To speak only of physics in the first place, this science presents different characteristics from those of astronomy. The speculative8 perfection of a science is measured by two correlative although distinct considerations, by the more or less complete co-ordination of the laws, and by the more or less accurate prevision of facts. Now, under one aspect or the155 other, even supposing that physics should make very important progress, it will always remain very much behind astronomy. Indeed, the celestial9 science presents an almost perfect unity10; physics, on the contrary, is composed of several branches which are almost isolated11 from one another, and each one taken by itself cannot even reduce all its laws to a more general law. And, as to the second point, while a very small number of direct observations allows of rational and exact prevision of the whole of the celestial phenomena, physics only renders possible predictions which are generally founded upon experience at once immediate13 and within easy reach. Undoubtedly14 some parts of physics allow of the use of mathematical analysis (we shall see presently under what conditions). Nevertheless, the part played by experience is infinitely15 greater in physics than in astronomy. So it is in the former science that we first meet with the inductive method, which is afterwards used and developed in the other positive sciences. Although deduction16 continues to fulfil an important part, it already ceases to predominate here, because, says Comte, in it the institution of true principles begins to become more troublesome than the development of accurate consequences.134
The inductive method implies these essential processes; 1° observation properly so called, that is to say the direct examination of the phenomenon such as it appears naturally: 2° experimenting, which is usually defined as the examination of the phenomenon more or less modified by artificial circumstances instituted by us in order to study it better; 3° comparison, that is to say the gradual consideration of a succession of analogous17 cases, in which the phenomenon becomes more and more simple. Of these three processes astronomy only makes use of the first. Physics cannot use the third which is reserved for biology; but it avails itself of the first and institutes the second. This is a fresh confirmation18 of the law156 established by Comte: to the complexity19 and increasing difficulty of the sciences, corresponds an increasing development of the processes of the positive method applicable to them.
Research by way of experiment, which is impossible in Astronomy, appears in Physics. It is therefore here where it originates that we must study it. It is also here that it is most successful, and gives the greatest number of results. Indeed, to experiment successfully we must be able to compare two cases “which present no other difference direct or indirect, than that which relates to the course of the phenomenon under analysis.”135 By experimenting, Comte here clearly designates what John Stuart Mill will call the method of difference, that is to say the most powerful of his methods for the investigation20 of phenomena.
Now, experimenting, so understood, is extremely difficult when very complicated phenomena are concerned. In physiology21, for instance, the experiments must be combined in such a way as to maintain the subjects in the living state, and even, as far as possible, in the normal state. But any modification22 of one part of the organism immediately affects the other parts. The living being reacts instantly, and adapts itself as best it can to the new conditions in which it has been placed by the experimentalist. We can therefore hardly ever establish in physiology what is so easily obtained in physics: two cases exactly similar in all respects, except in the one which we want to analyse. In chemistry, it is true, experimenting would seem to be even easier than in physics, since in it, as a rule, we merely consider facts resulting from circumstances which are produced by man’s intervention24. But this is to mistake the nature of the experimental method. The essence of this process does not consist in man’s institution of the circumstances surrounding the phenomena; it lies in the157 “freest possible choice of the case best suited to show the law of the phenomenon,” whether this case be, moreover, natural or artificial. Now, this choice is nearly always easier in physics than in chemistry. For the chemical phenomena more complex in themselves, in general can only be brought about by the co-operation of a great number of different influences; for this reason in chemistry, it is more difficult to modify the circumstances under which phenomena are produced, and still more difficult to isolate12 as completely as in physics the various conditions by which phenomena are determined25.
To the use of the experimental method, physics can often join that of mathematical analysis. But in the employment of the latter it must be extremely cautious, and we must only have recourse to this application of mathematics after having “carefully considered the reality of the starting point,” which alone can guarantee the solidity of the deductions26. In a word, the spirit proper to physical investigation, must constantly direct the use of this powerful instrument. Now, this condition has not always been fulfilled. Too often the preponderance of mathematical analysis has been the cause of the neglect of experimental studies. Not only has mathematical analysis in this way retarded27 the progress of physics but it has even tended to vitiate the conception of that science, and to bring it back to a state of obscurity and uncertainty28 which, says Comte, notwithstanding the apparent severity of the forms differs little, at bottom, from its old metaphysical state.136
For this reason, the application of analysis to physics must not be left to geometers who are chiefly concerned with the instrument. It must belong to the physicists29 who before all things consider the use to be made of it. Mathematicians31 have often encumbered32 physics with a quantity of analytical158 labour founded upon very doubtful hypothesis; they must give way to physicists trained in experimental studies, and, nevertheless, with sufficient knowledge of mathematics to make use of the analysis whenever it is possible. Within these limits mathematical analysis will render the greatest service to the science of physics. Would optics, acoustics34, the theories of heat and of electricity have reached the point where we see them to-day without the powerful help of analysis? Yet even here, physical researches are almost always so complex that, in order to assume a mathematical form, they demand the setting aside of a more or less essential portion of the conditions of the problem. Indeed we are here in presence of the general problem of the translation of the concrete into the abstract. This problem, which is admirably solved in mathematics, and sufficiently35 in astronomy, is only imperfectly solved in physics. The art of closely combining experience and analysis, says Comte, is still almost unknown. It constitutes the final progress of the method proper to the deeper study of physics.137 We may add, and this is in Comte’s mind, that conversely the progress made by this art would be useful to analysis itself.
II.
Astronomy has reached a perfect state of “positivity.” All trace of the metaphysical spirit has disappeared from it. Can we say as much of physics? It would not seem so, when we see the hypotheses which play so great a part in this science, and of which a few are keenly contested by Comte.
How can we distinguish the valuable hypotheses from the useless ones, those which are useful to physics from those which are merely an encumbrance37 and should be rejected? This is not a question which can be solved by referring to159 abstract rules. In order to answer it, we must study the use of hypotheses where it is perfect, and decide according to this example. To my mind, says Comte, the deeper study of the art of hypotheses in astronomy can alone establish the rules which are suitable to direct the use of this precious artifice38 in physics, and more so still in the remainder of natural philosophy.138 Now of what use is it to astronomers39? To anticipate the results of deduction or of induction40, “by making a provisional supposition concerning some of the very notions which constitute the final object of the research.” It is a process of which the methods of approximation used by geometers originally suggested the general idea. They “supposed” that the circumference41 was the limit of the perimeters42 of inscribed43 and circumscribed44 polygons the number of whose sides went on increasing. In the same way, hypotheses provisionally fill up the “lacun?” of our knowledge.
An hypothesis should always be open to a positive verification, “whose degree of precision is in harmony with that of the corresponding phenomena.” For it only expresses beforehand what experience and reasoning might have made known immediately, if the circumstances of the problem had been more favourable45. If, therefore, an hypothesis claimed to attain46 that which in its nature is inaccessible47 to observation and to reasoning, it would immediately become illegitimate and harmful. In a word, it must bear exclusively upon laws, and never upon causes or the modes of production of phenomena.
In the physics of his own time Comte finds the two kinds of hypotheses, but he also finds more bad hypotheses than good ones. He especially protests against the ethers and the fluids to which the phenomena of heat, light, electricity and magnetism48 were attributed. These hypotheses, according to160 him, are destined49 to disappear from science. It is true that the physicists deny that they attribute an objective reality to their ethers and their fluids. They claim to need them absolutely in order to facilitate the conception and the combination of phenomena. However, in spite of themselves, they are drawn50 into speaking of their ethers as if they really existed. Moreover, do they not see that astronomy gets on very well without similar hypotheses? In order to conceive the phenomena it is enough to observe and analyse them attentively51. And, as to combining them, that depends upon the knowledge which has been obtained of their positive relations.
The corpuscular theory is, on the contrary, an example of a good hypothesis in physics, where it plays a part analogous to that of the inertia52 of bodies in mechanics.139 The innermost structure of bodies is unknown to us. But we have a right to introduce all the hypotheses which can help us in our research, and in particular the hypothesis of atoms, so long as we do not understand it as something representing a reality.
The ethers and the fluids tend to “explain” the physical phenomena by the nature of the agent which produces them. It is here that these hypotheses bear the mark of the metaphysical spirit. To understand the appearance and especially the persistence53 of these hypotheses, it is not enough to consider them in themselves. We must get back to the history of physics, and compare it with that of the other fundamental sciences. Was it possible for physics to pass suddenly from the period in which phenomena are referred to causes and essences, to the positive period where they are conceived as simply subject to laws? A period of transition was necessary. The scholastic54 entities55, before disappearing, became semi-materialised. They were transformed into fluids. What is heat conceived as existing apart from a hot body, light inde161pendent of a luminous56 body, electricity separated from an electric body? They are the old entities in a new garment, more easily grasped, in spite of their “equivocal corporeity.” They gradually lead to the more and more exclusive consideration of phenomena and of laws, until, in their turn, they disappear.
Astronomy went through the same phases before Physics. In it we have also seen hypotheses which cannot be verified come to facilitate the transition from the theological to the positive state. Such was the conception of Descartes who explained the celestial motions by the system of vortices. Those famous vortices introduced the idea of a mechanism57 where Kepler himself had only dared to conceive the incomprehensible action of souls and genii. Then Newton came, who preserved the idea of mechanism, while giving up the vortices. In vain did the Cartesians fight against his entirely58 positive conception. Their arguments in favour of fluids and ethers were as plausible59 as those of the physicists of our own time. But we have ceased to listen to them. Having become entirely positive, astronomy no longer seeks anything but the laws at work in the phenomena observed. Every accessory hypothesis aiming at anything else has no further interest for us.
The most advanced portions of physics have already reached this point. Take, for instance, the study of gravitation. There was not perhaps a single scientific man of any importance in the XVII. century, even long after Galileo, who did not construct or adopt a system concerning the fall of bodies. At that time any science on this subject seemed impossible without a hypothesis of this kind. Who troubles himself with it to-day? We may be allowed to think that the other parts of physics will follow the same line, and that in turn they will conform to this rule of the positive method: “Every hypothesis must bear exclusively upon the laws of phenomena, and never upon their modes of production.”
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III.
In the series of the fundamental sciences Chemistry appears to fill a somewhat secondary and subordinate place. In it the positive method is not enriched by any process of capital importance, but it confines itself to developing the processes already made use of in physics. In spite of appearances, even experimenting is less easy and less fertile in chemistry than in physics. The only new process which we see appearing is the art of nomenclature. Whenever we wish to study this art “at its source” we shall have to refer to chemistry.140
The phenomena which it studies are the most complicated of the inorganic world. If then physics is extremely imperfect, it is not surprising that chemistry should be much more so. In the greater number of its researches “the chemistry of the present day hardly deserves the name of science.”141 But this inferiority of chemistry is not only due to the nature of its object. There are other causes which it would be easier to remedy. The progress of chemistry is retarded: 1, by the wrong direction given to much of its work up to the present time; 2, by the defective60 education of the majority of the scientific men who give themselves to its study.
Before all things, chemists lack a clear and rational idea of their science, of its relation to the sciences which stand nearest to it and the way in which its problems should be stated. Being intermediate between physics and biology, chemistry has suffered from the vicinity of both. As the more advanced sciences always have a marked tendency to encroach upon those above them, chemistry must in the first place defend itself against the ascendency of physics, as physics itself must fight against that of mathematics. The chemist must undoubtedly have studied physics, in order to make use of the results obtained by this science, and to turn them, if he163 can, into a method for his own use. The relation of these two sciences is very close, and a knowledge of the laws of calorific and electric phenomena, for instance, is of the highest importance for chemical research. But, for all this, the chemist has his own point of view. He studies, (which the physicist30 does not do), the laws of the phenomena of composition and decomposition61 which are the result of the molecular and specific action of diverse natural or artificial substances upon each other. He must therefore make use of physics, but not subordinate himself to it.
On the other hand physiological62 research is not within the province of chemistry. What has been called “biological chemistry” belongs, according to Comte, to biology alone. For the physiologist63 to have gone through the school of chemistry is natural and even indispensable. But his point of view is quite different from that of the chemist. As a matter of fact, chemists have shown themselves unqualified for physiological studies. None of their numerous attempts have succeeded in establishing a single point of general doctrine64, in biology. They merely furnished materials. Moreover these cannot be used just as they are by the physiologist, who is obliged to take up the researches again “under the preponderating65 influence of biological considerations.” Comte admires the self-confidence of the chemists who approach physiological questions without having measured or even suspected the special difficulties. It is, however, clear that the most carefully made chemical analyses must be fruitless here so long as they are not directed in the first place by a precise physiological notion of the whole of the phenomenon, and then modified by the knowledge of the limits of the normal variations to which the phenomena may be liable. Now, for proceeding66 in this manner, the physiologists67 alone are competent.142
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Analogous considerations lead Comte to reject even organic chemistry. Although the chemical phenomena present characteristics which in the inorganic world come nearest to the solidarity68 which subsists69 between the elements of living forms, nevertheless chemical phenomena remains70 irreducible to living phenomena. That which is chemical is not yet organic; and that which is organic is no longer purely71 chemical. We must do away with this heterogenous and fictitious72 grouping which is called organic chemistry, to unite the different parts, according to their respective nature, some to chemistry proper, the others to biology.143
How can we define the object of this science, so imperfectly determined at the present time? Comte knows that he is about to depart from the methods generally in use among chemists, but he is not afraid of this. For, he says, in order to understand the real nature of a science, we must always suppose it to be perfect.144 As chemistry, is in an extreme state of imperfection, the “scientific type” which the philosopher conceives respecting it will appear to be very far removed from what exists at present. It matters little so long as this type is perfectly36 “rational.”
What is essential to science is the possibility of foreseeing phenomena. Given the characteristic properties of the simple or complex substances placed in chemical relations with each other under well defined circumstances, the object of chemistry will therefore be to determine exactly in what their action will consist, and what will be the properties of the new substances produced.145 According to this definition, the fundamental data of chemistry should be ultimately, reducible to the knowledge of the essential properties of the simple elements alone, which would lead to that of the various immediate chemical substances, and consequently to the most complex165 and distant combinations. Obviously, the study of simple bodies can only be made by means of experiments, which alone reveal their properties. But, once this basis is laid down, “all the other chemical phenomena, notwithstanding their immense variety, should be capable of rational solutions, according to a small number of invariable laws, established by the science of chemistry for the various classes of combinations.”
Thus, Comte sees clearly that the complexity of the chemical phenomena prevents us from expressing their relations in a form which allows of the use of mathematical analysis. But none the less, in this science as in the preceding ones, he persists in making the experimental method a mere23 starting-point. The experimental method furnishes the data which it alone can supply. But these data are afterwards elaborated without its intervention. The scientific ideal in chemistry, as in physics and in astronomy, is to substitute as much as possible rational prevision to experimental verification. Science always seeks to deduce the greatest number of consequences from the smallest number of data, and the smallest number of data in this case are the properties of simple bodies. Deduction will establish a priori what the properties of a given combination of two simple bodies, or of two complex bodies will be.
In the name of this scientific ideal, Comte reproaches the chemists with the superabundance of their analytical33 work. In default of a rational conception of chemistry they do not make their work bear upon the necessary points. What is the use of studying such and such a body, placed in such and such conditions, in an arbitrary way and according to the fancy of investigation? The progress of chemistry should consist far less in the acquisition of new materials than in the systematisation of those which we already possess. Chemistry is to-day as rich in details as it is imperfectly constituted as a166 science.146 Its present state in no way gives an idea of what its normal state will be.
Not content with showing to chemists the “scientific type” towards which their science should tend, Comte suggests a contrivance in method which will bring them nearer to it. It is in no way like the hypothesis of affinities73, for this appears to him to be even more “ontological” than the hypothesis of imaginary fluids or ethers. As always happens when we are concerned with metaphysical conceptions, the explanations which we draw from affinities consist in the reproduction in abstract terms of the very statement of the phenomenon.147 To this hypothesis, which is not a scientific one since it bears up the mode of production of facts, Comte substitutes what he calls the “dualist hypothesis.” We ignore, he says, and it is not for us to seek the real manner in which the elements of which bodies are composed come to be grouped together. But, consequently, it is lawful74 for us, in the very circumscribed sphere of our positive research, to conceive the immediate composition of any substance whatever as merely binary75, each of the two bodies so separated being able, according as the case may be, to lend itself to a similar analysis, equally binary, and so on, as the occasion arises. We do not affirm that dualism is a real law of nature. It will be a fundamental contrivance in chemistry, like the hypothesis of inertia in mechanics, and that of atoms in physics. It will serve to “simplify our elementary conceptions” in chemistry, and in having recourse to it we do not exceed “the special kind of liberty” of which our intellect may avail itself, in the institution of science.148
The use of this hypothesis would allow us to endow chemistry with a “fine” character of unity and rationality which it lacks to-day. It is true that Comte himself confessed that this hypothesis, proposed by him in 1838, had yet “pro167duced nothing” in 1851. But he explains this sterility76 to himself by the metaphysical spirit, from which chemists are not sufficiently freed.
IV.
We can now take in at a single glance the relations of the sciences of the inorganic world (including astronomy), with the totality of positive philosophy.149
In several ways these sciences have contributed to the progress of the positive spirit. By their constitution, they allowed and prepared the formation of the more complex sciences of Biology and of Sociology. Moreover, their development struck a mortal blow at theological and metaphysical philosophy. Through them minds became familiarised with the idea of natural law. This idea was not so clearly brought to light by mathematics on account of their almost purely abstract character, and of the imperceptible part played in them by observation. It appears, on the contrary, as the mainspring of astronomy, of physics, and of chemistry. The whole effort of these sciences tends to discover invariable relations between phenomena given in experience.
Theological philosophy is the “explanation” of nature which the human mind first makes for itself. In order that it may give up this “explanation” some contrary evidence must oblige it to do so. It may see for instance, that phenomena can be predicted with a perfect exactness which is always confirmed by experience, or that man, under certain conditions, can modify them with certainty. Astronomy gives us an example of the former case. It studies phenomena which, it is true, are removed from our sphere of action. But, in return, it predicts them with a certainty of which the effect has been practically infallible in the long run. It is astronomy which has168 done most to discredit77 the religious and philosophical78 doctrine of final causes.150 Not only has it proved that the universe is not disposed with reference to man, but it has shown the imperfections of our solar system. It has helped more than any other science to check the mental habit of seeking the mode of production of phenomena.
Physics is far from allowing of a rational prevision which is comparable to that practised by astronomy. But, as a compensation, it shows how the knowledge of laws gives the power to cause phenomena to vary with certainty. This second way leads us no less surely than the first to the positive conception of nature. For example, Franklin destroyed the religious theory of thunder, even in the least cultivated intellects. The discovery of the means of directing lightning therefore had the same effect, in another way, as the exact prevision of the return of comets.151
On the other hand the sciences of the inorganic world furnish the general positive method with some of its most powerful processes. Astronomy introduces observation and hypothesis into this method, Physics adds experimenting to it, and Chemistry the art of nomenclatures. The inductive method, which virtually consists in simple scientific observation, becomes, however, enriched and is developed, according as the phenomena in question become more complicated.
But, in return, positive philosophy exercises a considerable influence over these sciences. It claims nothing less than to direct and “regenerate” them. Viewing them from above and as a whole, philosophy can bring a remedy to the difficulties which arise from their specialism. It sets an exact limit to each of the sciences. It delivers physics from the “algebraical yoke,” and protects the independence of chemists against the encroachments of the physicists. It places the169 entirety of the positive method at the service of each particular science. For instance, it directs the use of hypothesis in physics by the theory drawn from the use which is made of it in astronomy; for classifications, it extends to chemistry the use of the comparative method which properly belongs to biology. When, later, the integral and final constitution of the philosophy of our age shall have organised the relations between all the sciences, it will be almost impossible, save from the historical point of view, to understand how the study of nature was ever conceived and directed otherwise.152
Positive philosophy organises labour within each science, and puts an end to “anarchy.” It distinguishes between “idle” researches, and those which should be pursued. It avoids waste of efforts and prevents digressions. We have seen within what limits Comte wishes to enclose astronomy in the name of philosophy. He does not perceive the means by which he can unite the various branches of physics; but he claims to replace the fragmentary and scattered79 chemistry of his time by a single systematic80 science, which will forsake81 the researches of detail which are without interest for humanity. “Almost the whole of those innumerable compounds will not finally be worthy82 of any scientific attention. Some well-chosen series may even be able to satisfy the logical requirements of chemistry for the discovery of the abstract laws which belong to each order of composition.”153
Finally positive philosophy causes the disappearance83 of the last remains of the theological and metaphysical spirit from the sciences of inorganic nature. This philosophy has already shown that mathematics is not a more absolute science than the others, and that it originates in experience. In physics and in chemistry it banishes84 the hypotheses which, more or less avowedly85, tend to make us conceive the essence or the mode of production of phenomena. It is thus that it demands170 a science of physics freed from ethers and fluids, and a wholly rational chemistry which shall give up affinities.
Comte is not therefore possessed86 of a superstitious87 respect for the sciences in the state in which they appear before him. On the contrary, he intends that they should be subject to deep modifications88, and that they should strive towards an ideal form which is laid down for them by philosophy. He calls this form “positive.” In reality it is Cartesian.
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1
inorganic
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| adj.无生物的；无机的 | |
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distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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phenomena
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| n.现象 | |
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dependence
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| n.依靠，依赖；信任，信赖；隶属 | |
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subsist
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| vi.生存，存在，供养 | |
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alteration
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| n.变更，改变；蚀变 | |
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molecular
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| adj.分子的；克分子的 | |
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speculative
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| adj.思索性的，暝想性的，推理的 | |
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celestial
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| adj.天体的；天上的 | |
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unity
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| n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调 | |
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isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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isolate
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| vt.使孤立，隔离 | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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infinitely
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| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
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deduction
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| n.减除，扣除，减除额；推论，推理，演绎 | |
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analogous
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| adj.相似的；类似的 | |
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confirmation
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| n.证实，确认，批准 | |
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complexity
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| n.复杂(性)，复杂的事物 | |
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investigation
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| n.调查，调查研究 | |
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physiology
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| n.生理学，生理机能 | |
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modification
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| n.修改，改进，缓和，减轻 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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intervention
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| n.介入，干涉，干预 | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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deductions
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| 扣除( deduction的名词复数 )； 结论； 扣除的量； 推演 | |
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retarded
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| a.智力迟钝的，智力发育迟缓的 | |
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uncertainty
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| n.易变，靠不住，不确知，不确定的事物 | |
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physicists
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| 物理学家( physicist的名词复数 ) | |
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physicist
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| n.物理学家，研究物理学的人 | |
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mathematicians
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| 数学家( mathematician的名词复数 ) | |
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encumbered
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| v.妨碍，阻碍，拖累( encumber的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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analytical
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| adj.分析的；用分析法的 | |
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acoustics
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| n.声学，(复)音响效果，音响装置 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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encumbrance
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| n.妨碍物，累赘 | |
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artifice
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| n.妙计，高明的手段；狡诈，诡计 | |
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astronomers
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| n.天文学者，天文学家( astronomer的名词复数 ) | |
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induction
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| n.感应，感应现象 | |
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circumference
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| n.圆周，周长，圆周线 | |
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perimeters
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| 周边( perimeter的名词复数 )； 周围； 边缘； 周长 | |
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inscribed
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| v.写，刻( inscribe的过去式和过去分词 )；内接 | |
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circumscribed
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| adj.[医]局限的：受限制或限于有限空间的v.在…周围划线( circumscribe的过去式和过去分词 )；划定…范围；限制；限定 | |
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favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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attain
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| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
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inaccessible
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| adj.达不到的，难接近的 | |
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magnetism
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| n.磁性，吸引力，磁学 | |
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destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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attentively
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| adv.聚精会神地；周到地；谛；凝神 | |
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inertia
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| adj.惰性，惯性，懒惰，迟钝 | |
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persistence
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| n.坚持，持续，存留 | |
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scholastic
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| adj.学校的，学院的，学术上的 | |
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entities
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| 实体对像； 实体，独立存在体，实际存在物( entity的名词复数 ) | |
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luminous
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| adj.发光的，发亮的；光明的；明白易懂的；有启发的 | |
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mechanism
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| n.机械装置；机构，结构 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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plausible
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| adj.似真实的，似乎有理的，似乎可信的 | |
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defective
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| adj.有毛病的，有问题的，有瑕疵的 | |
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decomposition
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| n. 分解, 腐烂, 崩溃 | |
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physiological
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| adj.生理学的，生理学上的 | |
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physiologist
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| n.生理学家 | |
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doctrine
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| n.教义；主义；学说 | |
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preponderating
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| v.超过，胜过( preponderate的现在分词 ) | |
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proceeding
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| n.行动，进行，(pl.)会议录，学报 | |
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physiologists
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| n.生理学者( physiologist的名词复数 )；生理学( physiology的名词复数 )；生理机能 | |
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solidarity
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| n.团结；休戚相关 | |
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subsists
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| v.（靠很少的钱或食物）维持生活，生存下去( subsist的第三人称单数 ) | |
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remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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fictitious
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| adj.虚构的，假设的；空头的 | |
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affinities
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| n.密切关系( affinity的名词复数 )；亲近；（生性）喜爱；类同 | |
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lawful
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| adj.法律许可的，守法的，合法的 | |
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binary
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| adj.二，双；二进制的；n.双(体)；联星 | |
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sterility
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| n.不生育，不结果，贫瘠，消毒，无菌 | |
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discredit
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| vt.使不可置信；n.丧失信义；不信，怀疑 | |
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philosophical
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| adj.哲学家的，哲学上的，达观的 | |
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scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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systematic
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| adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的 | |
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forsake
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| vt.遗弃，抛弃；舍弃，放弃 | |
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worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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disappearance
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| n.消失，消散，失踪 | |
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banishes
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| v.放逐，驱逐( banish的第三人称单数 ) | |
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avowedly
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| adv.公然地 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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superstitious
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| adj.迷信的 | |
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modifications
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| n.缓和( modification的名词复数 )；限制；更改；改变 | |
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