I trust therefore that it will not be considered presumptuous6 for one who has been working for some ten or fifteen years at the original sources to endeavour to[p. iv] summarize in print the results of his investigations7; for I believe that even the reader who has already devoted9 a good deal of attention to the Peninsular War will find a considerable amount of new matter in these pages.
My resolve to take in hand a general history of the struggle was largely influenced by the passing into the hands of All Souls College of the papers of one of its most distinguished10 fellows, the diplomatist Sir Charles Vaughan. Not only had Vaughan unique opportunities for observing the early years of the Peninsular War, but he turned them to the best account, and placed all his observations on record. I suppose that there was seldom a man who had a greater love for collecting and filing information. His papers contain not only his own diaries and correspondence, but an infinite number of notes made for him by Spanish friends on points which he desired to master, and a vast bulk of pamphlets, proclamations, newspapers, and tables of statistics, carefully bound together in bundles, which (as far as I can see) have not been opened between the day of his death and that on which they passed, by a legacy11 from his last surviving relative, into the possession of his old college. Vaughan landed at Corunna in September, 1808, in company with Charles Stuart, the first English emissary to the Central Junta12. He rode with Stuart to Madrid and Aranjuez, noting everything that he saw, from Roman inscriptions13 to the views of local Alcaldes and priests on the politics of the day. He contrived14 to interview many persons of importance—for example, he heard from Cuesta’s own lips of his treasonable plot to overthrow15 the Junta, and he secured a long conversation with Casta?os as to the Capitulation of Baylen, from which I have extracted some wholly new facts as to that event. He then went to Aragon, where he stayed three weeks in the company of the Captain[p. v]-General Joseph Palafox. Not only did he cross-question Palafox as to all the details of his famous defence of Saragossa, but he induced San Genis (the colonel who conducted the engineering side of the operations) to write him a memorandum16, twelve pages long, as to the character and system of his work. Vaughan accompanied Palafox to the front in November, but left the Army of Aragon a day before the battle of Tudela. Hearing of the disaster from the fugitives17 of Casta?os’s army, he resolved to take the news to Madrid. Riding hard for the capital, he crossed the front of Ney’s cavalry18 at Agreda, but escaped them and came safely through. On arriving at Madrid he was given dispatches for Sir John Moore, and carried them to Salamanca. It was the news which he brought that induced the British general to order his abortive19 retreat on Portugal. Moore entrusted20 to him not only his dispatch to Sir David Baird, bidding him retire into Galicia, but letters for Lord Castlereagh, which needed instant conveyance21 to London. Accordingly Vaughan rode with headlong speed to Baird at Astorga, and from Astorga to Corunna, which he reached eleven days after his start from Tudela. From thence he took ship to England and brought the news of the Spanish disasters to the British Ministry22.
Vaughan remained some time in England before returning to Spain, but he did not waste his time. Not only did he write a short account of the siege of Saragossa, which had a great vogue23 at the moment, but he collected new information from an unexpected source. General Lefebvre-Desnouettes, the besieger24 of Saragossa, arrived as a prisoner in England. Vaughan promptly25 went to Cheltenham, where the Frenchman was living on parole, and had a long conversation with him as to the details of the siege, which he carefully[p. vi] compared with the narrative26 of Palafox. Probably no other person ever had such opportunities for collecting first-hand information as to that famous leaguer. It will please those who love the romantic side of history, to know that Vaughan was introduced by Palafox to Agostina, the famous ‘Maid of Saragossa,’ and heard the tale of her exploit from the Captain-General less than three months after it had occurred. The doubts of Napier and others as to her existence are completely dissipated by the diary of this much-travelled Fellow of All Souls College.
Vaughan returned to Spain ere 1809 was out, and served under various English ambassadors at Seville and Cadiz for the greater part of the war. His papers and collections for the later years of the struggle are almost as full and interesting as those for 1808 which I have utilized2 in this volume.
I have worked at the Record Office on the British official papers of the first years of the war, especially noting all the passages which are omitted in the printed dispatches of Moore and other British generals. The suppressed paragraphs (always placed within brackets marked with a pencil) contain a good deal of useful matter, mainly criticisms on individuals which it would not have been wise to publish at the time. There are a considerable number of intercepted27 French dispatches in the collection, and a certain amount of correspondence with the Spaniards which contains facts and figures generally unknown. Among the most interesting are the letters of General Leith, who was attached to the head quarters of Blake; in them I found by far the best account of the operations of the Army of Galicia in Oct.-Nov., 1808, which I have come upon.
As to printed sources of information, I have read all the Parliamentary papers of 1808-9, and the whole file[p. vii] of the Madrid Gazette, as well as many scores of memoirs and diaries, French, English, and Spanish. I think that no important English or French book has escaped me; but I must confess that some of the Spanish works quoted by General Arteche proved unprocurable, both in London and Paris. The British Museum Library is by no means strong in this department; it is even short of obvious authorities, such as the monographs28 of St. Cyr and of Cabanes on the War in Catalonia. The memoirs of the Peninsular veterans on both sides often require very cautious handling; some cannot be trusted for anything that did not happen under the author’s eye. Others were written so long after the events which they record, that they are not even to be relied upon for facts which must have been under his actual observation. For example, General Marbot claims that he brought to Bayonne the dispatch from Murat informing Napoleon of the insurrection of Madrid on May 2, and gives details as to the way in which the Emperor received the news. But it is absolutely certain, both from the text of Murat’s letter and from Napoleon’s answer to it, that the document was carried and delivered by a Captain Hannecourt. The aged29 Marbot’s memory had played him false. There are worse cases, where an eye-witness, writing within a short time of the events which he describes, gives a version which he must have known to be incorrect, for the glorification30 of himself or some friend. Thiébault and Le Noble are bad offenders31 in this respect: Thiébault’s account of some of the incidents in Portugal and of the combat of Aldea del Ponte, Le Noble’s narrative of Corunna, seem to be deliberately32 falsified. I have found one English authority who falls under the same suspicion. But on both sides the majority of the mistakes come either from writers who describe that which did not pass under[p. viii] their own eyes, or from aged narrators who wrote their story twenty, thirty, or forty years after the war was over. Their diaries written at the time are often invaluable33 correctives to their memoirs or monographs composed after an interval34; e.g. Foy’s rough diary lately published by Girod de l’Ain contains some testimonials to Wellington and the British army very much more handsomely expressed than anything which the General wrote in his formal history of the early campaigns of 1808.
I hope to insert in my second volume a bibliography35 of all the works useful for the first two years of the war. The inordinate36 size to which my first volume has swelled37 has made it impossible to include in it a list of authorities, which covers a good many pages.
It will be noticed that my Appendices include several extensive tables, giving the organization of the French and Spanish armies in 1808. For part of them I am indebted to General Arteche’s work; but the larger half has been constructed at great cost of time and labour from scattered38 contemporary papers—from returns to be found in the most varied39 places (some of the most important Spanish ones survive only in the Record Office or in Vaughan’s papers, others only in the Madrid Gazette). No one, so far as I know, had hitherto endeavoured to construct the complete table of the Spanish army in October, or of that of the exact composition of Napoleon’s ‘grand army’ in the same month. I hope my Appendices therefore may be found of some use.
More than one friend has asked me during the last few months whether it is worth while to rewrite the history of the Peninsular War when Napier’s great work is everywhere accessible. I can only reply that I no more dream of superseding40 the immortal41 six volumes of[p. ix] that grand old soldier, than Dr. S. R. Gardiner dreamed of superseding Clarendon’s History of the Great Rebellion when he started to write the later volumes of his account of the reign42 of Charles I. The books of Napier and Clarendon must remain as all-important contemporary narratives43, written by men who saw clearly one aspect of the events which they describe; in each the personal element counts for much, and the political and individual sympathies and enmities of the historian have coloured his whole work. No one would think of going to Clarendon for an unprejudiced account of the character and career of Oliver Cromwell. But I do not think that it is generally realized that it is just as unsafe to go to Napier for an account of the aims and undertakings44 of the Spanish Juntas45, or the Tory governments of 1808-14. As a narrator of the incidents of war he is unrivalled: no one who has ever read them can forget his soul-stirring descriptions of the charge of the Fusilier brigade at Albuera, of the assault on the Great Breach46 at Badajoz, or the storming of Soult’s positions on the Rhune. These and a hundred other eloquent47 passages will survive for ever as masterpieces of vigorous English prose.
But when he wanders off into politics, English or Spanish, Napier is a less trustworthy guide. All his views are coloured by the fact that he was a bitter enemy of the Tories of his own day. The kinsman48 not only of Charles James Fox, but of Lord Edward Fitzgerald, he could never look with unprejudiced eyes on their political opponents. Canning and Spencer Perceval were in his ideas men capable of any folly49, any gratuitous50 perversity51. Castlereagh’s splendid services to England are ignored: it would be impossible to discover from the pages of the Peninsular War that this was the man who picked out Wellington for the[p. x] command in Spain, and kept him there in spite of all manner of opposition52. Nor is this all: Napier was also one of those strange Englishmen who, notwithstanding all the evidence that lay before them, believed that Napoleon Bonaparte was a beneficent character, thwarted53 in his designs for the regeneration of Europe by the obstinate54 and narrow-minded opposition of the British Government. In his preface, he goes so far as to say that the Tories fought the Emperor not because he was the dangerous enemy of the British Empire, but because he was the champion of Democracy, and they the champions of caste and privilege. When the tidings of Napoleon’s death at St. Helena reached him (as readers of his Life will remember), he cast himself down on his sofa and wept for three hours! Hence it was that, in dealing55 with the Tory ministries56, he is ever a captious57 and unkind critic, while for the Emperor he displays a respect that seems very strange in an enthusiastic friend of political liberty. Every one who has read the first chapters of his great work must see that Bonaparte gets off with slight reproof58 for his monstrous59 act of treachery at Bayonne, and for the even more disgusting months of hypocritical friendship that had preceded it. While pouring scorn on Charles IV and Ferdinand VII, the silly father and the rebellious60 son, whose quarrels were the Emperor’s opportunity, Napier forgets to rise to the proper point of indignation in dealing with the false friend who betrayed them. He almost writes as if there were some excuse for the crimes of robbery and kidnapping, if the victim were an imbecile or a bigot, or an undutiful son. The prejudice in favour of the Emperor goes so far that he even endeavours to justify61 obvious political and military mistakes in his conduct of the Peninsular War, by throwing all the blame on the way in which his marshals[p. xi] executed his orders, and neglecting to point out that the orders themselves were impracticable.
On the other hand, Napier was just as over-hard to the Spaniards as he was over-lenient to Bonaparte. He was one of those old Peninsular officers who could never dismiss the memory of some of the things that he had seen or heard. The cruelties of the Guerillas, the disgraceful panic on the eve of Talavera, the idiotic62 pride and obstinacy63 of Cuesta, the cowardice64 of Imaz and La Pe?a, prejudiced him against all their countrymen. The turgid eloquence65 of Spanish proclamations, followed by the prosaic66 incapacity of Spanish performance, sickened him. He always accepts the French rather than the Spanish version of a story, forgetting that Bonaparte and his official writers were authorities quite as unworthy of implicit67 credence68 as their opponents. In dealing with individual Spaniards—we may take for example Joseph Palafox, or the unfortunate Daoiz and Velarde—he is unjust to the extreme of cruelty. His astounding69 libel on La Romana’s army, I have had occasion to notice in some detail on page 416 of this work. He invariably exaggerates Spanish defeats, and minimizes Spanish successes. He is reckless in the statements which he gives as to their numbers in battle, or their losses in defeat. Evidently he did not take the trouble to consult the elaborate collection of morning-states of armies and other official documents which the Spanish War Office published several years before he wrote his first volume. All his figures are borrowed from the haphazard70 guesses of the French marshals. This may seem strong language to use concerning so great an author, but minute investigation8 seems to prove that nearly every statement of Napier’s concerning a battle in which the Spaniards were engaged is drawn71 from some French source. The Spaniards’ version is ignored.[p. xii] In his indignation at the arrogance72 and obstinacy with which they often hampered73 his hero Wellington, he refuses to look at the extenuating74 circumstances which often explain, or even excuse, their conduct. After reading his narrative, one should turn to Arguelles or Tore?o or Arteche, peruse75 their defence of their countrymen, and then make one’s ultimate decision as to facts. Every student of the Peninsular War, in short, must read Napier: but he must not think that, when the reading is finished, he has mastered the whole meaning and importance of the great struggle.
The topographical details of most of my maps are drawn from the splendid Atlas76 published by the Spanish War Office during the last twenty years. But the details of the placing of the troops are my own. I have been particularly careful in the maps of Vimiero and Corunna to indicate the position of every battalion77, French or English.
I am in duty bound to acknowledge the very kind assistance of three helpers in the construction of this volume. The first compiled the Index, after grappling with the whole of the proofs. The second, Mr. C. E. Doble, furnished me with a great number of suggestions as to revision, which I have adopted. The third, Mr. C. T. Atkinson, of Exeter College, placed at my disposition78 his wide knowledge of British regimental history, and put me in the way of obtaining many details as to the organization of Wellesley’s and Moore’s armies. I am infinitely79 obliged to all three.
C. OMAN.
All Souls College,
March 31, 1902.
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1 memoirs | |
n.回忆录;回忆录传( mem,自oir的名词复数) | |
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2 utilized | |
v.利用,使用( utilize的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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3 autobiographies | |
n.自传( autobiography的名词复数 );自传文学 | |
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4 repose | |
v.(使)休息;n.安息 | |
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5 purely | |
adv.纯粹地,完全地 | |
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6 presumptuous | |
adj.胆大妄为的,放肆的,冒昧的,冒失的 | |
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7 investigations | |
(正式的)调查( investigation的名词复数 ); 侦查; 科学研究; 学术研究 | |
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8 investigation | |
n.调查,调查研究 | |
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9 devoted | |
adj.忠诚的,忠实的,热心的,献身于...的 | |
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10 distinguished | |
adj.卓越的,杰出的,著名的 | |
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11 legacy | |
n.遗产,遗赠;先人(或过去)留下的东西 | |
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12 junta | |
n.团体;政务审议会 | |
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13 inscriptions | |
(作者)题词( inscription的名词复数 ); 献词; 碑文; 证劵持有人的登记 | |
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14 contrived | |
adj.不自然的,做作的;虚构的 | |
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15 overthrow | |
v.推翻,打倒,颠覆;n.推翻,瓦解,颠覆 | |
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16 memorandum | |
n.备忘录,便笺 | |
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17 fugitives | |
n.亡命者,逃命者( fugitive的名词复数 ) | |
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18 cavalry | |
n.骑兵;轻装甲部队 | |
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19 abortive | |
adj.不成功的,发育不全的 | |
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20 entrusted | |
v.委托,托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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21 conveyance | |
n.(不动产等的)转让,让与;转让证书;传送;运送;表达;(正)运输工具 | |
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22 ministry | |
n.(政府的)部;牧师 | |
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23 Vogue | |
n.时髦,时尚;adj.流行的 | |
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24 besieger | |
n. 围攻者, 围攻军 | |
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25 promptly | |
adv.及时地,敏捷地 | |
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26 narrative | |
n.叙述,故事;adj.叙事的,故事体的 | |
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27 intercepted | |
拦截( intercept的过去式和过去分词 ); 截住; 截击; 拦阻 | |
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28 monographs | |
n.专著,专论( monograph的名词复数 ) | |
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29 aged | |
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30 glorification | |
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31 offenders | |
n.冒犯者( offender的名词复数 );犯规者;罪犯;妨害…的人(或事物) | |
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32 deliberately | |
adv.审慎地;蓄意地;故意地 | |
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33 invaluable | |
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34 interval | |
n.间隔,间距;幕间休息,中场休息 | |
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35 bibliography | |
n.参考书目;(有关某一专题的)书目 | |
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36 inordinate | |
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37 swelled | |
增强( swell的过去式和过去分词 ); 肿胀; (使)凸出; 充满(激情) | |
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38 scattered | |
adj.分散的,稀疏的;散步的;疏疏落落的 | |
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39 varied | |
adj.多样的,多变化的 | |
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40 superseding | |
取代,接替( supersede的现在分词 ) | |
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41 immortal | |
adj.不朽的;永生的,不死的;神的 | |
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42 reign | |
n.统治时期,统治,支配,盛行;v.占优势 | |
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43 narratives | |
记叙文( narrative的名词复数 ); 故事; 叙述; 叙述部分 | |
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44 undertakings | |
企业( undertaking的名词复数 ); 保证; 殡仪业; 任务 | |
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45 juntas | |
n.以武力政变上台的军阀( junta的名词复数 ) | |
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46 breach | |
n.违反,不履行;破裂;vt.冲破,攻破 | |
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47 eloquent | |
adj.雄辩的,口才流利的;明白显示出的 | |
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48 kinsman | |
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49 folly | |
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50 gratuitous | |
adj.无偿的,免费的;无缘无故的,不必要的 | |
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51 perversity | |
n.任性;刚愎自用 | |
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52 opposition | |
n.反对,敌对 | |
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53 thwarted | |
阻挠( thwart的过去式和过去分词 ); 使受挫折; 挫败; 横过 | |
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54 obstinate | |
adj.顽固的,倔强的,不易屈服的,较难治愈的 | |
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55 dealing | |
n.经商方法,待人态度 | |
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56 ministries | |
(政府的)部( ministry的名词复数 ); 神职; 牧师职位; 神职任期 | |
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57 captious | |
adj.难讨好的,吹毛求疵的 | |
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58 reproof | |
n.斥责,责备 | |
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59 monstrous | |
adj.巨大的;恐怖的;可耻的,丢脸的 | |
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60 rebellious | |
adj.造反的,反抗的,难控制的 | |
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61 justify | |
vt.证明…正当(或有理),为…辩护 | |
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62 idiotic | |
adj.白痴的 | |
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63 obstinacy | |
n.顽固;(病痛等)难治 | |
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64 cowardice | |
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65 eloquence | |
n.雄辩;口才,修辞 | |
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66 prosaic | |
adj.单调的,无趣的 | |
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67 implicit | |
a.暗示的,含蓄的,不明晰的,绝对的 | |
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68 credence | |
n.信用,祭器台,供桌,凭证 | |
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69 astounding | |
adj.使人震惊的vt.使震惊,使大吃一惊astound的现在分词) | |
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70 haphazard | |
adj.无计划的,随意的,杂乱无章的 | |
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71 drawn | |
v.拖,拉,拔出;adj.憔悴的,紧张的 | |
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72 arrogance | |
n.傲慢,自大 | |
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73 hampered | |
妨碍,束缚,限制( hamper的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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74 extenuating | |
adj.使减轻的,情有可原的v.(用偏袒的辩解或借口)减轻( extenuate的现在分词 );低估,藐视 | |
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75 peruse | |
v.细读,精读 | |
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76 atlas | |
n.地图册,图表集 | |
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77 battalion | |
n.营;部队;大队(的人) | |
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78 disposition | |
n.性情,性格;意向,倾向;排列,部署 | |
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79 infinitely | |
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