1761.
Yet for the present no considerable reinforcement was despatched to Ferdinand. A battalion11 from each regiment5 of Guards had indeed been sent to him late in the past campaign, together with the usual drafts to fill up vacancies12. But Pitt had another enterprise in hand as a diversion in Ferdinand's favour. A scheme of the kind had indeed been on the point of execution in the autumn of 1760; and eight thousand men had actually been embarked13 for a secret expedition under General Kingsley, but had been returned to the shore on receipt of the news of Kloster Kampen.[373] In January, however, the same regiments were again warned for service under Major-General Hodgson,[374] and on the 29th of March they sailed from Spithead under convoy14 of ten ships of the line, besides smaller vessels15, under Admiral Keppel, for their unknown destination.[375]
April.
April 22.
On the 7th of April the fleet anchored off the island of Belleisle on the French coast, and on the following day sailed round it looking for an undefended point. Finally Port La Maria on the south-eastern side was selected; the troops were shifted into flat-bottomed boats, and an attempt was made to storm some French entrenchments which covered the landing-place. But the ground was so steep that only sixty men of the [522]Thirty-seventh succeeded in making their way to the top of the heights above the sea, and these after a gallant16 attempt to hold their ground were overpowered by superior numbers. The attempt was therefore abandoned, and the troops were re-embarked, having lost about five hundred men, killed, wounded, and taken. The island was in fact so strong by nature, and so skilfully17 fortified19 by art, that Keppel despaired of a successful descent.[376] The commanders, however, decided20 that, if feint attacks were made on La Maria and Sauzon some footing might be obtained by ascending21 the rocks between them, which being judged inaccessible22 had been left undefended. The attempt was accordingly made on the 22nd and was brilliantly successful. The grenadier-company of the Nineteenth contrived23 to scramble24 up the rocks and to hold its own on the summit until reinforced, when the men charged with the bayonet, drove back the enemy and captured three guns. The French then retired25 into the fortress26 of Palais and proceeded to strengthen the defences; while Hodgson, to his infinite mortification27, was obliged to lie idle for a fortnight, being unable to land his heavy artillery28 owing to continual gales29. At length on the 2nd of May ground was broken, and on the 13th the entrenchments were carried by storm. The French thereupon retired into the citadel30, which after a most gallant defence was compelled on the 7th of June to surrender. The losses of the British throughout the whole of the operations were about seven hundred killed and wounded. Thus Belleisle was secured as a place of refreshment31 for the fleet while engaged in the weary work of blockading the French coast.
Feb.
Any hopes that might have been built on the value of this expedition as a help to Ferdinand were very speedily dissipated. Ferdinand himself had sought, while it was yet mid-winter, to make good the losses of the past campaign by a bold stroke for the recapture of Hesse. Moving out of his winter-quarters on the 11th[523] of February he distributed his army into three columns. The left or eastern column, under Sp?rcke, was designed to march to the Werra and Unstrut, and to join with a detachment of Prussians in an attack upon the Saxons in that quarter; the main or central army, under Ferdinand himself, was to march to the Eder; and the right or westward32 column, which was composed of the troops cantoned in Westphalia under the Hereditary33 Prince, was to advance on Fritzlar, while a separate corps was detached to attempt the capture of Marburg.
March 20.
March 21.
March.
Sp?rcke for his part did his work well and gained a brilliant little victory at Langensalza; but the rest of the scheme went to wreck34. Broglie on learning of Ferdinand's movements left a garrison35 in Cassel and retreated first to Hersfeld, behind the Eder, and finally to the Main. But meanwhile the Hereditary Prince had been delayed for two invaluable36 days by unexpected resistance at Fritzlar; and Ferdinand, though he had driven the enemy for the moment from Hesse, had left Cassel, Ziegenhain, and Marburg, invested indeed but untaken, behind him. He dared not linger to master these places one after another, for the whole country was laid waste, and the strain of hauling all supplies from the Weser was intolerable. The road from Beverungen to the central column of the army was paved with dead horses, the corpses37 tracing the whole line of the advance. He was therefore obliged to hasten on to a district where supplies were still obtainable, trusting that good fortune would throw the strong places into his hands before it was too late. But it was not to be. Broglie quickly concentrated his troops on the Main, summoned twelve thousand men from the Lower Rhine and advanced northward38 to Giessen; whereupon Ferdinand, who had penetrated39 as far south as the Ohm, was compelled to fall back to the Eder. On the following day the Hereditary Prince was attacked by superior numbers at Grünberg and compelled to retreat with loss of two thousand prisoners; and this misfortune neutralised all the advantages so[524] far gained by the enterprise. Ferdinand, therefore, raised the siege of Cassel and fell back with all speed by forced marches; for Broglie had now eighty thousand troops against his own twenty thousand. Arrived at his old position to north of the Diemel he dispersed40 his troops once more into winter-quarters. His stroke had failed; and the operations are interesting chiefly as exemplifying the futility41, in those days of slow communication, of an advance into an enemy's country, unless at least one fortress were first captured as a place of arms. It is easier to understand the reason for the laborious42 sieges of Marlborough and Wellington when it is observed that Ferdinand, though he drove the French before him from end to end of Hesse in a few weeks, was obliged to abandon the whole of it and to retreat because he had left Cassel uncaptured in his rear.
The Allies had suffered so terribly from hardship and exposure during this winter's expedition that it was two months before they were again fit to take the field;[377] and the French, partly from the same cause, partly owing to the magnitude of their preparations, needed little less time than they. The Court of Versailles had, in fact, resolved to make a gigantic effort and to close the war forthwith by employment of an overwhelming force. The army of the Rhine was raised to one hundred thousand men, under the Prince of Soubise, and that of the Main to sixty thousand men under Broglie. Soubise was to advance from the Rhine against Ferdinand early in May; thus forcing the Prince either to abandon Westphalia, together with Münster and Lippstadt, in order to gain time for recuperation of his army, or to march with his troops, still weakened and exhausted43 by the winter's campaign, to fight him. His task in fact was simply to keep Ferdinand's army in motion until Broglie's troops were refreshed, and ready to advance either into Hanover or to Hameln on the[525] Weser. When Broglie thus occupied the attention of Ferdinand, Soubise would find himself with a free hand in a free field. The weak point of the plan was that the two French armies were to act independently, and that the stronger of them was entrusted44 to Soubise, an incompetent45 commander but a favourite with Madame de Pompadour. But in any case the outlook for Ferdinand was formidable, since at the very most he could muster46 but ninety-three thousand men against one hundred and sixty thousand of the French.
April.
May 14.
Soubise duly arrived at Frankfort on the 13th of April and summoned Broglie to discuss matters with him. Then, instead of taking the field early in May, he remained motionless behind the Rhine on various pretexts47 until the beginning of June. Further, he determined48, contrary to the advice given to him at Versailles, to pursue operations to the south of the Lippe, and between that river and the Ruhr, in order to effect a junction49 with Broglie. The motives50 that may have dictated51 this resolution are unknown; but it was conjectured52 that he shrank from engaging so formidable an adversary53 as Ferdinand without a colleague to share the risk and responsibility. Meanwhile Ferdinand, selecting the least exhausted of his troops, sent a corps under the Hereditary Prince to Nottuln, a little to the west of Münster, to watch Soubise, and by great exertions54 contrived within ten weeks to render both his army and his transport fit to take the field. Soubise's army was known to be encumbered56 by a vast train of baggage; one troop of Horse Guards, for instance, with a strength of one hundred and forty men, travelling with no fewer than twelve hundred horses attached to it. So all the forage57 about Münster was destroyed, the inhabitants and their herds58 being provided for by the King's commissaries, and every step was taken to embarrass the French in their advance to the east.
June.
July 1-2.
July 3.
July 4.
July 6.
At length on the 13th of June Soubise crossed the Rhine at Wesel, and arrived ten days later at Unna, a[526] few miles to eastward59 of Dortmund, where he entrenched60 himself, with his front to the east. Ferdinand thereupon concentrated his army on the 19th at Paderborn, leaving twenty thousand men under Sp?rcke on the Diemel to watch Broglie, and a smaller corps of observation before G?ttingen. On the 20th he marched westward, and on the 28th encamped over against Soubise, where he was joined by the corps of the Hereditary Prince. Finding that the French position was too formidable to be attacked, he determined on a bold stroke, made a forced march of thirty hours round Soubise's left flank by Camen, and appeared suddenly at Dortmund full in his rear and across his line of communication. The movement left Soubise free to unite with Broglie; but this was rather an advantage than otherwise to Ferdinand, since the two commanders being on bad terms might neutralise each other, whereas each of them independently was at the head of a stronger army than Ferdinand's. On the 4th of July Ferdinand advanced against the rear of Soubise's camp; whereupon the French General at once moved on, always with the Allies close at his heels, to Soest, where Broglie came to concert with him the junction of the two armies.
July 10.
July.
Broglie himself had on the 29th of June advanced to the Diemel and obliged Sp?rcke to abandon Warburg and to retreat, not without loss of part of his artillery. He had then turned westward upon Paderborn, which he had occupied, and thence to Soest, where his army joined that of Soubise on the 10th of July. The joint61 strength of the two armies at Soest, after deducting62 the detachments made from both of them, was just about one hundred thousand men. Ferdinand's force, after the arrival of Sp?rcke, who had made his way to him from the Diemel with all haste, amounted to no more than sixty thousand men. Even with such odds63 against him, however, Ferdinand stood firm, refusing to cross to the north bank of the Lippe and abandon Lippstadt, as the French commanders had hoped. He[527] was determined that they should fight him for Lippstadt; and they, knowing their adversary, were not too eager to hazard the venture.
After sundry64 small changes and shiftings of position between the 7th and 11th of July Ferdinand made the following dispositions65. General von Sp?rcke with about eight thousand men was left on the north bank of the Lippe at Hersfeld, to watch Prince Xavier of Saxony, who lay with a corps in the vicinity of Paderborn. The main army was encamped on the south bank of the Lippe, with its left resting on the river; from whence the left wing extended to the village of Kirchdünckern on the Ase, a brook66 impassable except by bridges. Vellinghausen, Ferdinand's headquarters, lay midway between the Ase and the Lippe at the foot of a declivity67 called the Dünckerberg. From the Lippe to Vellinghausen the ground was occupied by Wutgenau's corps, of seven battalions68 and five squadrons, all of them German troops. From Vellinghausen to Kirchdünckern the heights were held by Granby's corps, consisting of two battalions of British grenadiers, the Fifth, Twelfth, Twenty-fourth and Thirty-seventh Foot under Brigadier Sandford, Keith's and Campbell's Highlanders, six foreign battalions, the Greys, Seventh and Eleventh Dragoons in one brigade under General Harvey, and eight foreign squadrons, together with a regiment of Hanoverian artillery. From the Ase the position was prolonged to the right along a similar line of heights by the villages of Sud Dünckern and Wambeln to the rear of Werle at Budberg, the whole of the front being covered by a marshy69 brook called the Salzbach. From the Ase to Wambeln the ground was occupied by Anhalt's corps of ten German battalions and the First, Sixth, and Tenth British Dragoons; to the right of Anhalt stood Conway's corps, of three battalions of British Guards with their grenadiers massed into a fourth battalion, Townsend's brigade of the Eighth, Twentieth, Twenty-fifth, and Fiftieth Foot, and the First, Third, and Seventh Dragoon Guards; to[528] the right of Conway stood Howard's corps, consisting of Cavendish's brigade of the Eleventh, Twenty-fifth, Twenty-third, and Fifty-first Foot, two German battalions, the British light batteries and two brigades of Hessian artillery; and finally the extreme right from Wambeln to Hilbeck was held by the Hereditary Prince's corps of twenty-five battalions and twenty-four squadrons of Germans. The Salzbach was an obstacle well-nigh insuperable, the only passage by which the French could cross it being by the village of Scheidingen, opposite to Conway's corps, where an old redoubt, dating from the days of Turenne, still remained to bar the way. The weak point of the position was its right flank which, though more or less protected by marshy ground, lay practically in the air, and could have been turned with little difficulty.
July 15.
The plan of the French commanders, though it took no advantage of this defect, was not ill conceived. Broglie was to attack the corps of Wutgenau and Granby, but particularly that of Granby between the Lippe and the Ase, with his whole force; while Soubise kept the rest of the Allies distracted by an attack on Scheidingen, at the same time sending a cloud of light troops round the right flank of the Allies to Hamm, five miles in their rear, so as to create confusion and embarrass their retreat. The attack was fixed70 for the 13th but was deferred71 for two days; and it was not until the evening of the 15th that Ferdinand was apprised72 of the advance of the French in force against his left. For some reason Wutgenau's corps had been encamped a thousand yards in rear of its position in the line of battle; and although it had received orders at noon, in consequence of suspicious movements by the French, to strike tents and march forward, yet this order had been cancelled. Thus Broglie's attack came upon it as a complete surprise. Granby's corps had only just time to seize its arms and turn out, leaving the tents standing73; the Highlanders indeed hardly emerging from their tents before the French guns opened fire[529] on them. Yet there was no confusion, and Granby's dispositions were so good that he was able to hold his own till Wutgenau's troops came up. The two corps then made a fine defence until darkness put an end to the combat; but none the less the French had succeeded in taking Nordel, a village on Granby's right front, and had made good their footing in Vellinghausen.
Meanwhile Soubise had not yet moved forward against Scheidingen. The time fixed by the Marshals for their decisive attack has been, in fact, the early hours of the 16th, so that Broglie's advance had been premature74. He excused himself by saying that he had intended only to drive in the outposts of the Allies, but that he had been encouraged by his unexpected success to bring forward more troops to hold the ground that he had gained, and that he had accordingly appealed to Soubise to hasten his movements likewise. Had Broglie really pushed his attack home he would probably have succeeded, for the Allies were too weak to stop him and were, moreover, short of ammunition75. But the Marshal was too timid a man to take responsibility on his own shoulders; so instead of making a bold attempt to carry the Dünckerberg, which if successful must have forced Ferdinand to retreat, he stopped short at Vellinghausen, leaving the Allies in their position unmoved.
July 16.
The night passed uneasily in the Allied76 camp. Between the Lippe and the Ase skirmishing never ceased. The road to Hamm was full of waggons77 going and returning with loads of ammunition; Anhalt's corps, together with all the British of Howard's corps, was streaming across the Ase to reinforce Granby; and Conway's and the Hereditary Prince's were extending themselves leftward to cover the ground thus left vacant. For Ferdinand knew Broglie to be his most dangerous antagonist78, and was determined to stop him at all costs by fresh troops. Broglie, on his side, was equally busy replacing the battalions that had already been engaged; and the dawn was no sooner come than his columns deployed79 and attacked in earnest.[530] The ground was so much broken up by hedges and ditches that in many places the troops engaged, though no more than one hundred and fifty yards apart, were unable to see each other, and fired furiously, not without destructive effect, at every puff80 of smoke that betrayed an enemy's presence. From four until eight o'clock this fusillade continued, neither side gaining or losing an inch of ground, until at last it slackened from the sheer exhaustion81 of the men, after more than twelve hours of intermittent82 action.
Meanwhile Broglie looked anxiously for Soubise's demonstration83 against the Allied centre and right, but he looked in vain. Soubise, though he did indeed bring forward troops against Scheidingen, made but a faint attack, often renewed with unchangeable feebleness and as often repulsed84. Then after half an hour's respite85, the fire opened again on the Allied left. Sp?rcke had detached six battalions to Wutgenau from Hersfeld; and the arrival of fresh troops infused new life into the engagement. Broglie too showed symptoms of reviving energy, for two French batteries were observed in motion towards a height opposite the Dünckerberg, from which they might have made havoc86 of Granby's corps. Ferdinand ordered that the height should be carried at all costs; and Maxwell's grenadiers, Keith's and Campbell's Highlanders and four foreign battalions advanced forthwith to storm it. The French were so much exhausted that they appear hardly to have awaited the attack. They broke and fled precipitately87, abandoning their dead, their wounded, and several guns. Maxwell's grenadiers alone made four battalions prisoners; and Broglie, disheartened by his failure and by the apathy88 of Soubise, gave the word to retreat. The ground was too much broken for the action of cavalry89; so he was able to draw off his troops with little loss indeed, but not without shame and disgrace.
July.
Thus ended the battle of Vellinghausen, one of the feeblest ever fought by the French army. The losses were not great on either side for the numbers engaged.[531] Those of the French were reckoned at from five to six thousand men, besides eight colours and nineteen guns; those of the Allies did not reach the figure of sixteen hundred men, of whom over nine-tenths belonged to the corps to the north of the Ase. The brunt of the fighting fell of course on Granby's troops; but the casualties of the British with him little exceeded four hundred men, while those of the British in other parts of the field did not amount to fifty. The victory was in fact trifling90 except for its moral effects; but these were sufficient. The French were humbled91 at the failure of a hundred thousand men against fifty thousand; and Broglie and Soubise, who had left the camp with embraces, returned to it sworn enemies, each bitterly reproaching the other for the loss of the battle. Lastly, Broglie, who possessed92 some military talent and had hitherto been anxious to bring his enemy to action, came to the conclusion that a general engagement with Ferdinand was a thing henceforth not to be courted but to be shunned93.
July 27.
August.
Aug. 16.
Aug. 22.
Aug. 28.
The remainder of the campaign is reckoned to be the finest example of Ferdinand's skill as a general; but it is impossible in this place to sketch94 it in more than the faintest outline. After the action, Soubise made up Broglie's army to forty thousand men, and therewith the two commanders separated; Broglie marching on Paderborn for operations against Hanover and Hesse, while Soubise made for Wesel to threaten Westphalia. The Hereditary Prince was detached to follow Soubise and to harass95 his rear-guard, while Ferdinand marched some thirty miles eastward to Büren, to be ready to move into Hesse and threaten Broglie's communications with Frankfort. At the same time Granby's corps was sent forward to Stadtberg, to drive back a French corps under Stainville, which covered Hesse at the line of the Diemel. At Büren Ferdinand remained, with his eye always on Lippstadt, until the 10th of August; when, Stainville having been forced back to Cassel and Soubise to the Rhine, both at a safe distance from the precious[532] fortress on the Lippe, he marched away to keep watch over Broglie's army. That officer had used his time to advance to H?xter, aiming at the capture of Hameln and the mastery of the line of the Weser, and had detached a corps under Prince Xavier of Saxony into the Principality of G?ttingen. Ferdinand by swift marches brought his army to northward of Broglie's at Reilenkirchen, thus heading him back from Hameln; while a separate corps, which he had sent across the Weser, attacked the French detachments about G?ttingen. The Hereditary Prince, finding nothing to fear from Soubise, also returned from the Rhine to threaten Broglie from the south. The Marshal thereupon crossed the Weser; and Ferdinand, for all his unwillingness96 to move to the east bank of the river, perforce followed him; carefully avoiding an engagement, however, lest Soubise should seize the opportunity to march on Lippstadt. Soubise, finding himself unwatched, moved eastward again towards Hanover; whereupon the Hereditary Prince flew back to look after him, and Ferdinand retiring with the rest of the army to the Diemel, advanced against Broglie's communications with Marburg and Frankfort. This movement brought Broglie back hurriedly to Cassel; whereupon Ferdinand retired quietly to Geismar on the Diemel, having accomplished97 his object of occupying Broglie's attention for weeks and of rendering98 his movements absolutely purposeless, without the risk of an action.
Sept. 20.
It was a whole fortnight before Broglie ventured to return to the east side of the Weser, having meanwhile reinforced Stainville's army for the protection of Hesse, and furnished him with most careful instructions for his guidance. No sooner was the Marshal's back turned, than Ferdinand made a sudden dash upon Stainville just to south of the Diemel, and though he failed to inflict99 any great damage on him, forced him to retire to Cassel and brought Broglie back in all haste from Hanover. Meanwhile the lethargic100 Soubise had made a diversion towards the sea, had actually taken Emden, and was[533] threatening Bremen. The Hereditary Prince was as usual despatched to hunt him back to the Rhine; and Ferdinand's communications with Holland were restored.
October 10.
There still remained some weeks, however, before the campaign could be closed; and Broglie, despite all Ferdinand's activity, was strong enough to detach a corps under Prince Xavier into Brunswick, which captured Wolfenbüttel and bade fair to capture Brunswick itself. The loss of these two fortresses101 would have been serious, since the French could have turned them into bases of operations for the next campaign, when Ferdinand would have found it impossible to attend both to Brunswick and to Lippstadt. He therefore hastened northward at once from the Diemel to save his brother's capital; whereupon Prince Xavier, though Ferdinand had travelled no further than Hameln on his way, at once withdrew from before Brunswick and evacuated102 Wolfenbüttel. Much relieved at the news of this deliverance, Ferdinand halted at Hameln until November, when Soubise went into winter-quarters. He then made a final effort to drive Broglie from the eastern bank of the Weser, but succeeded only in thrusting him back for a short distance from his northernmost post at Einbeck. Broglie then went into winter-quarters along the Leine from G?ttingen to Nordheim, and the Allies followed his example; their chain of posts running from Münster along the line of the Lippe and Diemel, and eastward through the Sollinger Forest to Ferdinand's headquarters at Hildesheim.
So ended this most arduous103 campaign, in which, though overmatched by two to one, Ferdinand had won a victory on the battlefield and lost little or no territory. The exertion55 demanded from his troops by incessant104 and severe marches told heavily upon their efficiency, and the more so since many of the men had been already much weakened by the winter's campaign in Hesse. The waste of the army was in fact appalling105, amounting to no fewer than five-and-twenty thousand out of ninety-five thousand men. Of these some few[534] had been killed in action, considerably106 more had deserted107, still more had been invalided108, and fully18 one-half had died of hardship and disease. It was only at such a price that Ferdinand could make one army do the work of two; and the task would have been beyond even his ability had not one of the commanders matched against him been utterly109 incompetent, and the other hampered110 by constant interference from Versailles. The extreme laxity of discipline among the French also helped him not a little, and served to heighten the moral superiority of his own troops. But, making all such allowance in his favour, the campaign remains111 memorable112 in the annals of war for the consummate113 skill with which Ferdinand kept two armies, jointly114 of double his strength, continually in motion for six months, without permitting them to reap the slightest advantage from their operations.
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1
reign
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| n.统治时期，统治，支配，盛行；v.占优势 | |
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insular
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| adj.岛屿的，心胸狭窄的 | |
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3
patriotism
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| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
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4
portend
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| v.预兆，预示；给…以警告 | |
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5
regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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7
initiated
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| n. 创始人 adj. 新加入的 vt. 开始，创始，启蒙，介绍加入 | |
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8
corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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9
embodied
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| v.表现( embody的过去式和过去分词 )；象征；包括；包含 | |
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10
militia
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| n.民兵，民兵组织 | |
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11
battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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12
vacancies
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| n.空房间( vacancy的名词复数 )；空虚；空白；空缺 | |
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13
embarked
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| 乘船( embark的过去式和过去分词 )； 装载； 从事 | |
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convoy
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| vt.护送，护卫，护航；n.护送；护送队 | |
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15
vessels
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| n.血管( vessel的名词复数 )；船；容器；（具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的）人 | |
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16
gallant
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| adj.英勇的，豪侠的；(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
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17
skilfully
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| adv. (美skillfully)熟练地 | |
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18
fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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19
fortified
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| adj. 加强的 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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ascending
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| adj.上升的，向上的 | |
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inaccessible
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| adj.达不到的，难接近的 | |
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contrived
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| adj.不自然的，做作的；虚构的 | |
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24
scramble
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| v.爬行，攀爬，杂乱蔓延，碎片，片段，废料 | |
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25
retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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fortress
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| n.堡垒，防御工事 | |
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mortification
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| n.耻辱，屈辱 | |
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28
artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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29
gales
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| 龙猫 | |
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30
citadel
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| n.城堡；堡垒；避难所 | |
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31
refreshment
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| n.恢复，精神爽快，提神之事物；（复数）refreshments:点心，茶点 | |
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westward
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| n.西方，西部；adj.西方的，向西的；adv.向西 | |
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hereditary
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| adj.遗传的，遗传性的，可继承的，世袭的 | |
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wreck
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| n.失事，遇难；沉船；vt.(船等)失事，遇难 | |
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35
garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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36
invaluable
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| adj.无价的，非常宝贵的，极为贵重的 | |
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37
corpses
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| n.死尸，尸体( corpse的名词复数 ) | |
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38
northward
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| adv.向北；n.北方的地区 | |
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39
penetrated
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| adj. 击穿的，鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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41
futility
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| n.无用 | |
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42
laborious
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| adj.吃力的，努力的，不流畅 | |
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43
exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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44
entrusted
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| v.委托，托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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45
incompetent
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| adj.无能力的，不能胜任的 | |
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46
muster
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| v.集合，收集，鼓起，激起；n.集合，检阅，集合人员，点名册 | |
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47
pretexts
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| n.借口，托辞( pretext的名词复数 ) | |
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48
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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49
junction
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| n.连接，接合；交叉点，接合处，枢纽站 | |
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50
motives
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| n.动机，目的( motive的名词复数 ) | |
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51
dictated
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| v.大声讲或读( dictate的过去式和过去分词 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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52
conjectured
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| 推测，猜测，猜想( conjecture的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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53
adversary
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| adj.敌手，对手 | |
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54
exertions
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| n.努力( exertion的名词复数 )；费力；（能力、权力等的）运用；行使 | |
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exertion
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| n.尽力，努力 | |
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56
encumbered
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| v.妨碍，阻碍，拖累( encumber的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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57
forage
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| n.(牛马的)饲料，粮草；v.搜寻，翻寻 | |
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herds
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| 兽群( herd的名词复数 )； 牧群； 人群； 群众 | |
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59
eastward
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| adv.向东；adj.向东的；n.东方，东部 | |
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entrenched
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| adj.确立的，不容易改的(风俗习惯) | |
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joint
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| adj.联合的，共同的；n.关节，接合处；v.连接，贴合 | |
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deducting
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| v.扣除，减去( deduct的现在分词 ) | |
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odds
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| n.让步，机率，可能性，比率；胜败优劣之别 | |
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sundry
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| adj.各式各样的，种种的 | |
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dispositions
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| 安排( disposition的名词复数 )； 倾向； （财产、金钱的）处置； 气质 | |
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brook
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| n.小河，溪；v.忍受，容让 | |
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declivity
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| n.下坡，倾斜面 | |
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68
battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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marshy
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| adj.沼泽的 | |
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fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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deferred
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| adj.延期的，缓召的v.拖延，延缓，推迟( defer的过去式和过去分词 )；服从某人的意愿，遵从 | |
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apprised
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| v.告知，通知( apprise的过去式和过去分词 )；评价 | |
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standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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premature
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| adj.比预期时间早的；不成熟的，仓促的 | |
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75
ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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76
allied
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| adj.协约国的；同盟国的 | |
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77
waggons
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| 四轮的运货马车( waggon的名词复数 )； 铁路货车； 小手推车 | |
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antagonist
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| n.敌人，对抗者，对手 | |
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deployed
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| （尤指军事行动）使展开( deploy的过去式和过去分词 )； 施展； 部署； 有效地利用 | |
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80
puff
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| n.一口(气)；一阵(风)；v.喷气，喘气 | |
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81
exhaustion
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| n.耗尽枯竭，疲惫，筋疲力尽，竭尽，详尽无遗的论述 | |
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intermittent
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| adj.间歇的，断断续续的 | |
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83
demonstration
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| n.表明，示范，论证，示威 | |
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84
repulsed
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| v.击退( repulse的过去式和过去分词 )；驳斥；拒绝 | |
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85
respite
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| n.休息，中止，暂缓 | |
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86
havoc
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| n.大破坏，浩劫，大混乱，大杂乱 | |
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87
precipitately
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| adv.猛进地 | |
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88
apathy
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| n.漠不关心，无动于衷；冷淡 | |
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89
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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90
trifling
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| adj.微不足道的；没什么价值的 | |
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humbled
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| adj. 卑下的，谦逊的，粗陋的 vt. 使 ... 卑下，贬低 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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93
shunned
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| v.避开，回避，避免( shun的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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sketch
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| n.草图；梗概；素描；v.素描；概述 | |
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95
harass
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| vt.使烦恼，折磨，骚扰 | |
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96
unwillingness
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| n. 不愿意，不情愿 | |
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97
accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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98
rendering
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| n.表现，描写 | |
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99
inflict
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| vt.(on)把…强加给，使遭受，使承担 | |
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100
lethargic
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| adj.昏睡的，懒洋洋的 | |
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101
fortresses
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| 堡垒，要塞( fortress的名词复数 ) | |
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102
evacuated
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| 撤退者的 | |
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103
arduous
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| adj.艰苦的，费力的，陡峭的 | |
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104
incessant
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| adj.不停的，连续的 | |
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105
appalling
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| adj.骇人听闻的，令人震惊的，可怕的 | |
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106
considerably
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| adv.极大地；相当大地；在很大程度上 | |
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107
deserted
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| adj.荒芜的，荒废的，无人的，被遗弃的 | |
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108
invalided
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| 使伤残（invalid的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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109
utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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110
hampered
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| 妨碍，束缚，限制( hamper的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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111
remains
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| n.剩余物，残留物；遗体，遗迹 | |
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112
memorable
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| adj.值得回忆的，难忘的，特别的，显著的 | |
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113
consummate
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| adj.完美的；v.成婚；使完美 [反]baffle | |
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114
jointly
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| ad.联合地，共同地 | |
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