Mr. H. Spencer has taken occasion of this definition to criticise3 the place assigned by Comte to astronomy in his classification of the sciences. He makes him contradict himself. He says: you term fundamental sciences the abstract sciences which do not study beings in nature, but the laws which govern phenomena in those beings; by what right is astronomy placed among these sciences, between mathematics and physics? Is not the object of astronomy the study of certain beings in nature? In what does the application of mathematics to celestial phenomena differ from their application to other cases? It appears evident that here Comte introduces into the series of abstract sciences a science which is really concrete, or at least, according to Mr. Spencer’s expression, abstract-concrete.
Comte had foreseen the objection. The answer which he makes throws a strong light upon the sense in which he understands the words “abstract” and “general” as applied4 to the sciences. He partly accepts the objection. The143 true astronomical5 notions, he says, only differ from purely6 mathematical notions by their special restriction7 to the celestial case; and this, at first sight, must appear contrary to the essentially8 abstract nature of the speculations9 which belong to the first philosophy. But on the other hand, these speculations bear upon the phenomena given in experience, and the order of the abstract sciences should reproduce the real order of dependence11 of the phenomena. Thus the first of these sciences, mathematics, determines the essential laws of the most general phenomena, which are common to all material beings (form, position, movement). Now, are not the most general phenomena after these, those “of which the the continuous ascendency inevitably12 dominates the course of all the other phenomena?”117 In other words, before passing to the study of physical, chemical, biological phenomena, etc., it is indispensable to know the general laws of the milieu13 in which these phenomena are manifested. Outside of this milieu, they would be impossible, or at any rate, it so conditions them that, were it otherwise, these phenomena would also be different from what they are.
The character of generality which, with that of abstraction, is made use of to institute the hierarchy14 of phenomena is thus reduced to the idea of dependence. It is the consideration of this dependence which assigns to astronomy its place between mathematics and physics in the encyclop?dic ladder of the sciences. Considered singly in themselves, the phenomena studied by astronomy are purely geometrical and mechanical. They would not, therefore, constitute the object of a science distinct from mathematics. But positive philosophy considers everything from the point of view of humanity. Now, for humanity, this “special case” is of unequalled importance. All the other phenomena given to us by experience (except the mathematical phenomena)144 depend, in a more or less direct manner, upon astronomical phenomena. The knowledge of astronomical laws is therefore the necessary condition for the knowledge of all the others. Thus, the infringement15 of the principle of the hierarchy of fundamental sciences is only apparent. An analogous16 case is found in chemistry. The analysis of air and water is incorporated in abstract chemistry, because air and water constitutes the general milieu, “in which all ulterior phenomena occur.”118
The place given to astronomy is therefore justified17. This science, moreover, remains18 abstract. For it to be a concrete science, all aspects of the existence of celestial bodies would have to be studied and considered in their relations, to each other in it. But, on the contrary, astronomy only studies the geometrical and mechanical phenomena in the celestial bodies, all physical and chemical considerations, etc., being eliminated. Comte concludes that in passing on to the celestial case mathematics does not lose its abstract nature. It only becomes more developed in the case of a special example, whose extreme importance demands such a specialisation.
The abstract character of astronomy belongs to it almost a priori. The facts upon which it rests are only revealed to us by one of our senses, the most intellectual of them indeed, but by which we are only informed of the mathematical properties of bodies. Our eyes alone touch the stars. There is no astronomy for a blind race. Dark stars, if such there be, are for ever hidden from us. All that is given to us, therefore, is the shape, the position and the motion of visible celestial bodies. We can never by any means know how to study their chemical composition, nor their mineral structure, nor a fortiori the nature of the organic bodies which may live upon them. Comte might have formulated19 in less categorical terms affirmations which were145 soon to be contradicted by spectral20 analysis and by photography. But he was confirmed in the entirely21 abstract and mathematical conception which he had of astronomy by his persuasion22 that no discoveries of so far-reaching a nature were possible.
Thus, astronomy appeared to be an excellent type of a positive science, because it is at once natural and abstract, and in it these two characteristics are equally apparent, which was not the case in mathematics. In this science the share of observation is so limited, so transient, that it becomes inappreciable. In astronomy, on the contrary, determination of certain facts evidently plays a part in the science. But, at the same time, nowhere do we see more clearly that science does not consist in the mere23 apprehension24 of facts. Here they are so simple, and moreover so uninteresting, that their connexion and the knowledge of their laws alone deserves the name of science. In general, what is an astronomical fact? None other than this: such a star has been seen at such a precise instant, and under such an angle duly measured. The more or less profound elaboration of these observations is indispensable to science, even in its most imperfect state. Astronomy, says Comte, did not really come into being when the priests of Egypt or Chaldea made a series of more or less exact empirical observations in the heavens; but only when the first Greek philosophers began to reduce the general phenomenon of diurnal25 motion to a few geometrical laws.119
Of all the natural sciences, after mathematics, astronomy is also the most perfectly26 free from all theological and metaphysical considerations. From every point of view it is positive. Astronomers27 no longer have recourse to a Providence29, which as the intelligent cause of the order of the celestial world, would in its turn, witness to the existence of this cause. They do not inquire any more146 into the intimate nature of forces (gravitation, attraction, etc.). Astronomy is content to determine the invariable relations of phenomena with the greatest possible precision. It is here that philosophical30 minds can study the essential characteristics of a positive science. In it they will also see how disinterested31 it must be in order to become useful. “Without the highest speculations of geometers upon celestial mechanics, which have so greatly increased the precision of astronomical tables, it would be impossible to determine the longitude32 of a ship with the degree of accuracy which is now attainable34.”120
Finally no science has exercised a greater influence upon the evolution of the human mind than this one. The great epochs in astronomy are also those in cosmological philosophy. The desperate resistance which was offered by theological dogmatism to Galileo’s discovery responded to a just apprehension of the consequences involved in this discovery. To admit that the earth was not the centre of the world was to take a first and a decisive step in the way which leads away from the anthropocentric prejudice. It was like pledging oneself to substitute sooner or later the relative point of view to the absolute one in philosophy. It was introducing the positive spirit, to-day in speculative35 physics, to-morrow in speculative ethics36.
II.
Although astronomy is an “eminently mathematical” science, the method of working by observation is used in it. The astronomer28 observes before calculating, and he observes again after having calculated. The art of observation for which there is no use in mathematics appears here then, and, with it, the inductive method.
Indeed there is no “absolute separation” between observ147ing and reasoning.121 The mind does not first observe facts in a receptive or “passive” manner, in order to work out combinations of these facts afterwards. In reality every observation is a combination, and this is particularly true in astronomical observation. The facts which we observe are really constructed. We can only see simultaneous or successive directions, according to which the mind must construct the form or the movement which the eye could not take in. The necessary and constant association “between prevision and inspection” is more intimate and more evident here than in any other science.
In the same way, hypothesis (which is inseparable from observation) can be studied in astronomy in its most simple form. Here it is presented in its clearest aspect, and, if one may say so, in the one which most reveals its essential nature. Now, hypothesis in astronomy “serves to fill up the necessary gaps in observation.” It provisionally supplements the knowledge—not indeed of causes, for positive science seeks nothing of this kind—but of facts and laws which we ignore. For instance, the simple geometrical sketch37 of a diurnal motion would remain impossible without an abstract hypothesis which being compared with the concrete spectacle presented by the movement itself enables us to connect together the various celestial positions. Modern astronomy, which has destroyed primitive38 assumptions regarded as real laws of the world, has maintained their permanent value for conveniently representing phenomena provisionally. And, as we are not deceived as to the reality of such assumptions we can use without scruple39 any one which seems to us most advantageous40.122
The use of hypothesis, as it is employed in astronomy, must be carried into the other sciences. This mode of procedure everywhere remains like to itself, although we do not148 always conceive it so clearly. “Its normal domain41 coincides with that of observation.” An hypothesis completes by anticipation42 what we know of facts and of their laws. Consequently, it is subject to be modified, corrected, or contradicted by a wider or deeper knowledge of facts. Hypotheses then are only valid43 during the time when they are advantageous, that is to say, as long as they serve to unite and co-ordinate our observations. As has been said, they labour to render themselves useless. But they are indispensable, and science, without them, could neither advance nor even begin. Far from giving too small a share to hypothesis, like Bacon, Comte would rather incur44 the reproof45 of having given it too large a one. He made too much use of it himself at the end of his life. But the theory which he gave of it in the Cours de philosophie positive and of which certain features appeal again in Claude Bernard’s Introduction a l’étude de la médecine experiméntale, was a careful study of its nature and function.
III.
Astronomy, or at least that part of astronomy which bears the name of celestial mechanics, of all the physical sciences is the one which has been carried to the highest degree of perfection. Nowhere else have the phenomena been better reduced to a supreme46 law which allows us to foresee them with sufficient precision. But this result could only have been obtained by substituting the notion of a solar world to that of a universe.123 This world is the only one which we can comprehend as a system. If the object of astronomy were the general laws of the universe, this science would be extraordinarily47 imperfect, not to say impossible. For what do we know about cosmic laws?124 We do not even know whether Newton’s law applies to any or all systems of stars.
149
We must then distinguish between astronomy as the science of our world and sidereal48 astronomy. The latter is not absolutely forbidden us, but we know very little on this subject, and we shall probably never know much more. Do the innumerable suns scattered49 in space form a general system, or do independent systems exist? Is space limitless? Is the number of celestial bodies an infinite one? philosophers ask. In truth the consideration of our world is positive. The consideration of the universe is not.
History helps us to understand the transition which led from one to the other. Ancient philosophy made the earth the centre of the universe. Notwithstanding the diversity of their particular characteristics and of their motions, it was natural then for all the celestial bodies to be conceived as the parts of a single system. A more or less clearly expressed postulate50 supported this astronomical conception: the purpose of the universe was the existence of man. There was no occasion to distinguish our world from the whole world. But could this conception stand when the earth was reduced to the condition of a planet revolving51 round a sun so like a multitude of other suns. Suddenly the stars were carried to distances infinitely52 more considerable than the greatest planetary intervals53. Undoubtedly54 the human mind could continue to regard the very small groups of which the earth forms a part as a system. But the system (if it exists) which embraces the whole of the celestial bodies ceased henceforth to be within our reach. Since then “the notion of the world has become clear and habitual55, and that of the universe has become uncertain and almost unintelligible56.”125
It matters little, moreover, for, according to one of Comte’s favourite maxims57, what we have no means of knowing, neither have we any need to know; and every thing which it is150 our interest to learn we can also attain33. Nor should we see in this any providential harmony. That which it is our interest to know must always in some way influence the conditions of our existence. By the mere fact that this action makes itself felt, it is inevitable58 that sooner or later, directly or indirectly59, we should come to know of it. This reflection can be well applied to astronomy. The study of the laws of the solar system, of which we form a part, is of supreme interest for us: and we have reached very great precision on this point. On the contrary, the exact notion of the universe is inaccessible60 to us; but it is unimportant to us leaving out of the question our “insatiable curiosity.” The independence of our world is certain. The phenomena which take place within the solar system do not appear to be affected61 by the more general phenomena which relate to the mutual62 action of suns. Our tables of celestial events, drawn63 up long beforehand and taking into consideration no other world than our own, so far accord strictly64 with direct observations. Supposing the law of gravitation to extend to the entire universe, the perturbation in our world caused by a mass equal to a million times its own, and which would be situated65 at the distance of the nearest sun to our own, would be several thousand million times less than that which brings about our tides, that is to say practically nil66.
Here, says Comte, is the only exception to the encyclop?dic law according to which the more general phenomena control the more particular ones without being influenced by them.126 From this he simply concludes that the phenomena of our system are the most general to which positive research can extend, and that the study of the universe must henceforth be excluded from natural philosophy. The encyclop?dic law then remains true for the whole of positive philosophy.
151
The delimitation of the object of astronomy is one of the points where we can best follow the successive modifications67 of Comte’s thought. In the second volume of the Cours de philosophie positive he gave to astronomy the place which is generally conceded to it by scientific men. He even claims, as a condition for its utility, the most perfect disinterestedness68 of scientific research in the whole extent of its province. The example which he gives of it (the determination of longitude at sea), is borrowed from Condorcet. Undoubtedly, Comte already insists upon the distinction between the ideas of world and universe, the former only being positive. Nevertheless, he still admits that we should not give up all hope of obtaining some sidereal knowledge,127 and that it would be very precious for us to know the relative motions of multiple stars, etc. But already in the sixth volume of the Cours he condemns69 entirely the “so-called sidereal astronomy, which to-day constitutes the only grave scientific aberration70 peculiar71 to celestial studies.”128 Ten years later, in the first volume of the Politique positive, he “regenerates” astronomy from the synthetic72 point of view. He is no longer content to limit it to the knowledge of the solar system. He confines the particular study of our world within narrow limits. Astronomy, like the other sciences, from objective must become subjective73. Instead of the vague (that is to say indefinite) study of the heavens its end must be the knowledge of the earth, and the consideration of the other celestial bodies only in their relation to the human planet. At this price alone can the unity74 of this science be secured.129
Thus Comte came back to Aristotle’s closed world with the earth as its centre. He points it out himself in showing in what way he differs from the ancient conception. “This unity,” he says, “existed for the ancients, but was of an absolute character which at that time was legitimate75.” When the152 motion of our planet became known, the ancient constitution of celestial science might merely have been modified “by preserving in it, as subjective, the centre which was at first supposed to be objective.” That would have sufficed to change astronomy from an absolute science to a relative one. Undoubtedly the ancients were deceived in believing the earth to be the centre of the world; but, in order to correct their error, it sufficed to say, the centre of our world. The subjective synthesis “indeed concentrates the celestial studies round the earth.” The other stars only deserve our attention in so far as the knowledge of our planet requires it. Comte ends by saying in the fourth volume of the Politique positive that, strictly speaking, the study of the sun and moon would suffice. We may add to them the ancient planets, but not the “little telescopic planets.”130
This progressive narrowing of the astronomical domain does not indicate a radical76 change in Comte’s philosophical thought. It only results from the growing subordination of the scientific interest to other superior interests. To know for the sake of knowing, appears to Comte to be a wrong use of the human intellect. The Newtons and the Laplaces in the past have fulfilled a necessary function, and humanity owes them eternal gratitude77. They struck a decisive blow against theological and metaphysical philosophy; and secured the victory for the positive spirit. In their time scientific speculation10 which tended to the discovery of the laws of phenomena, and especially of celestial phenomena, was at once the most sublime78 and the most useful occupation which those men of genius could set themselves. But now that their efforts have culminated79 in the foundation of positive philosophy, and this philosophy itself in the “final religion,” there is no longer any reason to continue researches with which henceforth humanity can dispense80. We must even “cut down many idle acquisitions.”131153 In a word, from the religious point of view, Comte, in order to remedy the anarchy81 of science, suppresses its liberty.
These extreme, but logically deduced consequences, are part of the whole of Comte’s religious conceptions, that is to say of a distant ideal. They must not blind us to the profundity82 of his philosophical considerations on astronomy. His reflections upon the relation between the ideas of the world and of the universe correspond, from the positive point of view, to the first antinomy of the transcendental Dialectics in the Critique de la raison pure. Can we ever be more fully83 conscious of the relativity of our knowledge, that when we see that what we know of celestial phenomena is admirably precise so long as the solar system is concerned, but is reduced to almost nothing if we look beyond it?
Our world will perish, and its disappearance84 like its existence, will perhaps be an imperceptible incident. By the continued resistance of the general milieu, says Comte, in the end our world must be re-united to the solar mass from which it came, until, in the immensity of future ages, a fresh dilatation of this mass shall organise85 a new world in the same manner, destined86 to repeat more or less completely the former cycle. Moreover, all these immense alternatives of destruction and of renewal87 have to be accomplished88 without influencing in any way the more general phenomena due to solar interaction; so that the great revolutions in our world would only be secondary and, so to speak, local events, in relation to transformations89 of a really universal character.132
This outlook into the “immensity” of space and of duration suffices to show that Comte was not a prisoner in the little solar fatherland in which he seems to seclude90 himself. It may be that for moral and religious reasons he will not allow himself to go beyond it. But, like Pascal, he well knows that he inhabits “a little out of the way district of nature.”
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1
phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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celestial
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| adj.天体的；天上的 | |
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criticise
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| v.批评，评论；非难 | |
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applied
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| adj.应用的；v.应用，适用 | |
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astronomical
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| adj.天文学的，（数字）极大的 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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restriction
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| n.限制，约束 | |
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essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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speculations
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| n.投机买卖( speculation的名词复数 )；思考；投机活动；推断 | |
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speculation
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| n.思索，沉思；猜测；投机 | |
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dependence
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| n.依靠，依赖；信任，信赖；隶属 | |
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inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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milieu
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| n.环境；出身背景；(个人所处的)社会环境 | |
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hierarchy
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| n.等级制度；统治集团，领导层 | |
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infringement
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| n.违反；侵权 | |
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analogous
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| adj.相似的；类似的 | |
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justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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formulated
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| v.构想出( formulate的过去式和过去分词 )；规划；确切地阐述；用公式表示 | |
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spectral
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| adj.幽灵的，鬼魂的 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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persuasion
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| n.劝说；说服；持有某种信仰的宗派 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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apprehension
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| n.理解，领悟；逮捕，拘捕；忧虑 | |
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diurnal
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| adj.白天的，每日的 | |
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perfectly
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astronomers
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| n.天文学者，天文学家( astronomer的名词复数 ) | |
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astronomer
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| n.天文学家 | |
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providence
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| n.深谋远虑，天道，天意；远见；节约；上帝 | |
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philosophical
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| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
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disinterested
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| adj.不关心的，不感兴趣的 | |
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longitude
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| n.经线，经度 | |
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attain
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| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
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attainable
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| a.可达到的，可获得的 | |
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speculative
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| adj.思索性的，暝想性的，推理的 | |
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ethics
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| n.伦理学；伦理观，道德标准 | |
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sketch
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| n.草图；梗概；素描；v.素描；概述 | |
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primitive
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| adj.原始的；简单的；n.原(始)人，原始事物 | |
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scruple
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| n./v.顾忌，迟疑 | |
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advantageous
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| adj.有利的；有帮助的 | |
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domain
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| n.(活动等)领域，范围；领地，势力范围 | |
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anticipation
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valid
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| adj.有确实根据的；有效的；正当的，合法的 | |
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incur
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| vt.招致，蒙受，遭遇 | |
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reproof
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| n.斥责，责备 | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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extraordinarily
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| adv.格外地；极端地 | |
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sidereal
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| adj.恒星的 | |
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scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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postulate
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| n.假定，基本条件；vt.要求，假定 | |
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revolving
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| adj.旋转的，轮转式的；循环的v.（使）旋转( revolve的现在分词 )；细想 | |
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infinitely
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| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
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intervals
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| n.[军事]间隔( interval的名词复数 )；间隔时间；[数学]区间；（戏剧、电影或音乐会的）幕间休息 | |
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undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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habitual
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| adj.习惯性的；通常的，惯常的 | |
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unintelligible
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| adj.无法了解的，难解的，莫明其妙的 | |
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maxims
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| n.格言，座右铭( maxim的名词复数 ) | |
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inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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indirectly
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| adv.间接地，不直接了当地 | |
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inaccessible
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| adj.达不到的，难接近的 | |
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affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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mutual
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| adj.相互的，彼此的；共同的，共有的 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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situated
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| adj.坐落在...的，处于某种境地的 | |
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nil
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| n.无，全无，零 | |
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modifications
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| n.缓和( modification的名词复数 )；限制；更改；改变 | |
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disinterestedness
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condemns
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| v.（通常因道义上的原因而）谴责( condemn的第三人称单数 )；宣判；宣布…不能使用；迫使…陷于不幸的境地 | |
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aberration
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| n.离开正路，脱离常规，色差 | |
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peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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synthetic
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| adj.合成的，人工的；综合的；n.人工制品 | |
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subjective
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| a.主观(上)的，个人的 | |
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unity
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| n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调 | |
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legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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radical
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| n.激进份子，原子团，根号；adj.根本的，激进的，彻底的 | |
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gratitude
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| adj.感激，感谢 | |
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sublime
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| adj.崇高的，伟大的；极度的，不顾后果的 | |
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culminated
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| v.达到极点( culminate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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dispense
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| vt.分配，分发；配(药)，发(药)；实施 | |
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anarchy
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| n.无政府状态；社会秩序混乱，无秩序 | |
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profundity
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| n.渊博；深奥，深刻 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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disappearance
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| n.消失，消散，失踪 | |
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organise
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| vt.组织，安排，筹办 | |
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destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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renewal
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| adj.(契约)延期，续订，更新，复活，重来 | |
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accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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transformations
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| n.变化( transformation的名词复数 )；转换；转换；变换 | |
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seclude
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| vi.使隔离，使孤立，使隐退 | |
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