Before the campaign closed in Germany, the great Minister who had revealed to England for the first time the plenitude of her strength in arms, and had turned that strength to such mighty1 enterprises, was fallen from power. The accession of the new King had brought with it a steady increase in the ascendency of John, Earl of Bute, long a trusted member of his household and now his chief adviser3 and friend. Blameless in private life and by no means lacking in culture or accomplishments4, Bute was both in council and debate a man of distressing5 mediocrity. Possessing neither sense of the ridiculous nor knowledge of his own limitations, and exalted6 by mere7 accident to a position of great influence, he interpreted the caprice of fortune as the reward of merit and aimed at once at the highest office. He was, in fact, one of the many men who, finding it no great exertion8 to climb up the winding9 stairs of a cathedral tower, press on, ducking, stooping, and crawling to the top, to find when they reach it that they dare not look down. Being weak as well as ambitious he was compelled to fall back on intrigue10 in default of ability to help him upward, and having succeeded in displacing Lord Holderness as Secretary of State in March 1761, he turned next to the ousting11 of Pitt himself. The opportunity soon came. The French Court, weary of the war, approached Pitt with proposals for peace. Resolved, as he said, that no Peace of Utrecht should again sully the annals of England, Pitt not only made large demands for the[536] benefit of Britain, but insisted that even a separate peace between Britain and France should not deter12 King George from giving aid to the King of Prussia. Curiously13 enough the negotiation14 was broken off owing precisely15 to one of the most disgraceful concessions16 made at the Peace of Utrecht. The Bourbon King of Spain, Charles the Third, who had succeeded to the throne in 1759, cultivated the friendship of the Bourbon King of France; and the result was a secret treaty of alliance between them, which presently became famous as the Family Compact. Pitt no sooner obtained an inkling of this agreement than he put an end to negotiations17 with France, and advocated immediate18 declaration of war against Spain. As shall presently be seen, he made his preparations, which were effective enough; but above all he desired to strike at Spain while she was still unready for war. The Cabinet, however, was alarmed at so bold a measure, being too blind to see that in such a case aggression19 is the truest precaution. Many of the ministry20 had only with difficulty been persuaded to second Pitt in the lofty language which he had held towards France; and Bute, who abhorred21 all interference with affairs on the Continent, was a leader among the dissentients. Lord Temple alone stood by his great chief, so Pitt, unable to prevail, resigned, and his solitary22 supporter with him. All power passed into the hands of Bute; and within three months Spain, having gained the time that she needed for her military preparations, assumed so offensive a tone that Bute, as Pitt had predicted, was to his huge vexation obliged to declare war against her himself. Such is the fashion in which politicians make difficulties for generals.
1761.
June.
Fortunately the designs of Pitt for the new year against both France and Spain were fully23 matured, and the means of executing them were ready to hand. In June 1761 two new regiments25[378] had been either raised or formed out of existing independent companies,[537] and thirteen more had been added in August and October,[379] thus bringing the number of regiments of the Line up to one hundred and fifteen. The total number of men voted by Parliament for 1762 was little short of one hundred and fifty thousand men, making with the German mercenaries a total of two hundred and fifteen thousand men in British pay. There were thus men in abundance for any enterprise; and the sphere of operations had been marked out by Pitt. The conquest of Canada having been completed by the end of 1760, there was no object in leaving a large number of troops unemployed26 in America; and as early as in January 1761 Pitt had written to Amherst that some of them would be required in the autumn for the conquest of Dominica, St. Lucia, and Martinique. Amherst was therefore instructed to send two thousand men forthwith to Guadeloupe; to concert with the Governor the means of taking the two first of the islands mentioned; and to despatch27 six thousand more men rather later in the year for the capture of Martinique.[380] Accordingly in the first days of June 1761 transports from America began to drop singly into Guadeloupe, the fleet having been dispersed28 by a storm. By the 3rd of June four ships had arrived, together with Lord Rollo, who had been appointed by Amherst to take the command; and on the following day the whole of these, together with one ship more from Guadeloupe itself, made sail under [538]escort of Sir J. Douglas's squadron to beat back against the trade-wind to Dominica.[381] By noon of the 6th they had arrived before Roseau, where the inhabitants were summoned to surrender. The French replied by manning their batteries and other defences, which included four separate lines of entrenchments, ranged one above another. Rollo landed his men and entered the town; when reflecting that the enemy might be reinforced in the night he resolved, though it was already late, to storm the entrenchments forthwith. He attacked accordingly, and drove out the French in confusion with trifling29 loss to himself. The French commander and his second being both taken prisoners, no further resistance was made; and on the following day Dominica swore allegiance to King George.
Therewith the operations in the West Indies for the time ceased, though the preparations continued always; but, notwithstanding all possible secrecy30, the French in Martinique got wind of the intended attack on that island, and took measures for their defence. Their force was not wholly contemptible31 in so mountainous a country, for it included twelve hundred regular troops, seven thousand local militia33, and four thousand hired privateersmen.[382] The neighbouring English islands did what they could to help the mother country. Antigua sent negroes and part of her old garrison34, the Thirty-eighth Foot, which had never left her since Queen Anne's day; and Barbados raised five hundred negroes and as many white men, which were the more acceptable since that island was, as usual, the rendezvous35 for the expedition.[383] The first troops to arrive in Carlisle Bay were a detachment from Belleisle,[384] where, as well as in America, regiments had been lying idle; and on [539]Christmas Eve appeared the main army from America under command of General Monckton. This was made up of eleven different regiments,[385] besides a few companies of American rangers36. In all, the force entrusted37 to Monckton must have amounted to fully eight thousand men.
1762.
January.
Jan. 24.
On the 5th of January the transports weighed anchor and sailed away to leeward38, under escort of Admiral Rodney's fleet, past the Pitons of St. Lucia, past the port of Castries and the bay which Rodney was twenty years later to make famous, and on the 7th anchored in St. Ann's Bay, just round the southern extremity39 of Martinique, on the western side. Two brigades were then landed in the Anse d'Arlet, a bay farther up the western coast, from which they marched to the south of the bay that forms the harbour of Fort Royal, but, finding the road impracticable for transport of cannon40, were re-embarked41. On the 16th the entire army was landed without loss of a man at Case Navire, a little to the north of Negro Point. This Point forms the northern headland of the harbour, and had at its foot a road leading due east over the mountains to the capital town of Fort Royal,[386] some three miles away. The way was blocked by deep gullies and ravines; while the French had erected43 redoubts at every point of vantage, as well as batteries on a hill beyond, named Morne Tortenson. Monckton was thus compelled to erect44 batteries to silence the French guns before he could advance farther. By the 24th this work was complete, and at daybreak a general attack was made under the fire of the batteries upon the French defences on Morne Tortenson, a party being at the same time detached to turn the enemy's right flank. The turning movement was completely successful; and the redoubts by the sea, on the enemy's left, having been carried, the troops stormed post after post, until at nine o'clock [540]they were in possession not only of the detached redoubts but of the entire position of Morne Tortenson, with its guns and entrenchments. The French retired45 in great confusion, some to Fort Royal and some to Morne Grenier, a still higher hill to the north of Morne Tortenson. Simultaneously46 two brigades under Brigadiers Haviland and Walsh attacked other French posts to the north of Morne Tortenson and, after great difficulty owing to the steepness of the ground, succeeded in driving them also back to Morne Grenier. The losses of the British in this action amounted to thirty-three officers and three hundred and fifty men killed and wounded.
Jan. 25.
On the following day Monckton, being now within range, began to throw up batteries against the citadel47 of Fort Royal, but finding himself much annoyed by the French batteries on Morne Grenier to his left, decided48 that these must first be silenced. Fortunately the enemy saved him from further trouble by taking the offensive. On the afternoon of the 27th they suddenly debouched in three columns from Morne Grenier upon Haviland's brigade and the Light Infantry49 of the army, on Monckton's left, and with unexpected temerity50 ventured to attack. Unhappily for them, one column exposed its flank to the Highlanders and was almost instantly routed. The two remaining columns thereupon gave way, and the whole fled back to Morne Grenier with the British in eager chase. Such was the impetuosity of the pursuers that they plunged51 down into the intervening ravine after the French, and swarming52 up Morne Grenier "by every path, road, and passage where men could run, walk, or creep,"[387] hunted the fugitives53 headlong before them. Night came on, but the British officers would not stop until they had cleared every Frenchman off the hill and captured all the works and cannon. Monckton at once sent off more troops to support the pursuers, and by one o'clock in the morning of the 28th[541] Morne Grenier was securely occupied, at a cost of little more than one hundred British killed and wounded. The batteries on Morne Tortenson were then completed, new batteries were constructed within four hundred yards of the citadel, and on the 3rd of February Fort Royal surrendered. Nine days more sufficed to reduce the rest of the Island, and by the 12th of February Monckton's work was done.[388]
Feb. 26-
March 3.
June.
He at once shipped off detachments to St. Lucia, Grenada, and St. Vincent, which islands fell without resistance, and had made his arrangements for the capture of Tobago also, when he received orders requiring the presence of his troops elsewhere. War had been declared against Spain; Lord Albemarle had been appointed to command an expedition against Havanna; and Amherst had been directed not only to embark42 four thousand men from America to join him, but to collect eight thousand more for an attack on Louisiana.[389] The stroke meditated54 by Pitt three months before was now about to fall. In February 1762 Albemarle's troops embarked; and on the 5th of March he sailed with four regiments only,[390] under convoy55 of Admiral Sir George Pocock, to pick up the remainder of his forces in the West Indies. On the 20th of April he arrived at Barbados, and on the 25th at Fort Royal, Martinique, where he took over from Monckton what he termed "the remains56 of a very fine army," much reduced by sickness, which brought his force to a strength of twelve thousand men of all ranks.[391] Thence continuing his voyage he came on the 6th of June into sight of Havanna. Twelve sail of the line were [542]detached to the mouth of the harbour to block in the Spanish fleet, and on the following day the troops were landed safely a little to the northward57 of the city. On the 8th the army advanced westward58, brushing away a force of militia that stood in its path, and on the same day arrived before the principal defences of Havanna.
July.
The entrance to the harbour of Havanna lies through a channel about two hundred yards wide, which was defended by two forts at its mouth, Fort Moro on the northern shore, and Fort Puntal opposite to it, the town also being situated59 on the southern shore. On the north side the ground rises rather abruptly60 from the harbour into a ridge61 known as the Cavannos, at the end of which stands Fort Moro, abutting62 on the open sea. A detached redoubt on these heights was carried without difficulty on the 11th of June, and, Fort Moro being found after reconnaissance to be surrounded with impenetrable brushwood, the construction of a battery was begun under cover of the trees. The work progressed slowly, for the soil was thin, while the Spanish ships in the harbour caused the besiegers no slight annoyance64; so on the 13th a part of the British force was landed at Chorera, on the other side of the harbour. It was not until July that the British batteries could open a really effective fire, but by the 15th, with the help of the fleet, the enemy's guns were for the time silenced; and since trenches65 were impossible in ground so rocky, approaches to Fort Moro were made of gabions and cotton-bales. Still the work made little progress, for the climate had begun to tell on the troops, and little more than half of the men were fit for duty. Meanwhile the garrison of Fort Moro continued to defend itself with the greatest obstinacy66, due in part to its confidence in the strength of the fort. The ditch at the point of attack was seventy feet deep from the edge of the counterscarp, except in one place, where a narrow ridge of rock made it possible to reach the wall of the fort without scaling-ladders. The only way to[543] surmount67 such an obstacle was to sink a shaft68 and blow the counterscarp into the ditch, but powder was already running short; and Albemarle grew extremely anxious over the issue of his operations.
July 30.
At length on the 27th Colonel Burton arrived from America with three thousand men of the Forty-sixth, Fifty-eighth, Gorham's rangers and Provincial69 troops, having lost five hundred men captured by the French on the voyage. Three days later the mine under the counterscarp was sprung with success, and Fort Moro was carried by storm with trifling loss, the Spaniards offering but little resistance. New batteries were then pushed forward along the shore at the foot of the Cavannos in order to play on the town. On the 10th of August these opened fire and on the same evening silenced Fort Puntal. The Spaniards then proposed a capitulation; and Albemarle, in consideration of their defence, granted them the honours of war, being in truth devoutly70 thankful to obtain possession of Havanna on any terms. His army was melting away rapidly from disease; there was indeed one brigade of four battalions71 which could not muster73 twenty men fit for duty. Albemarle hastened to ship it back to America; but Amherst could spare no more troops to replace these, having already reduced his garrison to a strength of less than four thousand men.[392] Albemarle hoped that rest and better quarters might restore the health of the army after the work of the siege was done; but on the contrary sickness increased. The losses actually caused by the enemy's fire during the siege were rather less than a thousand men killed and wounded, yet by the 18th of October the British had buried over five thousand men dead from sickness alone.[393] Nor did the transfer of the troops from Cuba to America serve to abate74 the plague among them; for the hapless brigade first shipped off by Albemarle lost three hundred and sixty men within a month after its return. Yet at any [544]rate Cuba was taken, and Cuba in those days was reckoned a prize little less rich than India.
June 27.
Sept. 18.
The virtual destruction of the army before Havanna put all ideas of an attack on Louisiana out of the question; and the French seized the opportunity offered by the removal of so many troops from Canada to send a small squadron and fifteen hundred troops against Newfoundland. The British garrison being only one hundred strong could offer no resistance, and the island was accordingly surrendered. Amherst, however, sent his brother with a sufficient force to recover it; and the French after a short defence capitulated as prisoners of war. As Amherst's losses did not exceed fifty men, and the captured French garrison numbered six hundred, the enemy gained little by this brief occupation of Newfoundland.
Walker & Boutall del.
To face page 544.
GUADELOUPE, 1759.
HAVANNA, 1762.
MARTINIQUE, 1762.
BELLEISLE, 1761.
Aug. 1.
Sept. 24.
Sept. 25.
Oct. 4.
Oct. 5.
But in India also there were troops lying idle since the fall of Pondicherry, which could be employed against Spain. In June Admiral Cornish received secret orders for an expedition, which he communicated to the authorities at Calcutta; and on the 1st of August the fleet sailed away to eastward75 with a force of one thousand Europeans, half of them of Draper's regiment24, and two thousand Sepoys, under General Draper. On the 24th of September, after much delay owing to stormy weather and the extremely defective76 condition of Cornish's ships, the expedition entered the bay of Manila and anchored off Fort Cavita. Draper decided not to waste time in reducing the fort, so landed his troops unopposed on the following day through a heavy surf, about a mile and a half from the walls of the city. On the 26th he seized a detached fort which had been abandoned by the Spaniards within two hundred yards of the glacis, and began to construct a battery, while the ships sailed up to draw the fire of the town upon themselves. On the 30th a storeship arrived with entrenching77 tools, but was driven ashore78 on the very same evening by a gale79, and there lay hard and fast. By singular good fortune, however, she had taken the[545] ground at a point where she served exactly to screen the rear of Draper's camp from the Spanish cannon, while her stores were landed with greater speed and safety than would have been possible had she remained afloat; for the gale continued for several days and forbade the passage of boats through the surf. Four days later the battery and the ships opened a furious fire, which in four hours silenced the enemy's guns, and by the next day had made a practicable breach80. That night the Spaniards made a sally upon the British position with a thousand Indians, who, despite their ferocity and daring, were driven back with heavy loss; and at dawn of the 6th Draper's regiment and a party of sailors attacked the breach and carried the fortifications with little difficulty. Thereupon Manila, with the island of Luzon and its dependencies, surrendered to the British, paying four million dollars for ransom81 of the town and of the property contained therein. Thus fell Manila within ten days of the arrival of the British; but the siege though short was attended by much difficulty and hardship. Regular approaches were impracticable owing to the incessant82 rain; while the surf made the landing of troops and stores a matter of extreme labour and peril83. Had not the defences of the town been for the most part feeble and the spirit of the garrison feebler still, the capture of the Philippines would have been no such simple matter. The story of Manila is, however, interesting as a comment on Wentworth's proceedings84 at Carthagena, justifying85 to the full Vernon's predilection86 for a direct assault at the earliest possible moment in all operations against the Spaniard.
Aug. 26.
Yet another expedition brought the British face to face with their new enemy on more familiar ground than Luzon. The Spaniards, on the pretext87 of Portuguese88 friendship with England, in April invaded Portugal, overran the country as far as the Douro from the north, and threw another force against Almeida from the east. The injured kingdom appealed to England for help; and in May orders were sent to Belleisle for the despatch[546] of four regiments of infantry,[394] together with the detachment of the Sixteenth Light Dragoons, to Portugal. Two more regiments were added from Ireland,[395] bringing the total up to about seven thousand men; and simultaneously a number of British officers were sent to take up commands in the Portuguese army. Unfortunately there was some trouble over the selection of a commander; and though the two regiments from Ireland were actually in the Tagus by the first week in May, it was not until June that the rest of the troops arrived, with the Count of Lippe-Bückeburg, the famous artillerist89, as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied90 forces, and Lord Loudoun in command of the British. The operations that followed were so trifling and of so short duration that they are unworthy of detailed92 mention. The Spaniards captured Almeida early in August; and Bückeburg was obliged to stand on the defensive93 and cover Lisbon at the line of the Tagus. Two brilliant little affairs, however, served to lift an officer, who so far was little known, into a prominence94 which was one day to be disastrous95 to himself and to England. This was Brigadier-General John Burgoyne, Colonel of the Sixteenth Light Dragoons, who with four hundred troopers of his regiment surprised the town of Valencia de Alcantara after a forced march of forty-five miles, annihilated96 a regiment of Spanish infantry and captured several prisoners. Not content with this, he a month later surprised the camp of another party of Spaniards at Villa97 Velha, on the south bank of the Tagus, dispersed it with considerable loss and captured six guns, at a cost of but one man killed and ten wounded. Such affairs, which in Ferdinand's army were so common as seldom to be noticed, made Burgoyne and the Sixteenth[396] the heroes of this short campaign; but [547]though the regiment has lived the rest of its life according to this beginning, Burgoyne's career will end for us twenty years hence at Saratoga.
From these scattered98 enterprises against Spain I return to Ferdinand's last campaign against the old enemy in Germany. We left the contending parties in their winter-quarters, the French army of the Rhine cantoned along the river from Cleve to Cologne; the army of the Main extending from Altenkirchen, a little to north of Treves, north-eastward to Cassel and from Cassel south-eastward to Langensalza; and the Allies, facing almost due south, stretched from Münster to Halberstadt. The whole situation was, however, changed in various respects. The French had resolved to throw their principal strength into the army of the Main, which was accordingly raised to eighty thousand men under the command of Soubise and Marshal d'Estrées; Broglie having been recalled to France. The army of the Rhine was reduced proportionately to thirty thousand men under the Prince of Condé. The total numbers of the French, though less than in previous years, still remained far superior to Ferdinand's; but, on the other hand, owing to the change of ministry in England and the reopening of negotiations by Bute, the Court of Versailles was content to hold the ground already gained without attempt at further conquest. Soubise and d'Estrées were therefore instructed to cling fast to Cassel and G?ttingen, to spare the district between the Rhine and the Lahn with a view to winter-quarters, and to destroy the forage99 between the Eder and the Diemel so as to prevent Ferdinand from man?uvring on their flanks and rear.
Ferdinand on his side, though still outmatched by the armies opposed to him, was relatively100 stronger in numbers than in any previous year, having a nominal101 total of ninety-five thousand men ready for the field. Winter-quarters were little disturbed during the early months of 1762, the country having been so much devastated102 that neither side could move, from lack of forage,[548] until the green corn was already grown high. Towards the end of May both armies began to concentrate; and Ferdinand, though much delayed by the negligence103 of the British Ministry in recruiting the British regiments to their right strength, determined104 to be first in the field.
June 18.
June 22.
Having detached a strong corps105 under the Hereditary106 Prince to watch the movements of Condé, he concentrated at Brakel, a little to the east of Paderborn, and advanced to the Diemel, where he posted the main army about Corbeke, with Granby's corps to westward of it at Warburg. Hearing at the same time that the French had left a corps under Prince Xavier on the east of the Weser to invade Hanover, he detached General Lückner with a small force across the river to keep an eye on him, sending also parties to seize the Castle of Zappaburg, some few miles to south-east, to secure communications with Lückner, and to occupy the passes leading from the south of the Diemel into Hesse. Meanwhile, on the 22nd of June, Soubise and d'Estrées moved northward from Cassel with the main body of the army as far as Gr?benstein, fixed107 their headquarters at Wilhelmsthal and halted. The design of this movement is unintelligible108 unless, as is conjectured109 by one writer,[397] they wished simply to amuse themselves at the castle of Wilhelmsthal; but in any case they neglected all necessary precautions. Their right flank rested on the large forest known as the Reinhardswald, and might have been rendered absolutely secure by the occupation of the Zappaburg, which commanded every road through that forest; yet they had suffered this important post to fall into Ferdinand's hands. Again, the occupation of the passes to the south of the Diemel would have secured their front; but here also they had allowed the Allies to be before them. None the less there they remained, careless of all consequences, at Wilhelmsthal; while to tempt32 an active enemy still farther, they stationed a corps under M. de Castries before their right front at Carlsdorff, in absolute[549] isolation110 from their main body. Ferdinand saw his opportunity, and though he could bring but fifty thousand men against their seventy thousand, resolved to strike at once.
June 23.
On the 23rd he recalled Lückner from across the Weser to Gottesbühren, a little to the north of the Zappaburg; and on hearing of his safe arrival at eight o'clock of the same evening, ordered the whole army to be under arms at midnight. For Lückner's corps was but one of the toils111 which he was preparing to draw around the unsuspecting French; and the places for the rest had already been chosen. Sp?rcke, with twelve battalions of Hanoverians and several squadrons, was to advance from the left of the main body, turn a little to the eastward upon Humme after crossing the Diemel, and, marching from thence southward, was to fall upon the right flank and rear of Castries' corps at Hombrechsen. Lückner, with six battalions and seven squadrons, was to march south-west from Gottesbühren through the Zappaburg to Udenhausen, and form up to the left of Sp?rcke on Castries' right rear. Colonel Riedesel was to push forward from the Zappaburg with a body of irregulars to Hohenkirch, on the south and left of Lückner. Meanwhile Ferdinand was to advance with the main body in five columns between Liebenau and Sielen, upon the front of the French principal army, while Granby should move south upon Zierenberg and fall upon its left flank. Supposing that every corps fulfilled its duty exactly in respect of time and place, there was good hope that the entire force of the French might be destroyed.
June 24.
Riedesel and Lückner were punctually in their appointed places at seven o'clock on the morning of the 24th. Sp?rcke's two columns, on emerging from the Reinhardswald at five o'clock, found only two vedettes before them on the heights of Hombrechsen, and ascended112 those heights unopposed. Then, however, not seeing Castries' corps, which, as it chanced, was hidden from them by a wood, they turned to their left[550] instead of to their right, and advanced unconsciously towards the front of the French main army. The startled vedettes galloped113 back to give the alarm; and Castries hurriedly calling his men to arms prepared to retreat. Pushing forward his cavalry114 right and left to screen his movements from Sp?rcke and from Riedesel, Castries quickly set his infantry in order for march; and having contrived115 to hold Sp?rcke at bay for an hour, began his retreat upon Wilhelmsthal and Cassel. Lückner came up as he had been bidden at Udenhausen, but meeting part of Sp?rcke's corps on its march in the wrong direction was fired upon by it; and in the confusion Castries was able to make his escape. Riedesel being weak in numbers could not stop him, though he fell furiously with his hussars upon the rear-guard and cut one regiment of French infantry to pieces; but except for this loss Castries retired with little damage. Thus, as so often happens, failed the most important detail of Ferdinand's elaborate combinations.
Meanwhile the French main army, startled out of its sleep by the sound of the guns about Hombrechsen, was in absolute confusion. Fortunately for the Marshals, the unlucky mistake as to Lückner's corps which had saved Castries, saved them also, since it checked Sp?rcke's advance against their right. Breaking up their camp with amazing rapidity, they formed upon the heights and hastened their baggage away towards Cassel. Lückner, awake to the miscarriage116 of the turning movement on the French right, now begged Kielmansegge, who commanded the left column of Sp?rcke's corps, to hasten with him to Hohenkirchen, from whence a cross way to westward would enable them to bar every road between Wilhelmsthal and Cassel. But Kielmansegge persisted in attacking the right flank of the French main body, despite the fact that it was covered by a brook117 running through a swampy118 valley; and before he could effect his passage over this obstacle, the opportunity for cutting off the French retreat was lost.
[551]
Meanwhile the troops under Ferdinand in the centre advanced against the French front, though very slowly. Sp?rcke's right column formed up on their left, but being out of its right place hampered119 the advance of the rest and caused lamentable120 delay. The French main army, having cleared its baggage out of the way, was falling back in several columns towards Wilhelmsthal, when the appearance of Granby on their left showed them the full extent of their peril. The flower of the French infantry was then collected under M. de Stainville and thrown out on the left to cover the retreat of the main body at any cost; and now the action began in earnest. Taking up a strong position in a wood Stainville prepared to do his utmost. Granby's infantry consisted of three battalions of British Guards, the British grenadiers in three battalions, and the Fifth and Eighth Foot,—some of the finest troops in the British Army—but the fight was long and stubborn. Stainville appears at first to have taken the offensive and to have fallen upon the head of Granby's columns before the whole of his troops had come up, but to have been gradually forced back as more and more of the British battalions advanced into action. French and English came to close quarters, guns were taken and retaken, and for a time two British cannon remained in the hands of the French. Granby, however, seems to have got the upper hand at last, to have surrounded the wood on two sides and to have made his dispositions121 for surrounding it on all sides, when Ferdinand's troops at last came up on Stainville's rear and put an end to the conflict. The gallant123 Frenchman's corps was nearly annihilated; fifteen hundred men were killed and wounded, nearly three thousand surrendered to the Fifth Foot alone,[398] and two battalions only made good their escape. The Allied army[552] advanced a little to the south of Wilhelmsthal; and so the action came to an end.
The losses of the Allies were small, reaching but seven hundred men killed and wounded, of which four hundred and fifty belonged to Granby's corps. The result of the action was in fact a great disappointment, due partly to the mistakes of Sp?rcke and Kielmansegge, partly to the extreme slowness of Ferdinand's advance in the centre. The main body of the Allies indeed seems to have taken five hours to move from Gr?benstein to Wilhelmsthal, a distance of little more than four miles; and the fact would appear to indicate considerable clumsiness on the part of some officer or officers in the handling of their men. Still the fact remained that forty thousand men had attacked seventy thousand and driven them back in confusion; and the French were not a little shamefaced and discouraged over their defeat.
July 1.
July 24.
Aug. 30.
On the night of the action Soubise and d'Estrées fell back across the Fulda and took up a position between Cassel and Lutternberg. Ferdinand therefore ordered Granby's corps to a position near Cassel and sent forward a detachment to clear the enemy from the north bank of the Eder; whereupon the French evacuated125 Fritzlar and retiring across the Fulda took post upon its eastern bank. Both armies remained in this position until the 1st of July, Ferdinand trying always to force the French back, but obliged to act with caution, since Prince Xavier's Saxons had joined the French at Lutternberg and might at any time give trouble on the eastern side of the Weser. Finally on the 24th he boldly attacked the French right at Lutternberg and completely defeated it.[399] The French thereupon fell back to Melsungen on the Fulda, while Ferdinand took up a position opposite to them on the western bank of the river and threatened their communications with Frankfort. The Marshals then summoned Condé from the Rhine, but Ferdinand continued[553] to press their communications so hard that at length they evacuated G?ttingen and retreated by Hersfeld and Fulda to Vilbel, a little to the north of Frankfort; Ferdinand marching parallel with them on their western flank to the Nidda, in the hope, which was disappointed, of preventing their junction126 with Condé. So far he had done well, for he had for the present driven the French armies from Hesse.
Sept. 7.
Sept. 15.
Meanwhile Condé, obedient to orders, had marched towards Frankfort, joining Soubise a little to the south of Friedberg on the 30th of August. The Hereditary Prince, who had followed him closely all the way from the Rhine, attacked him on the same day, apparently127 in ignorance of the presence of Soubise's army, and was repulsed128 with considerable loss. For the next few days the two armies remained inactive, Ferdinand between the Nidder and Nidda with his headquarters at Staden, facing south-west, and the French opposite to him between Friedburg and Butzbach. Such a position, while forces were so unequal, could not continue long; and on the 7th of September the French moved northward by Giessen towards the Eder. Ferdinand, divining that their design was to cut him off from Cassel, which it was his own intention to besiege63, at once hurried northward to stop them. It was a race between the two armies. The French travelled due north by Giessen and Marburg, crossing the Lahn above the latter town. Ferdinand made for Homberg on the north bank of the Ohm, and turning north-westward from thence marched on by Kirchhain and Wetter, where he overtook the French advanced guard. On the following day he offered battle; but Soubise declined, and, turning to the right about, repassed the Lahn and encamped along the line of the Ohm, with his left at Marburg and his right over against Homberg. Ferdinand thereupon took post in full sight of the enemy on the opposite bank of the river, with his left at Homberg and his right extended beyond Kirchhain. This was the position from which he had intended[554] Imhoff to cover Hesse in 1760; and he had no intention now of allowing the French to break through it to Cassel, for he had made up his mind to recover Cassel for himself.
September.
The valley of the Ohm south-eastward from Kirchhain is about eleven hundred yards broad, rising gradually on the east bank of the river to a height called the Galgenberg, and on the western bank to a steep basaltic hill known as the Am?neberg. The Ohm itself between these hills is from twenty to thirty feet wide and from five to seven feet deep, flowing between steep banks. Just to the south of the Am?neberg was a stone bridge by which stood a water-mill, consisting of a massive court with a group of houses. The steep sides of the Am?neberg frown close to it on the northern hand; but to westward the ground rises in a gentle slope, through which a hollow road, covered by an old redoubt, ran down to the mill. The town and castle of the Am?neberg itself was surrounded with a wall and towers strong enough, on the south and south-western sides, to defy all but heavy artillery129. The bridge with the mill and the castle beyond it were for some reason neglected by the Allies. There had been some attempt to secure the bridge itself, and a redoubt had been begun on Ferdinand's side of the river for its defence; but the breastwork was not above three feet high and as many feet thick, so that it could be commanded by an enemy's fire, and the more easily since the western or French bank of the river was the higher. The court of the mill was occupied by but thirteen men; the old redoubt appears not to have been occupied at all; and the garrison of the castle of Am?neberg consisted of a single battalion72 of irregulars only. Yet the Am?neberg was an advanced post over against the enemy's left wing and on the enemy's side of the river; and the possession of the bridge was of vital importance to the Allies, not only to ensure communication with that advanced post, but to bar the advance of the French across the Ohm and to secure to Ferdinand the[555] means of taking the offensive. The carelessness which allowed these points to remain so slenderly guarded is therefore almost inexplicable130.
Sept. 21.
The French were not slow to take advantage of the opening thus afforded to them. On the night of the 20th they invested the castle of the Am?neberg so closely that not a man of the garrison could pass through their lines, and, driving the thirteen men from the mill, occupied the court as well as the old redoubt with light troops. This done they waited till morning, and at six o'clock, under cover of a dense131 mist, opened a heavy fire on the bridge and on the unfinished redoubt beyond it. The men in that redoubt, two hundred Hanoverians, resisted stoutly132, in order to gain time for their supports to come up and for their artillery on the Galgenberg to answer the French batteries. The corps in occupation of the ground immediately before the Brückemühle (for so the mill was named) was Zastrow's of seven battalions, seven squadrons and six guns; while Wangenheim's corps of about the same strength lay on his left, and Granby's[400] on the heights of Kirchhain to his right. Ferdinand on hearing the sound of the firing hastened to the scene of action and found the redoubt still safe, the two hundred Hanoverians having held it stubbornly for two hours until relieved by Zastrow. But meanwhile the French brought forward more guns behind the veil of the mist; and presently thirty pieces of cannon were playing furiously upon the redoubt, while the infantry under cover of the fire renewed their attack on the bridge. Zastrow continued to feed the redoubt with fresh troops, and so held his ground; but the full significance of the attack was not realised until at ten o'clock the mist rolled away, when it was seen by the French dispositions that the enemy was bent133 upon carrying the bridge at any cost. Then at last Ferdinand ordered[556] up Granby's corps from Kirchhain to Zastrow's assistance.
Sept. 22.
Meanwhile the fight waxed hotter. The superiority of the French in artillery made itself felt; nine out of twelve of Zastrow's guns were dismounted by noon, and the rest were silent for want of ammunition134. At length at four o'clock the British Guards and the Highlanders arrived; and twelve German field-pieces attached to Granby's corps came also into action. The French likewise brought up reinforcements and the combat became livelier than ever. So far the reliefs for the garrison in the redoubt had marched down in regular order, but the fire of the French artillery was now so terrible that the men were ordered to creep down singly and dispersed, as best they could. British Guards replaced Hanoverians, and Hessians replaced British Guards; regiment after regiment taking its turn to send men to certain destruction. So the fight wore on till the dusk lowered down and the flashes of the guns turned from yellow to orange and from orange to red. The Hessians piled up the corpses135 of the dead into a rampart and fired on, for the redoubt though untenable must be held at any cost. At seven o'clock the French by a desperate effort carried the passage of the bridge and fought their way close up to the redoubt, but they were met by the same dogged resistance and repulsed; and at eight o'clock, after fourteen hours of severe fighting, they abandoned the attack. Zastrow's and Granby's corps bivouacked about the bridge, and Ferdinand took up his quarters in the mill; but on the next day, none the less, the French after several unsuccessful assaults forced the garrison of Am?neberg to an honourable136 capitulation.
November.
The loss of the Allies in this action was about seven hundred and fifty killed and wounded, more than a third of whom were British; the Scots Guards suffering more heavily than any corps of the troops engaged. The loss of the French rose to twelve hundred men, and the failure of their attack decided the fate of Hesse.[557] Ferdinand, who on his advance southward had left behind a force to blockade Cassel, was able within three weeks to spare troops enough for a regular siege. On the 16th of October the trenches were opened, and on the 1st of November the town surrendered. A few days later came the news that preliminaries of a treaty had been signed. For despite all the successes of the year nothing could deter Bute from his resolution to make peace; and, indeed, knowledge of this fact had latterly made English commanders negligent137 and British troops backward in the field.[401] So with the fall of Cassel the war came to an end.
The terms, including as they did the cession2 by the French of India, except Pondicherry and Chandernagore, of French America, Canada, Tobago, Dominica and St. Vincent, might not seem unfavourable to England. But it was reasonably thought at the time that Goree and Martinique should have been added, though Bute was in such haste to bring the war to an end that it was only as an afterthought that he exacted the cession of Florida by Spain in exchange for Havanna. But the true blot138 on the treaty was the desertion of Frederick the Great and the conclusion of a separate peace, an exhibition of selfishness and folly139 which recalled the Peace of Utrecht. Nevertheless Frederick was able to insist on the conditions from which he had from the first resolved not to recede140, namely the retention141 of all that he had taken from Austria in Silesia. In February 1763 the peace was finally concluded, and Frederick entered Berlin with Ferdinand of Brunswick, who had through five campaigns guarded his right flank, appropriately seated at his right side.
The story of the war in Germany should not be closed without some few words as to Ferdinand, who, little though we know of him, was the greatest commander that led British troops to victory in Europe between Marlborough and Wellington. It was no small feat124 to have fought through five campaigns successfully,[558] always with one army against two, and with at most four men against five. It is true that the conception of his most skilful142 movements may often be traced to Westphalen, the chief of his staff; but it is not every commander who knows when to take advice and how to act on it, or is so sure of the confidence of his troops that he can trust them always to make the best of it. Moreover, he was confronted, though in a smaller degree, with many of the difficulties that afflicted143 Marlborough. His army was not an army of Allies, though generally so styled, but a mercenary army of German troops in the pay of England. So far he had the advantage of the great Duke; but his force was compounded of several different elements, British, Hanoverians, Hessians, Brunswickers and Bückeburgers, who were divided by not a little jealousy144 as to their respective precedence, privileges, and superiority. Of all of these the British gave him the most trouble. Their insular145 contempt for all foreigners was heightened by the knowledge that their comrades were mercenaries paid by their own nation; and they claimed the best quarters, the post of danger and the post of honour on all occasions. In one respect perhaps they did show superiority to the rest of the army, namely when actually on the field of battle; for beyond all doubt theirs is the chief credit for the success at Minden, at Warburg, at Emsdorff, at Wilhelmsthal, and in a lesser146 degree at Vellinghausen. In every action indeed they did well, and at Minden and Emsdorff they accomplished147 what probably no other troops in the army would have attempted. But there were scores of minor148 actions fought during these campaigns by German troops only, which could be matched against any other of their achievements; and there were grave defects which marred149 not a little the general efficiency of the British. In the first place there was a large number of British officers of all ranks from the general to the ensign who, though brave enough, knew nothing of their duty. In the second, as Turenne had noticed a century earlier in[559] Flanders, they were extremely negligent in the matter of outposts, patrols, and guards, owing partly to inexperience, partly to their more luxurious150 life at home, and partly to the contempt of danger and the spirit of gambling151 which is so strong in the race. Frequently Ferdinand, though quite alive to the valour of British troops in action, dared not trust them as advanced parties; whereupon the red-coats themselves, quite confident of their own sufficiency, grumbled152 because the foremost place was not given to them. Such jealousies153 as these gave endless trouble; and the disposition122 of the various corps, particularly of Granby's division of the Guards and Blues154, required careful study as a matter not of military exigency155 but of policy and tact156, lest the various nationalities in the army should fall at variance157 and take to fighting among themselves. Lastly, the British soldiers, taken as a whole, were men of inferior character to the Germans and of less experience in war; and by loose behaviour in quarters and on the march they set a bad example, which came ill from the men that looked down on all the rest of the army.
Such were the troubles which hampered Ferdinand and his staff at every turn; yet under his guidance the machine worked always with the least possible friction158 and the greatest development of power. He was in fact not only a great soldier but a great governor and leader of men. He combined patience, tact, and self-control with a genial159 and hearty160 courtesy, he had the faculty161 of selecting good men for his instruments, and above all he worked without fear or favour in noble singleness of purpose for the common cause. Of his merits as a General his campaigns speak sufficiently162; and it is only necessary to add that their history was thought worthy91 of official study and compilation163 fifty years ago by the Prussian General Staff. British troops may feel proud to have so served under so able a soldier and so great and gallant a man in the campaigns which they fought in Germany for the conquest of their own empire.
[560]
Authorities.—For the expedition to Belleisle there is little beyond the official papers in the Record Office, W.O., Orig. Corres., vol. xxi., and the accounts to be found in such histories as Entick's. The like is true of the operations in Portugal, except that few original papers are to be found in the Record Office. As to Martinique there is again little besides the Official Papers, C. O., America and West Indies, vol. cii., with the letter in the Bouquet164 Papers already quoted. For Havanna there is a printed account of the siege, and the original papers in C. O., America and West Indies, Havanna. For Manila, see Admiral's despatches, East Indies, and the account in Entick. The Annual Register is also a source of information in default of better in all the above expeditions.
For Ferdinand's campaigns, the most readable account is that of Mauvillon, being written in German of rare clearness and simplicity165. There are also the histories of Tempelhof and Archenholtz, La Vie Militaire de Ferdinand, Mémoires de Bourcet, and Westphalen's Feldzüge Herzogs Ferdinand, in which last is printed every document that came to Ferdinand's headquarters, besides a great many more, with quotations166 from all other writers on the subject—an exhaustive work of six huge volumes, without an index. Ferdinand's original letters, with some from Granby and other officers, will be found in the Record Office, F. O. Mil. Auxiliary167 Expeditions, vols. xxviii.-xxxi., xxxiii., xxxiv., xxxvii.-xliv., xlix., l. The letters in the Belvoir Papers, Hist. Manuscript Commission, are disappointing.
Walker & Boutall, del.
To face page 560.
WARBURG, 31st July 1760.
WILHELMSTHAL, 24th June 1762.
Dispositions at the opening
of the attack of the Allies.
VELLINGHAUSEN,
15th 16th July 1761.
The attack of 16th July.
Part of HESSE-CASSEL
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1 mighty | |
adj.强有力的;巨大的 | |
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2 cession | |
n.割让,转让 | |
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3 adviser | |
n.劝告者,顾问 | |
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4 accomplishments | |
n.造诣;完成( accomplishment的名词复数 );技能;成绩;成就 | |
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5 distressing | |
a.使人痛苦的 | |
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6 exalted | |
adj.(地位等)高的,崇高的;尊贵的,高尚的 | |
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7 mere | |
adj.纯粹的;仅仅,只不过 | |
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8 exertion | |
n.尽力,努力 | |
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9 winding | |
n.绕,缠,绕组,线圈 | |
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10 intrigue | |
vt.激起兴趣,迷住;vi.耍阴谋;n.阴谋,密谋 | |
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11 ousting | |
驱逐( oust的现在分词 ); 革职; 罢黜; 剥夺 | |
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12 deter | |
vt.阻止,使不敢,吓住 | |
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13 curiously | |
adv.有求知欲地;好问地;奇特地 | |
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14 negotiation | |
n.谈判,协商 | |
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15 precisely | |
adv.恰好,正好,精确地,细致地 | |
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16 concessions | |
n.(尤指由政府或雇主给予的)特许权( concession的名词复数 );承认;减价;(在某地的)特许经营权 | |
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17 negotiations | |
协商( negotiation的名词复数 ); 谈判; 完成(难事); 通过 | |
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18 immediate | |
adj.立即的;直接的,最接近的;紧靠的 | |
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19 aggression | |
n.进攻,侵略,侵犯,侵害 | |
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20 ministry | |
n.(政府的)部;牧师 | |
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21 abhorred | |
v.憎恶( abhor的过去式和过去分词 );(厌恶地)回避;拒绝;淘汰 | |
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22 solitary | |
adj.孤独的,独立的,荒凉的;n.隐士 | |
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23 fully | |
adv.完全地,全部地,彻底地;充分地 | |
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24 regiment | |
n.团,多数,管理;v.组织,编成团,统制 | |
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25 regiments | |
(军队的)团( regiment的名词复数 ); 大量的人或物 | |
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26 unemployed | |
adj.失业的,没有工作的;未动用的,闲置的 | |
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27 despatch | |
n./v.(dispatch)派遣;发送;n.急件;新闻报道 | |
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28 dispersed | |
adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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29 trifling | |
adj.微不足道的;没什么价值的 | |
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30 secrecy | |
n.秘密,保密,隐蔽 | |
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31 contemptible | |
adj.可鄙的,可轻视的,卑劣的 | |
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32 tempt | |
vt.引诱,勾引,吸引,引起…的兴趣 | |
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33 militia | |
n.民兵,民兵组织 | |
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34 garrison | |
n.卫戍部队;驻地,卫戍区;vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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35 rendezvous | |
n.约会,约会地点,汇合点;vi.汇合,集合;vt.使汇合,使在汇合地点相遇 | |
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36 rangers | |
护林者( ranger的名词复数 ); 突击队员 | |
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37 entrusted | |
v.委托,托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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38 leeward | |
adj.背风的;下风的 | |
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39 extremity | |
n.末端,尽头;尽力;终极;极度 | |
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40 cannon | |
n.大炮,火炮;飞机上的机关炮 | |
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41 embarked | |
乘船( embark的过去式和过去分词 ); 装载; 从事 | |
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42 embark | |
vi.乘船,着手,从事,上飞机 | |
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43 ERECTED | |
adj. 直立的,竖立的,笔直的 vt. 使 ... 直立,建立 | |
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44 erect | |
n./v.树立,建立,使竖立;adj.直立的,垂直的 | |
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45 retired | |
adj.隐退的,退休的,退役的 | |
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46 simultaneously | |
adv.同时发生地,同时进行地 | |
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47 citadel | |
n.城堡;堡垒;避难所 | |
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48 decided | |
adj.决定了的,坚决的;明显的,明确的 | |
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49 infantry | |
n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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50 temerity | |
n.鲁莽,冒失 | |
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51 plunged | |
v.颠簸( plunge的过去式和过去分词 );暴跌;骤降;突降 | |
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52 swarming | |
密集( swarm的现在分词 ); 云集; 成群地移动; 蜜蜂或其他飞行昆虫成群地飞来飞去 | |
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53 fugitives | |
n.亡命者,逃命者( fugitive的名词复数 ) | |
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54 meditated | |
深思,沉思,冥想( meditate的过去式和过去分词 ); 内心策划,考虑 | |
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55 convoy | |
vt.护送,护卫,护航;n.护送;护送队 | |
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56 remains | |
n.剩余物,残留物;遗体,遗迹 | |
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57 northward | |
adv.向北;n.北方的地区 | |
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58 westward | |
n.西方,西部;adj.西方的,向西的;adv.向西 | |
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59 situated | |
adj.坐落在...的,处于某种境地的 | |
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60 abruptly | |
adv.突然地,出其不意地 | |
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61 ridge | |
n.山脊;鼻梁;分水岭 | |
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62 abutting | |
adj.邻接的v.(与…)邻接( abut的现在分词 );(与…)毗连;接触;倚靠 | |
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63 besiege | |
vt.包围,围攻,拥在...周围 | |
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64 annoyance | |
n.恼怒,生气,烦恼 | |
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65 trenches | |
深沟,地沟( trench的名词复数 ); 战壕 | |
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66 obstinacy | |
n.顽固;(病痛等)难治 | |
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67 surmount | |
vt.克服;置于…顶上 | |
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68 shaft | |
n.(工具的)柄,杆状物 | |
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69 provincial | |
adj.省的,地方的;n.外省人,乡下人 | |
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70 devoutly | |
adv.虔诚地,虔敬地,衷心地 | |
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71 battalions | |
n.(陆军的)一营(大约有一千兵士)( battalion的名词复数 );协同作战的部队;军队;(组织在一起工作的)队伍 | |
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72 battalion | |
n.营;部队;大队(的人) | |
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73 muster | |
v.集合,收集,鼓起,激起;n.集合,检阅,集合人员,点名册 | |
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74 abate | |
vi.(风势,疼痛等)减弱,减轻,减退 | |
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75 eastward | |
adv.向东;adj.向东的;n.东方,东部 | |
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76 defective | |
adj.有毛病的,有问题的,有瑕疵的 | |
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77 entrenching | |
v.用壕沟围绕或保护…( entrench的现在分词 );牢固地确立… | |
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78 ashore | |
adv.在(向)岸上,上岸 | |
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79 gale | |
n.大风,强风,一阵闹声(尤指笑声等) | |
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80 breach | |
n.违反,不履行;破裂;vt.冲破,攻破 | |
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81 ransom | |
n.赎金,赎身;v.赎回,解救 | |
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82 incessant | |
adj.不停的,连续的 | |
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83 peril | |
n.(严重的)危险;危险的事物 | |
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84 proceedings | |
n.进程,过程,议程;诉讼(程序);公报 | |
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85 justifying | |
证明…有理( justify的现在分词 ); 为…辩护; 对…作出解释; 为…辩解(或辩护) | |
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86 predilection | |
n.偏好 | |
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87 pretext | |
n.借口,托词 | |
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88 Portuguese | |
n.葡萄牙人;葡萄牙语 | |
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89 artillerist | |
炮手,炮兵,炮术家 | |
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90 allied | |
adj.协约国的;同盟国的 | |
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91 worthy | |
adj.(of)值得的,配得上的;有价值的 | |
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92 detailed | |
adj.详细的,详尽的,极注意细节的,完全的 | |
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93 defensive | |
adj.防御的;防卫的;防守的 | |
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94 prominence | |
n.突出;显著;杰出;重要 | |
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95 disastrous | |
adj.灾难性的,造成灾害的;极坏的,很糟的 | |
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96 annihilated | |
v.(彻底)消灭( annihilate的过去式和过去分词 );使无效;废止;彻底击溃 | |
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97 villa | |
n.别墅,城郊小屋 | |
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98 scattered | |
adj.分散的,稀疏的;散步的;疏疏落落的 | |
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99 forage | |
n.(牛马的)饲料,粮草;v.搜寻,翻寻 | |
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100 relatively | |
adv.比较...地,相对地 | |
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101 nominal | |
adj.名义上的;(金额、租金)微不足道的 | |
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102 devastated | |
v.彻底破坏( devastate的过去式和过去分词);摧毁;毁灭;在感情上(精神上、财务上等)压垮adj.毁坏的;极为震惊的 | |
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103 negligence | |
n.疏忽,玩忽,粗心大意 | |
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104 determined | |
adj.坚定的;有决心的 | |
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105 corps | |
n.(通信等兵种的)部队;(同类作的)一组 | |
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106 hereditary | |
adj.遗传的,遗传性的,可继承的,世袭的 | |
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107 fixed | |
adj.固定的,不变的,准备好的;(计算机)固定的 | |
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108 unintelligible | |
adj.无法了解的,难解的,莫明其妙的 | |
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109 conjectured | |
推测,猜测,猜想( conjecture的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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110 isolation | |
n.隔离,孤立,分解,分离 | |
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111 toils | |
网 | |
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112 ascended | |
v.上升,攀登( ascend的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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113 galloped | |
(使马)飞奔,奔驰( gallop的过去式和过去分词 ); 快速做[说]某事 | |
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114 cavalry | |
n.骑兵;轻装甲部队 | |
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115 contrived | |
adj.不自然的,做作的;虚构的 | |
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116 miscarriage | |
n.失败,未达到预期的结果;流产 | |
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117 brook | |
n.小河,溪;v.忍受,容让 | |
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118 swampy | |
adj.沼泽的,湿地的 | |
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119 hampered | |
妨碍,束缚,限制( hamper的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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120 lamentable | |
adj.令人惋惜的,悔恨的 | |
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121 dispositions | |
安排( disposition的名词复数 ); 倾向; (财产、金钱的)处置; 气质 | |
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122 disposition | |
n.性情,性格;意向,倾向;排列,部署 | |
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123 gallant | |
adj.英勇的,豪侠的;(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
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124 feat | |
n.功绩;武艺,技艺;adj.灵巧的,漂亮的,合适的 | |
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125 evacuated | |
撤退者的 | |
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126 junction | |
n.连接,接合;交叉点,接合处,枢纽站 | |
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127 apparently | |
adv.显然地;表面上,似乎 | |
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128 repulsed | |
v.击退( repulse的过去式和过去分词 );驳斥;拒绝 | |
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129 artillery | |
n.(军)火炮,大炮;炮兵(部队) | |
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130 inexplicable | |
adj.无法解释的,难理解的 | |
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131 dense | |
a.密集的,稠密的,浓密的;密度大的 | |
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132 stoutly | |
adv.牢固地,粗壮的 | |
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133 bent | |
n.爱好,癖好;adj.弯的;决心的,一心的 | |
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134 ammunition | |
n.军火,弹药 | |
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135 corpses | |
n.死尸,尸体( corpse的名词复数 ) | |
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136 honourable | |
adj.可敬的;荣誉的,光荣的 | |
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137 negligent | |
adj.疏忽的;玩忽的;粗心大意的 | |
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138 blot | |
vt.弄脏(用吸墨纸)吸干;n.污点,污渍 | |
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139 folly | |
n.愚笨,愚蠢,蠢事,蠢行,傻话 | |
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140 recede | |
vi.退(去),渐渐远去;向后倾斜,缩进 | |
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141 retention | |
n.保留,保持,保持力,记忆力 | |
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142 skilful | |
(=skillful)adj.灵巧的,熟练的 | |
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143 afflicted | |
使受痛苦,折磨( afflict的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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144 jealousy | |
n.妒忌,嫉妒,猜忌 | |
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145 insular | |
adj.岛屿的,心胸狭窄的 | |
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146 lesser | |
adj.次要的,较小的;adv.较小地,较少地 | |
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147 accomplished | |
adj.有才艺的;有造诣的;达到了的 | |
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148 minor | |
adj.较小(少)的,较次要的;n.辅修学科;vi.辅修 | |
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149 marred | |
adj. 被损毁, 污损的 | |
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150 luxurious | |
adj.精美而昂贵的;豪华的 | |
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151 gambling | |
n.赌博;投机 | |
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152 grumbled | |
抱怨( grumble的过去式和过去分词 ); 发牢骚; 咕哝; 发哼声 | |
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153 jealousies | |
n.妒忌( jealousy的名词复数 );妒羡 | |
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154 blues | |
n.抑郁,沮丧;布鲁斯音乐 | |
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155 exigency | |
n.紧急;迫切需要 | |
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156 tact | |
n.机敏,圆滑,得体 | |
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157 variance | |
n.矛盾,不同 | |
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158 friction | |
n.摩擦,摩擦力 | |
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159 genial | |
adj.亲切的,和蔼的,愉快的,脾气好的 | |
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160 hearty | |
adj.热情友好的;衷心的;尽情的,纵情的 | |
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161 faculty | |
n.才能;学院,系;(学院或系的)全体教学人员 | |
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162 sufficiently | |
adv.足够地,充分地 | |
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163 compilation | |
n.编译,编辑 | |
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164 bouquet | |
n.花束,酒香 | |
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165 simplicity | |
n.简单,简易;朴素;直率,单纯 | |
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166 quotations | |
n.引用( quotation的名词复数 );[商业]行情(报告);(货物或股票的)市价;时价 | |
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167 auxiliary | |
adj.辅助的,备用的 | |
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