There is no need for us to trace back the growth of Napoleon’s conception of himself as the successor of Charlemagne beyond the winter of 1805-6, the moment when victorious11 at Austerlitz and master for the first time of Central Europe, he began to put into execution his grandiose12 scheme for enfeoffing all the realms of the Continent as vassal states of the French Empire. He had extorted13 from Francis of Austria the renunciation of his meagre and time-worn rights as head of the Holy Roman Empire, because he intended to replace the ancient shadow by a new reality. The idea that he might be Emperor of Europe and not merely Emperor of the French was already developed, though Prussia still needed to be chastised15, and Russia to be checked and turned back on to the ways of the East. It was after Austerlitz but before Jena that the foundations of the Confederation of the Rhine were laid[5], and that the Emperor took in hand the erection of that series of subject realms under princes of his own house, which was to culminate16 in the new kingdom of Spain ruled by ‘Joseph Napoleon the First.’ By the summer of 1806 the system was already well developed: the first modest experiment, the planting out of his sister Eliza and her insignificant17 husband in the duchy of Lucca and Piombino was now twelve months old. There had followed the gift of the old Bourbon kingdom of Naples to Joseph Bonaparte in February, 1806, and the transformation18 of the Batavian Republic into Louis Bonaparte’s kingdom of Holland in June. The Emperor’s brother-in-law, Joachim Murat, had been made Grand-Duke of Berg in March, his sister, Pauline, Duchess of Guastalla in the same month. It cannot be doubted that his eye was already roving all round Europe, marking out every region in which the system of feudatory states could be further extended.
At the ill-governed realms of Spain and Portugal it is certain that he must have taken a specially19 long glance. He had against the house of the Bourbons the grudge20 that men always feel against[p. 3] those whom they have injured. He knew that they could never forgive the disappointed hopes of 1799, nor the murder of the Duc d’Enghien, however much they might disguise their sentiments by base servility. What their real feelings were might be guessed from the treacherous21 conduct of their kinsmen22 of Naples, whom he had just expelled from the Continent. The Bourbons of Spain were at this moment the most subservient23 and the most ill-used of his allies. Under the imbecile guidance of his favourite Godoy, Charles IV had consistently held to the league with France since 1795, and had thereby24 brought down untold25 calamities26 upon his realm. Nevertheless Napoleon was profoundly dissatisfied with him as an ally. The seventy-two million francs of subsidies27 which he was annually28 wringing29 from his impoverished30 neighbour seemed to him a trifle. The chief gain that he had hoped to secure, when he goaded31 Spain into war with England in 1804, had been the assistance of her fleet, by whose aid he had intended to gain the control of the narrow seas, and to dominate the Channel long enough to enable him to launch his projected invasion against the shores of Kent and Sussex. But the Spanish navy, always more formidable on paper than in battle, had proved a broken reed. The flower of its vessels32 had been destroyed at Trafalgar. There only remained in 1806 a few ships rotting in harbour at Cadiz, Cartagena, and Ferrol, unable even to concentrate on account of the strictness of Collingwood’s blockade. Napoleon was angry at his ally’s impotence, and was already reflecting that in hands more able and energetic than those of Charles IV Spain might give aid of a very different kind. In after years men remembered that as early as 1805 he had muttered to his confidants that a Bourbon on the Spanish throne was a tiresome33 neighbour—too weak as an ally, yet dangerous as a possible enemy[6]. For in spite of all the subservience34 of Charles IV the Emperor believed, and believed quite rightly, that a Bourbon prince must in his heart loathe35 the unnatural36 alliance with the child of the Revolution. But in 1806 Bonaparte had an impending37 war with Prussia on his hands, and there was no leisure for interfering38 in the affairs of the Peninsula.[p. 4] Spain, he thought, could wait, and it is improbable that he had formulated in his brain any definite plan for dealing39 with her.
The determining factor in his subsequent action was undoubtedly40 supplied in the autumn of 1806 by the conduct of the Spanish government during the campaign of Jena. There was a moment, just before that decisive battle had been fought, during which European public opinion was expecting a check to the French arms. The military prestige of Prussia was still very great, and it was well known that Russia had not been able to put forth41 her full strength at Austerlitz. Combined it was believed that they would be too much for Napoleon. While this idea was still current, the Spanish king, or rather his favourite Godoy, put forth a strange proclamation which showed how slight was the bond of allegiance that united them to France, and how hollow their much vaunted loyalty42 to the emperor[7]. It was an impassioned appeal to the people of Spain to take arms en masse, and to help the government with liberal gifts of men, horses and money. ‘Come,’ it said, ‘dear fellow countrymen, come and swear loyalty beneath the banners of the most benevolent43 of sovereigns.’ The God of Victories was to smile on a people which helped itself, and a happy and enduring peace was to be the result of a vigorous effort. It might have been pleaded in defence of Charles IV that all this was very vague, and that the anonymous45 enemy who was to be crushed might be England. But unfortunately for this interpretation46, three whole sentences of the document are filled with demands for horses and an instant increase in the cavalry47 arm of the Spanish military establishment. It could hardly be urged with seriousness that horsemen were intended to be employed against the English fleet. And of naval48 armaments there was not one word in the proclamation.
This document was issued on Oct. 5, 1806: not long after there arrived in Madrid the news of the battle of Jena and the capture of Berlin. The Prince of the Peace was thunderstruck at the non-fulfilment of his expectations and the complete triumph of Napoleon. He hastened to countermand49 his armaments, and to shower letters of explanation and apology on the Emperor, pointing out that his respected ally could not possibly have been the ‘enemy’ referred to in the proclamation. That document had[p. 5] reached Napoleon on the very battle-field of Jena, and had caused a violent paroxysm of rage in the august reader[8]. But, having Russia still to fight, he repressed his wrath50 for a moment, affecting to regard as satisfactory Godoy’s servile letters of explanation. Yet we can hardly doubt that this was the moment at which he made up his mind that the House of Bourbon must cease to reign44 in Spain. He must have reflected on the danger that southern France had escaped; a hundred thousand Spaniards might have marched on Bordeaux or Toulouse at the moment of Jena, and there would have been no army whatever on the unguarded frontier of the Pyrenees to hold them in check. Supposing that Jena had been deferred51 a month, or that no decisive battle at all had been fought in the first stage of the struggle with Prussia, it was clear that Godoy would have committed himself to open war. A stab in the back, even if dealt with no better weapon than the disorganized Spanish army, must have deranged52 all Napoleon’s plans, and forced him to turn southward the reserves destined53 to feed the ‘Grand Army.’ It was clear that such a condition of affairs must never be allowed to recur54, and we should naturally expect to find that, the moment the war of 1806-7 was ended, Napoleon would turn against Spain, either to dethrone Charles IV, or at least to demand the dismissal from office of Godoy. He acknowledged this himself at St. Helena: the right thing to have done, as he then conceded, would have been to declare open war on Spain immediately after Tilsit[9].
After eight years of experience of Bonaparte as an ally, the rulers of Spain ought to have known that his silence during the campaigns of Eylau and Friedland boded57 them no good. But his present intentions escaped them, and they hastened to atone58 for the proclamation of Oct. 5 by a servile obedience59 to all the orders which he sent them. The most important of these was the command to mobilize and send to the Baltic 15,000 of their best troops [March, 1807]. This was promptly60 done, the depleted[p. 6] battalions61 and squadrons being raised to war-strength, by drafts of men and horses which disorganized dozens of the corps62 that remained at home[10]. The reason alleged63, the fear of Swedish and English descents on the rear of the Grand Army, was plausible64, but there can be no doubt that the real purpose was to deprive Spain of a considerable part, and that the most efficient, of her disposable forces. If Godoy could have listened to the interviews of Napoleon and Alexander of Russia at Tilsit, he would have been terrified at the offhand65 way in which the Emperor suggested to the Czar that the Balearic Isles66 should be taken from Spain and given to Ferdinand of Naples, if the latter would consent to cede55 Sicily to Joseph Napoleon[11]. To despoil67 his allies was quite in the usual style of Bonaparte—Godoy cannot have forgotten the lot of Trinidad and Ceylon—but he had not before proposed to tear from Spain, not a distant colony, but an ancient province of the Aragonese crown. The project was enshrined in the ‘secret and supplementary’ clauses of the Treaty of Tilsit, which Napoleon wished to conceal68 till the times were ripe.
It was only when Bonaparte had returned to France from his long campaign in Poland that the affairs of the Iberian Peninsula began to come seriously to the front. The Emperor arrived in Paris at the end of July, 1807, and this was the moment at which he might have been expected to produce the rod, for the chastisement69 which the rulers of Spain had merited by their foolish proclamation of the preceding year. But no sign of any such intention was displayed: it is true that early in August French troops in considerable numbers began to muster70 at Bayonne[12], but[p. 7] Bonaparte openly declared that they were destined to be used, not against Spain, but against Portugal. One of the articles of the Peace of Tilsit had been to the effect that Sweden and Portugal, the last powers in Europe which had not submitted to the Continental System, should be compelled—if necessary by force—to adhere to it, and to exclude the commerce of England from their ports. It was natural that now, as in 1801, a French contingent71 should be sent to aid Spain in bringing pressure to bear on her smaller neighbour. With this idea Godoy and his master persisted in the voluntary blindness to the signs of the times which they had so long been cultivating. They gave their ambassador in Lisbon orders to act in all things in strict conjunction with his French colleague.
On August 12, therefore, the representatives of Spain and France delivered to John, the Prince-Regent of Portugal (his mother, Queen Maria, was insane), almost identical notes, in which they declared that they should ask for their passports and leave Lisbon, unless by the first of September the Regent had declared war on England, joined his fleet to that of the allied72 powers, confiscated73 all British goods in his harbours, and arrested all British subjects within the bounds of his kingdom. The prince, a timid and incapable74 person, whose only wish was to preserve his neutrality, answered that he was ready to break off diplomatic relations with England, and to close his ports against British ships, but that the seizure75 of the persons and property of the British merchants, without any previous declaration of war, would be contrary to the rules of international law and morality. For a moment he hoped that this half-measure would satisfy Napoleon, that he might submit to the Continental System without actually being compelled to declare war on Great Britain. But when dispatches had been interchanged between the French minister Rayneval and his master at Paris, the answer came that the Regent’s offer was insufficient76, and that the representatives of France and Spain were ordered to quit Lisbon at once. This they did on September 30, but without issuing any formal declaration of war.
On October 18, the French army, which had been concentrating at Bayonne since the beginning of August, under the harmless name of the ‘Corps of Observation of the Gironde,’ crossed the Bidassoa at Irun and entered Spain. It had been placed under[p. 8] the orders of Junot, one of Napoleon’s most active and vigorous officers, but not a great strategist after the style of Masséna, Soult, or Davoust. He was a good fighting-man, but a mediocre77 general. The reason that he received the appointment was that he had already some knowledge of Portugal, from having held the post of ambassador at Lisbon in 1805. He had been promised a duchy and a marshal’s baton78 if his mission was carried out to his master’s complete satisfaction.
It is clear that from the first Napoleon had intended that Portugal should refuse the ignominious79 orders which he had given to the Prince-Regent. If he had only been wishing to complete the extension of the Continental System over all Southern Europe, the form of obedience which had been offered him by the Portuguese80 government would have been amply sufficient. But he was aiming at annexation81, and not at the mere14 assertion of his suzerainty over Portugal. The fact that he began to mass troops at Bayonne before he commenced to threaten the Regent is sufficient proof of his intentions. An army was not needed to coerce82 the Portuguese: for it was incredible that in the then condition of European affairs they would dare to risk war with France and Spain by adhering too stiffly to the cause of England. The Regent was timid and his submission83 was certain; but Napoleon took care to dictate84 the terms that he offered in such an offensive form that the Portuguese government would be tempted85 to beg for changes of detail, though it sorrowfully accepted the necessity of conceding the main point—war with England and the acceptance of the Continental System. The Prince-Regent, as might have been expected, made a feeble attempt to haggle86 over the more ignominious details, and then Napoleon withdrew his ambassador and let loose his armies.
Shortly after Junot had crossed the Bidassoa there was signed at Fontainebleau the celebrated87 secret treaty which marks the second stage of the Emperor’s designs against the Peninsula. It was drawn88 up by Duroc, Napoleon’s marshal of the palace, and Eugenio Izquierdo, the agent of Godoy. For the official ambassador of Spain in Paris, the Prince of Masserano, was not taken into the confidence of his master[13]. All delicate matters were conducted by the favourite’s private representative, an obscure but astute89 personage, the director of the Botanical Gardens at Madrid, whose[p. 9] position was legitimized by a royal sign-manual giving him powers to treat as a plenipotentiary with France. ‘Manuel is your protector: do what he tells you, and by serving him you serve me,’ the old king had said, when giving him his commission.
The Treaty of Fontainebleau is a strange document, whose main purpose, at a first glance, seems to be the glorification90 of Godoy. It is composed of fourteen articles[14], the most important of which contain the details of a projected dismemberment of Portugal. The country was to be cut up into three parts. Oporto and the northern province of Entre-Douro-e-Minho were to become the ‘Kingdom of Northern Lusitania,’ and to be ceded56 to a Bourbon, the young King of Etruria, whom Napoleon was just evicting91 from his pleasant abode92 at Florence. All Southern Portugal, the large province of Alemtejo and the coast region of Algarve, was to be given as an independent principality to Godoy, under the title of ‘Prince of the Algarves’[15]. The rest of Portugal, Lisbon and the provinces of Beira, Estremadura and Tras-os-Montes were to be sequestrated till the conclusion of a general peace, and meanwhile were to be governed and administered by the French. Ultimately they were to be restored, or not restored, to the house of Braganza according as the high contracting parties might determine.
Instead therefore of receiving punishment for his escapade in the autumn of 1806, Godoy was to be made by Napoleon a sovereign prince! But Spain, as apart from the favourite, got small profit from this extraordinary treaty: Charles IV might take, within the next three years, the pompous93 title of ‘Emperor of the Two Americas,’ and was to be given some share of the transmarine possessions of Portugal—which meanwhile (treaties or no) would inevitably94 fall into the hands of Great Britain, who held the command of the seas, while Napoleon did not.
It is incredible that Bonaparte ever seriously intended to carry out the terms of the Treaty of Fontainebleau: they were not even[p. 10] to be divulged95 (as Article XIV stipulated) till it was his pleasure. Godoy had deserved badly of him, and the Emperor was never forgiving. The favourite’s whole position and character (as we shall presently show) were so odious96 and disgraceful, that it would have required an even greater cynicism than Napoleon possessed97, to overthrow98 an ancient and respectable kingdom in order to make him a sovereign prince. To pose perpetually as the regenerator99 of Europe, and her guardian100 against the sordid101 schemes of Britain, and then to employ as one’s agent for regeneration the corrupt102 and venal103 favourite of the wicked old Queen of Spain, would have been too absurd. Napoleon’s keen intelligence would have repudiated104 the idea, even in the state of growing autolatry into which he was already lapsing105 in the year 1807. What profit could there be in giving a kingdom to a false friend, already convicted of secret disloyalty, incapable, disreputable, and universally detested106?
But if we apply another meaning to the Treaty of Fontainebleau we get a very different light upon it. If we adopt the hypothesis that Bonaparte’s real aim was to obtain an excuse for marching French armies into Spain without exciting suspicion, all its provisions become intelligible107. ‘This Prince of the Peace,’ he said in one of his confidential108 moments, ‘this mayor of the palace, is loathed109 by the nation; he is the rascal110 who will himself open for me the gates of Spain[16].’ The phantom111 principality that was dangled112 before Godoy’s eyes was only designed to attract his attention while the armies of France were being poured across the Pyrenees. It is doubtful whether the Emperor intended the project of the ‘Principality of the Algarves’ to become generally known. If he did, it must have been with the intention of making the favourite more odious than he already was to patriotic113 Spaniards, at the moment when he and his master were about to be brushed away by a sweep of the imperial arm. That Napoleon was already in October preparing other armies beside that of Junot, and that he purposed to overrun Spain when the time was ripe, is shown in the Treaty itself. Annexed114 to it is a convention regulating the details of the invasion of Portugal: the sixth clause of this paper mentions that it was the emperor’s intention to concentrate 40,000 more troops at Bayonne—in case Great Britain should threaten an armed descent[p. 11] on Portugal—and that this force would be ready to cross the Pyrenees by November 20. Napoleon sent not 40,000 but 100,000 men, and pushed them into Spain, though no English invasion of Portugal had taken place, or even been projected. After this is it possible to believe for a moment in his good faith, or to think that the Treaty of Fontainebleau was anything more than a snare115?
Those who could best judge what was at the back of the emperor’s mind, such as Talleyrand and Fouché, penetrated116 his designs long before the treaty of Fontainebleau had been signed. Talleyrand declares in his memoirs[17] that the reason for which he was deprived of the portfolio117 of Foreign Affairs in August, 1807, was that he had disliked the scheme of invading Spain in a treacherous fashion, and warned his master against it. No improbability is added to this allegation by the fact that Napoleon at St. Helena repeatedly stated that Talleyrand had first thought of the idea, and had recommended it to him ‘while at the same time contriving118 to set an opinion abroad that he was opposed to the design.’ On the other hand, we are not convinced of the Prince of Benevento’s innocence119 merely by the fact that he wrote in his autobiography120 that he was a strenuous121 opponent of the plan. He says that the emperor broached122 the whole scheme to him the moment that he returned from Tilsit, asseverating123 that he would never again expose himself to the danger of a stab in the back at some moment when he might be busy in Central Europe[18]. He himself, he adds, combated the project by every possible argument, but could not move his master an inch from his purpose. This is probably true; but we believe it not because Talleyrand wrote it down—his bills require the endorsement124 of some backer of a less tarnished125 reputation—but because the whole of the Spanish episode is executed in the true Napoleonesque manner. Its scientific mixture of force and fraud is clearly the work of the same hand that managed the details of the fall of the Venetian Republic, and of the dethroning of Pope Pius VII. It is impossible to ascribe the plot to any other author.
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1
epoch
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| n.(新)时代；历元 | |
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inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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continental
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| adj.大陆的，大陆性的，欧洲大陆的 | |
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formulated
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| v.构想出( formulate的过去式和过去分词 )；规划；确切地阐述；用公式表示 | |
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Founder
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| n.创始者，缔造者 | |
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monarch
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| n.帝王，君主，最高统治者 | |
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monarchs
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| 君主，帝王( monarch的名词复数 ) | |
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derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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writ
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| n.命令状，书面命令 | |
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vassal
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| n.附庸的；属下；adj.奴仆的 | |
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victorious
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| adj.胜利的，得胜的 | |
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grandiose
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| adj.宏伟的，宏大的，堂皇的，铺张的 | |
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extorted
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| v.敲诈( extort的过去式和过去分词 )；曲解 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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chastised
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| v.严惩（某人）（尤指责打）( chastise的过去式 ) | |
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culminate
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| v.到绝顶，达于极点，达到高潮 | |
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insignificant
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| adj.无关紧要的，可忽略的，无意义的 | |
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transformation
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| n.变化；改造；转变 | |
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specially
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| adv.特定地；特殊地；明确地 | |
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grudge
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| n.不满，怨恨，妒嫉；vt.勉强给，不情愿做 | |
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treacherous
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| adj.不可靠的，有暗藏的危险的；adj.背叛的，背信弃义的 | |
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kinsmen
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| n.家属，亲属( kinsman的名词复数 ) | |
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subservient
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| adj.卑屈的，阿谀的 | |
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thereby
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| adv.因此，从而 | |
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untold
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| adj.数不清的，无数的 | |
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calamities
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| n.灾祸，灾难( calamity的名词复数 )；不幸之事 | |
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subsidies
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| n.补贴，津贴，补助金( subsidy的名词复数 ) | |
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annually
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| adv.一年一次，每年 | |
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wringing
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| 淋湿的，湿透的 | |
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impoverished
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| adj.穷困的，无力的，用尽了的v.使（某人）贫穷( impoverish的过去式和过去分词 )；使（某物）贫瘠或恶化 | |
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goaded
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| v.刺激( goad的过去式和过去分词 )；激励；（用尖棒）驱赶；驱使（或怂恿、刺激）某人 | |
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vessels
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| n.血管( vessel的名词复数 )；船；容器；（具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的）人 | |
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tiresome
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| adj.令人疲劳的，令人厌倦的 | |
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subservience
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| n.有利，有益；从属（地位），附属性；屈从，恭顺；媚态 | |
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loathe
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| v.厌恶，嫌恶 | |
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unnatural
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| adj.不自然的；反常的 | |
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impending
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| a.imminent, about to come or happen | |
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interfering
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| adj. 妨碍的 动词interfere的现在分词 | |
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dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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loyalty
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| n.忠诚，忠心 | |
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benevolent
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| adj.仁慈的，乐善好施的 | |
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reign
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| n.统治时期，统治，支配，盛行；v.占优势 | |
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anonymous
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| adj.无名的；匿名的；无特色的 | |
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interpretation
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| n.解释，说明，描述；艺术处理 | |
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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naval
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| adj.海军的，军舰的，船的 | |
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countermand
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| v.撤回(命令)，取消(订货) | |
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wrath
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| n.愤怒，愤慨，暴怒 | |
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deferred
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| adj.延期的，缓召的v.拖延，延缓，推迟( defer的过去式和过去分词 )；服从某人的意愿，遵从 | |
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deranged
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| adj.疯狂的 | |
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destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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54
recur
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| vi.复发，重现，再发生 | |
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55
cede
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| v.割让，放弃 | |
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56
ceded
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| v.让给，割让，放弃( cede的过去式 ) | |
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57
boded
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| v.预示，预告，预言( bode的过去式和过去分词 )；等待，停留( bide的过去分词 )；居住；（过去式用bided）等待 | |
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58
atone
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| v.赎罪，补偿 | |
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59
obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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promptly
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| adv.及时地，敏捷地 | |
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61
battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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63
alleged
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| a.被指控的，嫌疑的 | |
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64
plausible
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| adj.似真实的，似乎有理的，似乎可信的 | |
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offhand
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| adj.临时，无准备的；随便，马虎的 | |
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isles
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| 岛( isle的名词复数 ) | |
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67
despoil
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| v.夺取，抢夺 | |
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68
conceal
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| v.隐藏，隐瞒，隐蔽 | |
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chastisement
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| n.惩罚 | |
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muster
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| v.集合，收集，鼓起，激起；n.集合，检阅，集合人员，点名册 | |
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contingent
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| adj.视条件而定的；n.一组，代表团，分遣队 | |
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allied
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| adj.协约国的；同盟国的 | |
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73
confiscated
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| 没收，充公( confiscate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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74
incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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75
seizure
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| n.没收；占有；抵押 | |
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insufficient
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| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
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mediocre
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| adj.平常的，普通的 | |
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78
baton
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| n.乐队用指挥杖 | |
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ignominious
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| adj.可鄙的，不光彩的，耻辱的 | |
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80
Portuguese
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| n.葡萄牙人；葡萄牙语 | |
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annexation
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| n.吞并，合并 | |
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82
coerce
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| v.强迫，压制 | |
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83
submission
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| n.服从，投降；温顺，谦虚；提出 | |
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84
dictate
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| v.口授；(使)听写；指令，指示，命令 | |
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tempted
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| v.怂恿（某人）干不正当的事；冒…的险（tempt的过去分词） | |
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86
haggle
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| vi.讨价还价，争论不休 | |
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celebrated
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| adj.有名的，声誉卓著的 | |
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88
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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astute
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| adj.机敏的，精明的 | |
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glorification
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| n.赞颂 | |
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91
evicting
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| v.（依法从房屋里或土地上）驱逐，赶出( evict的现在分词 ) | |
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abode
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| n.住处，住所 | |
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pompous
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| adj.傲慢的，自大的；夸大的；豪华的 | |
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inevitably
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| adv.不可避免地；必然发生地 | |
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divulged
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| v.吐露，泄露( divulge的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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odious
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| adj.可憎的，讨厌的 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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overthrow
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| v.推翻，打倒，颠覆；n.推翻，瓦解，颠覆 | |
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regenerator
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| n.收革者，交流换热器，再生器；蓄热器 | |
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guardian
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| n.监护人；守卫者，保护者 | |
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sordid
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| adj.肮脏的，不干净的，卑鄙的，暗淡的 | |
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corrupt
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| v.贿赂，收买；adj.腐败的，贪污的 | |
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103
venal
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| adj.唯利是图的，贪脏枉法的 | |
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104
repudiated
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| v.（正式地）否认( repudiate的过去式和过去分词 )；拒绝接受；拒绝与…往来；拒不履行（法律义务） | |
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105
lapsing
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| v.退步( lapse的现在分词 )；陷入；倒退；丧失 | |
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106
detested
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| v.憎恶，嫌恶，痛恨( detest的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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intelligible
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| adj.可理解的，明白易懂的，清楚的 | |
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108
confidential
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| adj.秘（机）密的，表示信任的，担任机密工作的 | |
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109
loathed
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| v.憎恨，厌恶( loathe的过去式和过去分词 )；极不喜欢 | |
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110
rascal
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| n.流氓；不诚实的人 | |
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phantom
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| n.幻影，虚位，幽灵；adj.错觉的，幻影的，幽灵的 | |
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112
dangled
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| 悬吊着( dangle的过去式和过去分词 )； 摆动不定； 用某事物诱惑…； 吊胃口 | |
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113
patriotic
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| adj.爱国的，有爱国心的 | |
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114
annexed
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| [法] 附加的，附属的 | |
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115
snare
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| n.陷阱，诱惑，圈套；（去除息肉或者肿瘤的）勒除器；响弦，小军鼓；vt.以陷阱捕获，诱惑 | |
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116
penetrated
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| adj. 击穿的，鞭辟入里的 动词penetrate的过去式和过去分词形式 | |
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117
portfolio
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| n.公事包；文件夹；大臣及部长职位 | |
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118
contriving
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| （不顾困难地）促成某事( contrive的现在分词 )； 巧妙地策划，精巧地制造（如机器）； 设法做到 | |
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119
innocence
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| n.无罪；天真；无害 | |
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120
autobiography
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| n.自传 | |
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121
strenuous
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| adj.奋发的，使劲的；紧张的；热烈的，狂热的 | |
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122
broached
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| v.谈起( broach的过去式和过去分词 )；打开并开始用；用凿子扩大（或修光）；（在桶上）钻孔取液体 | |
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123
asseverating
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| v.郑重声明，断言( asseverate的现在分词 ) | |
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124
endorsement
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| n.背书；赞成，认可，担保；签(注)，批注 | |
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125
tarnished
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| （通常指金属）（使）失去光泽，（使）变灰暗( tarnish的过去式和过去分词 )； 玷污，败坏 | |
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