1760.
With such a plague in his midst Murray might well feel apprehensive16 for the safety of Quebec against the enemy without the walls, for ever since the British occupation of the city the French had made no secret of their intention to recapture it. Murray had established two fortified17 posts a few miles to westward18 of Quebec at Sainte Foy and Old Lorette; while the French had established themselves at St. Augustine, only two days' march from the gates, from which position it was soon necessary to expel them. Petty skirmishes such as this were frequent, but ended always with so easy advantage to the British that the troops began to think themselves invincible19. Repeated intelligence, however, still arrived of French designs against Quebec, vague enough at first, but, as the winter wore on, gradually assuming more definite form. Lévis, the ablest officer left to the French since the fall of Montcalm, was in fact straining every nerve to organise20 and equip a force of overwhelming strength for the purpose. He had full information of the state of Murray's army and knew that he had but to bide21 his time for scurvy to do the best part of his work for him. At the end of March he heard that half of the British were on the sick-list, and the report was not far from the truth. By the middle of April Murray had barely three thousand men fit for duty, while no fewer than seven hundred were lying in the snow-drifts, waiting till spring should unbind the frozen ground to give them a grave.
April 21.
April 26.
April 27.
On the 17th of April Murray, learning that the preparations of the French were complete, occupied the[391] mouth of Cap Rouge22 River to prevent a landing at that point. Four days later Lévis set out with about seven thousand men, half of them regular troops, and a fleet of bateaux escorted by two frigates23 and by several smaller craft. The river was not yet free from ice, the weather was bad, and navigation was difficult; but on the 26th the army, reinforced by the garrisons25 of several outlying stations to nearly nine thousand men, landed at St. Augustine and marched upon the British advanced posts. The British at once fell back from Cap Rouge and Old Lorette upon Sainte Foy. Lévis followed after them all night, despite the difficulties of half-thawed ice and driving rain and tempest, and at daybreak arrived before Sainte Foy to find every house occupied by the British and their cannon26 playing on his columns as they emerged from the forest. Murray, warned by the information of a French gunner, who had been picked up half dead from the floating ice in the St. Lawrence, had marched out with half of the garrison to cover the retreat of his advanced parties. The position which he occupied was strong, and Lévis being ignorant of the weakness of his numbers would not venture to attack, but resolved to wait until nightfall and then move round the British left flank. Murray therefore was able to retire in safety to Quebec, while Lévis occupied Sainte Foy and pushed his light troops forward to Sillery.
April 28.
Murray's position now was none of the pleasantest. The fortifications of Quebec were in no condition to withstand an energetic cannonade, and the ground was still frozen so hard that it was impossible for him to throw up entrenchments, as he had long desired, outside the walls. The only alternative open to him was to sally out and fight Lévis, at odds27 of one against two, and beat him if he could. Murray was young, daring and fired by the example of Wolfe; his army was, as he said, in the habit of beating the enemy;[333] and he had a fine train of artillery28. He therefore resolved to go out and fight. Accordingly at half-past six on the morning[392] of the 28th he marched out of Quebec at the head of all the troops that he could muster29, a bare three thousand men, with three howitzers and twenty field-pieces, and drew them up on the ground which Montcalm had occupied on the famous 13th of September. The force was formed in one line of two brigades, the right or Burton's brigade consisting, from right to left, of the Fifteenth, Fifty-eighth, second battalion30 of the Sixtieth, and Forty-eighth regiments31; the left or Fraser's brigade of the Forty-third, Forty-seventh, Fraser's Highlanders, and the Twenty-eighth. The Thirty-fifth and third battalion of the Sixtieth were posted in reserve in rear of the centre, while the Light Infantry32 and the Provincial33 rangers9 stood wide on the right and left flanks. The field-guns were distributed in pairs to each battalion.
Moving forward to reconnoitre, Murray perceived that the French line was not yet formed. That Lévis had chosen his ground was clear, for he had occupied two block-houses built by the British above Anse du Foulon at the southern edge of the plateau, as well as a house and a fortified windmill at the northern brink34, and had extended his vanguard along the ridge35 between these two points. But the main body was still debouching in columns from Sillery Wood, a mile or more in rear, and two brigades only were as yet deployed36 by the block-house to form the French right wing. Thinking the opportunity favourable37, Murray ordered an immediate38 advance; and his whole line moved forward, the men dragging their guns with them in the intervals39 between battalions40. The ground was for the most part still covered with snow, which in some places was piled up in drifts and everywhere soft and sodden41 with rain; and the tramp of three thousand men soon turned the soil into a sea of mud. Arrived at the ground where Wolfe's army had stood, the line halted, and the guns unlimbering opened so destructive a fire on the French columns that Lévis ordered the battalions of his left to fall back to the woods. The man?uvre was not executed without confusion, and Murray, elated by his apparent[393] success, ordered the line to renew its advance, inclining to its right. This movement, however, brought Burton's brigade on to low ground, where the melting snow was knee-deep and the guns could not be worked with effect. The British Light Infantry attacked the windmill and houses on the French left with great spirit, carried them in spite of a desperate resistance, and pressed on in pursuit of the retreating French. But now the battalions of the French left, no longer checked by the fire of artillery, dashed out of the woods in skirmishing order and falling on the rash pursuers fairly overwhelmed them. Over two hundred of the Light Infantry were killed and wounded, and the few survivors42 hurrying back in confusion upon Burton's brigade prevented it from firing on the advancing enemy. The French seized the opportunity to reform their broken ranks and the combat was hotly maintained for more than an hour, until ammunition43 for the British artillery failed, the tumbrils being immovably fixed44 in the snow-drifts.
On Murray's left his hasty advance was little less disastrous45. The block-houses were indeed carried and held for a time, but the French fell back into the woods only to advance again in overwhelming force when the fire of the British artillery failed, and to extend themselves along the British front and flank. The two battalions of the reserve were called up and the fight was maintained with indomitable stubbornness; but with both flanks turned the efforts of the British were hopeless, and Murray gave the word to fall back. The men, though but two in three of them remained unhurt, were furious at the order. "Damn it, what is falling back but retreating!" they said; but there was no help for it. So first the left brigade and then the right retired46, cursing as they went. Some of the regiments tried to carry off their guns with them, but finding this impossible owing to deep snow and mud spiked47 and abandoned them. The French followed in pursuit, hoping to cut them off from the city; but Lévis perceiving the orderliness of the retreat judged it more prudent48 to recall his troops,[394] and Murray brought back the remnant of his force in safety to Quebec.
So ended the action of Sainte Foy after two hours of stern and bloody49 work. The loss of the British amounted to a thousand killed and wounded or a full third of the entire force. The Fifteenth, Twenty-eighth, and Highlanders[334] were, after the Light Infantry, the greatest sufferers, but in the attenuated50 state of the battalions it is probable that in seven out of the ten there fell at least one man in three. The loss of the French was admitted to have exceeded eight hundred. Altogether it was an unfortunate affair, though it cannot be called discreditable to the troops. Murray was misled by overweening confidence in his men and miscalculation of the spirit of the French. His past experience doubtless partly excused the mistake; but even if he had failed to grasp that Lévis was a man who could restore confidence to demoralised troops, he might at least have guessed that he would bring up fresh regiments, who had not learned to fear the red-coats, to meet him. As things were, he sacrificed the advantages of his position and of his superiority in artillery and found himself shut up within the miserable51 fortifications of Quebec, with his force reduced to twenty-four hundred men, nominally52 fit for duty, but in reality, to use the expressive53 words of one of them, "half-starved scorbutic skeletons."
May 9.
May 16.
Murray, however, rose to the emergency with a spirit worthy54 of a British officer. The troops were at first inclined to break loose from discipline, but Murray hanged the chief offender55, staved in all the rum-barrels of the sutlers and quickly restored order. Then every soul of the garrison fell to work to strengthen the defences. Officers yoked56 themselves to cannon and plied[395] pickaxe and spade, and the men with such an example before them strained themselves to the utmost. In a short time one hundred and fifty guns were mounted and at work on the walls of Quebec, while the French, however they might toil57 at their trenches58 in the stubborn soil of the plateau, had hardly brought up a single cannon to answer them. None the less incessant59 labour and bad food were telling heavily on the enfeebled strength of the garrison, when on the 9th of May the Lowestoft frigate24 sailed up to Quebec with the news that a squadron was at the mouth of the river and would arrive within a few days. The tidings put new heart into the besieged60, though had Lévis ventured on an assault they would have found it hard to repel61 him. On the 15th two more British men-of-war arrived at Quebec, and next morning two frigates sailed up above the city, attacked and destroyed Lévis' ships and with them the French supplies of food and ammunition. That same evening Lévis raised the siege and retreated with precipitation, leaving behind him forty guns, the whole of his material for the siege, and every man of his sick and wounded. Murray marched at dawn to fall upon his rear, but though he captured many stragglers failed to overtake the main body. Thus Quebec was saved; and the advent62 of spring, together with a supply of fresh provisions, soon turned Murray's sickly battalions into an army fit for service in the field.
During these miserable months of cold, privation, and disease Amherst had been maturing his plans for a decisive campaign. Pitt had enjoined63 the capture of Montreal upon him as the principal object, and had resolved to demolish64 the useless fortress65 of Louisburg, thereby66 releasing the garrison for active service.[335] The provincial assemblies were called upon once more to furnish large contingents67 of troops for a supreme68 effort, and the final blow was about to fall. Amherst's design was to invade Canada simultaneously69 from east, west, and south. Murray was to ascend70 the St. Lawrence[396] from Quebec; Brigadier Haviland was to break in by Lake Champlain; and Amherst himself was to lead the main army down the St. Lawrence from Lake Ontario. Of the three lines of advance Amherst's was not only the longest but the most difficult and dangerous, owing to the rapids which obstruct71 the navigation of the St. Lawrence; but on the other hand the movement would cut off the retreat of the French army to westward and force it back upon Montreal, where Haviland and Murray would close in upon it and fairly throttle72 it. The plan was delicate in the extreme and called for the greatest nicety of calculation, for the three armies must start from three different points hundreds of miles apart without possibility of inter-communication, and yet arrive at their goal together, lest the French should concentrate and overwhelm Murray's or Haviland's corps73 in detail. The principal French posts for barring the lines of advance were ?le aux Noix at the head of Lake Ontario, Sorel on the eastern side of Montreal, and La Galette at the head of the rapids of the St. Lawrence.
The year opened ill for Amherst. In March he was compelled to send thirteen hundred men[336] to the south to quell74 a rising of Cherokee Indians; and he had not long communicated his instructions to Murray when he received tidings of the defeat of Sainte Foy. He at once summoned two battalions from Louisburg to reinforce Murray, but it was not until late in June that he was relieved by news of the safety of Quebec. The provincial governments also were as usual a sore trial and the cause of much vexatious delay;[337] but Amherst was a man of tenacity76 and patience who never lost sight of his object nor relaxed his industry for a moment. At length, when midsummer was fully77 past, the net which he had woven began to close round the French.
[397]
July.
August 4.
Murray was the first to move. His garrison had rapidly recovered health and strength, and by July he was able to pick out twenty-two hundred men for the advance on Montreal, while still leaving seventeen hundred behind him for the garrison of Quebec. On the 14th of July his little column embarked78 in thirty-two vessels79 with a number of boats and bateaux, and on the following day set sail up the St. Lawrence, leaving Lord Rollo to follow with the Twenty-second and Fortieth Regiments, which had arrived from Louisburg. Murray advanced slowly, skirmishing with small parties of the enemy which hovered80 about the flotilla on the shore, and disarming81 the inhabitants as he passed. On the 4th of August he reached Three Rivers, where lay a detachment of the French army; but without delaying to attack it, he passed on to Sorel, where Bourlamaque and M. Dumas with some four thousand men were entrenched82 along both banks of the river. These officers had been instructed to follow up the flotilla as it moved, so British and French alike advanced towards Montreal, where Lévis lay with the main French army. Murray, meanwhile, by rigour towards the recalcitrant83 and lenity towards the submissive, persuaded half of Bourlamaque's militia84 to yield up its arms and take an oath of neutrality. By the 24th, being within nine leagues of Montreal, he sent out a party to seek news of Haviland, and then moving up to ?le Sainte Thérése, just below Montreal, he encamped and awaited the coming of his colleagues.
August 27.
Haviland, meanwhile, had embarked in the third week of August at Crown Point, with two battalions of regulars, and with Provincials85 and Indians sufficient to raise his force to thirty-four hundred men. Four days brought him to Bougainville's position at ?le aux Noix, where he landed, erected86 batteries, and opened fire on the fort; while at the same time a party of rangers dragged three guns to the rear of the position and turned them upon Bougainville's sloops87 of war, which got under way in all haste and stranded88 in the next[398] bend of the river. Thus Bougainville's communications with the next post, St. John's, down the river Richelieu, were severed89, and, as Amherst had foreseen,[338] he was compelled to abandon the island. He joined M. Roquemaure at St. John's with infinite difficulty by a night march through the forest; and both officers falling back from St. John's and Chambly waited with Bourlamaque on the banks of the St. Lawrence, where their force melted away fast through desertion. Haviland opened communications with Murray, and both awaited the approach of Amherst.
August 26.
Sept.
Sept. 5.
The main army had assembled at Oswego during July, Amherst himself arriving on the 9th, but it was not until the first week of August that the last of the appointed regiments appeared at the rendezvous90. The force consisted of eight weak battalions of British, numbering less than six thousand men, with four thousand five hundred Provincials and seven hundred Indians, or about eleven thousand in all. The flotilla for the transport of the army was made up of nearly eight hundred whale-boats and bateaux, and was escorted by gun-boats. On the 10th of August the entire force was embarked and by the 15th it had reached Oswegatchie or La Galette, on the site of the present Ogdensburg. Here a French brig of ten guns was attacked and captured by the gun-boats, and the flotilla pursued its way among the Thousand Islands. On an islet at the head of the rapids stood a French post named Fort Lévis, with a garrison of three hundred men, which Amherst forthwith invested, and after three days' cannonade reduced to surrender. Repair of the fort and of his boats detained him until the 30th, and on the 31st the expedition entered upon the most critical of its work, the descent of the rapids. On the 1st of September the flotilla was compelled to proceed in single file, but all went well until the 4th, when the most dangerous of the rapids was reached. On that day over sixty boats were wrecked[399] or damaged and eighty-four men were drowned: but the passage was accomplished91 without molestation92 from the enemy, though large numbers of Canadians were on the watch on the banks. The next day was consumed in repairs, and on the 6th, the last rapid having been passed, the boats glided93 down to La Chine, nine miles from Montreal, on the left bank of the St. Lawrence. Here the army landed unopposed, marched straight upon Montreal and encamped beneath the walls on the eastern side: while Haviland on the 8th arrived on the southern shore against Amherst's camp. Amherst was a little late, having been delayed by the resistance of Fort Lévis. Had he been content to ignore it and simply to cut it off from Montreal, he, Murray and Haviland would have met, punctual to a day, on the 29th of August. As it was the junction94 was sufficiently95 complete, and the work of the campaign was practically done.
Sept. 8.
Bougainville, Bourlamaque, and Roquemaure had crossed over to Montreal with the few regular troops remaining with them, for the whole of their militia had melted away, and even the regulars had been greatly reduced by desertion. Thus the army assembled at Montreal, the sole force that remained for the defence of Canada, amounted to barely twenty-five hundred men, demoralised in order, in spirit, and in discipline. Around the city lay an hostile army of seventeen thousand men; the fortifications were contemptible96 except for defence against Indians, and Amherst's cannon were already moving up from La Chine. The French Governor called a council of war, which resolved that resistance was hopeless. Articles of capitulation were accordingly drawn97 up, and carried on the 7th by Bougainville to Amherst. The condition on which the French laid greatest stress was that they should march out with the honours of war; but this Amherst flatly refused. The troops, he said, must lay down their arms and serve no further during the present war: the French had played so inhuman98 a[400] part in stirring up the Indians to treachery and barbarity of every kind, that he was determined99 to make an example of them. It is probable that the General referred only to the massacre100 of the wounded after the defeats at Fort William Henry, Ticonderoga, and the Monongahela; but the reckoning to be paid went back to earlier times. There were the wrongs, the encroachment101 and the double-dealing of a full century to be redressed102; and the time for payment was come. In vain the French pleaded for easier terms: Amherst, a man not easily turned from his purpose, remained inflexible103. Accordingly on the 8th of September, despite expostulation which rose almost to the point of mutiny on the part of Lévis, the capitulation was signed, and half a continent passed into the hands of Great Britain.
Meanwhile, as if to crown the whole work and to redeem104 all past failings and misfortunes, the expedition against the Cherokee Indians had been brilliantly successful. Trifling105 though the affair may seem in comparison with Amherst's momentous106 operations in the north, it marked the banishment107 of the panic fear of Indians which had followed on the defeat of Braddock. The command was entrusted108 to Colonel Montgomery, and the force committed to him was four hundred of the First Royals, seven hundred of his own Highlanders, and a strong body of Provincials. Starting from Charlestown, Carolina, Montgomery marched up one hundred and fifty miles to the township of Ninety-six, so called because it was supposed to be ninety-six miles from the township of Keowee, and pushed forward thence for four days through dense109 forest and mountainous country without finding any sign of Indians. Concluding therefore that the Cherokees were unaware110 of his advance, he left all tents and baggage behind and made a forced march to surprise the savages112 before they could escape. The main body of the Indians, however, retired before he could reach them; and he could accomplish no more than the destruction of crops[401] and villages, after which he returned to a fort on the frontier, having traversed no less than sixty miles over a most difficult country without a halt. It was then resolved to begin the work anew and to make a fresh advance into the forest. On this occasion the Indians lay in wait for the British in a wooded valley and burst upon them suddenly, as they had upon Braddock, with hideous113 whooping114 and howling, and a scattered115 but deadly fire of rifles. The grenadiers and Light Infantry at once plunged116 into the forest to engage them, while the Highlanders hastened round their rear to cut off their retreat; and after a sharp action of an hour the Indians were put to flight with great slaughter117. This engagement cost the British over eighty men killed and wounded, twice as many as Amherst had lost by lead and steel during the whole of his advance from Oswego to Montreal. But the mere118 comparison of casualties is of small moment. The really weighty matter is that British officers had learned to face the difficulties which had been fatal to Braddock, and to overcome them with a light heart.
It now remained for Amherst to enforce the capitulation on the French posts of the west. The occupation of Detroit, Miamis, and Michillimackinac was entrusted to Rogers, the partisan119, with his rangers, who in the course of the winter hauled down the ensign of the Bourbons and hoisted120 the British flag in its place. There was still to be trouble with these remote stations, but it was not to come immediately, nor directly from the French. The rest of the General's work was principally administrative121. Generous terms were granted to the inhabitants, and every precaution was taken to protect them against the Indian allies of the British. Amherst issued a general order appealing to his troops not to disgrace their victory by any unsoldierlike behaviour or appearance of inhumanity; and the army responded to the appeal with a heartiness122 which amazed the Canadians. A month after the capitulation the General could report that British soldiers and Canadian peasants were joining[402] their provisions and messing together, and that when he had ordered soldiers to leave their scattered quarters so as to be closer to their companies, the people had begged that they might not be moved.[339] Such was not the fashion in which the French were wont123 to treat a captured territory.
Here then for the present we may take leave of Amherst. Pitt, as shall presently be seen, had further tasks for him, which were to be executed as usual quietly and thoroughly. The fame of the man is lost in that of Wolfe, and yet it was he, not Wolfe, that was the conqueror124 of Canada. The criticism usually passed upon him is that he was sure but slow, and to some extent it is justified125 by facts. Yet it should be remembered that, when he took over the command, affairs in North America were in extreme confusion and disorder126, and that the work assigned to him was, on a far larger and more formidable scale, that which had fallen to Cumberland in 1745. Braddock had started everything in the wrong direction. Not only had he quarrelled with the Provincials and failed to instruct his troops aright, but he had deliberately127 forced them to follow wrong methods. Loudoun, again, had not improved relations with the provincial assemblies either by his correspondence with them or by his military operations. Finally Abercromby's imbecility at Ticonderoga had sacrificed hundreds of valuable lives, disgusted the colonists128, and heightened the reputation gained by the French at the Monongahela. Then Amherst took the whole of the confused business in hand, and from that moment all went smoothly129 and well; so smoothly indeed that people quite forgot that it had ever gone otherwise. Yet his difficulties with the Provincials were not less than those of his predecessors130 nor less trying to his patience than to theirs; nay131, even the good-will of the colonists was sometimes as embarrassing to him as their obstruction132. It must not be forgotten, moreover, that the atmosphere of young communities, such as were[403] then the North American colonies, is most noxious133 to discipline. Americans, as their latest military effort has proved, do not yet understand the meaning of the term; the colonists of Australia and New Zealand, which have no such religious traditions as America, have but the vaguest conception of its significance. Thus when Amherst returned from the conquest of Louisburg to Boston, not all his efforts could prevent the inhabitants of that godly city from filling his men with rum; and the same spirit of indiscipline doubtless haunted the army through all the long and dreary134 months of winter-quarters. There was, again, the additional complication that in the matter of forest-fighting the British had much to learn from the Provincials; and it fell to Amherst to teach his troops greater freedom and independence in action without simultaneous relaxation135 of discipline. He overcame all these obstacles, however, in his quiet, methodical way. Discipline never failed; for Amherst, though no martinet136, could be inexorably severe. Special corps of light troops and of marksmen were organised, and the drill of the whole army was modified to suit new conditions. It was in fact Amherst who showed the way to the reform afterwards carried out by Sir John Moore at Shorncliffe, of reducing the depth of the ranks to two men only. Such a formation would have diminished Wolfe's difficulties and materially have strengthened his dispositions137 on the plains of Abraham: but apparently138 so important an innovation never occurred to him. Amherst never fought a great action, so his improvements were never put to the test; but this does not impair139 his credit as a soldier of forethought and originality140.
But the most remarkable141 quality in Amherst was his talent for organisation142. The difficulties of transport in the Canada of his day were appalling143. "Canada," says the American historian Parkman, "was fortified with vast outworks of defence in the savage111 forests, marshes144, and mountains that encompassed145 her, where the thoroughfares were streams choked with fallen[404] trees and obstructed146 by cataracts147. Never was the problem of moving troops encumbered148 by artillery and baggage a more difficult one. The question was less how to fight an enemy than how to get at him." It was just this problem which Amherst's industry and perseverance149 had power to solve. We read of his launching forth on to Lake George with a flotilla of eight hundred boats and an army of eleven thousand men, and all sounds simple and straightforward150 enough. Yet these boats, setting aside the original task of building and collecting them, had to make several journeys to carry the necessary stores and provisions from Albany to the head of the lake, while every one of them, together with its load, required to be hauled overland from three to six miles through forest and swamp from the carrying-place on the Mohawk to Wood Creek151. The same provision against the same difficulties were necessary on a smaller scale for Prideaux's attack on Niagara, and, under conditions of special embarrassment152, for Stanwix's advance to the Ohio; while over and above this, there was marine153 transport and all necessaries for the expedition to Quebec to be provided, so as to enable Wolfe to proceed on his mission fully equipped and without delay. Add to this burden of work endless correspondence with the various provinces, as well as constant friction154, obstruction, and general dilatoriness155, and it becomes apparent that for all his slowness Amherst accomplished no small feat75 when he achieved the conquest of Canada in two campaigns.
The whole problem was in truth one of organisation, and Amherst was the man to solve it, for he was a great military administrator156. Cautious undoubtedly157 he was in the field, but it would be absurd to contend that a man who took ten thousand men down the rapids of the St. Lawrence, with the dry comment that the said rapids were "more frightful158 than dangerous,"[340] was wanting in enterprise or audacity159. His career as a general in the field was short, and his crowning campaign,[405] having achieved its end without a general action, has little fame. Such is the penalty of bloodless operations, though they be the masterpiece of a mighty160 genius. Austerlitz is a name familiar to thousands who know nothing of the capitulation of Ulm. So Amherst to the majority of Englishmen is but a name: as though it were a small thing for a colonel taken straight from the classic fields of Flanders to cross the Atlantic to a savage wilderness161, assume command of disheartened troops and the direction of discordant162 colonists, and quietly and deliberately to organise victory. He was the greatest military administrator produced by England since the death of Marlborough, and remained the greatest until the rise of Wellington.
Authorities.—The history of the French in Canada and of the long struggle between them and the English for the mastery of the continent has been admirably written in a series of volumes by Francis Parkman. Following in his footsteps through the original papers in the Record Office (C.O., America and West Indies, vols. lxiii., lxv., lxxiv.-lxxvi., lxxxi.-xciv., xcix.; W. O. Orig. Corres., vols. xiii.-xv.), through the Bouquet163 and Haldimand Papers, and through other English material, I have found little or nothing to glean164, while the information which he has gathered from American sources is most valuable. The histories of Mante and Entick give a general account of the operations. Knox's Journal is one of the most valuable sources of information. Other authorities will be found given in detail by Parkman. Readers who are familiar with his works will have no difficulty in apprehending165 my obligations to him, which I wish to acknowledge to the full.
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1
thoroughly
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adv.完全地,彻底地,十足地 | |
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2
pillage
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v.抢劫;掠夺;n.抢劫,掠夺;掠夺物 | |
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3
insufficient
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adj.(for,of)不足的,不够的 | |
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4
sentries
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哨兵,步兵( sentry的名词复数 ) | |
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5
nuns
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n.(通常指基督教的)修女, (佛教的)尼姑( nun的名词复数 ) | |
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6
sledges
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n.雪橇,雪车( sledge的名词复数 )v.乘雪橇( sledge的第三人称单数 );用雪橇运载 | |
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7
forth
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adv.向前;向外,往外 | |
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8
muskets
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n.火枪,(尤指)滑膛枪( musket的名词复数 ) | |
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9
rangers
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护林者( ranger的名词复数 ); 突击队员 | |
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10
afflicted
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使受痛苦,折磨( afflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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11
scourge
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n.灾难,祸害;v.蹂躏 | |
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12
garrison
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n.卫戍部队;驻地,卫戍区;vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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13
entirely
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ad.全部地,完整地;完全地,彻底地 | |
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14
procure
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vt.获得,取得,促成;vi.拉皮条 | |
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15
scurvy
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adj.下流的,卑鄙的,无礼的;n.坏血病 | |
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16
apprehensive
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adj.担心的,恐惧的,善于领会的 | |
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17
fortified
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adj. 加强的 | |
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18
westward
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n.西方,西部;adj.西方的,向西的;adv.向西 | |
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19
invincible
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adj.不可征服的,难以制服的 | |
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20
organise
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vt.组织,安排,筹办 | |
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21
bide
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v.忍耐;等候;住 | |
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22
rouge
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n.胭脂,口红唇膏;v.(在…上)擦口红 | |
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23
frigates
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n.快速军舰( frigate的名词复数 ) | |
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24
frigate
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n.护航舰,大型驱逐舰 | |
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25
garrisons
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守备部队,卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
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26
cannon
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n.大炮,火炮;飞机上的机关炮 | |
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27
odds
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n.让步,机率,可能性,比率;胜败优劣之别 | |
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28
artillery
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n.(军)火炮,大炮;炮兵(部队) | |
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29
muster
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v.集合,收集,鼓起,激起;n.集合,检阅,集合人员,点名册 | |
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30
battalion
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n.营;部队;大队(的人) | |
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31
regiments
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(军队的)团( regiment的名词复数 ); 大量的人或物 | |
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32
infantry
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n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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33
provincial
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adj.省的,地方的;n.外省人,乡下人 | |
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34
brink
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n.(悬崖、河流等的)边缘,边沿 | |
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35
ridge
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n.山脊;鼻梁;分水岭 | |
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36
deployed
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(尤指军事行动)使展开( deploy的过去式和过去分词 ); 施展; 部署; 有效地利用 | |
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37
favourable
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adj.赞成的,称赞的,有利的,良好的,顺利的 | |
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38
immediate
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adj.立即的;直接的,最接近的;紧靠的 | |
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39
intervals
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n.[军事]间隔( interval的名词复数 );间隔时间;[数学]区间;(戏剧、电影或音乐会的)幕间休息 | |
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40
battalions
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n.(陆军的)一营(大约有一千兵士)( battalion的名词复数 );协同作战的部队;军队;(组织在一起工作的)队伍 | |
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41
sodden
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adj.浑身湿透的;v.使浸透;使呆头呆脑 | |
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42
survivors
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幸存者,残存者,生还者( survivor的名词复数 ) | |
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43
ammunition
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n.军火,弹药 | |
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44
fixed
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adj.固定的,不变的,准备好的;(计算机)固定的 | |
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45
disastrous
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adj.灾难性的,造成灾害的;极坏的,很糟的 | |
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46
retired
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adj.隐退的,退休的,退役的 | |
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47
spiked
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adj.有穗的;成锥形的;有尖顶的 | |
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48
prudent
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adj.谨慎的,有远见的,精打细算的 | |
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49
bloody
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adj.非常的的;流血的;残忍的;adv.很;vt.血染 | |
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50
attenuated
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v.(使)变细( attenuate的过去式和过去分词 );(使)变薄;(使)变小;减弱 | |
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51
miserable
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adj.悲惨的,痛苦的;可怜的,糟糕的 | |
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52
nominally
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在名义上,表面地; 应名儿 | |
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53
expressive
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adj.表现的,表达…的,富于表情的 | |
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54
worthy
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adj.(of)值得的,配得上的;有价值的 | |
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55
offender
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n.冒犯者,违反者,犯罪者 | |
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56
yoked
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结合(yoke的过去式形式) | |
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57
toil
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vi.辛劳工作,艰难地行动;n.苦工,难事 | |
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58
trenches
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深沟,地沟( trench的名词复数 ); 战壕 | |
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59
incessant
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adj.不停的,连续的 | |
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60
besieged
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包围,围困,围攻( besiege的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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61
repel
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v.击退,抵制,拒绝,排斥 | |
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62
advent
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n.(重要事件等的)到来,来临 | |
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63
enjoined
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v.命令( enjoin的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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64
demolish
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v.拆毁(建筑物等),推翻(计划、制度等) | |
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65
fortress
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n.堡垒,防御工事 | |
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66
thereby
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adv.因此,从而 | |
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67
contingents
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(志趣相投、尤指来自同一地方的)一组与会者( contingent的名词复数 ); 代表团; (军队的)分遣队; 小分队 | |
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68
supreme
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adj.极度的,最重要的;至高的,最高的 | |
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69
simultaneously
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adv.同时发生地,同时进行地 | |
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70
ascend
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vi.渐渐上升,升高;vt.攀登,登上 | |
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71
obstruct
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v.阻隔,阻塞(道路、通道等);n.阻碍物,障碍物 | |
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72
throttle
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n.节流阀,节气阀,喉咙;v.扼喉咙,使窒息,压 | |
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73
corps
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n.(通信等兵种的)部队;(同类作的)一组 | |
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74
quell
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v.压制,平息,减轻 | |
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75
feat
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n.功绩;武艺,技艺;adj.灵巧的,漂亮的,合适的 | |
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76
tenacity
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n.坚韧 | |
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77
fully
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adv.完全地,全部地,彻底地;充分地 | |
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78
embarked
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乘船( embark的过去式和过去分词 ); 装载; 从事 | |
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79
vessels
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n.血管( vessel的名词复数 );船;容器;(具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的)人 | |
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80
hovered
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鸟( hover的过去式和过去分词 ); 靠近(某事物); (人)徘徊; 犹豫 | |
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81
disarming
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adj.消除敌意的,使人消气的v.裁军( disarm的现在分词 );使息怒 | |
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82
entrenched
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adj.确立的,不容易改的(风俗习惯) | |
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83
recalcitrant
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adj.倔强的 | |
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84
militia
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n.民兵,民兵组织 | |
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85
provincials
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n.首都以外的人,地区居民( provincial的名词复数 ) | |
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86
ERECTED
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adj. 直立的,竖立的,笔直的 vt. 使 ... 直立,建立 | |
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87
sloops
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n.单桅纵帆船( sloop的名词复数 ) | |
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88
stranded
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a.搁浅的,进退两难的 | |
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89
severed
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v.切断,断绝( sever的过去式和过去分词 );断,裂 | |
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90
rendezvous
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n.约会,约会地点,汇合点;vi.汇合,集合;vt.使汇合,使在汇合地点相遇 | |
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91
accomplished
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adj.有才艺的;有造诣的;达到了的 | |
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92
molestation
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n.骚扰,干扰,调戏;折磨 | |
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93
glided
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v.滑动( glide的过去式和过去分词 );掠过;(鸟或飞机 ) 滑翔 | |
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94
junction
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n.连接,接合;交叉点,接合处,枢纽站 | |
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95
sufficiently
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adv.足够地,充分地 | |
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96
contemptible
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adj.可鄙的,可轻视的,卑劣的 | |
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97
drawn
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v.拖,拉,拔出;adj.憔悴的,紧张的 | |
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98
inhuman
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adj.残忍的,不人道的,无人性的 | |
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99
determined
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adj.坚定的;有决心的 | |
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100
massacre
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n.残杀,大屠杀;v.残杀,集体屠杀 | |
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101
encroachment
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n.侵入,蚕食 | |
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102
redressed
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v.改正( redress的过去式和过去分词 );重加权衡;恢复平衡 | |
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103
inflexible
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adj.不可改变的,不受影响的,不屈服的 | |
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104
redeem
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v.买回,赎回,挽回,恢复,履行(诺言等) | |
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105
trifling
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adj.微不足道的;没什么价值的 | |
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106
momentous
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adj.重要的,重大的 | |
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107
banishment
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n.放逐,驱逐 | |
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108
entrusted
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v.委托,托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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109
dense
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a.密集的,稠密的,浓密的;密度大的 | |
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110
unaware
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a.不知道的,未意识到的 | |
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111
savage
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adj.野蛮的;凶恶的,残暴的;n.未开化的人 | |
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112
savages
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未开化的人,野蛮人( savage的名词复数 ) | |
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113
hideous
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adj.丑陋的,可憎的,可怕的,恐怖的 | |
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114
whooping
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发嗬嗬声的,发咳声的 | |
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115
scattered
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adj.分散的,稀疏的;散步的;疏疏落落的 | |
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116
plunged
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v.颠簸( plunge的过去式和过去分词 );暴跌;骤降;突降 | |
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117
slaughter
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n.屠杀,屠宰;vt.屠杀,宰杀 | |
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118
mere
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adj.纯粹的;仅仅,只不过 | |
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119
partisan
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adj.党派性的;游击队的;n.游击队员;党徒 | |
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120
hoisted
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把…吊起,升起( hoist的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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121
administrative
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adj.行政的,管理的 | |
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122
heartiness
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诚实,热心 | |
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123
wont
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adj.习惯于;v.习惯;n.习惯 | |
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124
conqueror
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n.征服者,胜利者 | |
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125
justified
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a.正当的,有理的 | |
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126
disorder
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n.紊乱,混乱;骚动,骚乱;疾病,失调 | |
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127
deliberately
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adv.审慎地;蓄意地;故意地 | |
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128
colonists
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n.殖民地开拓者,移民,殖民地居民( colonist的名词复数 ) | |
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129
smoothly
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adv.平滑地,顺利地,流利地,流畅地 | |
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130
predecessors
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n.前任( predecessor的名词复数 );前辈;(被取代的)原有事物;前身 | |
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131
nay
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adv.不;n.反对票,投反对票者 | |
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132
obstruction
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n.阻塞,堵塞;障碍物 | |
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133
noxious
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adj.有害的,有毒的;使道德败坏的,讨厌的 | |
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134
dreary
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adj.令人沮丧的,沉闷的,单调乏味的 | |
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135
relaxation
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n.松弛,放松;休息;消遣;娱乐 | |
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136
martinet
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n.要求严格服从纪律的人 | |
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137
dispositions
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安排( disposition的名词复数 ); 倾向; (财产、金钱的)处置; 气质 | |
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138
apparently
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adv.显然地;表面上,似乎 | |
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139
impair
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v.损害,损伤;削弱,减少 | |
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140
originality
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n.创造力,独创性;新颖 | |
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141
remarkable
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adj.显著的,异常的,非凡的,值得注意的 | |
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142
organisation
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n.组织,安排,团体,有机休 | |
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143
appalling
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adj.骇人听闻的,令人震惊的,可怕的 | |
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144
marshes
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n.沼泽,湿地( marsh的名词复数 ) | |
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145
encompassed
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v.围绕( encompass的过去式和过去分词 );包围;包含;包括 | |
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146
obstructed
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阻塞( obstruct的过去式和过去分词 ); 堵塞; 阻碍; 阻止 | |
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147
cataracts
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n.大瀑布( cataract的名词复数 );白内障 | |
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148
encumbered
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v.妨碍,阻碍,拖累( encumber的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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149
perseverance
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n.坚持不懈,不屈不挠 | |
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150
straightforward
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adj.正直的,坦率的;易懂的,简单的 | |
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151
creek
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n.小溪,小河,小湾 | |
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152
embarrassment
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n.尴尬;使人为难的人(事物);障碍;窘迫 | |
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153
marine
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adj.海的;海生的;航海的;海事的;n.水兵 | |
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154
friction
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n.摩擦,摩擦力 | |
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155
dilatoriness
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n.迟缓,拖延 | |
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156
administrator
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n.经营管理者,行政官员 | |
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157
undoubtedly
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adv.确实地,无疑地 | |
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158
frightful
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adj.可怕的;讨厌的 | |
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159
audacity
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n.大胆,卤莽,无礼 | |
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160
mighty
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adj.强有力的;巨大的 | |
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161
wilderness
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n.杳无人烟的一片陆地、水等,荒漠 | |
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162
discordant
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adj.不调和的 | |
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163
bouquet
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n.花束,酒香 | |
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164
glean
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v.收集(消息、资料、情报等) | |
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165
apprehending
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逮捕,拘押( apprehend的现在分词 ); 理解 | |
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