The reader will, I think, have gathered at least that the extension of operations and the consequent increase of the British forces during the war was almost portentously10 rapid. A few figures will make this more apparent. In 1702 and 1703 Flanders was practically the only scene of active operations, the raid on Cadiz being of too short duration and too little account to be worthy11 of serious mention. In both of these years the British troops with Marlborough were set down at eighteen thousand men. In 1704 to 1706 they rose to twenty-two thousand, and in 1708 to 1709 to twenty-five thousand men, reverting13 once again to twenty-two thousand from 1711 to 1712. Concurrently14 with the first increase of 1704 came the first despatch15 of eight[555] thousand troops to the Peninsula, rising to nine thousand in 1705, ten thousand in 1706, and twenty-six thousand[380] from 1707 to 1709, relapsing between 1710 and 1712 to rather over twenty thousand. The total number of forces borne on the list of the British Army at its greatest was six troops of Household Cavalry16, eleven regiments17 of horse, sixteen of dragoons, and seventy-five of foot, comprehending in all seventy-nine battalions20.[381] The nominal21 war strength of a battalion19 in Flanders was, as a rule, in round numbers nine hundred and forty of all ranks, in the Peninsula from seven hundred and fifty to eight hundred and eighty, a diversity of establishments which gave rise to much trouble and confusion. It would not be safe to reckon the British infantry22 at any period during the war as exceeding fifty thousand men. The regiments of dragoons again varied23 from a normal strength of four hundred to four hundred and fifty, rising in occasional instances to six hundred; but they cannot reasonably be calculated at a higher figure than six thousand men. The regiments of horse were subject to similar variations, but their total strength, even including the six strong troops of Household Cavalry, cannot be counted as more than seven thousand men. There then remains24 the artillery25, of which, from want of data as well as from vagueness of organisation26, it is impossible to make any accurate calculation. Speaking generally, the highest strength actually attained27 by British troops at home and abroad during the war may be set down at seventy thousand men.[382]
[556]
The defect that will seem most flagrant, according to modern ideas, in the scheme above sketched28 is the multiplicity of distinct units that go to make up so small a force. The French had long abandoned the system of single battalions, and indeed given to their regiments the name of brigades. In the British Army the Guards and the Royal Scots alone had two battalions; and though we know by actual information that, in the case of the former, the battalions at home were used to feed those abroad, yet it is indubitable that both battalions of the Royal Scots took the field and kept it from beginning to end of the war. For this, however, the principles that then governed the conduct of a war and the maintenance of an army sufficiently29 account. The year was divided for military purposes into two parts—the campaigning season, which lasted roughly from the 1st of April to the 1st of October, and the recruiting season, which covered the months that remained over. Directly the campaign was ended and the troops distributed into winter quarters, a sufficient number of officers returned home to raise for each regiment18 the recruits that were needed. In strictness no officer enlisted31 a man except for his own corps32; and it was only occasionally that a regiment, having enlisted more recruits than were required for its own wants, transferred its superabundance to another.
But apart from this, we find throughout the reign of Queen Anne a resolute33 and healthy opposition34 to the principle of completing one regiment by drafts from[557] another. At the beginning of the war the ranks of the Army were, thanks to the wanton imbecility of the House of Commons, so empty that it was impossible to send any appreciable35 number of regiments abroad without depletion36 of those that were left at home. As an exceptional favour therefore the first troops sent to Spain and to the West Indies were completed by drafts; but at that point the practice was checked.[383] Marlborough had early set his face against so vicious a system, and although once, under pressure of orders from the Queen herself, he directed it to be enforced, yet it is sufficiently clear from his language and from his ready deference37 to the protest of the officer concerned, that he fully38 recognised the magnitude of its evil.[384] After the disaster of Almanza the War Office appears to have been urged in many quarters to resort to drafting, but St. John told the House of Commons outright39 that the practice had been found ruinous to the service, prejudicial alike to the corps that furnished and that received the draft. As Marlborough's influence declined, the mischievous41 system seems to have been revived, and although in more than one case colonels flatly declined to part with their men,[385] yet at the close of the war we find garrisons42 denuded44 by drafts to an extent that was positively45 dangerous.[386] The same objectionable practice, as is well known, is still rampant46 among us; would that the authority of Marlborough could help to break it down.
There remains the question why, instead of raising new regiments, the authorities did not raise additional battalions to existing regiments? The reply is that they doubtless knew their own business, and adopted the best plan that lay open to them. Englishmen have [558]a passion for independent command. To this day, as the history of the volunteers shows, there are many men who, though unwilling47 to serve in any existing corps, would cheerfully expend48 ten times the care, trouble, and expense on a regiment, or even on a troop or company, of their own. It must be remembered, too, that a regiment in those days was not only a command but a property, that it afforded to officers opportunities for good and for evil such as are now undreamed of, that, lastly, it was in the vast majority of cases called by its colonel's name.
Let us now, before examining the measures taken for the supply of recruits, glance briefly49 at the principal centres and causes of consumption and of demand. The inquiry50 must not be considered superfluous51, for the primary force in the maintenance of a voluntary army is attraction, and it is only after full knowledge of the elements of repulsion which work counter to it that the failure of the attractive force, and the necessity for substituting coercion52 in its place, can be rightly understood. The theatres of war claim first attention, and of these Flanders claims the precedence. It is well known that sickness or fatigue53 are more destructive in war than bullet and sword, and Marlborough's campaigns can have been no exception to the rule. Yet it is remarkable54 that the British were never so much thinned as after the campaign of Blenheim, wherein they bore the brunt of two severe actions. The march to the Danube was of course severe, but the men stood it well; nor do we hear of extraordinary sickness on the return march. All that we know is that when the British regiments reached the Rhine they were too weak to be fit for further work. We never hear the like in subsequent campaigns, in spite of severe marching and sieges. Yet the capture of one of Vauban's fortresses55 was always a long and murderous piece of work, while, if the trenches56 were flooded by heavy rain or the natural oozing57 of marshy58 ground, an epidemic59 of dysentery was sure to follow. We have no returns of the losses[559] from sickness in Flanders, but it is certain that the operations in that field were by no means the most deadly to the troops, nor the most exhausting to England. This must be ascribed almost entirely60 to the care and forethought of the great Duke. Marlborough knew the peculiar61 weaknesses as well as the peculiar value of his own countrymen, and was careful to keep them always well fed. In the second place, and this was most important, the theatre of war was but a few hours distant from England, so that a force once fairly set on foot could be maintained with comparative ease. Recruits, too, did not feel that they were going to another part of the world, and would never return home. Moreover, a bounty62 had been granted for Blenheim, there was some prospect63 of plunder,[387] and there was the glory of marching to certain victory with Corporal John.
It was far otherwise in the Peninsula. There a campaign was broken not only by winter-quarters, but also by summer-quarters in the hot months of July and August. Again, the voyage to Lisbon, and still more to Catalonia, to say nothing of the risk of storm and shipwreck64, occupied days and weeks, whereas the passage to Flanders was reckoned by hours. The transport-service, too, had a bad name. Although after 1702 the official complaints of bad and insufficient66 food ceased, yet the mortality on board the troop-ships sent to the Peninsula shows that the sickness and misery67 must have been appalling68. The reinforcements despatched to Lisbon in the summer of 1706 with a total strength of eight thousand men were reduced to little more than half of their numbers when they landed in Valencia in February 1707. They had suffered from bad weather and long confinement69, it is true, but theirs was no exceptional case.[388] In 1710, of a detachment of three hundred men that were landed, only a hundred ever [560]reached their regiments.[389] In 1711 five weak regiments lost sixty men dead, and two hundred disabled from sickness in a voyage of ten days.[390] A private of the First Guards summed up his experience of a month in a transport as "continual destruction in the foretop, the pox above board, the plague between decks, hell in the forecastle, and the devil at the helm."[391]
This was one great discouragement to recruits; and others became quickly known to them. The Peninsula was ill-supplied, transport was difficult, the quarters of the troops were very unhealthy, and the Portuguese70 unfriendly even to brutality71.[392] Altogether, though steel and lead played their part in the destruction of the British in the Peninsula, the havoc72 that they wrought73 was trifling74 compared with that of privation and disease. Prisoners of course were never lost for long, as Marlborough had always abundance of French to give in exchange for them; but in spite of this, the waste in Portugal and Spain was terrible, and the service proportionately unpopular.
So much for the two theatres of war; but the sphere of foreign service was not bounded by these. New York, Bermuda, and Newfoundland each possessed75 a small garrison43; and the West Indies, as we have seen, claimed from four to six battalions. This colonial service was undoubtedly76 the most unpopular of all. When the single company that defended Newfoundland left England in 1701, their destination was carefully concealed78 from the men lest they should desert. The most hardened criminal could hope for pardon if he enlisted for Jamaica. Once shipped off to the West Indies, the men seem to have been totally forgotten. No proper provision was made for paying them; [561]colonels who cared for their men were compelled to borrow money to save them from starvation; colonels who did not, came home, together with many of their officers, and left the men to shift for themselves.[393] Clothing, again, was entirely overlooked. The troops in Jamaica were reduced almost to nakedness; and when finally their clothing, already two years overdue79, was ready for them, it was delayed by a piece of bungling80 such as could only have been perpetrated by the War Office.[394] Another great difficulty was that, there being no regular system of reliefs, colonels never knew whether to clothe their men for a hot or a temperate81 climate. Recruits were consequently most difficult to obtain, although owing to the unhealthiness of the climate they were in great request. The result was that old men and boys were sent across the Atlantic only to be at once discharged, at great pecuniary82 loss, by the officers, who were ashamed to admit creatures of such miserable84 appearance into their companies.[395]
Again, during the course of the war, two new acquisitions demanded garrisons of three or four battalions apiece. Minorca appears to have given no very serious trouble; but Gibraltar having been reduced virtually to ruins by the siege was, owing to the lack of proper habitations, a hot-bed of sickness. The authorities seem in particular to have neglected the garrison of Gibraltar, though they took considerable pains for the fortification of the Rock. In 1706 more than half of the garrison was disabled through disease brought on by exposure,[396] yet it was not until four years later that [562]orders were given for the construction of barracks,[397] while even in 1711 the men were obliged to burn their own miserable quarters from want of fuel.[398]
These lapses85 in countries beyond sea might possibly find some excuse in the plea of inexperience, though this should not be admitted in a country which for nearly four centuries had continually sent expeditions across the Channel, and for more than two centuries across the Atlantic also. Yet there were similar faults at home which show almost incredible thoughtlessness and neglect. Thus in 1709 many soldiers at Portsmouth perished from want of fire and candle,[399] while the garrison of Upnor Castle was required to supply a detachment of guards in the marshes86 three miles from any house or shelter, where the men on duty stood up to their knees in water.[400] No one had thought that they might want a guard-room or at least tents. Again, it was not until a ship's load of men invalided87 from Portugal had been turned adrift in the streets of Penrhyn, penniless and reduced to beg for charity, that any provision was made for the sick and wounded. Then at last, in the fourth campaign of the war, commissioners88 were appointed to make them their special care. So far no one had been responsible for them, the duty having been thrust provisionally upon the commissioners of transport.[401] In a word, no forethought nor care was to be found beyond the reach of Marlborough's own hand; all administration on the side of the War Office, even under the secretaryship of so able a man as Henry St. John, was marked by blindness and incompetence90.
The ground being now cleared, and the principal obstacles in the way of recruiting being indicated, it is [563]time to examine the means employed by Parliament to overcome them. We may properly confine ourselves to England, since she with her population of five and a quarter millions was necessarily the main source for the supply of men. Ireland was not yet the recruiting-ground that she became at a later day, for the simple reason that none but Protestants could be enlisted. She had, however, her five distinctly national regiments,[402] a small proportion which enabled her to provide a dozen or fifteen more in the course of the war. Protestant Ireland, in fact, still under the spell of William of Orange, played her part very fully and generously during these years. Scotland, as became a country of great military traditions, maintained a larger number of national regiments than her sister,[403] but being thinly populated, inaccessible91 in many districts and already engaged to furnish troops to the Dutch service, was unable to provide more than three additional battalions. The greatest stress therefore fell, and fell rightly, upon England.
Transporting ourselves therefore for a moment to the opening of the war, when the Army was still smarting under its shameful92 treatment by Parliament after the Peace of Ryswick, we find without surprise that the strain of providing recruits made itself felt very early. The Mutiny Act of 1703 shows this by a clause empowering the Queen to order the delivery from gaol93 of capital offenders94 who had been pardoned on condition of enlistment95. This enactment6 was of course something like a reversion to the methods of Elizabeth; but although this class of recruit does not sound desirable, yet the competition for it was so keen that a regular roster96 was kept to ensure that every regiment should profit by the windfall in its turn.[404] It must be remembered that many a man was then condemned97 [564]to death who would now be released under the First Offenders' Act; but apart from this, criminals were welcome to the recruiting officer, first, because they cost nothing, and secondly98, because they were often men of fine physique.[405] In the later years of the war the sweepings99 of the gaols101 were in particular request, and the multiplication102 of petitions from the condemned shows that the fact was appreciated within the walls of Newgate.
In the session of 1703-4 an Act, for which there was a precedent103 in the days of King William, was passed to provide for the discharge of all insolvent104 debtors105 from prison, who should serve or procure106 another to serve in the fleet or Army. This probably brought some useful young recruits who enlisted to procure the release of their fathers; and there is evidence that the bankrupt was as much sought after by recruiting officers as the sheep-stealer. Another most important Act of the same session was the first of a long series of annual Recruiting Acts. Under this, a bounty of one pound[406] was offered for volunteers; and justices of the peace were empowered to levy107 as recruits all able-bodied men who had no visible employment or means of subsistence, and to employ the officers of borough12 and parish for the purpose. For each such recruit a bounty of ten shillings[407] was allowed for himself as well as a fee of ten shillings to the parish officer. To remove any temptation to malpractice, no officer of the regular Army was permitted to sit as a justice under the Act; and all voters were specially109 exempted110 from its operation, the possession of the franchise111 being apparently112 considered, as it probably was, a sufficiently visible means of subsistence.
This latter measure brought with it a considerable crop of abuses. In the very next session it was found [565]necessary to give special protection to harvest-labourers, many having been already impressed, while many more had hidden themselves from fear of impressment. But this was by no means all. Voters occasionally shared the fate of their unenfranchised brethren, and required hasty deliverance with many apologies to the member for their borough.[408] The high bounty again gave a stimulus113 to wrongful impressment, fraudulent enlistment, and desertion. It was found necessary after a few months to restrain the zeal114 of parish officers, who enlisted men that were already soldiers. Again, there were recruiting-officers who would discharge the recruits brought to them for a pecuniary consideration, an occurrence which though not common was not unknown. Finally, recruits would occasionally try to break away in a body, which led to desperate fighting and to awkward complications. In one instance a large number of recruits made so determined116 an attempt to overpower the guard and escape that they were not quelled117 until two of them had been actually slain118. The guard, who thought with justice that they had done no more than their duty, then found themselves threatened with an indictment119 for murder; and the War Office was obliged to call in the Attorney-General to advise how they should be protected.[409] Turbulent scenes with the rural population over the arrest of deserters and the impressment of idle fellows were by no means infrequent. We have, for instance, accounts of the whole town of Exminster turning out with flails120 and pitchforks against an officer who claimed a deserter, and of the mob of Abergavenny, mad for the rescue of an impressed recruit, driving the officers from house to house, and compelling them to fire in self-defence.[410]
After the campaign of Blenheim, the heavy losses in the field, and the resolution to send a large force [566]to the Peninsula drove the military authorities to desperate straits. Suggestions of course came in from various quarters; among them a proposal from a gentleman of Amsterdam that every one who had two or more lacqueys should send one into the Army, the writer having observed that members of Parliament "abounded121 in that sort of person."[411] But the stress of the situation is shown by the fact that a Bill was actually introduced to compel every parish and corporation to furnish a certain number of recruits, though it was presently dropped as being an imitation from the French and unfit for a free country.[412] The authorities therefore contented122 themselves by ordering stricter enforcement of the Recruiting Act, and apparently with success.[413] During the next two years there was no change in the Act, excepting the addition, in 1706, of a penalty of five pounds against parochial officers who should neglect to execute it. But in 1707 the measure showed signs of failing, and was hastily patched up by increasing the bounty to two pounds[414] for volunteers enlisting123 during the recruiting season, and to one pound for such as enlisted after the campaign had been opened. Some effort was also made to systematize the power granted by the Act by convening124 regular meetings of justices at stated times and places.
The close of the year, however, found the Commons face to face with the disaster of Almanza, and with urgent need for close upon twenty thousand recruits. The Recruiting Act now assumed a new and drastic form. The authority to impress men of no employment was transferred from the justices to the commissioners of the land-tax, with full powers [567]to employ the parochial officers. The penalty on these officers for neglect of duty was increased to ten pounds, while for diligent125 execution of the same a reward of one pound was promised them for every recruit, as well as sixpence a day for the expense of keeping him until he should be made over to his regiment. The parish likewise received three pounds for every man thus recruited, in order to quicken its zeal against the idle. Finally, as an entire novelty, borrowed be it noted126 from the French,[415] volunteers were enlisted at the same high rate of bounty for a term of three years, at the close of which they were entitled to claim their discharge. Great results were evidently expected from these provisions, for the standard of height for recruits was still maintained at five feet five inches,[416] men below that stature127 being accepted only for marines. So from this year until the close of the war it is possible to study the first trial of short service in England.
Unfortunately abuses seemed only to multiply under the new Act. The campaign of Oudenarde, prolonged as it was into December, drained Marlborough's army heavily, and the spring of 1709 found the forces in want of yet another fifteen thousand recruits. Moreover, from the moment when Marlborough's power began to decline the tone of the Army at home began to sink. The justices again were jealous of the commissioners of land-tax, and in some instances openly abused and reproached them.[417] In at least one case they were found conniving128 with officers to accept money for the discharge of impressed men.[418] Officers on their [568]side also began to misbehave, withholding130 the bounty from recruits and subjecting them to the gantlope if they complained, and in some instances not only withholding the bounty but demanding large bribes131 for their discharge.[419] As the war continued, matters grew worse and worse. Sham83 press-gangs established themselves with the object of levying132 blackmail;[420] and as a climax133 Army and Navy began to fight for the possession of impressed men.
At the opening of 1711 the first batch134 of men enlisted for three years completed their term, but found to their surprise that their discharge did not come to them automatically, as they had expected. The officers had no instructions. They were unwilling too to part with the sixty best soldiers in each regiment, for such these men of short service had proved to be, and could only promise to let them go as soon as orders should arrive from home. Harley's Secretary-at-War, with the characteristic ill faith of the politician towards the soldier, boldly proposed to pass an Act compelling them to serve for two years longer; but the Attorney-General, to whom the matter was referred, decided135 that the men were beyond all question entitled to their discharge.[421] Thereupon, rather late in the day, the Secretary-at-War hurriedly ordered the instant discharge of a man whose term had expired, in order to encourage others to enlist30.[422] Finally, in 1711 abuses increased so rapidly under the new administration that the whole system of recruiting broke down.[423] The evils of Harley's short tenure136 of office were by no means bounded by the Peace of Utrecht.
[569]
There remains a further question still to be dealt with, that namely of desertion, which directly and indirectly137 sapped the strength of the Army as much as any campaign. Let it not be thought that this evil was confined to England, for it was rampant in every army in Europe, and nowhere a greater scourge138 than in France. Nor let the deserter from the army in the field be too severely139 judged, for his anxiety was not to serve against his own countrymen but simply to get back to his own home. Some of the English deserters in Flanders were even cunning enough to pass homeward as exchanged prisoners belonging to the fleet.[424] But it was before starting for the seat of war that deserters gave most trouble, particularly if, as was often unavoidably the case, the regiments were kept waiting long for their transports.[425] No punishment seemed to deter115 others from abetting140 them.[426] If we may judge by the records of the next reign a thousand to fifteen hundred lashes142 was no uncommon143 sentence on a deserter, while not a few were actually shot in Hyde Park.[427] The only resource, therefore, was to check the evil as far as possible by prevention. Thus we constantly find large bodies of troops under orders for foreign service quartered in the Isle144 of Wight, from which they could not easily escape. This remedy was at least in one case found worse than the disease, for the numbers of the men being too great to be accommodated in the public houses, very many of them perished from exposure to the weather. Thereupon the Secretary-at-War made inquiry as to barns and empty houses for them, according to the traditions of his office, fatally too late.[428]
[570]
Another practice, which from ignorance of its origin has been blindly followed till within the last few years, also took its rise from the prevalence of desertion at this period, namely that of shifting troops from quarter to quarter of England by sea. On the same principle men were frequently cooped up in the transport-vessels for weeks and even months before they sailed on foreign service, occasionally with frightful145 consequences. Thus in 1705 certain troops bound for Jamaica were embarked146 on transports on the 18th of May. They remained there for two months with fever and small-pox on board, until at last, the medical supplies being exhausted147, the case was represented to the Secretary-at-War. The reply was that they were to receive such relief as was possible; but they remained in the same transports until October, when at last they were drafted off in parties of sixty on the West Indian packets to their destination. Forty-eight of them were lost through a storm in port long before October, but the number that perished from sickness is unknown, and was probably most sedulously148 concealed.[429]
Let us now turn to the pleasanter theme of the changes that were wrought for the benefit of the soldier. The first of these appears in the Mutiny Act of 1703, and was doubtless due in part to the scandals revealed in the office of the Paymaster-General. The rates of pay to all ranks below the status of commissioned officers are actually given in the Act, with express directions, under sufficient penalties, that the subsistence money shall be paid regularly every week, and the balance over and above it every two months. Further, all stoppages by the Paymaster-General, Secretary-at-War, commissaries, and muster-masters are definitely forbidden, and the legitimate149 deductions150 strictly152 limited to the clothing-money, one day's pay to Chelsea Hospital, and one shilling in the pound to the Queen. The continuance of this last tax was of course a crying[571] injustice153, but the abolition154 of the other irregular claims was distinctly a gain to the British soldier, due, as it is satisfactory to know, to the newly appointed Controllers of Accounts. Altogether the condition of the soldier as regards his pay seems decidedly to have improved, Marlborough's attention to this most important matter having evidently borne good fruit. It is true that in Spain and the colonies, to which he had not leisure nor opportunity to give personal attention, the neglect of the Secretary-at-War caused great grievances157 and much suffering; it is true also that even in England, when his influence was gone, there was a recurrence158 of the old scandals under the miserable administration of Harley;[430] yet on the whole the improvements in this province were at once distinct and permanent.
Another valuable reform in respect of clothing was due to the direct interposition of Marlborough himself. In 1706 the abuses in this department were, at his instance, made the subject of inquiry by Secretary St. John and General Charles Churchill, with the ultimate result that the pattern and allowance of clothing and the deduction151 of off-reckonings were laid down by strict rule, while the whole business of clothing, though still left to the colonels, was subjected to the control of a board of six General officers, whose sanction was essential to the validity of all contracts and to the acceptance of all garments. Thus was established the Board of General Officers,[431] whose minutes are still the great authority for the uniforms of the eighteenth century.
Unfortunately these benefits could weigh but little against the disadvantages already described. It is certain that despite the standard laid down by Act of [572]Parliament, vast numbers of boys were enlisted as well as men of fifty and sixty years of age, who no sooner entered the field than they were sent back into hospital. Good regiments, however, then as now obtained good recruits, sometimes through the offer of extra bounty from the officers,[432] more often through the character of the officers themselves. The presence of thieves, pirates, and other criminals in the ranks must necessarily have introduced a certain leaven159 of ruffianism, yet neither in Flanders nor in the Peninsula do we find anything approaching to the outrageous160 bursts of indiscipline which were witnessed a century later at Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz. There was, it is true, the mutiny under the Duke of Ormonde, but it was of short duration and easily suppressed; and altogether, for reasons that shall presently be given, Marlborough's army seems to have been better conducted than Wellington's. Unfortunately, although two men who served in the ranks left us journals of a whole or part of the war, we remain still without a picture of the typical soldier of Marlborough. The one figure that emerges with any distinctness from the ranks is that of Christian161 Ross, a woman who served as a dragoon in several actions, was twice wounded before her sex was discovered, and ended her career as virago162, sutleress, and out-pensioner of Chelsea Hospital.[433] The rest, with the exception of Sergeant163 Littler, Sergeant John Hall,[434] and Private Deane remain buried in dark oblivion, leaving a lamentable164 gap that can never be filled in our military history.
From the men I pass to the officers. Our information in regard to them is curiously165 mixed. Certain of the abuses that dishonoured166 them have already been revealed, nor can these be said to exhaust the list. There [573]were grave scandals in the Guards, which had the misfortune to possess one colonel, of a distinguished167 Scottish family, who revived the worst traditions of Elizabeth and Charles the Second. Not only did he systematically168 enlist thieves and other bad characters as "faggots,"[435] but he did not scruple169 to accept recruits who offered themselves for the sake of defrauding170 their creditors171, to receive money from them for doing so, and to extort172 more money by threatening to withhold129 his protection or to ship them off to fight in Spain. These men did no duty,[436] wore no uniform and drew no pay, to the great profit of the colonel and the great disgrace of the regiment; and the evil grew to such a height that when the House of Commons finally took the matter in hand, the "faggots" were found to number one-fourth of the nominal strength of the regiment.[437] Such cases, however, as this of the infamous173 Colonel Chartres were rare; and the decrease of this particular vice40 of officers in Queen Anne's time presents a pleasing contrast to its prevalence in the time of King William.
Another habit, which sounds particularly objectionable in modern ears, was the occasional unwillingness174 of officers to accompany their regiments, and their readiness to leave them, when employed on distasteful service. This was especially true of regiments on colonial stations, particularly in the West Indies,[438] and was by no means unknown of those actually on active service in Flanders and the Peninsula. Sometimes the offenders had received leave of absence, which the Secretary-at-War would willingly grant as a matter of jobbery in the case [574]of a friend,[439] but more often they took leave without asking for it, occasionally for as much as five years together,[440] without objection from the colonel or rebuke175 from the War Office. One colonel took it as a great grievance156 when Marlborough insisted that he should sell his commission since he was unwilling to do duty;[441] and altogether the general connivance176 at shirking of this kind rendered the offence so little discreditable that it must not be judged by the standard of to-day. Speaking generally, however, the officers had far more grievances that command our pity than faults which provoke our indignation.
One hardship that bore on officers with peculiar severity was the expense of obtaining recruits. They received, of course, levy-money for the purpose, but this was frequently insufficient, while no allowance was made for recruits lost through desertion, sickness, or other misfortunes over which they had no control. Marlborough was most strict in discouraging, except in extreme cases, any attempts of officers to transfer their burdens from themselves to the State, though he freely admitted, not without compassion177, that officers had been ruined by sheer bad luck with their recruits. We find bitter complaints from officers in the Peninsula that owing to the heavy mortality in the transports, their recruits, by the time that they reached them, cost them eight or nine pounds a head.[442] Indeed, if one may judge from contemporary newspapers, which are quite borne out by scattered178 evidence, the sufferings [575]of officers on account of recruiting were almost unendurable.[443]
Remounts again were a heavy tax upon the officer. An allowance of levy-money at the rate of twelve pounds a horse[444] was granted to officers for the purpose, but was complained of as quite inadequate179 to the charge,[445] in consequence of heavy losses through the epidemic of horse-sickness in Flanders. Carelessness in the hiring and fitting of transports also caused much waste of life among the horses,[446] until Marlborough, as his letters repeatedly show, took the matter into his own hands. It is interesting to learn that Irish horses, being obtainable for five pounds apiece,[447] were much used in Spain, though less in Flanders, Marlborough having a prejudice in favour of English horses as of English men, as superior to all others. This cheapness, however, was of little [576]service to the officers. They were expected to pay for the transport of their horses at a fixed180 rate, and though at length in reply to their complaints free transport was granted for twenty-six horses to a battalion, yet this privilege was again withdrawn181 as soon as it was discovered that Irish animals were to be purchased at a low price.[448]
Again, the officers were always subject to extortion from civilians183. Parish constables185, to whom the law allowed sixpence a day for the subsistence of recruits, declined to deliver them unless they were paid eightpence a day.[449] But as usual the chief delinquents186 were the regimental agents. The Controllers of Accounts early made an attack on these gentry187, but with little success, the fellows pleading that they were not public officials but private servants of the colonel, and therefore not bound to produce their accounts. The complaints of the officers against them were endless, and with good reason. Perhaps the most heartless instance of an agent's rascality188 was that of one who stole the small allowance made by a lieutenant189 on active service to his wife, and refused to pay it until ordered by the Queen.[450] Officers clamoured that the agents should be tried by court-martial, but this was not permitted, and perhaps wisely, for a court-martial would probably have sentenced a scoundrel to the gantlope, in which case the men would not have let him escape alive.
Yet another tax fell upon officers in the shape of contribution to pensions and regimental debts. In every regiment except those serving in Flanders a fictitious190 man was allowed in the roll of each troop or company, whose pay was taken to form a fund for the support of officers' widows;[451] but in Marlborough's army [577]these widows were supported by a voluntary subscription191 from the officers, without expense to the State. By some contrivance, which seems utterly192 outrageous and was presumably the work of the War Office or of the Treasury193, this voluntary fund was saddled with the maintenance of widows who had lost their husbands in the previous war, so that in 1709 Marlborough was obliged to protest and to ask for the extension of "widows' men" to some at least of his own troops.[452] Again, some regiments appear to have been charged with pensions to particular individuals, though by what right or for what service it is impossible to say.[453] Yet again, by misfortune, carelessness, or roguery of a colonel, or more commonly of an agent, regiments found themselves burdened with debts amounting to several thousand pounds, as, for instance, through the loss of regimental funds by shipwreck or through mismanagement of the clothing. In such cases the only possible relief was the sale, by royal permission, of the next company or ensigncy for the liquidation194 of the debt.[454]
Another form of pension which, though sometimes used for worthy objects, was at least as often perverted195 to purposes of jobbery, was the appointment of infant officers. In many instances children received commissions in a regiment wherein their fathers had commanded and done good service, either for the relief of the widows, if those fathers had fallen in action, or for a reward if they were still living. Sometimes these children actually took the field, for there is record of one who went to active service in Flanders at the age of twelve, "behaving with more courage and conduct than could have been expected from one of his years," [578]and ruined his career at sixteen by killing196 his man in a duel197.[455] But beyond all doubt in many instances the favour was granted without sufficient cause, while even at its best it was an abuse of public money and a wrong done to the regiment. This abuse was of course no new thing, and did not amount to an actual grievance; but it had fostered a feeling, that was already too strong, of the privileges conferred on colonels by their proprietary198 rights in their regiments.
The grant of commissions to children was forbidden by the Royal Regulations of 1st May 1711, a collection of orders which had at any rate for their ostensible199 object a considerable measure of reform, and therefore demands some notice here. Hereby the grant of brevets, which had given considerable trouble to Marlborough, and had already been forbidden in 1708, was again prohibited; and finally an attempt was made to limit the sale and purchase of commissions. To this end no sale of commissions whatever was permitted except by royal approbation200 under the sign manual, and then only to officers who had served for twenty years or had been disabled by active service. The announcement appears to have been treated as a joke;[456] and within six months the rule, in consequence of representations from Marlborough, was considerably201 modified.[457] If (so the Duke pointed89 out) subalterns who have been unlucky with their recruits may not sell their commissions, the debt will fall on the regiment: if, again, the successors to officers who die on service do not contribute something towards the dead man's wife and family, many widows and children must starve; lastly, colonels often wish to promote officers from other regiments to their own when they have no officer of their own fit for advancement202, which is for the good of the service but must [579]become impracticable unless the superseded203 officer receive something in compensation.[458] His arguments were seen to be irresistible204 unless the State were prepared to incur205 large additional military expenditure206, and the rules were shortly afterwards amended207 in the spirit of his recommendations and for the reasons that he had adduced.[459]
Thus almost the final administrative208 act of Marlborough as Captain-General was to uphold the system of purchase then existing against the hasty reforms of civilian184 counsellors. Enough has been said to show that contemporary military policy in England, with which he was chiefly identified, tended always to make the regiment more and more self-contained and less dependent on the support of the State: it will be seen before long how regiments met the charge imposed on them by the institution of regimental funds in the nature of insurance. The drawback of such a system is obvious. Excess of independence in the members can hardly but entail209 weakening of central control, with incoherence and consequent waste of energy in the action of the entire body. Regimental traditions, regimental pride, are priceless possessions well worthy the sacrifice of ideal unity155 of design and perfect assimilation to a single pattern. But regimental isolation210, fostered and encouraged on principle to the utmost, must inevitably211 bring with it a certain division of command, a want of subordination to the supreme212 authority, in a word that measure of indiscipline in high places which distinguishes an aggregation213 of regiments from an army.
[580]
Yet who can doubt but that Marlborough acted with his usual strong good sense as a soldier and his usual sagacity as a statesman? He had risked his popularity in the Army by his avowed214 severity towards officers in the matter of recruits,[460] because he knew that the slightest attempt to shift this burden upon the State would mean the refusal of Parliament to carry on the war, and a wholesale215 disbandment of the Army. He favoured the sale of commissions on precisely216 the same principle; for, as his letter clearly shows, he foresaw the growth of what is now called a non-effective vote, and doubted the willingness of Parliament to endure it. That which he dreaded217 has now come to pass, for better or worse; the country is saddled with a vast load of pensions, and the Commons grow annually218 more impatient over increase of military expenditure without corresponding increase of efficiency. Marlborough's choice lay between an aggregation of regiments and no army, and of two evils he chose the less. It still remains to be proved that he was wrong.
From the regimental I pass to the general administration. Herein the first noticeable feature is the amalgamation219 by the Act of union of the English and Scotch220 establishments into a single establishment for Great Britain. Ireland of course still remained with a separate establishment of her own, and all the paraphernalia221 of Commander-in-Chief, Secretary-at-War, and Master-General of Ordnance222. There continued always in Ireland as heretofore a different rate of pay for all ranks, which, owing to constant transfer of regiments from Ireland to England or abroad gave rise to great confusion in the accounts. The chief matter of interest in Ireland is the very reasonable jealousy223 of the Irish Commons for the retention224 within the kingdom of all regiments on the Irish establishment, or at least for the substitution of other regiments in their place if they should be withdrawn. Their intention was that Irish revenue should be spent in Ireland, and it is satisfactory[581] to note that it was rigidly225 and conscientiously227 respected by the authorities in England.[461]
Another important matter was a first attempt to settle the position of the marines, who up to the middle of the reign were subject to a curious and embarrassing division of control. St. John early disclaimed228 all authority over them,[462] but they were evidently subject to the regulations of the army and suffered not a little in consequence. The rigid226 rule that regiments must be mustered229 before they were paid inflicted230 great hardship on marines, for it could not be carried out when a regiment was split up on half a dozen different ships, and the result was that the men were not paid at all. Even when ashore231 they were exposed to the same inconvenience owing to the inefficiency232 of the commissaries,[463] so that some regiments actually received no wages for eight years.[464] The inevitable233 consequence was hatred234 of the service and mutiny, which at one moment threatened to be serious.[465] Finally, on the 17th of December 1708, the marines were definitely placed under the jurisdiction235 of the Lord High Admiral.[466]
I come now to the most fateful of all changes in the administration, namely the rise to supreme importance of the Secretary-at-War. Attention has already been drawn182 to the duties and powers which silently accumulated in the hands of this civilian official after the death of Monk236, owing to the lack of [582]efficient control by the Sovereign. The reigns237 of King William and Queen Anne, in consequence of the constant absence of the Captain-General on active service, did nothing to restore this lost control, and the almost unperceived change which released the Secretary-at-War from personal attendance on the Commander-in-Chief in the field virtually abolished it altogether. The terms of the Secretary-at-War's commission remained the same, "to obey such orders as he should from time to time receive from the Sovereign or from the General of the forces for the time being, according to the discipline of war;"[467] but the situation was in reality reversed. Even in King William's time the Secretary-at-War had countersigned238 the military estimates submitted to Parliament; from the advent239 of St. John he assumes charge of all military matters in the Commons, often taking the chair of the committee while they are under discussion. Thus he becomes the mouthpiece of the military administration in the House, and, since the Commander-in-Chief is generally absent on service he ceases to take his orders from him, but becomes, except in the vital matter of responsibility, a Secretary-of-State, writing in the name of the Queen or of her consort240, or finally in his own name and by his own authority without reference to a higher power. Lastly, his office, thus exalted241 to importance, becomes the spoil of political party; Secretaries-at-War follow each other in rapid succession,—St. John, Walpole, Granville, Lord Lansdowne, Windham, Gwynne; and the Army is definitely stamped as a counter in the eternal game of faction242.
The power of the Secretary-at-War in Queen Anne's time is sufficiently shown by his letter-books. In the Queen's name he gives orders for recruiting, for[583] drafting, for armament, for musters243, for change of quarters, relief of garrisons, hire of transports, embarkation244 of troops, patrolling of the coast, escort of treasure, and in a word for all matters of routine. In the Duke of Marlborough's name also he directs men to be embarked, money to be advanced, and recruits to be furnished, and even criticises the execution of the orders issued by him on behalf of the Queen.[468] On his own authority he bids colonels to send him muster-rolls and lists of recruiting staff and to provide their regiments with quarters, regrets that he cannot strengthen weak garrisons, and lays down the route for all marches within the kingdom.[469] He corresponds direct with every rank of officer without the slightest regard for discipline or dignity. We find Walpole threatening a lieutenant with forfeiture245 of his commission for absence without leave, bidding a captain be thankful that owing to his own clemency246 he is not cashiered for fraud,[470] regretting that he cannot in conscience excuse one subaltern from attending his regiment on foreign service,[471] ordering another to pay for his quarters immediately,[472] summoning a third person to the War Office to account to him for wrongful detention247 of a recruit. Granville promises an officer leave of absence from foreign service, but must first, in common decency248, apply to the General in command.[473] Lord Lansdowne begs the Governor of Portsmouth not to be too hard on a young regiment in the matter of guard-duties, orders the discharge of a soldier when three years of his service have expired, and writes to the Irish Secretary-at-War for leave of [584]absence for a friend.[474] Finally, all ask favours of colonels on behalf of officers and men. One thing only they left for a time untouched, namely the sentences of court-martial, which St. John expressly abjured249 in favour of the Judge Advocate-General; but for the rest they issued orders, approbations, and reprimands with all the freedom of a Commander-in-Chief.
The Office of Ordnance remained as before independent of the War Office, though of course liable to fulfil its requisitions for arms and stores. It is remarkable that Marlborough, like Wellington a century later, no sooner became Master-General[475] than he restored the organisation of King James the Second. But the strain imposed upon the Department by the multitude of forces in the field was too severe for it. Two months before Blenheim was fought the supply of firelocks and socket-bayonets was exhausted; and in succeeding years, as disasters grew and multiplied in Spain, the Office was obliged frequently, and to the great indignation of English manufacturers, to purchase arms abroad.[476]
The subject of weapons leads us directly to the progress of the Army in the matter of armament, equipment, and training. The first point worthy of notice is the disappearance250 of the time-honoured pike. Pikes were issued to a battalion in the proportion of one to every five muskets252 as late as 1703, but were delivered back into store in the following year;[477] and in 1706 a letter from St. John announces that pikes are considered useless and that musket251 and bayonet must be furnished to every man.[478] The bayonet was, of [585]course, the socket-bayonet; and the musket, being of a new and improved model, was a weapon much superior to that issued in the days of King William.[479] Partly, no doubt, owing to the efficiency of this musket, which carried bullets of sixteen to the pound, as against the French weapon, which was designed for bullets of twenty-four to the pound, and still more owing to superiority of discipline and tactics, the fire of the British was incomparably more deadly than that of the French.[480] The secret, so far as concerned tactics, lay in the fact that the British fired by platoons according to the system of Gustavus Adolphus, whereas the French fired by ranks; and the perfection of drill and discipline was superbly manifested at Wynendale. For this, as well as for the better weapon, the Army had their great chief to thank, for the Duke knew better than any the value of fire-discipline, as it is called, and would put the whole army through its platoon-exercise by signal of flag and drum before his own eye.[481] Nevertheless, the cool head and accurate aim for which the British have always been famous played their part, and a leading part, in the victories of Marlborough.
Of the drill proper there is little to be said, though some few changes are significant of coming reforms. The number of ranks was left unfixed, being increased or reduced according to the frontage required, but probably seldom exceeded three and was occasionally reduced to two. The old method of doubling ranks was still preserved; but the men no longer fell in by files, and the file may be said definitely to have lost its old position as a tactical unit. A company now fell in in single rank, was sorted off into three or more divisions and formed into ranks, by the wheel of the divisions from line into column, which was a complete [586]novelty. The manual and firing exercise remained as minute and elaborate as ever; and a single word of command shows that the old exercise of the pike was soon to be adopted for the bayonet.[482] With these exceptions there was little deviation253 from the old drill of Gustavus Adolphus; but the real improvement, which made that drill doubly efficient, was in the matter of discipline. That the lash141 and the gantlope were unsparingly used in Marlborough's army there can be no doubt, and that they were employed even more savagely254 at home can be shown by direct evidence;[483] but the Duke, as shall presently be shown, understood how to make the best of his countrymen by other means besides cutting their backs to pieces.
For the cavalry, of which he was evidently very fond, Marlborough did very signal service by committing it definitely to action by shock. Again and again in the course of the war the French squadrons are found firing from the saddle with little or no effect, and the British crashing boldly into them and sweeping100 them away. There are few actions, too, in which the Duke himself is not found in personal command of the horse at one period or another of the battle—at Blenheim in the great charge which won the day, at Ramillies at the most critical moment, at Malplaquet in support of the British infantry, and most brilliantly of all at the passage of the lines at Landen. Yet he was too sensible not to imitate an enemy where he could do so with advantage. The French gendarmerie had received pistol-proof armour255 in 1703;[484] the British horse in Flanders, at Marlborough's suggestion, received a cuirass [587]in 1707, a reform which was copied by the Dutch and urged upon all the rest of the Allies.[485] It is characteristic of the Duke's never-failing good sense that the cuirasses consisted of breast-pieces only, so that men should find no protection unless their faces were turned towards the enemy.
As to the artillery there is little to be said except that the organisation by companies appears to have been thoroughly256 accepted, and the efficiency of the arm thereby257 greatly increased. The Duke was never greater than as an artillerist258. Every gun at Blenheim was laid under his own eye; and the concentration of the great central battery at Malplaquet and its subsequent advance shows his mastership in the handling of cannon259. For the rest, the artillery came out of the war with not less, perhaps with even more, brilliancy than the other corps of the army; and, though no mention is made of the fact by the historian of the regiment, it is likely that no artillery officers ever worked more strenuously260 and skilfully261 in the face of enormous difficulties than the devoted262 men who brought their guns first down to the south side of the Danube and then back across the river to the battlefield of Blenheim.[486]
It is impossible to quit this subject without a few words on the great man who revived for England the ancient glory of Cre?y, Poictiers, and Agincourt, the greatest, in the Duke of Wellington's words, who ever appeared at the head of a British Army. There are certain passages in his life which make it difficult sometimes to withhold from him hard names; but allowance should be made for one who was born in revolution, nurtured263 in a court of corruption264, and matured in fresh revolution. Wellington himself admitted that he never understood the characters of that period, nor exercised due charity towards them, till he had observed the effects of the French Revolution on the minds and consciences [588]of French statesmen and marshals. Marlborough's fall was brought about by a faction, and his fame has remained ever since a prey265 to the tender mercies of a faction. But the prejudices of a partisan266 are but a sorry standard for the measure of one whose transcendent ability as a general, a statesman, a diplomatist, and an administrator267, guided not only England but Europe through the War of the Spanish Succession, and delivered them safe for a whole generation from the craft and the ambition of France.
Regarding him as a general, his fame is assured as one of the great captains of all time; and it would not become a civilian to add a word to the eulogy268 of great soldiers who alone can comprehend the full measure of his greatness. Yet one or two small points are worthy of attention over and above the reforms, already enumerated269, which were introduced by him in all three arms of the service. First, and perhaps most important, is the blow struck by Marlborough against the whole system, so much favoured by the French, of passive campaigns. It was not, thanks to Dutch deputies and German princelets, as effective as it should have been, but it still marked a step forward in the art of war. It must never be forgotten that we possess only the wreck65 of many of Marlborough's finest combinations, shattered, just as they were entering port, against the rocks of Dutch stupidity and German conceit270. Next, there is a great deal said and written in these days about night marches and the future that lies before them. It will be well to glance also at the past that they have behind them, and to mark with what frequency, with what consummate271 skill, and what unvarying success they were employed under far greater than modern difficulties by Marlborough.
Next let it be observed how thoroughly he understood the British soldier. He took care to feed him well, to pay him regularly, to give him plenty of work, and to keep him under the strictest discipline; and with all this he cherished a genial272 feeling for the men,[589] which showed itself not only in strict injunctions to watch over their comfort but in acts of personal kindness kindly273 bestowed274. The magic of his personality made itself felt among his men far beyond the scope of mere275 military duty. His soldiers, as the Recruiting Acts can testify, were for the most part the scum of the nation. Yet they not only marched and fought with a steadiness beyond all praise, but actually became reformed characters and left the army sober, self-respecting men.[487] Marlborough, despite his lapses into treachery as a politician, was a man of peculiar sensitiveness and delicacy276. He had a profound distaste for licentiousness277 either in language or in action, and he contrived278 to instil279 a like distaste into his army. His force did not swear terribly in Flanders, as King William's had before it, and although the annual supply of recruits brought with it necessarily an annual infusion280 of crime, yet the moral tone of the army was singularly high. Marlborough's nature was not of the hard, unbending temper of Wellington's. The Iron Duke had a heart so steeled by strong sense, duty, and discipline that it but rarely sought relief in a burst of passionate281 emotion. Marlborough was cast in a very different mould. He too, like Wellington, was endowed with a strong common sense that in itself amounted to genius, and possessed in the most trying moments a serenity282 and calm that was almost miraculous283. But there was no coldness in his serenity, nothing impassive in his calm. He was sensitive to a fault; and though his temper might remain unchangeably sweet and his speech unalterably placid284 and courteous285, his face would betray the anxiety and worry which his tongue had power to conceal77.[488] With such a temperament286 there was a bond of humanity between him and his men that was lacking in Wellington. Great as Wellington was, the Iron Duke's army could never have nicknamed him the Old Corporal.
The epithet287 Corporal suggests comparison with the Little Corporal, who performed such marvels288 with the French Army. Undoubtedly the name was in both cases a mark of the boundless289 confidence and devotion which the two men could evoke290 from their troops, and which they could turn to such splendid account in their operations. Marlborough could make believe that he was meant to throw away his entire army and yet be sure of its loyalty291; Napoleon could throw away whole hosts, desert them, and command the unaltered trust of a new army. In both the personal fascination292 was an extraordinary power; but here the resemblance ends. Napoleon, for all his theatrical293 tricks, had no heart nor tenderness in him, and could not bear the intoxication294 of success. Marlborough never suffered triumph to turn his head, to diminish his generosity295 towards enemies, to tempt108 him from the path of sound military practice, or to obscure his unerring insight into the heart of things. Twice his plans were opposed as too adventurous296 by Eugene, first when he wished to hasten the battle of Malplaquet, and secondly when he would have masked Lille and advanced straight into France; but even assuming, as is by no means certain, that in both instances Eugene was right, there is no parallel here to the gambling297 spirit which pervaded298 the latter enterprises of Napoleon. "Marlborough," said Wellington, "was remarkable for his clear, cool, steady understanding," and this quality was one which never deserted299 him. Nevertheless, if there be one attribute which should be chosen as supremely300 characteristic of the man, it is that which William Pitt selected as the first requisite301 of a statesman—patience; "patience," as the Duke himself once wrote to Godolphin, "which can overcome all things";[489] patience which, as may be seen in a hundred passages during the war, was possessed by him in such measure that it appears almost godlike. These are the qualities which mark the sanity302 of perfect genius, that distinguish a[591] Milton from a Shelley, a Nelson from a Dundonald, and a Marlborough from a Peterborough; and it is in virtue303 of these, indicating as they do the perfect balance of transcendent ability, that Marlborough takes rank with the mightiest304 of England's sons, with Shakespeare, with Bacon, and with Newton, as "the greatest statesman and the greatest general that this country or any other country has produced."
END OF VOL. I
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44 denuded | |
adj.[医]变光的,裸露的v.使赤裸( denude的过去式和过去分词 );剥光覆盖物 | |
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45 positively | |
adv.明确地,断然,坚决地;实在,确实 | |
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46 rampant | |
adj.(植物)蔓生的;狂暴的,无约束的 | |
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47 unwilling | |
adj.不情愿的 | |
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48 expend | |
vt.花费,消费,消耗 | |
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49 briefly | |
adv.简单地,简短地 | |
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50 inquiry | |
n.打听,询问,调查,查问 | |
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51 superfluous | |
adj.过多的,过剩的,多余的 | |
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52 coercion | |
n.强制,高压统治 | |
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53 fatigue | |
n.疲劳,劳累 | |
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54 remarkable | |
adj.显著的,异常的,非凡的,值得注意的 | |
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55 fortresses | |
堡垒,要塞( fortress的名词复数 ) | |
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56 trenches | |
深沟,地沟( trench的名词复数 ); 战壕 | |
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57 oozing | |
v.(浓液等)慢慢地冒出,渗出( ooze的现在分词 );使(液体)缓缓流出;(浓液)渗出,慢慢流出 | |
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58 marshy | |
adj.沼泽的 | |
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59 epidemic | |
n.流行病;盛行;adj.流行性的,流传极广的 | |
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60 entirely | |
ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
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61 peculiar | |
adj.古怪的,异常的;特殊的,特有的 | |
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62 bounty | |
n.慷慨的赠予物,奖金;慷慨,大方;施与 | |
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63 prospect | |
n.前景,前途;景色,视野 | |
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64 shipwreck | |
n.船舶失事,海难 | |
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65 wreck | |
n.失事,遇难;沉船;vt.(船等)失事,遇难 | |
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66 insufficient | |
adj.(for,of)不足的,不够的 | |
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67 misery | |
n.痛苦,苦恼,苦难;悲惨的境遇,贫苦 | |
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68 appalling | |
adj.骇人听闻的,令人震惊的,可怕的 | |
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69 confinement | |
n.幽禁,拘留,监禁;分娩;限制,局限 | |
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70 Portuguese | |
n.葡萄牙人;葡萄牙语 | |
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71 brutality | |
n.野蛮的行为,残忍,野蛮 | |
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72 havoc | |
n.大破坏,浩劫,大混乱,大杂乱 | |
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73 wrought | |
v.引起;以…原料制作;运转;adj.制造的 | |
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74 trifling | |
adj.微不足道的;没什么价值的 | |
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75 possessed | |
adj.疯狂的;拥有的,占有的 | |
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76 undoubtedly | |
adv.确实地,无疑地 | |
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77 conceal | |
v.隐藏,隐瞒,隐蔽 | |
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78 concealed | |
a.隐藏的,隐蔽的 | |
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79 overdue | |
adj.过期的,到期未付的;早该有的,迟到的 | |
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80 bungling | |
adj.笨拙的,粗劣的v.搞糟,完不成( bungle的现在分词 );笨手笨脚地做;失败;完不成 | |
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81 temperate | |
adj.温和的,温带的,自我克制的,不过分的 | |
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82 pecuniary | |
adj.金钱的;金钱上的 | |
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83 sham | |
n./adj.假冒(的),虚伪(的) | |
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84 miserable | |
adj.悲惨的,痛苦的;可怜的,糟糕的 | |
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85 lapses | |
n.失误,过失( lapse的名词复数 );小毛病;行为失检;偏离正道v.退步( lapse的第三人称单数 );陷入;倒退;丧失 | |
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86 marshes | |
n.沼泽,湿地( marsh的名词复数 ) | |
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87 invalided | |
使伤残(invalid的过去式与过去分词形式) | |
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88 commissioners | |
n.专员( commissioner的名词复数 );长官;委员;政府部门的长官 | |
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89 pointed | |
adj.尖的,直截了当的 | |
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90 incompetence | |
n.不胜任,不称职 | |
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91 inaccessible | |
adj.达不到的,难接近的 | |
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92 shameful | |
adj.可耻的,不道德的 | |
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93 gaol | |
n.(jail)监狱;(不加冠词)监禁;vt.使…坐牢 | |
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94 offenders | |
n.冒犯者( offender的名词复数 );犯规者;罪犯;妨害…的人(或事物) | |
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95 enlistment | |
n.应征入伍,获得,取得 | |
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96 roster | |
n.值勤表,花名册 | |
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97 condemned | |
adj. 被责难的, 被宣告有罪的 动词condemn的过去式和过去分词 | |
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98 secondly | |
adv.第二,其次 | |
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99 sweepings | |
n.笼统的( sweeping的名词复数 );(在投票等中的)大胜;影响广泛的;包罗万象的 | |
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100 sweeping | |
adj.范围广大的,一扫无遗的 | |
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101 gaols | |
监狱,拘留所( gaol的名词复数 ) | |
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102 multiplication | |
n.增加,增多,倍增;增殖,繁殖;乘法 | |
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103 precedent | |
n.先例,前例;惯例;adj.在前的,在先的 | |
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104 insolvent | |
adj.破产的,无偿还能力的 | |
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105 debtors | |
n.债务人,借方( debtor的名词复数 ) | |
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106 procure | |
vt.获得,取得,促成;vi.拉皮条 | |
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107 levy | |
n.征收税或其他款项,征收额 | |
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108 tempt | |
vt.引诱,勾引,吸引,引起…的兴趣 | |
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109 specially | |
adv.特定地;特殊地;明确地 | |
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110 exempted | |
使免除[豁免]( exempt的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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111 franchise | |
n.特许,特权,专营权,特许权 | |
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112 apparently | |
adv.显然地;表面上,似乎 | |
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113 stimulus | |
n.刺激,刺激物,促进因素,引起兴奋的事物 | |
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114 zeal | |
n.热心,热情,热忱 | |
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115 deter | |
vt.阻止,使不敢,吓住 | |
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116 determined | |
adj.坚定的;有决心的 | |
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117 quelled | |
v.(用武力)制止,结束,镇压( quell的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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118 slain | |
杀死,宰杀,杀戮( slay的过去分词 ); (slay的过去分词) | |
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119 indictment | |
n.起诉;诉状 | |
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120 flails | |
v.鞭打( flail的第三人称单数 );用连枷脱粒;(臂或腿)无法控制地乱动;扫雷坦克 | |
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121 abounded | |
v.大量存在,充满,富于( abound的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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122 contented | |
adj.满意的,安心的,知足的 | |
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123 enlisting | |
v.(使)入伍, (使)参军( enlist的现在分词 );获得(帮助或支持) | |
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124 convening | |
召开( convene的现在分词 ); 召集; (为正式会议而)聚集; 集合 | |
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125 diligent | |
adj.勤勉的,勤奋的 | |
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126 noted | |
adj.著名的,知名的 | |
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127 stature | |
n.(高度)水平,(高度)境界,身高,身材 | |
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128 conniving | |
v.密谋 ( connive的现在分词 );搞阴谋;默许;纵容 | |
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129 withhold | |
v.拒绝,不给;使停止,阻挡 | |
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130 withholding | |
扣缴税款 | |
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131 bribes | |
n.贿赂( bribe的名词复数 );向(某人)行贿,贿赂v.贿赂( bribe的第三人称单数 );向(某人)行贿,贿赂 | |
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132 levying | |
征(兵)( levy的现在分词 ); 索取; 发动(战争); 征税 | |
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133 climax | |
n.顶点;高潮;v.(使)达到顶点 | |
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134 batch | |
n.一批(组,群);一批生产量 | |
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135 decided | |
adj.决定了的,坚决的;明显的,明确的 | |
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136 tenure | |
n.终身职位;任期;(土地)保有权,保有期 | |
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137 indirectly | |
adv.间接地,不直接了当地 | |
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138 scourge | |
n.灾难,祸害;v.蹂躏 | |
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139 severely | |
adv.严格地;严厉地;非常恶劣地 | |
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140 abetting | |
v.教唆(犯罪)( abet的现在分词 );煽动;怂恿;支持 | |
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141 lash | |
v.系牢;鞭打;猛烈抨击;n.鞭打;眼睫毛 | |
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142 lashes | |
n.鞭挞( lash的名词复数 );鞭子;突然猛烈的一击;急速挥动v.鞭打( lash的第三人称单数 );煽动;紧系;怒斥 | |
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143 uncommon | |
adj.罕见的,非凡的,不平常的 | |
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144 isle | |
n.小岛,岛 | |
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145 frightful | |
adj.可怕的;讨厌的 | |
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146 embarked | |
乘船( embark的过去式和过去分词 ); 装载; 从事 | |
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147 exhausted | |
adj.极其疲惫的,精疲力尽的 | |
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148 sedulously | |
ad.孜孜不倦地 | |
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149 legitimate | |
adj.合法的,合理的,合乎逻辑的;v.使合法 | |
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150 deductions | |
扣除( deduction的名词复数 ); 结论; 扣除的量; 推演 | |
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151 deduction | |
n.减除,扣除,减除额;推论,推理,演绎 | |
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152 strictly | |
adv.严厉地,严格地;严密地 | |
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153 injustice | |
n.非正义,不公正,不公平,侵犯(别人的)权利 | |
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154 abolition | |
n.废除,取消 | |
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155 unity | |
n.团结,联合,统一;和睦,协调 | |
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156 grievance | |
n.怨愤,气恼,委屈 | |
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157 grievances | |
n.委屈( grievance的名词复数 );苦衷;不满;牢骚 | |
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158 recurrence | |
n.复发,反复,重现 | |
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159 leaven | |
v.使发酵;n.酵母;影响 | |
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160 outrageous | |
adj.无理的,令人不能容忍的 | |
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161 Christian | |
adj.基督教徒的;n.基督教徒 | |
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162 virago | |
n.悍妇 | |
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163 sergeant | |
n.警官,中士 | |
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164 lamentable | |
adj.令人惋惜的,悔恨的 | |
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165 curiously | |
adv.有求知欲地;好问地;奇特地 | |
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166 dishonoured | |
a.不光彩的,不名誉的 | |
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167 distinguished | |
adj.卓越的,杰出的,著名的 | |
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168 systematically | |
adv.有系统地 | |
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169 scruple | |
n./v.顾忌,迟疑 | |
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170 defrauding | |
v.诈取,骗取( defraud的现在分词 ) | |
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171 creditors | |
n.债权人,债主( creditor的名词复数 ) | |
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172 extort | |
v.勒索,敲诈,强要 | |
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173 infamous | |
adj.声名狼藉的,臭名昭著的,邪恶的 | |
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174 unwillingness | |
n. 不愿意,不情愿 | |
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175 rebuke | |
v.指责,非难,斥责 [反]praise | |
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176 connivance | |
n.纵容;默许 | |
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177 compassion | |
n.同情,怜悯 | |
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178 scattered | |
adj.分散的,稀疏的;散步的;疏疏落落的 | |
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179 inadequate | |
adj.(for,to)不充足的,不适当的 | |
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180 fixed | |
adj.固定的,不变的,准备好的;(计算机)固定的 | |
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181 withdrawn | |
vt.收回;使退出;vi.撤退,退出 | |
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182 drawn | |
v.拖,拉,拔出;adj.憔悴的,紧张的 | |
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183 civilians | |
平民,百姓( civilian的名词复数 ); 老百姓 | |
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184 civilian | |
adj.平民的,民用的,民众的 | |
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185 constables | |
n.警察( constable的名词复数 ) | |
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186 delinquents | |
n.(尤指青少年)有过失的人,违法的人( delinquent的名词复数 ) | |
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187 gentry | |
n.绅士阶级,上层阶级 | |
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188 rascality | |
流氓性,流氓集团 | |
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189 lieutenant | |
n.陆军中尉,海军上尉;代理官员,副职官员 | |
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190 fictitious | |
adj.虚构的,假设的;空头的 | |
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191 subscription | |
n.预订,预订费,亲笔签名,调配法,下标(处方) | |
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192 utterly | |
adv.完全地,绝对地 | |
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193 treasury | |
n.宝库;国库,金库;文库 | |
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194 liquidation | |
n.清算,停止营业 | |
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195 perverted | |
adj.不正当的v.滥用( pervert的过去式和过去分词 );腐蚀;败坏;使堕落 | |
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196 killing | |
n.巨额利润;突然赚大钱,发大财 | |
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197 duel | |
n./v.决斗;(双方的)斗争 | |
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198 proprietary | |
n.所有权,所有的;独占的;业主 | |
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199 ostensible | |
adj.(指理由)表面的,假装的 | |
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200 approbation | |
n.称赞;认可 | |
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201 considerably | |
adv.极大地;相当大地;在很大程度上 | |
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202 advancement | |
n.前进,促进,提升 | |
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203 superseded | |
[医]被代替的,废弃的 | |
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204 irresistible | |
adj.非常诱人的,无法拒绝的,无法抗拒的 | |
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205 incur | |
vt.招致,蒙受,遭遇 | |
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206 expenditure | |
n.(时间、劳力、金钱等)支出;使用,消耗 | |
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207 Amended | |
adj. 修正的 动词amend的过去式和过去分词 | |
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208 administrative | |
adj.行政的,管理的 | |
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209 entail | |
vt.使承担,使成为必要,需要 | |
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210 isolation | |
n.隔离,孤立,分解,分离 | |
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211 inevitably | |
adv.不可避免地;必然发生地 | |
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212 supreme | |
adj.极度的,最重要的;至高的,最高的 | |
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213 aggregation | |
n.聚合,组合;凝聚 | |
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214 avowed | |
adj.公开声明的,承认的v.公开声明,承认( avow的过去式和过去分词) | |
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215 wholesale | |
n.批发;adv.以批发方式;vt.批发,成批出售 | |
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216 precisely | |
adv.恰好,正好,精确地,细致地 | |
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217 dreaded | |
adj.令人畏惧的;害怕的v.害怕,恐惧,担心( dread的过去式和过去分词) | |
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218 annually | |
adv.一年一次,每年 | |
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219 amalgamation | |
n.合并,重组;;汞齐化 | |
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220 scotch | |
n.伤口,刻痕;苏格兰威士忌酒;v.粉碎,消灭,阻止;adj.苏格兰(人)的 | |
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221 paraphernalia | |
n.装备;随身用品 | |
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222 ordnance | |
n.大炮,军械 | |
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223 jealousy | |
n.妒忌,嫉妒,猜忌 | |
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224 retention | |
n.保留,保持,保持力,记忆力 | |
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225 rigidly | |
adv.刻板地,僵化地 | |
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226 rigid | |
adj.严格的,死板的;刚硬的,僵硬的 | |
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227 conscientiously | |
adv.凭良心地;认真地,负责尽职地;老老实实 | |
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228 disclaimed | |
v.否认( disclaim的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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229 mustered | |
v.集合,召集,集结(尤指部队)( muster的过去式和过去分词 );(自他人处)搜集某事物;聚集;激发 | |
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230 inflicted | |
把…强加给,使承受,遭受( inflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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231 ashore | |
adv.在(向)岸上,上岸 | |
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232 inefficiency | |
n.无效率,无能;无效率事例 | |
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233 inevitable | |
adj.不可避免的,必然发生的 | |
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234 hatred | |
n.憎恶,憎恨,仇恨 | |
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235 jurisdiction | |
n.司法权,审判权,管辖权,控制权 | |
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236 monk | |
n.和尚,僧侣,修道士 | |
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237 reigns | |
n.君主的统治( reign的名词复数 );君主统治时期;任期;当政期 | |
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238 countersigned | |
v.连署,副署,会签 (文件)( countersign的过去式 ) | |
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239 advent | |
n.(重要事件等的)到来,来临 | |
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240 consort | |
v.相伴;结交 | |
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241 exalted | |
adj.(地位等)高的,崇高的;尊贵的,高尚的 | |
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242 faction | |
n.宗派,小集团;派别;派系斗争 | |
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243 musters | |
v.集合,召集,集结(尤指部队)( muster的第三人称单数 );(自他人处)搜集某事物;聚集;激发 | |
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244 embarkation | |
n. 乘船, 搭机, 开船 | |
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245 forfeiture | |
n.(名誉等)丧失 | |
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246 clemency | |
n.温和,仁慈,宽厚 | |
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247 detention | |
n.滞留,停留;拘留,扣留;(教育)留下 | |
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248 decency | |
n.体面,得体,合宜,正派,庄重 | |
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249 abjured | |
v.发誓放弃( abjure的过去式和过去分词 );郑重放弃(意见);宣布撤回(声明等);避免 | |
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250 disappearance | |
n.消失,消散,失踪 | |
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251 musket | |
n.滑膛枪 | |
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252 muskets | |
n.火枪,(尤指)滑膛枪( musket的名词复数 ) | |
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253 deviation | |
n.背离,偏离;偏差,偏向;离题 | |
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254 savagely | |
adv. 野蛮地,残酷地 | |
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255 armour | |
(=armor)n.盔甲;装甲部队 | |
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256 thoroughly | |
adv.完全地,彻底地,十足地 | |
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257 thereby | |
adv.因此,从而 | |
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258 artillerist | |
炮手,炮兵,炮术家 | |
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259 cannon | |
n.大炮,火炮;飞机上的机关炮 | |
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260 strenuously | |
adv.奋发地,费力地 | |
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261 skilfully | |
adv. (美skillfully)熟练地 | |
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262 devoted | |
adj.忠诚的,忠实的,热心的,献身于...的 | |
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263 nurtured | |
养育( nurture的过去式和过去分词 ); 培育; 滋长; 助长 | |
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264 corruption | |
n.腐败,堕落,贪污 | |
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265 prey | |
n.被掠食者,牺牲者,掠食;v.捕食,掠夺,折磨 | |
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266 partisan | |
adj.党派性的;游击队的;n.游击队员;党徒 | |
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267 administrator | |
n.经营管理者,行政官员 | |
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268 eulogy | |
n.颂词;颂扬 | |
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269 enumerated | |
v.列举,枚举,数( enumerate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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270 conceit | |
n.自负,自高自大 | |
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271 consummate | |
adj.完美的;v.成婚;使完美 [反]baffle | |
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272 genial | |
adj.亲切的,和蔼的,愉快的,脾气好的 | |
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273 kindly | |
adj.和蔼的,温和的,爽快的;adv.温和地,亲切地 | |
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274 bestowed | |
赠给,授予( bestow的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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275 mere | |
adj.纯粹的;仅仅,只不过 | |
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276 delicacy | |
n.精致,细微,微妙,精良;美味,佳肴 | |
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277 licentiousness | |
n.放肆,无法无天 | |
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278 contrived | |
adj.不自然的,做作的;虚构的 | |
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279 instil | |
v.逐渐灌输 | |
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280 infusion | |
n.灌输 | |
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281 passionate | |
adj.热情的,热烈的,激昂的,易动情的,易怒的,性情暴躁的 | |
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282 serenity | |
n.宁静,沉着,晴朗 | |
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283 miraculous | |
adj.像奇迹一样的,不可思议的 | |
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284 placid | |
adj.安静的,平和的 | |
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285 courteous | |
adj.彬彬有礼的,客气的 | |
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286 temperament | |
n.气质,性格,性情 | |
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287 epithet | |
n.(用于褒贬人物等的)表述形容词,修饰语 | |
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288 marvels | |
n.奇迹( marvel的名词复数 );令人惊奇的事物(或事例);不平凡的成果;成就v.惊奇,对…感到惊奇( marvel的第三人称单数 ) | |
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289 boundless | |
adj.无限的;无边无际的;巨大的 | |
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290 evoke | |
vt.唤起,引起,使人想起 | |
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291 loyalty | |
n.忠诚,忠心 | |
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292 fascination | |
n.令人着迷的事物,魅力,迷恋 | |
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293 theatrical | |
adj.剧场的,演戏的;做戏似的,做作的 | |
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294 intoxication | |
n.wild excitement;drunkenness;poisoning | |
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295 generosity | |
n.大度,慷慨,慷慨的行为 | |
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296 adventurous | |
adj.爱冒险的;惊心动魄的,惊险的,刺激的 | |
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297 gambling | |
n.赌博;投机 | |
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298 pervaded | |
v.遍及,弥漫( pervade的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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299 deserted | |
adj.荒芜的,荒废的,无人的,被遗弃的 | |
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300 supremely | |
adv.无上地,崇高地 | |
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301 requisite | |
adj.需要的,必不可少的;n.必需品 | |
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302 sanity | |
n.心智健全,神智正常,判断正确 | |
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303 virtue | |
n.德行,美德;贞操;优点;功效,效力 | |
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304 mightiest | |
adj.趾高气扬( mighty的最高级 );巨大的;强有力的;浩瀚的 | |
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