，小丘 | |
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182
artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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183
contrived
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| adj.不自然的，做作的；虚构的 | |
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184
coup
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| n.政变；突然而成功的行动 | |
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185
hurled
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| v.猛投，用力掷( hurl的过去式和过去分词 )；大声叫骂 | |
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186
chaos
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| n.混乱，无秩序 | |
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187
terse
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| adj.(说话，文笔)精炼的，简明的 | |
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188
riddled
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| adj.布满的；充斥的；泛滥的v.解谜，出谜题(riddle的过去分词形式) | |
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189
entrusted
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| v.委托，托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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190
asylum
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| n.避难所，庇护所，避难 | |
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191
mishap
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| n.不幸的事，不幸；灾祸 | |
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192
intensity
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| n.强烈，剧烈；强度；烈度 | |
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193
juncture
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| n.时刻，关键时刻，紧要关头 | |
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194
catastrophe
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| n.大灾难，大祸 | |
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195
wrested
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| （用力）拧( wrest的过去式和过去分词 )； 费力取得； （从…）攫取； （ 从… ） 强行取去… | |
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196
withdrawn
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| vt.收回；使退出；vi.撤退，退出 | |
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197
gorge
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| n.咽喉，胃，暴食，山峡；v.塞饱，狼吞虎咽地吃 | |
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198
cleaves
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| v.劈开，剁开，割开( cleave的第三人称单数 ) | |
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199
bulwark
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| n.堡垒，保障，防御 | |
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200
superfluous
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| adj.过多的，过剩的，多余的 | |
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201
evaded
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| 逃避( evade的过去式和过去分词 )； 避开； 回避； 想不出 | |
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202
salvation
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| n.（尤指基督）救世，超度，拯救，解困 | |
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203
sluggishness
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| 不振，萧条，呆滞；惰性；滞性；惯性 | |
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204
renown
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| n.声誉，名望 | |
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205
audacity
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| n.大胆，卤莽，无礼 | |
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206
tormented
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| 饱受折磨的 | |
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207
peril
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| n.(严重的)危险；危险的事物 | |
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208
regaining
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| 复得( regain的现在分词 )； 赢回； 重回； 复至某地 | |
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209
relics
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| [pl.］n.遗物，遗迹，遗产；遗体，尸骸 | |
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210
sleepless
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| adj.不睡眠的，睡不著的，不休息的 | |
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211
concocted
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| v.将（尤指通常不相配合的）成分混合成某物( concoct的过去式和过去分词 )；调制；编造；捏造 | |
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212
butt
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| n.笑柄；烟蒂；枪托；臀部；v.用头撞或顶 | |
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213
favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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214
regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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215
obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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216
disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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217
entangled
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| adj.卷入的；陷入的；被缠住的；缠在一起的v.使某人（某物/自己）缠绕，纠缠于（某物中），使某人（自己）陷入（困难或复杂的环境中）( entangle的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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218
chagrin
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| n.懊恼；气愤；委屈 | |
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219
atone
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| v.赎罪，补偿 | |
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220
exertion
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| n.尽力，努力 | |
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221
averted
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| 防止，避免( avert的过去式和过去分词 )； 转移 | |
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