“Through the foundation of sociology,” says Comte at the beginning of the Cours, “positive philosophy will acquire that universal character which it still lacks, and will thus become qualified6 to take the place of theological and metaphysical philosophy, whose only real property to-day is this universality,”10 and at the end of the Cours he concludes: “The creation of sociology endows with fundamental unity7 the entire system of modern philosophy.”11
This creation, upon which everything else depended, dates from the time when Comte discovered the law of the three states as it is called. For, once this law is established, “social physics” ceases to be a mere8 philosophical9 conception,36 and becomes a positive science. This law had been anticipated and even already formulated10 in the XVIII. century by Turgot, then by Condorcet, and by Dr. Burdin. Comte, nevertheless, takes to himself the merit of the discovery. As he is generally most precise in doing full justice to his “precursors,” we must admit that, according to him, none of them had seen the scientific importance of this law. It certainly is one thing to gather the notion of a law out of a number of facts, and another to understand its capital importance, and to discern in it the fundamental law which governs the whole of the evolution of humanity.
This is the way in which Comte enounces it, in the Plan des travaux scientifiques nécessaires pour réorganiser la société (1822).
“According to the very nature of the human intellect every branch of our knowledge must necessarily pass successively in the course of its progressive development, through three different theoretical states: the theological or fictitious11 state, the metaphysical or abstract state, finally the scientific or positive state.”12
In the first lesson of the Cours de philosophie positive, after having reproduced this statement, Comte adds: “In other words the human mind, by its nature, in each one of its researches makes use successively of three methods of philosophising, essentially12 different and even opposed to each other: firstly, the theological method, next, the metaphysical, and lastly the positive. Hence we find three kinds of philosophies, or general systems of conceptions of the totality of phenomena, which mutually exclude each other. The first is the necessary starting-point of human intelligence, the third, its fixed13 and final state; the second is solely14 destined15 to serve as a transition.”13
37
The words “theological” and “metaphysical” are here taken in a particular sense, strictly16 defined.
Comte calls “theology” a general system of conceptions concerning the universality of phenomena, which explains the appearance of these phenomena by the will of gods. He has not in his mind theological speculation17 as one usually understands it, as a rational or sacred science. He does not in the least dream of a study of revealed truth. He only designated by this name an interpretation18 of natural phenomena by means of supernatural and arbitrary causes. Theological—that is to say—fictitious. Elsewhere Comte calls this mode of explanation “imaginary” or “mythological.” It is in this sense that he could ask if each one of us did not remember having been in regard to his most important notions, a theologian in his infancy19, a metaphysician in his youth, and a physicist20 in his manhood?14 Comte does not allude21 to the religious traditions which the child receives from his parents, but indeed to the spontaneous tendency which causes him in the first place to explain natural phenomena by wills, and not by laws. Theology is here synonymous with anthropomorphism in the conception of causes.
Similarly Comte does not take the word “metaphysics” in the most usual extension of its meaning. The science of Being as such, the science of Substance or of first Principles, is not here in question, at least directly. He only refers to a certain mode of explaining phenomena given in our experience. For example, in physics, the hypothesis of an ether to explain optical and electrical phenomena is metaphysical. So it is in physiology22 with the hypothesis of a vital principle, or, in psychology23, with the hypothesis of a soul. “Metaphysical or abstract,” says Comte. At bottom this mode of explanation is no other than the preceding one, but more and more pale and colourless, vanishing, so to speak,38 as natural phenomena, better observed, are referred no longer to capricious wills, but to invariable laws.
Let us then be careful not to give here to the words “metaphysics” and “theology” their full meaning. For instance, to conclude from the law of the three States that the evolution of humanity ever carries it further from theology, to end in a final state wherein religion should have no place is singularly to misapprehend Comte’s doctrine24. On the contrary the evolution of humanity is leading it to a state which will be pre-eminently religious. In it religion will regulate the whole life of man. Comte perhaps would not refuse to define man, as has often been done, as a religious animal. The history of humanity may be represented, in a sense, as an evolution which proceeds from primitive26 religion (fetichism) to final religion (positivism). But the object of the law of the three States is not to express the religious evolution of humanity. It is only concerned with the progress of the human intellect. It sets forth5 the successive philosophies which that intelligence has been obliged by turn to adopt in the interpretation of natural phenomena. It is, in a word, the general law of the evolution of thought.
Those who made a mistake about it probably only considered this law in the first lesson of the Cours, where it is separately presented. But the error is no longer possible when one refers to the fourth volume of the Cours, where the law is put in its place, in social dynamics27, especially in the fifty-eighth lesson, in the sixth volume.
It is not, however, without reason that Comte set forth this law in the first pages of his Cours de philosophie positive. In sociology as he conceives it, the law of the intellectual evolution of humanity, that is to say the law of the three States is the essential law of dynamics, and therefore of the whole of social science. For, of all the social factors of which the39 concomitant and joint28 evolution constitutes the progress of humanity, the intellectual factor is the most important. It is the dominant29 one, in the sense that the others depend far more upon it than it does upon them. The history of art, of institutions, of morals, of law, of civilisation30 in general could not be understood without the history of intellectual evolution, that is to say of science and of philosophy, whereas this one, strictly speaking, would still be intelligible31 without the others. This evolution is therefore the principal axis32 around which the other series of social phenomena are arranged. Thus the law which expresses it is the most “fundamental,” the most “general,” in the precise sense in which Comte understands this word. In enunciating this law he declares legitimate33 by anticipation34 the existence of a social science. He proves ipso facto not only that it is possible, but that it already exists. Hence the eminent25 position which he gives to the law of the three states.
II.
The demonstration35 of this law presents itself under two distinct forms. In the first place Comte supports his argument by history. This proves indeed that every branch of our knowledge passes in turn through the three states, with never a single retrogression. It is true that much of our knowledge has not yet reached the positive state. But at any rate it is established that up to the present even those sciences which have not yet reached that state have all described the same curve, already described by those that have reached it.
Historical verification would suffice, if necessary, provided it were complete. Comte is not satisfied with it. He claims moreover to deduce the law of the three states from the nature of man. He will thus give a direct demonstration of it. However useful history may appear to him as an40 instrument of proof, he still wishes to render its verdict intelligible. To reach this end he has recourse to psychology. “We ought,” he says, “carefully to characterise the general motives37, drawn38 from an exact knowledge of human nature, which must have rendered partly inevitable39, partly indispensable, the necessary succession of social phenomena, considered directly with respect to the intellectual development which dominates essentially their chief advance.”15
In the first place, the human mind could only begin to interpret nature by a philosophy of the theological type. For it is the only one which is spontaneously produced, the only one which does not presuppose another. Man at first conceives all activity on the same plan as his own. In order to understand phenomena, he likens them to his own actions, whose mode of production he thinks he apprehends40, because he has the feelings of his own efforts and the consciousness of his own volitions. This anthropomorphic explanation comes so naturally to us that we are always ready to give way to it. Even to-day, if we forget positive discipline for a moment, if we venture to ask for the mode of production of some phenomenon, we immediately dimly imagine an activity more or less like our own. And among the metaphysicians who profess42 to give an idea of God, the most consistent, according to Comte, are those who make a person of Him.
The spontaneity which characterises the theological mode of thought has been extremely useful. Without it, we do not see how man’s intelligence could have begun to unfold itself. For, in order to form a scientific theory, however modest and fragmentary, of natural phenomena, the mind needs previous observations, while, on the other hand, in default of a theory, or at any rate of a preexisting hypothesis, no scientific observation is possible. Absolute empiricism, says Comte, is41 barren, and even, strictly speaking, inconceivable. Simple collections of facts, however numerous we may suppose them to be, do not possess by themselves any scientific significance. Such, for instance, would be the case in the meteorological facts, making interminable lists, and filling volumes. They would only become observations if in collecting them the mind tried to put upon them some interpretation, however vague or precise, real or chimerical43.
Caught between the two equally imperative44 necessities of observing in the first place in order to reach “suitable conceptions”, and of conceiving at the same time some theory in order to make coherent observations, the human mind saves itself by the theological mode of thought. For it has no need of previous observations to imagine everywhere in nature activities similar to its own. Once this hypothesis has arisen, observation comes into play, first to confirm it, but soon to oppose it. From that moment the impulse has been given. The evolution of the sciences and of philosophy will be continued through doctrines45 which will succeed each other in a necessary order.
In the same way, from the moral point of view, a theological philosophy alone could at first inspire weak and ignorant humanity with sufficient courage and confidence to shake off its primitive torpor46. To-day, if man knows that phenomena are subject to invariable laws, he also knows that a knowledge of these laws gives him a certain control over nature. But in the days when man could not foresee the power of science, the idea that phenomena obeyed necessary laws would have filled him with despair. It would probably have paralysed him for all exertion47. The theological mode of thought was far more encouraging since the phenomena are imagined to be arbitrarily modifiable. Anything may happen. Nothing is impossible, neither is anything necessary. The will of the gods suffices for a thing to happen or not to42 happen. Directly, man has no power over nature; indirectly48 he can do everything, provided only that he can propitiate49 the divinities whose will is law. In this way, it is at the moment when man’s impotence is greatest, that his confidence in his own power is the strongest.
Finally, from a social point of view, theological philosophy was indispensable for human society to subsist50 and to be developed. For this society does not merely imply sympathy of feeling and union of interests among its members, but first and above all unanimous adhesion to certain beliefs. Without a “certain system of common preliminary opinions” there can be no human society. But, on the other hand, how can we conceive the appearance of such a system, if social life is not organised? Here is a new vicious circle, out of which the theological philosophy alone can release us. It constitutes at first sight a totality of common beliefs. All the members of the society defend them all the more energetically, because with them are bound up their hopes and their fears, for this world, and for the next, if they already believe in it.
At the same time, this theological philosophy determines the formation, in society, of a special class, consecrated51 to speculative52 activity. What an immense progress this division between practice and theory must have been, however roughly outlined! Such a division was established as soon as a sacerdotal class began to be distinguished53 from the rest of the social body. And how slow this progress must have been, when we see even to-day how hard it is for men to accept any innovation which does not seem to carry with it any immediate41 practical advantage! The sacerdotal class, invested, by the nature of its functions with an authority which was precious for social progress, at the same time enjoyed that leisure which is indispensable for theoretical research. “Without the spontaneous establishment of such a class,” says Comte, “all our activity, thenceforth exclusively practical,43 would have confined itself to the improvement, very soon checked, of some processes having reference to military or industrial life.”16 The subsequent division of labour depended upon this initial step. Our savants, our philosophers, our engineers descend54 from the first priests, sorcerers and rain conjurors.
Thus, given the nature of Man, the theological philosophy was bound to appear spontaneously. This appearance was at the same time “inevitable and indispensable,” in a word, necessary. Immediately begins what one might call the dialectics of the intellectual history of humanity. The theological philosophy has made possible the observation of phenomena. In its turn, this observation introduces the idea of invariable laws into the mind, whereby the theological philosophy begins to be compromised. The time comes when it appears antiquated55 and pernicious and reason tends to take the place of the imagination in the interpretation of nature. The more evolution advances, the more marked becomes the preference of the human mind for the positive mode of thought, and, in the several orders of the sciences, after a more or less prolonged conflict, this latter ends by obtaining the ascendancy56.
As a matter of fact, the theological stage of our knowledge, even when it exercises its greatest dominion57, that is to say, at the time nearest to its origin, already contains the germs of its own decomposition58. It is never perfectly59 homogeneous. There are very common phenomena whose regularity60 man has never failed to recognize, and which he has never conceived as depending upon arbitrary wills. Comte likes to quote a passage from Adam Smith, where that philosopher remarks that in no time and in no country do we find a god of Weight. Moreover, since the existence of society, man must have had some idea of psychological laws since he was obliged to regulate his conduct according to the way in44 which his fellows thought and acted. Consequently “the elementary germ of positive philosophy is quite as primitive, at bottom, as that of theological philosophy, although it could only be developed very much later.”17 Not being universal, theological philosophy could only be provisional. The philosophy, that is to say, the method of interpretation of natural phenomena, will alone be final, which will be applicable to all phenomena without exception, from the most simple to the most complicated. For this philosophy alone will realise the unity demanded by the understanding.
The passage from theological to positive philosophy is never suddenly accomplished61. Their opposition62 is too sharply defined, and our intelligence does not lend itself to such an abrupt63 change. The metaphysical state serves as a transition. This state is distinguished from the two others, in that it has no principle proper which defines it. Theological philosophy is sufficient to itself. It forms a harmonious64 whole, at least so long as the germ of positiveness which it contains has not yet revealed its activity. In the same way, the positive state will be perfectly homogeneous. On the contrary, the metaphysical state is only described by a mixture of the two others. “The metaphysical conceptions,” wrote Comte in 1825, “proceed at the same time from theology and physics, or rather are only the former modified by the latter.”18 Under ever varying and progressively attenuated65 forms, metaphysics procure66 the indispensable conciliation67 in order that the theological and positive philosophies may coexist in men’s minds, so long as the latter is not perfectly worked out. Under cover of metaphysical hypotheses, the scientific method has been able to push its conquests, without greatly alarming the defenders68 of theological philosophy. Thus metaphysical speculation has a very active critical quality. It has not slightly contributed to the decomposition of the ancient system of45 beliefs. In this sense, Comte regards the French philosophers of the XVIII. century, for the most part, as excellent representatives of the metaphysical spirit.
Nevertheless, if we must refer this intermediate stage to one of the two extremes, Comte does not hesitate to approximate it to the theological stage. As a matter of fact, metaphysical philosophy substitutes entities69 to will, and Nature to the Creator, but with a very analogous70 function. It supplies, at bottom, the same “explanation” of the real, although weakened by a stronger and stronger sense of the need of natural laws. This equivocal method preserves theology, “while destroying its principal mental consistency71.” It denies the consequences in the name of the principles. Moreover, it offers no guarantee against an offensive return of theological conceptions, so long as they have not been replaced by positive notions. In the final conflict between the theological spirit, and the positive spirit, the metaphysicians will probably be seen, with the Deists, involved in a retrograde concentration.”19 “Positive philosophy,” says Comte, “has neither historical nor dogmatic solidarity72 with this negative philosophy, and can only contemplate73 it as a final preparatory transformation74 of theological philosophy.”20
Thus the metaphysical stage is never other than an unstable75 compromise. It only lasts on condition that it changes continually. In default of a principle of its own, metaphysical philosophy is purely76 critical in character. As a fact, there are but two philosophies, that is to say two methods, two organic modes of thought. Only theological philosophy and positive philosophy allow the mind to construct a logical and harmonious system of ideas, the basis of a morality and of a religion. The theological spirit is “ideal in its advance, absolute in its conception, arbitrary in its applica46tion.” The positive spirit substitutes the method of observation to that of imagination, relative notions to absolute notions. It does not flatter itself with unlimited77 dominion over the phenomena of nature; it knows that its power is measured by its knowledge. The intellectual history of humanity shows by what stages it has passed from the former mode of thought to the latter.
III.
Comte regards the law of the three stages as demonstrated. “Seventeen years of continuous meditation78 on this great subject,” he writes in 1839, “discussed under all its aspects, and subjected to all possible tests, authorise me to affirm beforehand, without the slightest scientific hesitation79, that we shall always see confirmed this historical proposition, which now seems to me as fully36 demonstrated as any of the general facts actually admitted in the other parts of natural philosophy.”21 It could only be doubted if we found any branch of our knowledge which had gone back from the metaphysical to the theological state, or from the positive state to either of the two preceding states. But this case has never presented itself. The theoretical demonstration of the law has established that it could not present itself.
Indeed this demonstration has shown that the successive advance through the three stages, in invariable order, was the necessary form of progress of the human mind in the knowledge of phenomena. It is founded upon the nature of the mind. In Comte’s thought, the law of the three states could therefore have been equally called psychological or historical.
But we are not here concerned with introspective Psychology, which uses self-consciousness as a means of investigation80. Comte does not recognize any scientific value in this47 method.22 He even denies its possibility. Moreover the observation of a subject by himself, were it possible, would be of no help in the present case. For it would only reveal to him the present state of his individual intellect, and not the law of the evolution of the human mind. For this law to become manifest, we must consider not the individual, but the species. Giving up a fruitless effort at self-contemplation in its activity, the intellect must grasp the law of its successive phases in the progress of what it has produced. The philosophical history of our beliefs, of our conceptions, and of our systems: such is the consciousness which the human intellect can have of itself. There only, the philosopher sees the faculties81 of which this intellect contained the germ coming into play by turns, to reach a “durable harmony.” Then, once discovered, the law of the three States helps us to understand the intellectual evolution of each individual, and the study of the individual then furnishes us with a supplementary82 verification of the law. But, by itself, this study of the individual could not have established it. Whatever utility I may have often derived83 from the consideration of the individual, says Comte, it is evidently to the direct study of the species that I owed, not only the fundamental thought in my theory, but afterwards its specific development.
The law of the three States is then the general formula of the progress of the human intellect, considered not in an individual subject, but in the universal subject, which is humanity.
It is indeed also the “universal subject” that Kant has studied in his Critic of Pure Reason. But Kant’s method is altogether abstract and metaphysical, the universal subject of which he seeks the laws is a human mind “in itself,” considered in its essence. Comte, on the contrary, represents the universal subject as a concrete unity, which realized itself in time. For48 him, the study of the mental functions characteristic of man only becomes positive when it is carried out from an historical and sociological point of view. That is why the discovery of the law of the three States is an event of capital importance. It inaugurates the positive science of humanity, which was an indispensable condition for positive philosophy to be established. It marks the time when, all phenomena being henceforth studied after the same method, the “perfect logical coherence” is definitely assured. This law of social dynamics is the corner-stone of the whole positive system.
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attaining
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的现在分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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ascent
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| n.(声望或地位)提高；上升，升高；登高 | |
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hierarchy
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| n.等级制度；统治集团，领导层 | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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qualified
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| adj.合格的，有资格的，胜任的，有限制的 | |
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unity
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| n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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philosophical
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| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
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formulated
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| v.构想出( formulate的过去式和过去分词 )；规划；确切地阐述；用公式表示 | |
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fictitious
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| adj.虚构的，假设的；空头的 | |
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essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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solely
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| adv.仅仅，唯一地 | |
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destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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speculation
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| n.思索，沉思；猜测；投机 | |
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interpretation
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| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
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infancy
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| n.婴儿期；幼年期；初期 | |
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physicist
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| n.物理学家，研究物理学的人 | |
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allude
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| v.提及，暗指 | |
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physiology
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| n.生理学，生理机能 | |
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psychology
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| n.心理，心理学，心理状态 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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eminent
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| adj.显赫的，杰出的，有名的，优良的 | |
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primitive
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| adj.原始的；简单的；n.原(始)人，原始事物 | |
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dynamics
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| n.力学，动力学，动力，原动力；动态 | |
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joint
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| adj.联合的，共同的；n.关节，接合处；v.连接，贴合 | |
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dominant
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| adj.支配的，统治的；占优势的；显性的；n.主因，要素，主要的人(或物)；显性基因 | |
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civilisation
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| n.文明，文化，开化，教化 | |
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intelligible
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| adj.可理解的，明白易懂的，清楚的 | |
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axis
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| n.轴，轴线，中心线；坐标轴，基准线 | |
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legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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anticipation
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| n.预期，预料，期望 | |
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demonstration
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| n.表明，示范，论证，示威 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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apprehends
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| 逮捕，拘押( apprehend的第三人称单数 )； 理解 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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profess
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| v.声称，冒称，以...为业，正式接受入教，表明信仰 | |
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chimerical
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| adj.荒诞不经的，梦幻的 | |
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imperative
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| n.命令，需要；规则；祈使语气；adj.强制的；紧急的 | |
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doctrines
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| n.教条( doctrine的名词复数 )；教义；学说；（政府政策的）正式声明 | |
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torpor
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| n.迟钝；麻木；（动物的）冬眠 | |
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exertion
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| n.尽力，努力 | |
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indirectly
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| adv.间接地，不直接了当地 | |
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propitiate
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| v.慰解，劝解 | |
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subsist
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| vi.生存，存在，供养 | |
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consecrated
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| adj.神圣的，被视为神圣的v.把…奉为神圣，给…祝圣( consecrate的过去式和过去分词 )；奉献 | |
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speculative
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| adj.思索性的，暝想性的，推理的 | |
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distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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descend
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| vt./vi.传下来，下来，下降 | |
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antiquated
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| adj.陈旧的，过时的 | |
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ascendancy
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| n.统治权，支配力量 | |
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dominion
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| n.统治，管辖，支配权；领土，版图 | |
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decomposition
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| n. 分解, 腐烂, 崩溃 | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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regularity
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| n.规律性，规则性；匀称，整齐 | |
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accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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opposition
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| n.反对，敌对 | |
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abrupt
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| adj.突然的，意外的；唐突的，鲁莽的 | |
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harmonious
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| adj.和睦的，调和的，和谐的，协调的 | |
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attenuated
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| v.（使）变细( attenuate的过去式和过去分词 )；（使）变薄；（使）变小；减弱 | |
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procure
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| vt.获得，取得，促成；vi.拉皮条 | |
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conciliation
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| n.调解，调停 | |
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defenders
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| n.防御者( defender的名词复数 )；守卫者；保护者；辩护者 | |
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entities
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| 实体对像； 实体，独立存在体，实际存在物( entity的名词复数 ) | |
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analogous
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| adj.相似的；类似的 | |
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consistency
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| n.一贯性，前后一致，稳定性；(液体的)浓度 | |
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solidarity
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| n.团结；休戚相关 | |
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contemplate
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| vt.盘算，计议；周密考虑；注视，凝视 | |
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transformation
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| n.变化；改造；转变 | |
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unstable
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| adj.不稳定的，易变的 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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unlimited
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| adj.无限的，不受控制的，无条件的 | |
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meditation
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| n.熟虑，（尤指宗教的）默想，沉思，（pl.）冥想录 | |
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hesitation
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| n.犹豫，踌躇 | |
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investigation
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| n.调查，调查研究 | |
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faculties
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| n.能力( faculty的名词复数 )；全体教职员；技巧；院 | |
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supplementary
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| adj.补充的，附加的 | |
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derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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