Even James I. thought that the heavy armour of his time was “an excellent invention, for it not only saved the life of the wearer, but prevented his hurting anybody else”;9 while “Dugald Dalgetty” found the metal thigh-pieces were powerless to stop the bullets of the firearms used by those who pursued him when he escaped from “that high and mighty12 prince,” the Duke of Argyle. To summarise13 the gradual disuse of arms from Tudor times to those of Anne, it may be stated that though body armour and the helmet were long used, the former had become but a cuirass to which a short skirt of metal was attached. The helmet became more open; still36 covering the head, the back of the neck and ears, but the face was only guarded by a “nasal” (like that of the time of the Conqueror14 somewhat), which could be moved up or down, or by a triple bar attached to the peak, which could be raised bodily like the visor was. This soon gave way to the mere15 iron “pot-helmet” without any face guards; and when this went, the cuirass soon followed. Last of all, the neck-piece or gorget was worn finally as a mere ornament16. For mounted men the lance disappeared, and the sword, pistol, carbine, or “dragon” took its place. On foot, as the musket17 became general, the ammunition18 was long carried in a bandolier. But in addition to the firearms, or “shot,” there were pikemen carrying plain pikes eighteen to twenty-four inches long, and forming an important part of the infantry19.
Naturally, therefore, by degrees the proportion of firearms in the battaglia (whence comes our modern “battalion”) increased, and the formation of definite fighting units, such as brigades, by Gustavus Adolphus, Maurice of Nassau, and others, began to make the force more capable of direction and control. De Rohan in France, too, devised regiments21 on what were then scientific principles. His were composed of 600 pikes, 600 musketeers, and 240 swordsmen, and, later, cavalry22 were placed between these massive battalions23. Speaking generally, the artillery24 was little moved, and remained stationary25 during a battle. The cavalry charged sword in hand or with pistols, and the infantry received the charge with the pike or partially26 met it by fire. But with an improved artillery arose also the necessity for ammunition and other supply trains from fixed27 magazines, and hence more careful strategy based on care for these magazines or “bases of operations,” and regard for the roads “or lines of communication” leading from them to the army, influenced the conduct of campaigns; so also did the introduction of superior organisation28.
For food supplies, armies on the move were still dependent on the good-will of the people, open markets, or plunder29. It was long before the supply of troops formed part of the37 serious study of the art of war. There was yet but little change in the method of fighting. Artillery as an “arm” was not. Rupert thought still that cavalry was the principal arm and could do anything. Cromwell alone recognised what trained infantry could be made to do.
It is only here and there that strategical enterprise is apparent, while the old tactical methods too were changing, but very slowly. Mr. Ward30 in his Animadversions of War, dated 1639, shows the cavalry formed five ranks deep, and (as the battles show) an undue31 dependence32 was placed on this arm, though in the early battles it, seriously, effected little, and was rather a cause of disaster than of victory. They were armed with firearms of sorts and the sword, the lance of the Middle Ages having fallen into complete disuse. They were classed as cuirassiers, arquebusiers, carbineers, and dragoons; but all fought much the same way, and were, taken altogether, rather mounted infantry than true cavalry. Each battaglia, even as late as 1677, so says Lord Orrery in his Act of War, had still one-third of its number “pikes”; the remainder, as “shot,” were assembled in groups at the four angles of the mass of pikes, which were ten ranks deep; but at the beginning of the Civil War the proportion of pikes to shot was about one-half. No wonder that the weapon “which never missed fire,” and was sixteen feet long, for many a year was all-important, and that the heavy arquebus, a matchlock with a rest which trailed, was long looked on as an adjunct, not as the primary weapon of the foot-soldier. The weapon was fired by a slow match, and one common stratagem34 at night, in retreat, was to leave these matches attached to the branches of trees in a hedgerow, to make believe that it was still held after the defenders35 had actually fallen back.
The general “order of battle” was two or three lines of these battaglia (named the “main battle,” the “battle of succour,” and the “rear battle”) at close intervals36, with the cavalry on the flanks, and the guns dispersed37 along the front. In the beginning of the battle small bodies or “forlorn hopes” were pushed to the front to draw the enemy’s fire,38 much as the deployment38 of lines or columns later was covered by light infantry skirmishers. The guns, immobile, badly mounted, and badly horsed as they were, were not to be despised as far as size went. There were “cannon39 royal” of 8 inches calibre, firing a 63-pound shot, down to “sakers” with 6-pound projectiles40, and “bases” of half a pound, and the range varied41 from 500 to 1500 yards; and the “demi-culverin” with a 10-pound shot was a not uncommon42 field gun. Of course their rate of fire was slow. There were no cartridges43, and the gun was fired, after being primed, by a linstock with a slow match. Curiously44 enough, the first cannons45 were breech-loaders, and were simply securely fastened into wooden slabs46 on low wheels by way of carriage, and so were capable of very little elevation47; but later on they were furnished with trunnions on which the gun pivoted48.
The colours worn by the men seemed to have followed the armorial bearings of their leaders. Orange, the colour of Essex, was generally worn by officers; Lord Saye’s men wore blue, Hampden’s green, and so on.
The opposing armies formed opposite one another at about 400 yards range, and after due consideration one side attacked, and without any real tactical plan the battle became a series of independent combats, in which, practically, the last unbroken body remained master of the field, and called it victory. Still this was a great advance on the tactics of earlier days. The idea of “tactics” was there, but, like the Caroline “strategy,” it was of a very feeble description. There was plenty of bravery, little of the combined effort which “tactics” implies.
Artillery.
Early B.L. Cannon
Culverin
B.L. Ship Gun, 1545 (Recovered 1836).
M.L. Burgundian (without trunnions) 1477.
M.L. Spanish (with trunnions & dolphins) 1800.
R.B.L. Field Gun 1896
But with the Stuarts had arisen a new power. To loyalty49 to the head of the State was to be added reverence50 for an asserted divine right to govern, of which little had been said before. With James I. arose the theory of the divine right of kings. How it came to be that his people, or a section of them, acquiesced51 in this assumption,—if they ever really did,—is one of the unexplained wonders of the time; but that the idea grew up and grew into full strength when39 Charles I., the best, if not the ablest of the Stuarts, was king, is clear.
With him the idea of the personal sacredness of majesty52 came to a head, and died with him, as men died for his “idea.” Again another stage in the army’s growth. Before this brave soldiers had died for “ideas” in battle; now they were to die for an idea translated, or crystallised, into a king. Out of this feeling came the men who fought for the cause and the country as well as the sovereign, and less than before for the personal duty due to the military chief or leader of a feudal53 family or clan54. There were several reasons for this alteration in the causes that made men then join armies. During the Tudor dynasty there had been a vast extension of foreign trade, with foreign travel, which opened men’s minds and induced freedom in political thought. The theological revival56 which culminated57 in the Reformation had aroused a spirit, first of intolerance, and then of a desire for freedom in religious belief. To the latter a hatred58 to Roman Catholicism, a dread59 of popish interference in secular60 matters, the example given by the religious conditions of our great commercial antagonist61, Spain, and the cruelties attributed to the Inquisition, largely contributed. To the former the increase of commercial wealth, with a corresponding decrease in the feudal power of the nobles, and a greater dependence on general taxation62 to support the Government and foreign wars, lent their aid. When Charles I. became king, he represented, in person, these conflicting elements; for though not a Roman Catholic himself, he was a High Churchman, his wife a Roman Catholic, and to an autocratic belief in his own divine right he added an untrustworthiness which was one of the many causes that led to his downfall. “From this inordinate63 reverence for the kingly office grew a great evil, for with a perverseness64 of reasoning which we name Jesuitical, Charles held that for the advancement65 of so holy a cause as that of the king must ever be, no means, however vile66 or mean to the common eye, could be in verity67 aught but virtuous68 and true. To this Moloch he sacrificed his children, as he had previously40 surrendered his home, his wife, and his happiness; to this idol69 he offered up the love of his subjects, the hope of his house, and the good of his country; for this he became an outcast, a vagrant70, and a prisoner; and when love, friends, and liberty had been swallowed by the burning fiery71 furnace, he flung in with them his honour and his fair fame for ever. It was then no hard matter to die for the god. Let those only judge him for whom there exists a Truth so living.”10
The coming recrudescence of civil war differed somewhat, therefore, in its origin from that between the rival houses of York and Lancaster. In these, political rancour was fostered by great nobles, and armies were formed on the feudalistic principle of personal servitude to these chiefs; while on the other side was the trading spirit openly fostered by Edward the Fourth. The Stuart wars are much more personal and individual throughout. The men, the rank and file even, fought with interest in the cause, and—as a rule, not as an exception, as before—joined either side from feelings of personal predilection72. Hence it was that when the Restoration came, there was less bitter antagonism73 between the factions74 than when Warwick fell at Barnet. Then the king or queen or the feudal lord decided75 the measure of slaughter76. In the Stuart wars no such order as that of Edward, before Barnet, “to give no quarter,” would have been, save in the most exceptional case, obeyed. It was only when the purely77 theological animosity was paramount78 that needless cruelties followed victory. The Covenanters at Bothwell Brig were personally hateful to men like Claverhouse, for religious as well as other reasons; so also the massacres79 at Drogheda, of which more anon. Stern repression81 of the severest kind in such cases was both the law and custom in those days.
The actual outbreak of hostilities82 was preceded by minor83 outbreaks, which increased the growing antagonism. Ships were lent to France and used against the Huguenots of Rochelle, and the failure of an attempt at Cadiz increased the irritation84; and when the troops returned from the Continent, they were not disbanded, as was customary, but billeted on41 the population, and martial85 law was introduced during a time of peace. Lastly, the efforts of the Star Chamber86 to raise fresh loans accorded but little with the English spirit, and the direct tax of ship-money on inland as well as coastal87 towns, together with the attempted arrest of the five members of the House of Commons hostile to the king’s policy, brought matters to a climax88.
Thus the Civil War began, much as in former times, without real strategy. At first, certainly, there was little or no plan of campaign. When an army formed, it moved on some point that seemed locally of value, or to some town or garrison89 that wanted help. The only broad principle of a very feeble strategy seems to have been to threaten (or protect) London, and on the Parliament side to keep free for use the road from London to the West.
Practically, as in the Wars of the Roses, the political situation was this. The north part of the Midlands and the west favoured the Royalists, the east and south the Parliamentarians. But in both cases there were numerous centres of disaffection in each area, and the commercial spirit of the great towns and seaports90 in the south and east was hostile to the king.
Speaking generally, too, the nobles and gentry91 favoured the royal cause, the middle classes that of the Parliament; though of course there were many exceptions on both sides. The fashionable, worldly, and gay were with Charles, the serious-minded, austere92, and visionary with the Parliament. But there was more than this: even the “people” found a recruiting ground, for London trained bands and peaceful traders donned buff and bandolier to fight in the national cause. As at Barnet, though now much more so, the commercial class stood side by side with that which deemed itself, by birth and education, more military.
The gradual introduction of the supply train had introduced the elements of strategy, though the study was still in its infancy93. The strategical objectives were rather more distinct, but even now there is little trace of a connected serious strategic plan. The isolated94 armies did not yet42 unite to a definite strategic end; the plan of campaign was much the same as before, though a little less so. The king assembled an army at X, the Parliament formed one at Y to beat it. The main difference is, that in the Wars of the Roses defeat generally meant dispersion, in this Civil War it meant more or less retreat to re-form. The art of war was growing up, that was all.
Briefly95 speaking, the only noteworthy points of military interest are these which follow; as the most instructive tactical example is that of the battle of Naseby.
The early campaigns merely tell the usual tale of disconnected skirmishes and resultless battles. Nominally96 the Parliament guarded the capital, their opponents wanted to seize it. But they rarely tried, and never seriously. In 1643, when Essex was retreating from the relief of Gloucester, he was intercepted97 by the king at Newbury, where strategically and tactically the royal forces were skilfully98 posted. But the battle partakes of the nature of chance rather than intent. Nothing practically came of it; but it showed the Cavaliers that if infantry stood firm, the most reckless gallantry of cavalry could do nothing.
In that same year two political steps were taken that led eventually to serious results. The Parliament allied101 itself with Scotland, and increased Cromwell’s innate102 dislike to that nation; on the other hand, Charles, to all intents and purposes, allied himself temporarily with the Irish, and raised the theological hatred of his British foes103 to fever heat. But constant war was hardening and teaching Cromwell and his men, if it taught their opponents nothing. The handling of the three armies in 1644 was skilful99. Throughout the whole contest, too, the better and steadier pay of the Parliamentary army told; they plundered104 less than their harder-up adversaries105, and as the rank and file improved, so did their leaders, when the “self-denying ordinance” eliminated incompetent106 soldiers, and handed over the conduct of the war to those who meant to bring it to a successful issue. The true professional soldier was being made. The superior and more intelligent strategy of the end of the campaign of43 1646 clearly shows this, and by the end of the following year hostilities had practically ceased.
FORMATION OF THE LINES OF BATTLE AT NASEBY 14th JUNE 1645
Though there was at first much similarity between the conduct of all the battles, there was an observable improvement on the Parliamentary side as the years rolled on; and the battle of Naseby is perhaps the best evidence of the better tactical appreciation107 of the situation than that of any early combat. It evidenced how little the Royalists, how much the Parliamentarians, had learned of the art of war in this the fourth year since hostilities began.
Of course the armies met haphazard108, as such forces must do with little or no strategic plan; so that when the king’s levies109 met at Daventry, it was surprised, when contemplating110 the relief of Pontefract and Scarborough, to find itself in touch with the army of Fairfax, which, abandoning the siege of Oxford111, had moved north to engage the royal army. With it was Cromwell as lieutenant-general of horse. But if the king was ignorant as to the whereabouts of his adversary112, Fairfax was not. The use of cavalry was being understood; “every step of the army of the Parliament was guided and guarded by the action of detachments” of this arm.11 Ireton watched and threatened the enemy’s retreat on Market Harborough, and on the evening of the 13th drove the king’s rearguard out of Naseby, the main body of the army being then south of Harborough. The next day the very casual and careless reconnaissance of Rupert’s troopers reported that no hostile bodies were in sight, and with the false impression that Fairfax was retreating, the royal army advanced to the attack of an enemy superior in number, more highly disciplined, and strongly posted on Mill Hill, north-west of the village of Naseby. The king’s army was in three lines: the first of four regiments, the second of three regiments, the third of the king’s and Rupert’s regiments. Lord Astley commanded the infantry (about 5500 men), Rupert the right, and Langdale the left, wing of cavalry, or “horse,” each about 2500 strong.
The army of the Parliament was thus disposed: right44 wing, six regiments of cavalry under Cromwell in three lines, with the right flank echeloned back. Ireton commanded the cavalry of the left wing, of five regiments of cavalry and one of dragoons arranged in two lines, while the latter lined a hedgerow to protect the left flank. The infantry under Skippon was in two lines: the first, five regiments strong, the second or reserve, three regiments. The baggage, with a strong guard of “shot,” was posted in rear of the left flank.
The battle began by the attack of Ireton against the opposing cavalry “in echelon113 right in front”; but as this exposed his right flank to the fire of the infantry squares of the first line, he turned his right squadrons upon them. In this he was dismounted and wounded. Whether from this cause, or what not, Rupert routed this wing, pursuing them as far as Naseby, and then wasting time in attacking the baggage train, while Ireton’s broken squadrons rallied. This is a perfect example of the reckless and unskilful way in which the Royalist charges were always made.
The Royalist first line next advanced, and, breaking Skippon’s left and centre, forced it back upon the second line or reserve; but by this time Cromwell’s cavalry had broken that under Langdale, and with a true appreciation of the situation, had then despatched but two regiments in careful and guarded pursuit, and turned with the remainder on the king’s still unbroken centre. This relieved the pressure on Skippon’s infantry, and these, thereupon, rallied, and in a combined attack broke the king’s remaining square. The battle was virtually over. Rupert returned, all too late and all too exhausted115 to be of service. The king in person tried to rally and employ the reserve, but the force was already beaten and demoralised, and the retreat became a disorderly rout114. The prizes of the victors were 5000 prisoners, 8000 arms, and 100 colours; but, most of all, this severe defeat was a death-blow to the royal cause, and was the last in which Charles I. engaged in person.
One curious result of it was that Lieutenant-General Cromwell himself reported to the Speaker of the House of45 Commons “how the good hand of God” had fought for them.
There was little after Naseby in the year 1648 to disturb the victorious116 army of the Parliament. There were sundry117 small fortresses118 and castles to reduce, and these soon fell. To Cromwell was deputed the task of capturing Devizes, Winchester, and Basing, and the latter is especially noteworthy for the tenacity119 with which it was long defended, and the rapidity of its final fall. The seat of the Marquis of Winchester, whose motto of “Aimez loyauté” gave the name of “Loyalty” to his mansion120 at Basing (to which also “the jubilant Royalists” had given the name of “Basting” House), was a large and important group of buildings, consisting of four great square towers linked together by a wall, and with inner buildings of sorts. The main importance was, that it closed the Great Western Road, south of the Kennet valley, as Donnington Castle did on the north bank of that river. It had been several times attempted during the past four years—first by Sir W. Waller in 1643, who suffered heavily in his attempt to storm; and other very partial attempts followed, until Cromwell himself was sent to settle, once and for all, in whose hands the road by Basingstoke from London should rest.
So the lieutenant-general laid formal siege to it, and, on the morning of 14th October 1645, stormed it, and carried it in three-quarters of an hour. “He had spent much time in prayer,” says Mr. Peters, “the night before the storm, and was able to write that night to ‘the Hon. William Lenthall, Speaker of the Common House of Parliament,’ to the follow-effect: ‘Sir, I thank God I can give a good account of Basing.’” The marquis and two hundred prisoners were taken, and so speedily was the capture completed, that there is some reason for the tradition that the attack was a surprise, and that the garrison were playing cards. Hence the local saying, “Clubs trumps121, as when Basing was taken.” Here, too, was slain122 Robison the player, who was mercilessly shot after the surrender by fanatical Harrison, who shot him through the head with the wild quotation123, “Cursed is he that46 doeth the work of the Lord negligently124.” The action and the remark evidence, better than anything else could, the increasing embitterment125 of the controversy126, and the real, or pretended, religious fervour, or rather rancour, that accompanied its continuance. That the feeling was honest, however strained, with many who fought against the king, is undoubted; as undoubted as the religious fervour of the Jews when “Samuel hewed127 Agag in pieces before the Lord”; or when a modern Mohammedan charges home upon a British square with “Allah” on his dying lips. Incomprehensible to some, it is a feeling that has to be taken serious account of in the last great Civil War in England.
So Basing fell. It was “now the twentieth garrison that hath been taken in the summer by this army; and I believe most of them the answer of the prayers, and trophies128 of the faith of some of God’s servants.”
So thought Mr. Peters in that year of grace 1645, and so thought many who, in the Commons House of Parliament, heard him tell his story of how Basing fell.
With the death of the king in 1649 came the real beginning of the end. This is no place to discuss the merit or demerit of a step so serious that it only finds a partial parallel in the action of Elizabeth towards Mary of Scotland. But two great results grew out of it: the proclamation of Charles II. as King of Scotland, and the invitation of Ormond to Ireland, where also Charles was hailed as the new sovereign. From this came the last two wars of the Commonwealth129, the first of which was fought in Ireland. There anarchy130 reigned131. Petty war was the normal condition of the rather more than half-savage clans132. There had been a massacre80 of Protestants, variously estimated at from forty thousand to a hundred thousand, under circumstances of the “most revolting barbarity; ... men, women and children they indiscriminately murdered, in a manner of which the details recall those of the massacre of Cawnpore.” This fact must be gravely borne in mind in considering the English invasion, and must be added to the fierce religious hatred and the increasingly intense political47 antagonism which the latest events had once more brought to the front. There is much to be said for the bitter revenge taken by the stern Protestant party, which composed the army sent to destroy the Irish people who had done their utmost to aid the monarchical133 cause in the late war.
To the sectaries it was no mere word-painting to say that Papacy was “Anathema,” and the Pope “Antichrist.” To break down the “carved images” was infinitely134 less a figure of speech in Irish churches than it was in English fanes. War in Ireland was to them a crusade, a religious war, a war of creeds135 as well as people; and the antagonism of peoples was little less than the antagonism of creeds. So alien were the Irish deemed, that, long before this, Pigott of Clotheram disinherited his eldest136 son merely for marrying an Irishwoman! Often conquered before, never had this unhappy land been more completely subdued137 than now. Yet even with this “curse of Cromwell” came peace and prosperity. “Districts which had recently been as wild as those where the first white settlers of Connecticut were contending with the red men, were in a few years transformed into the likeness138 of Kent and Norfolk. New buildings and new roads were everywhere seen.” Rightly or wrongly, he held that war was not made with rosewater any more than omelettes without breaking eggs. He may have been, and probably was, quite conscientious139 when he wrote: “Truly I believe this bitterness will save much effusion of blood.”
It is not just to severely140 condemn141 Cromwell for his action in Ireland. He lived in the seventeenth, not the nineteenth century, and acted according to his lights. His Irish campaigns have been described as “a series of blood-massacres, the just punishment of atrocious deeds, or as the fanatical orgie of a tyrant142. This was a complete perversion143 of fact, and Cromwell’s conduct in Ireland had yet to be judged impartially144 by a candid145 historian and by a competent thinker on war. No doubt he was a stern and severe conqueror; no doubt they turned their eyes away from Wexford and Drogheda; no doubt Cromwell and his avenging146 host regarded Celtic Papists as accursed idolaters,48 dripping with the carnage of 1641, and to be trodden under foot, like the doomed147 tribes of Palestine were crushed ‘at the bidding of the Lord’; but when he set foot in Ireland, he had to deal with a nation in armed and furious revolt, which had a country difficult in the extreme to penetrate148. The experiences of previous Irish wars had shown, that under conditions like these, it was essential to strike hard at once, and the peculiarities149 of the Irish climate, fatal in the seventeenth century to British troops, made it necessary to avoid the inland districts, and, if possible, to obtain immediate151 success. These considerations explained his deeds in Ireland. He was pitiless and inexorable, but he acted upon a far-sighted policy, and his generalship was bold, decided, and brilliant. His severity at Drogheda, he told them himself, was calculated ‘to prevent the effusion of blood.’ Just as Villars deliberately152 starved Fribourg, just as the garrison of Pampeluna would have been put to the sword had it not yielded to the summons of Wellington.”12
Whatever be the criticism of the means he employed, the end was that all open rebellion had ceased by 1653.
Meanwhile, in Scotland, too, the war-cloud had again burst; and though Fairfax resigned rather than invade that country, Cromwell either had less scruples153, or was more firmly determined154 to put down all armed insurrection to the Republic, and assumed command of a fresh army of the North.
But the actions were, except that at Dunbar, disconnected and inconclusive. There were the usual small affairs, minor sieges and operations in an exceptionally difficult country. Whether Cromwell wilfully155 left the doorway156 into England open or not is doubtful, though Colonel Walford is of opinion he did; but be that as it may, the Scotch157 army fell into a trap, marched into England as far as Worcester, and there met what Cromwell and his party thought the crowning mercy of defeat. His army had marched to that victory for twenty-four days, and had covered in that time 350 miles.
49 Thus in Scotland, as in Ireland, the stern discipline of Cromwell’s army, though the religious feeling was in this case more or less common to both, prevailed when the time came. Notwithstanding the theoretical, and to a certain extent practical, sympathy which linked the two nations of Great Britain together, all the wild and undoubted bravery of the Northern Celt availed the royal cause at the end as little as, or even less than, that of his more emotional brother across the channel of St. George. But it must be remembered that the racial antipathy158 between the two great branches of the inhabitants of Britain had never been so accentuated159, certainly not for half a century, as that which existed then, and long after, between the Irish and the British.
What is clear in this last campaign is, that Cromwell had little in common with those who governed the sister kingdom. “You ken33 very well,” said the Lord Chancellor160 of Scotland in 1645, “that Lieutenant-General Cromwell is no friend of ours.” He knew this, and his personal and possibly religious antipathies161 were therefore in no wise lessened162.
But with the general and steady improvement in the systematic163 conduct of war that is increasingly apparent as time went on, there is evidence of an attempt at organising a system of supply; an attempt that, though in a very sketchy164 and elementary way, foreshadows the higher strategy that is more and more noticeable as the eighteenth century grew from youth to old age.
There is no doubt that in many of the battles the baggage trains were more considerable than heretofore, and formed an important element in the operations of the campaign. Instances of their presence, in sufficient strength to be mentioned in the contemporary accounts, are shown both in the first battle of Newbury, where they were collected at Hampstead Park; as also at Naseby, where, far in rear of Mill Hill, Rupert attacked Fairfax’s baggage train and its guard. Essex, in his march to Newbury in 1643, complains of the want of food and the difficulty in foraging165, owing to the small amount of supplies they could carry; and in passing50 through Aldbourne two ammunition waggons166 broke down, and were consequently blown up. Doubtless they were even then only improvised167 from private sources, and only the ordinary vehicles used in the districts where war was being carried on were employed. Even then, be it remembered, roads were still few and bad, though probably more numerous and somewhat better than when Barnet was fought. But firearms and what not had increased the importance of not being dependent for supplies on what could be locally collected in towns and villages, or what the soldier could himself carry; and thus with the need for their replenishment168 at recognised bases, and their protection before, during, and after a battle, began the true strategy of modern war. Supply trains, organised supply trains, alone render an army really mobile and capable of carrying out a connected serious plan of campaign.
Again, comparing the time that was to come with that at this time existing, Marmont writes to Berthier in 1812: “I arrived at the headquarters of the north in January last: I did not find a grain of corn in the magazine; nothing anywhere but debts; and a real or fictitious169 scarcity170, the natural result of the absurd system of administration which has been adopted. Provisions for each day’s consumption could only be obtained with arms in our hands. There is a wide difference between that state and the possession of magazines which can enable an army to move;” and later on: “The army of Portugal at this season is incapable171 of acting172, and if it advanced beyond the frontier, it would be forced to return after a few days, having lost all its horses. The Emperor has ordered great works at Salamanca; he appears to forget that we have neither provisions to feed the workmen nor money to pay them, and that we are in every sense on the verge173 of starvation.”
What was true in Spain in 1812 must have been infinitely more so in 1644. The country was not rich in any way, and the armies were, for a poor country, considerable. But another step forward in the art of war is faintly indicated in the greater mobility174, because more regular attention to supply,51 that characterises the armies of the Civil War as compared with those of York and Lancaster.
Thus the great Civil War terminated in a considerable change both in the tactical and strategical condition of the army. It left behind a true “army of the people,” such as England had never seen before, and probably will never see again. If in previous wars the mass had followed the lead of the few, in the middle of the seventeenth century the Civil War had affected175 the mass and not the few only. There was a greater feeling of individualism; and, unlike previous armies, either of feudalism or of Saxondom, which was essentially176 more or less the compulsory177 service of a militia178, it was a force recruited by a voluntary system. But this was of two kinds.
The soldiers of the king were essentially volunteers, serving very largely without pay, or even contributing to the royal military chest; those of his opponent were also voluntarily enlisted180, but received pay from the resources of the State, over which Parliament had the chief control.
At first, therefore, the former afforded far the best fighting material. They were largely—and entirely181, as far as their leaders were concerned—gentlemen and men accustomed to the use of arms, but there they remained, and showed little aptitude182 of infusing into their natural martial ardour the stern and necessary tonic183 of discipline. On the other hand, the early armies of the Parliament were “hirelings whom want and idleness had reduced to enlist179.” Even Hampden’s regiment20, one of the best of any, was described by Cromwell as a “mere rabble184 of tapsters and serving-men out of place.” No one saw this more than Cromwell, and it is that instinct which makes him stand out among the leaders of the Civil War. No one more fully100 recognised than he that “you must get men of spirit: of a spirit that is likely to go on as far as gentlemen will go, or else I am sure you will be beaten still.” The metal might be there, but it wanted tempering, and the opportunity for this the “self-denying ordinance” gave. By means of this the army was purged185 of all its weaker parts. As Cromwell52 had organised his own special regiment, so did he infuse into the rest of the force some of the stern enthusiasm that made his Ironsides “very devils”13 in battle, fearless and fearful factors in the fight. They “prospered186 because they were much in prayer and reading Scripture187, an exercise that till of late soldiers have used but little.” They “were constant, conscientious, sober, strict, and thus conquered much upon the vanity and looseness of the enemy. Men fought on principle as well as for pay; they were little mutinous188 in disputing commands, fair in their marches, to friends merciful in battle, and in success to their enemies.” Finally their commissioners189 were “wise, provident190, active, faithful in providing ammunition, arms, recruits, of men’s clothes, and that family must needs strive that hath good stewards191.” It was inured192 to war, therefore, by a series of campaigns in which strategical as well as tactical conditions were beginning to be foreshadowed. Its organisation was more complete and thorough than heretofore, its men were imbued193 with the stern religious enthusiasm which has ever rendered such armies dangerous. It knew its strength and had gauged194 it by its continued success; what it had had to do had been God-directed (so its leaders and rank and file thought, or professed195 to think), and bore the imprint196 of immediate divine direction.
Thus it was, when the great Protector died, that the army he left was probably the most formidable body of armed men the world had ever seen.
Socially and morally, pecuniarily197 and theologically, it was peculiar150. “The pay of the private soldier was much above the wages earned by the great body of the people,14 and if he distinguished198 himself by intelligence and courage, he might hope to attain199 high commands. The ranks were accordingly composed of persons superior in station and education to the multitude. These persons, sober, moral, diligent200, and accustomed to reflect, had been induced to take up arms, not by the pressure of want, not by the love of novelty and licence, not by the arts of recruiting officers, but by religious and political zeal201, mingled202 with the desire of53 distinction and promotion203. The boast of the soldiers, as we find it recorded in their solemn resolutions, was, that they had not been forced into the service, nor had enlisted chiefly for the sake of lucre204, that they were no janissaries, but free-born Englishmen, who had, of their own accord, put their lives in jeopardy205 for the liberties and religion of England, and whose right and duty it was to watch over the welfare of the nation which they had saved.”15
Such a body was none the less a distinct menace to the State it had armed itself to protect. So strong an engine for defence against the tyranny of monarchy206 was equally a possible engine of oppression to the rest of the body politic55 in the hands of an autocratic or incapable ruler.
It had compelled Richard Cromwell to dissolve Parliament, and by “this act left the people at the mercy of an irresponsible authority, and without representation or means of appeal.”
It is curious to see, therefore, how the first voluntary national army, long embodied207, produced an antagonism, among the mass of the people, to standing2 armies altogether, a feeling which lasts even until now in theory, if not in fact.
When Charles II. entered London in triumph, the sombre Ironside soldiery must have felt their reign was over. If they did not, the people did. For with the “Happy Restoration” of the monarchy, the dread of a military supremacy208, whether of king or dictator, was strong enough to decree that the army of the Commonwealth should be totally disbanded.
So, for a short time at least, the army ceased to be. Its men soberly disappeared as a mass into private life; but so good was its warlike material, that “the Royalists themselves confessed that in every department of honest industry, the discarded warriors209 prospered beyond other men, that none was charged with any theft or robbery, that none was heard to ask an alms, and that if a baker210, a mason, or a waggoner attracted notice by his diligence and sobriety, he was in all probability one of Oliver’s old soldiers.”15
54 Of the royal force there is nothing to be said, except that in displaying the national bravery they added nothing to the military knowledge and strength of the country when the sword was sheathed211. It is not from them, but from their stern, more resolute212, and better trained adversaries that we have to look for the germs of the future army of the State. After the war in 1652, the total force of the Protector’s army was 31,519 men in England, and about 20,000 in Ireland, though during the war it seems to have numbered at the highest about 80,000 men.
So, till Richard Cromwell disappeared, Great Britain not only possessed213 a standing army, but was practically governed by it. To the very fact that this was so may be directly traced its nearly entire disappearance214; and, curiously enough, to the dread of it, when Charles II. returned, may be confidently attributed its reluctant restoration to safeguard the State he ruled.
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1
alteration
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| n.变更，改变；蚀变 | |
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standing
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| n.持续，地位；adj.永久的，不动的，直立的，不流动的 | |
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gunpowder
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| n.火药 | |
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armour
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| （=armor）n.盔甲；装甲部队 | |
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lavished
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| v.过分给予，滥施( lavish的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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engraving
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| n.版画；雕刻（作品）；雕刻艺术；镌版术v.在（硬物）上雕刻（字，画等）( engrave的现在分词 )；将某事物深深印在（记忆或头脑中） | |
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superseded
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| [医]被代替的，废弃的 | |
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reign
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| n.统治时期，统治，支配，盛行；v.占优势 | |
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steadily
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| adv.稳定地；不变地；持续地 | |
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lessening
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| 减轻，减少，变小 | |
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lighter
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| n.打火机，点火器；驳船；v.用驳船运送；light的比较级 | |
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mighty
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| adj.强有力的；巨大的 | |
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summarise
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| vt.概括，总结 | |
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conqueror
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| n.征服者，胜利者 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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ornament
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| v.装饰，美化；n.装饰，装饰物 | |
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musket
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| n.滑膛枪 | |
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ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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stationary
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| adj.固定的，静止不动的 | |
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partially
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| adv.部分地，从某些方面讲 | |
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fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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organisation
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| n.组织，安排，团体，有机休 | |
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29
plunder
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| vt.劫掠财物，掠夺；n.劫掠物，赃物；劫掠 | |
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30
ward
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| n.守卫，监护，病房，行政区，由监护人或法院保护的人（尤指儿童）；vt.守护，躲开 | |
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31
undue
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| adj.过分的；不适当的；未到期的 | |
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dependence
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| n.依靠，依赖；信任，信赖；隶属 | |
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ken
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| n.视野，知识领域 | |
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stratagem
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| n.诡计，计谋 | |
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defenders
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| n.防御者( defender的名词复数 )；守卫者；保护者；辩护者 | |
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intervals
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| n.[军事]间隔( interval的名词复数 )；间隔时间；[数学]区间；（戏剧、电影或音乐会的）幕间休息 | |
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37
dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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deployment
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| n. 部署,展开 | |
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39
cannon
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| n.大炮，火炮；飞机上的机关炮 | |
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40
projectiles
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| n.抛射体( projectile的名词复数 )；（炮弹、子弹等）射弹，（火箭等）自动推进的武器 | |
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41
varied
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| adj.多样的，多变化的 | |
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uncommon
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| adj.罕见的，非凡的，不平常的 | |
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43
cartridges
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| 子弹( cartridge的名词复数 )； （打印机的）墨盒； 录音带盒； （唱机的）唱头 | |
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44
curiously
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| adv.有求知欲地；好问地；奇特地 | |
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45
cannons
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| n.加农炮，大炮，火炮( cannon的名词复数 ) | |
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slabs
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| n.厚板，平板，厚片( slab的名词复数 )；厚胶片 | |
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47
elevation
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| n.高度；海拔；高地；上升；提高 | |
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48
pivoted
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| adj.转动的，回转的，装在枢轴上的v.（似）在枢轴上转动( pivot的过去式和过去分词 )；把…放在枢轴上；以…为核心，围绕（主旨）展开 | |
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49
loyalty
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| n.忠诚，忠心 | |
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50
reverence
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| n.敬畏，尊敬，尊严；Reverence:对某些基督教神职人员的尊称；v.尊敬，敬畏，崇敬 | |
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51
acquiesced
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| v.默认，默许( acquiesce的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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52
majesty
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| n.雄伟，壮丽，庄严，威严；最高权威，王权 | |
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53
feudal
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| adj.封建的，封地的，领地的 | |
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54
clan
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| n.氏族，部落，宗族，家族，宗派 | |
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55
politic
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| adj.有智虑的；精明的；v.从政 | |
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56
revival
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| n.复兴，复苏，（精力、活力等的）重振 | |
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57
culminated
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| v.达到极点( culminate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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58
hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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59
dread
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| vt.担忧，忧虑；惧怕，不敢；n.担忧，畏惧 | |
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60
secular
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| n.牧师，凡人；adj.世俗的，现世的，不朽的 | |
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61
antagonist
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| n.敌人，对抗者，对手 | |
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62
taxation
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| n.征税，税收，税金 | |
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63
inordinate
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| adj.无节制的；过度的 | |
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64
perverseness
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| n. 乖张, 倔强, 顽固 | |
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65
advancement
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| n.前进，促进，提升 | |
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66
vile
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| adj.卑鄙的，可耻的，邪恶的；坏透的 | |
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67
verity
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| n.真实性 | |
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68
virtuous
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| adj.有品德的，善良的，贞洁的，有效力的 | |
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idol
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| n.偶像，红人，宠儿 | |
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70
vagrant
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| n.流浪者，游民；adj.流浪的，漂泊不定的 | |
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fiery
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| adj.燃烧着的，火红的；暴躁的；激烈的 | |
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predilection
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| n.偏好 | |
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antagonism
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| n.对抗，敌对，对立 | |
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74
factions
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| 组织中的小派别，派系( faction的名词复数 ) | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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76
slaughter
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| n.屠杀，屠宰；vt.屠杀，宰杀 | |
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purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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paramount
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| a.最重要的，最高权力的 | |
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massacres
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| 大屠杀( massacre的名词复数 )； 惨败 | |
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massacre
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| n.残杀，大屠杀；v.残杀，集体屠杀 | |
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81
repression
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| n.镇压，抑制，抑压 | |
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82
hostilities
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| n.战争；敌意(hostility的复数)；敌对状态；战事 | |
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minor
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| adj.较小(少)的，较次要的；n.辅修学科；vi.辅修 | |
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84
irritation
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| n.激怒，恼怒，生气 | |
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martial
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| adj.战争的，军事的，尚武的，威武的 | |
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86
chamber
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| n.房间，寝室；会议厅；议院；会所 | |
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coastal
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| adj.海岸的，沿海的，沿岸的 | |
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climax
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| n.顶点；高潮；v.(使)达到顶点 | |
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garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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seaports
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| n.海港( seaport的名词复数 ) | |
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91
gentry
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| n.绅士阶级，上层阶级 | |
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austere
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| adj.艰苦的；朴素的，朴实无华的；严峻的 | |
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infancy
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| n.婴儿期；幼年期；初期 | |
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isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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briefly
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| adv.简单地，简短地 | |
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nominally
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| 在名义上，表面地； 应名儿 | |
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intercepted
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| 拦截( intercept的过去式和过去分词 )； 截住； 截击； 拦阻 | |
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skilfully
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| adv. (美skillfully)熟练地 | |
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skilful
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| (=skillful)adj.灵巧的，熟练的 | |
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fully
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| adv.完全地，全部地，彻底地；充分地 | |
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allied
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| adj.协约国的；同盟国的 | |
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innate
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| adj.天生的，固有的，天赋的 | |
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foes
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| 敌人，仇敌( foe的名词复数 ) | |
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plundered
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| 掠夺，抢劫( plunder的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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105
adversaries
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| n.对手，敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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106
incompetent
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| adj.无能力的，不能胜任的 | |
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107
appreciation
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| n.评价；欣赏；感谢；领会，理解；价格上涨 | |
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108
haphazard
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| adj.无计划的，随意的，杂乱无章的 | |
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109
levies
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| （部队）征兵( levy的名词复数 )； 募捐； 被征募的军队 | |
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110
contemplating
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| 深思，细想，仔细考虑( contemplate的现在分词 )； 注视，凝视； 考虑接受（发生某事的可能性）； 深思熟虑，沉思，苦思冥想 | |
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111
Oxford
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| n.牛津（英国城市） | |
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112
adversary
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| adj.敌手，对手 | |
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113
echelon
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| n.梯队；组织系统中的等级；v.排成梯队 | |
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114
rout
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| n.溃退，溃败；v.击溃，打垮 | |
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115
exhausted
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| adj.极其疲惫的，精疲力尽的 | |
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116
victorious
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| adj.胜利的，得胜的 | |
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117
sundry
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| adj.各式各样的，种种的 | |
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118
fortresses
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| 堡垒，要塞( fortress的名词复数 ) | |
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119
tenacity
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| n.坚韧 | |
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120
mansion
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| n.大厦，大楼；宅第 | |
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121
trumps
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| abbr.trumpets 喇叭；小号；喇叭形状的东西；喇叭筒v.（牌戏）出王牌赢（一牌或一墩）( trump的过去式 )；吹号公告，吹号庆祝；吹喇叭；捏造 | |
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122
slain
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| 杀死，宰杀，杀戮( slay的过去分词 )； (slay的过去分词) | |
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123
quotation
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| n.引文，引语，语录；报价，牌价，行情 | |
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124
negligently
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125
embitterment
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126
controversy
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| n.争论，辩论，争吵 | |
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127
hewed
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| v.（用斧、刀等）砍、劈( hew的过去式和过去分词 )；砍成；劈出；开辟 | |
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128
trophies
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| n.（为竞赛获胜者颁发的）奖品( trophy的名词复数 )；奖杯；（尤指狩猎或战争中获得的）纪念品；（用于比赛或赛跑名称）奖 | |
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129
commonwealth
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| n.共和国，联邦，共同体 | |
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130
anarchy
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| n.无政府状态；社会秩序混乱，无秩序 | |
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131
reigned
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| vi.当政，统治（reign的过去式形式） | |
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132
clans
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| 宗族( clan的名词复数 )； 氏族； 庞大的家族； 宗派 | |
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133
monarchical
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| adj. 国王的，帝王的，君主的，拥护君主制的 =monarchic | |
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134
infinitely
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| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
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135
creeds
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| （尤指宗教）信条，教条( creed的名词复数 ) | |
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136
eldest
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| adj.最年长的，最年老的 | |
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137
subdued
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| adj. 屈服的，柔和的，减弱的 动词subdue的过去式和过去分词 | |
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138
likeness
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| n.相像，相似（之处） | |
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139
conscientious
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| adj.审慎正直的，认真的，本着良心的 | |
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140
severely
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| adv.严格地；严厉地；非常恶劣地 | |
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141
condemn
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| vt.谴责，指责；宣判(罪犯)，判刑 | |
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142
tyrant
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| n.暴君，专制的君主，残暴的人 | |
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143
perversion
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| n.曲解；堕落；反常 | |
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144
impartially
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| adv.公平地，无私地 | |
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145
candid
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| adj.公正的，正直的；坦率的 | |
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146
avenging
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| adj.报仇的，复仇的v.为…复仇，报…之仇( avenge的现在分词 )；为…报复 | |
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147
doomed
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| 命定的 | |
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148
penetrate
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| v.透(渗)入；刺入，刺穿；洞察，了解 | |
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149
peculiarities
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| n. 特质, 特性, 怪癖, 古怪 | |
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150
peculiar
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| adj.古怪的，异常的；特殊的，特有的 | |
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151
immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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152
deliberately
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| adv.审慎地；蓄意地；故意地 | |
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153
scruples
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| n.良心上的不安( scruple的名词复数 )；顾虑，顾忌v.感到于心不安，有顾忌( scruple的第三人称单数 ) | |
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154
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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155
wilfully
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| adv.任性固执地；蓄意地 | |
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156
doorway
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| n.门口，(喻)入门；门路，途径 | |
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157
scotch
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| n.伤口，刻痕；苏格兰威士忌酒；v.粉碎，消灭，阻止；adj.苏格兰(人)的 | |
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158
antipathy
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| n.憎恶；反感，引起反感的人或事物 | |
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159
accentuated
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| v.重读( accentuate的过去式和过去分词 )；使突出；使恶化；加重音符号于 | |
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160
chancellor
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| n.(英)大臣；法官；(德、奥)总理；大学校长 | |
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161
antipathies
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| 反感( antipathy的名词复数 )； 引起反感的事物； 憎恶的对象； （在本性、倾向等方面的）不相容 | |
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162
lessened
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| 减少的，减弱的 | |
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163
systematic
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| adj.有系统的，有计划的，有方法的 | |
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164
sketchy
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| adj.写生的，写生风格的，概略的 | |
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165
foraging
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| v.搜寻（食物），尤指动物觅（食）( forage的现在分词 )；（尤指用手）搜寻（东西） | |
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166
waggons
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| 四轮的运货马车( waggon的名词复数 )； 铁路货车； 小手推车 | |
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167
improvised
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| a.即席而作的,即兴的 | |
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168
replenishment
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| n.补充(货物) | |
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169
fictitious
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| adj.虚构的，假设的；空头的 | |
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170
scarcity
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| n.缺乏，不足，萧条 | |
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171
incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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172
acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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173
verge
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| n.边，边缘；v.接近，濒临 | |
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174
mobility
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| n.可动性，变动性，情感不定 | |
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175
affected
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| adj.不自然的，假装的 | |
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176
essentially
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| adv.本质上，实质上，基本上 | |
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177
compulsory
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| n.强制的，必修的；规定的，义务的 | |
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178
militia
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| n.民兵，民兵组织 | |
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179
enlist
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| vt.谋取(支持等)，赢得；征募；vi.入伍 | |
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180
enlisted
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| adj.应募入伍的v.（使）入伍， （使）参军( enlist的过去式和过去分词 )；获得（帮助或支持） | |
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181
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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182
aptitude
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| n.(学习方面的)才能，资质，天资 | |
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183
tonic
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| n./adj.滋补品，补药，强身的，健体的 | |
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184
rabble
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| n.乌合之众，暴民；下等人 | |
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185
purged
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| 清除（政敌等）( purge的过去式和过去分词 )； 涤除（罪恶等）； 净化（心灵、风气等）； 消除（错事等）的不良影响 | |
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186
prospered
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| 成功，兴旺( prosper的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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187
scripture
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| n.经文，圣书，手稿；Scripture:(常用复数)《圣经》，《圣经》中的一段 | |
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188
mutinous
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| adj.叛变的，反抗的；adv.反抗地，叛变地；n.反抗，叛变 | |
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189
commissioners
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| n.专员( commissioner的名词复数 )；长官；委员；政府部门的长官 | |
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190
provident
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| adj.为将来做准备的，有先见之明的 | |
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191
stewards
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| （轮船、飞机等的）乘务员( steward的名词复数 )； （俱乐部、旅馆、工会等的）管理员； （大型活动的）组织者； （私人家中的）管家 | |
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192
inured
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| adj.坚强的，习惯的 | |
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193
imbued
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| v.使（某人/某事）充满或激起（感情等）( imbue的过去式和过去分词 )；使充满；灌输；激发（强烈感情或品质等） | |
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194
gauged
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| adj.校准的；标准的；量规的；量计的v.（用仪器）测量( gauge的过去式和过去分词 )；估计；计量；划分 | |
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195
professed
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| 公开声称的，伪称的，已立誓信教的 | |
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196
imprint
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| n.印痕，痕迹；深刻的印象；vt.压印，牢记 | |
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197
pecuniarily
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| adv.在金钱上，在金钱方面 | |
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198
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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199
attain
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| vt.达到，获得，完成 | |
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200
diligent
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| adj.勤勉的，勤奋的 | |
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201
zeal
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| n.热心，热情，热忱 | |
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202
mingled
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| 混合，混入( mingle的过去式和过去分词 )； 混进，与…交往[联系] | |
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203
promotion
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| n.提升，晋级；促销，宣传 | |
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204
lucre
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| n.金钱，财富 | |
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205
jeopardy
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| n.危险；危难 | |
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206
monarchy
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| n.君主，最高统治者；君主政体，君主国 | |
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207
embodied
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| v.表现( embody的过去式和过去分词 )；象征；包括；包含 | |
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208
supremacy
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| n.至上；至高权力 | |
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209
warriors
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| 武士，勇士，战士( warrior的名词复数 ) | |
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210
baker
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| n.面包师 | |
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211
sheathed
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| adj.雕塑像下半身包在鞘中的；覆盖的；铠装的；装鞘了的v.将（刀、剑等）插入鞘( sheathe的过去式和过去分词 )；包，覆盖 | |
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212
resolute
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| adj.坚决的，果敢的 | |
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213
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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disappearance
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| n.消失，消散，失踪 | |
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