An account of the numbers and the organization of an army is of comparatively little interest, unless we understand the principles on which its leaders are accustomed to handle it on the day of battle, and its value as a fighting machine.
Speaking generally, the tactics of the French infantry2 during the Peninsular War were those which had been developed fifteen years before, during the first struggles of the Revolution. They nearly always attacked with a thick cloud of tirailleurs covering one or two lines of battalions4 in column. The idea was that the very numerous and powerful skirmishing line would engage the enemy sufficiently5 to attract all his attention, so that the massed battalions behind arrived at the front of battle almost without sustaining loss. The momentum6 of the columns ought then to suffice to carry them right through the enemy’s lines, which would already have suffered appreciably7 from the fire of the tirailleurs. This form of attack had won countless8 victories over Prussian, Austrian, and Russian; and many cases had been known where a hostile position had been carried by the mere9 impetus10 of the French columns, without a shot having been fired save by their skirmishers. But this method, which Wellington called ‘the old French style,’ never succeeded against the English. It had the fatal defect that when the column came up through the tirailleurs and endeavoured to charge, it presented a small front, and only the first two ranks could fire. For the normal French battalion3 advanced in column of companies, or less frequently of double companies, i.e. with a front of forty or at most of eighty men, and a depth of nine or of eighteen, since the company was always three deep, and there were six companies to a battalion. The rear ranks only served to give the front ranks moral support, and to impress the enemy with a sense of the solidity and inexorable strength of the approaching[p. 115] mass. Sometimes a whole regiment11 or brigade formed one dense12 column. Now if the enemy, as was always the case with the British, refused to be impressed, but stood firm in line, held their ground, and blazed into the head of the mass, the attack was certain to fail. For 800 men in the two-deep line, which Wellington loved, could all use their muskets13, and thus poured 800 bullets per volley into a French battalion of the same strength, which only could return 160. The nine-deep, or eighteen-deep, column was a target which it was impossible to miss. Hence the front ranks went down in rows and the whole came to a standstill. If, as was often the case, the French battalion tried to deploy14 in front of the English line, so as to bring more muskets to bear, it seldom or never succeeded in accomplishing the man?uvre, for each company, as it straggled out from the mass, got shot down so quickly that the formation could never be completed. No wonder that Foy in his private journal felt himself constrained15 to confess that, for a set battle with equal numbers on a limited front, the English infantry was superior. ‘I keep this opinion to myself,’ he adds, ‘and have never divulged16 it; for it is necessary that the soldier in the ranks should not only hate the enemy, but also despise him[88].’ Foy kept his opinion so closely to himself that he did not put it in his formal history of the Peninsular War: it has only become public property since his journals were published in 1900.
But the fact that with anything like equal numbers the line must beat the column was demonstrated over and over again during the war. It had first been seen at Maida in 1806, but that obscure Calabrian battle was hardly known, even by name, save to those who had been present. It was at Talavera, and still more at Busaco and Albuera, that it became patent to everybody that the attack in battalion column, even if preceded by a vigorous swarm17 of skirmishers, could never succeed against the English. At the two former fights the French attacked uphill, and laid the blame of their defeat upon the unfavourable ground. But when at Albuera three English brigades drove double their own numbers from the commanding ridge18 on which Soult had ranged them, simply by the superiority of their musketry fire, there was no longer any possibility of disguising the moral. Yet to the end of the war, down to Waterloo itself, the French stuck to their old formation: at the great battle in 1815, as Wellington tersely[p. 116] said, ‘The French came on once more in the old style, and we beat them in the old style.’
But when Napoleon’s armies were opposed to troops who could not stand firm to meet them in a line formation, they generally succeeded. The Spaniards, in their earlier battles, often tried to resist in a line of deployed19 battalions, but their morale20 was not good enough when the attacking column drew close to them, and they generally gave way at the critical moment and let their assailants break through[89]. The same had often been the case with the Austrians and Prussians, who in their earlier wars with Napoleon used the line formation which Frederick the Great had popularized fifty years before. The great king had accustomed his troops to fight in a three- or four-deep line, with a comparatively small provision of skirmishers to cover their front, for it was by the fire of the whole battalion that his troops were intended to win. The masses of tirailleurs which the French sent forward in front of their columns generally succeeded in engaging the Prussian or Austrian line so closely, that the columns behind them came up without much loss, and then broke the line by their mere momentum and moral effect. Hence in their later wars the German powers copied their enemies, and took to using a very thick skirmishing line backed by battalion columns in the French style.
Wellington never found any reason to do so. His method was to conceal21 his main line as long as possible by a dip in the ground, a hedge, or a wall, or to keep it behind the crest22 of the position which it was holding. To face the tirailleurs each battalion sent out its light company, and each brigade had assigned to it several detached companies of riflemen: from 1809 onward23 some of the 60th Rifles and one or two foreign light corps[90] were broken up and distributed round the various divisions for this special purpose. This gave a line of skirmishers strong enough to hold back the tirailleurs for a long time, probably till the supporting columns[p. 117] came up to help them. It was only then that the British skirmishing line gave way and retired24 behind its main body, leaving the deployed battalions in face of the French column, of which they never failed to give a satisfactory account. The covering screen of light troops often suffered terribly; e.g., at Barossa, Brown’s ‘light battalion’ lost fourteen out of twenty-one officers and more than half its rank and file[91], while holding off the French advance from the line which was forming in its rear. But the combat always went well if the enemy’s skirmishers could be kept back, and his supporting columns forced to come to the front, to engage with the regiments25 in two-deep formation which were waiting for them.
Charges with the bayonet are often heard of in narratives—especially French narratives—of the Peninsular War. But it was very seldom that the opposing troops actually came into collision with the white weapon. There were occasions, almost invariably in fighting in villages or enclosed ground, on which considerable numbers of men were killed or wounded with the bayonet, but they were but few. It is certain, however, that the 43rd at Vimiero, the 71st and 88th at Fuentes d’O?oro, and the 20th at Roncesvalles, engaged in this fashion[92]; and other cases could be quoted. But as a rule a ‘bayonet charge’ in a French historian merely means the advance of a column up to the enemy’s position without firing: it does not imply actual contact or the crossing of weapons. An English charge on the other hand was practically an advance in line with frequent volleys, or independent file-firing. At Albuera, or Barossa, or Salamanca it was the ball not the bayonet which did the work; the enemy was shot down, or gave way without any hand-to-hand conflict.
French cavalry27 tactics had by 1808 developed into as definite a system as those of the infantry. Napoleon was fond of massing his horsemen in very large bodies and launching them at the flank, or even at the centre, of the army opposed to him. He would occasionally use as many as 6,000 or 8,000, or (as at Waterloo) even 12,000 men for one of these great strokes. Two or three of his[p. 118] famous battles were won by tremendous cavalry charges—notably28 Marengo and Dresden, while Eylau was just saved from falling into a disaster by a blow of the same kind. But cavalry must be used at precisely29 the right moment, must be skilfully31 led and pushed home without remorse32, and even then it may be beaten off by thoroughly33 cool and unshaken troops. It is only against tired, distracted, or undisciplined battalions that it can count on a reasonable certainty of success. All through the war the Spanish armies supplied the French horsemen with exactly the opportunities that they required: they were always being surprised, or caught in confusion while executing some complicated man?uvre; and as if this was not enough, they were often weak enough in morale to allow themselves to be broken even when they had been allowed time to take their ground and form their squares. The battles of Gamonal (1808), Medellin, Alba de Tormes, and Oca?a (1809), the Gebora, and Saguntum (1811) were good examples of the power of masses of horse skilfully handled over a numerous but ill-disciplined infantry.
On the other hand, against the English the French cavalry hardly ever accomplished34 anything worthy35 of note. It is only possible to name two occasions on which they made their mark: the first was at Albuera, where, profiting by an opportune36 cloud-burst which darkened the face of day, two regiments of lancers came in upon the flank of a British brigade (Colborne’s of the second division), and almost entirely37 cut it to pieces. The second incident of the kind was at Fuentes d’O?oro, in the same summer, when Montbrun’s cavalry charged with some effect on Houston’s division and hustled38 it back for some two miles, though they never succeeded in breaking its squares.
On the other hand the cases where the French horsemen found themselves utterly39 unable to deal with the British infantry were very numerous—we need only mention Cacabellos (during Moore’s retreat), El Bodon, Salamanca, and several skirmishes during the retreat from Burgos in 1812. After such experiences it was no wonder that Foy, and other old officers of the army of Spain, looked with dismay upon Napoleon’s great attempt at Waterloo to break down the long line of British squares between La Haye Sainte and Hougoumont, by the charges of ten or twelve thousand heavy cavalry massed on a short front of less than a mile[93]. The Emperor[p. 119] had never seen the British infantry fight, and was entirely ignorant of their resisting power.
Of fights between cavalry and cavalry, where the two sides were present in such equal numbers as to make the struggle a fair test of their relative efficiency, there were but few in the Peninsular War. In the early years of the struggle Wellington was very scantily40 provided with horsemen, and never could afford to engage in a cavalry battle on a large scale. Later on, when he was more happily situated41 in this respect, he showed such a marked reluctance42 to risk great cavalry combats that the old saying that he was ‘pre-eminently an infantry general’ seems justified43. That he could use his horsemen vigorously enough, when he saw his opportunity, he showed at Assaye, long before he had made his name known in Europe. Yet the only one of his great battles in Spain where his dragoons took a prominent part in the victory was Salamanca, where Le Marchant’s brigade struck such a smashing blow on the flank of the French army. We have his own authority[94] for the fact that he hesitated to mass great bodies of horse, because he doubted the tactical skill of his officers, and the power of the regiments to man?uvre. ‘I considered our cavalry,’ he wrote ten years after the war was over, ‘so inferior to the French from want of order, that although I considered one squadron a match for two French, I did not like to see four British opposed to four French: and as the numbers increased and order, of course, became more necessary, I was the more unwilling44 to risk our men without having a superiority in numbers. They could gallop45, but could not preserve their order.’
Foy, in his excellent history of the Spanish War, emits an opinion in words curiously46 similar to those of Wellington, stating that for practical purposes the English troopers were inferior to the French on account of their headlong impetuosity and want of power to man?uvre[95]. When two such authorities agree, there must clearly have been some solid foundation for their verdict. Yet it is hard to quote many combats in their support: there were cases, no doubt, where English regiments threw their chances away by their blind fury in charging, as did the 23rd Light Dragoons at Talavera, the 13th Light Dragoons near Campo Mayor on March 25, 1811, and Slade’s brigade at Maguilla on June 11, 1812. Yet with the memory before us of Paget’s admirable operations at Sahagun and[p. 120] Benavente in December, 1808, of Lumley’s skilful30 containing of Latour Maubourg’s superior numbers at Albuera, and his brilliant success at Usagre over that same general in 1811, as well as Cotton’s considerable cavalry fight at Villa26 Garcia in 1812, it seems strange to find Wellington disparaging47 his own troopers. No doubt we must concede that the British horsemen did not show that marked superiority over their rivals of the same arm which Wellington’s infantry always asserted. But fairly balancing their faults and their merits, it would seem that there was something wanting in their general no less than in themselves. A lover of the cavalry arm would have got more profit out of the British horse than Wellington ever obtained. It is noticeable that not one of the successful fights cited above took place under the eye or the direction of the Duke.
As to the Spanish cavalry, it was (as we have already had occasion to remark) the weakest point in the national army. In the first actions of the war it appeared on the field in such small numbers that it had no chance against the French. But later on, when the juntas48 succeeded in raising large masses of horsemen, their scandalous conduct on a score of fields was the despair of Spanish generals. We need only mention Medellin and Oca?a as examples of their misbehaviour. No French cavalry-general ever hesitated to engage with double of his own number of Spanish horse. When vigorously charged they never failed to give way, and when once on the move it was impossible to rally them. It was often found on the night of a battle that the mass of the cavalry was in flight twenty miles ahead of the infantry, which it had basely deserted49.
Napoleon, as every student of the art of war knows, had started his career as an officer of artillery50, and never forgot the fact. He himself has left on record the statement that of all his tactical secrets the concentration of an overwhelming artillery fire on a given point was the most important. ‘When once the combat has grown hot,’ he wrote, ‘the general who has the skill to unite an imposing51 mass of artillery, suddenly and without his adversary’s knowledge, in front of some point of the hostile position, may be sure of success.’ His leading idea was to secure an overwhelming artillery preparation for his infantry attacks: for this reason his typical battle began with the massing of a great number of guns on the points of the enemy’s line which he intended ultimately to break down. In this respect he abandoned entirely the vicious tactics that prevailed[p. 121] in the earlier years of the revolutionary war, when the cannon52, instead of being concentrated, were distributed about in twos and threes among the infantry battalions. We shall find that his method had been perfectly53 assimilated by his subordinates: when the ground allowed of it, they were much given to collecting many guns at some salient point of the line, and bringing a concentrated fire to bear on the weak spot in the enemy’s position. At Oca?a a battery of this kind had a great share in the credit of the victory; at Albuera it saved Soult’s routed troops from complete destruction. The names of artillery generals like Senarmont and Ruty need honourable54 mention for such achievements. If the French artillery had less effect against the English than against most of Napoleon’s foes55, it was because of Wellington’s admirable custom of hiding his troops till the actual moment of battle. Austrian, Russian, or Prussian generals occupied a hillside by long lines drawn56 up on the hither slope, of which every man could be counted. Hence they could be thoroughly searched out and battered57 by the French guns, long before the infantry was let loose. Wellington, on the other hand, loved to show a position apparently58 but half-defended, with his reserves, or even his main line, carefully hidden behind the crest, or covered by walls and hedges, or concealed59 in hollows and ravines. Hence the French artillery-preparation was much embarrassed: there were no masses to fire at, and it was impossible to tell how any part of the line was held. By the end of the war the French marshals grew very chary60 of attacking any position where Wellington showed fight, for they never could tell whether they were opposed by a mere rearguard, or by a whole army skilfully concealed.
The English armies, unlike the French, always took with them a comparatively small proportion of artillery, seldom so much as two guns to the thousand men, as Foy remarks. But what there was was excellent, from its high discipline and the accuracy of its fire. The Duke preferred to work with small and movable units, placed in well-chosen spots, and kept dark till the critical moment, rather than with the enormous lines of guns that Bonaparte believed in. His horse artillery was often pushed to the front in the most daring way, in reliance on its admirable power of man?uvring and its complete steadiness. At Fuentes d’O?oro, for example, it was made to cover the retreat of the right wing before the masses of French cavalry, in a way that would have[p. 122] seemed impossible to any one who was not personally acquainted with Norman Ramsay and his gunners. Hence came the astounding61 fact that during the whole war the Duke never in the open field lost an English gun. Several times cannon were taken and retaken; once or twice guns not belonging to the horse or field batteries were left behind in a retreat, when transport failed. But in the whole six years of his command Wellington lost no guns in battle. Foy gives an unmistakable testimony62 to the English artillery in his history, by remarking that in its material it was undoubtedly63 superior to the French[96]: the same fact may be verified from the evidence of our own officers, several of whom have left their opinion on record, that after having inspected captured French cannon, limbers, and caissons they much preferred their own.
This statement, it must be remembered, only applies to the field and horse artillery. The English siege artillery, all through the war, was notably inferior to the French. Wellington never possessed64 a satisfactory battering65 train, and the awful cost at which his sieges were turned into successes is a testimony to the inadequacy66 of his resources. The infantry were sent in to win, by sheer courage and at terrible expense of life, the places that could not be reduced by the ill-equipped siege artillery. There can be no doubt that in poliorcetics the enemy was our superior: but with a very small number of artillery officers trained to siege work, an insignificant67 body of Royal Engineers[97], and practically no provision of trained sappers[98], what was to be expected? It was not strange that the French showed themselves our masters in this respect. But the fault lay with the organization at head quarters, not with the artillery and engineer officers of the Peninsular army, who had to learn their trade by experience without having received any proper training at home.
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1
adversaries
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| n.对手，敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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momentum
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| n.动力，冲力，势头；动量 | |
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appreciably
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| adv.相当大地 | |
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countless
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| adj.无数的，多得不计其数的 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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impetus
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| n.推动，促进，刺激；推动力 | |
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regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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dense
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| a.密集的，稠密的，浓密的；密度大的 | |
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muskets
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| n.火枪，（尤指）滑膛枪( musket的名词复数 ) | |
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deploy
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| v.（军）散开成战斗队形，布置，展开 | |
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constrained
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| adj.束缚的,节制的 | |
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divulged
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| v.吐露，泄露( divulge的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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swarm
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| n.(昆虫)等一大群；vi.成群飞舞；蜂拥而入 | |
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ridge
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| n.山脊；鼻梁；分水岭 | |
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deployed
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| （尤指军事行动）使展开( deploy的过去式和过去分词 )； 施展； 部署； 有效地利用 | |
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morale
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| n.道德准则，士气，斗志 | |
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conceal
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| v.隐藏，隐瞒，隐蔽 | |
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crest
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| n.顶点；饰章；羽冠；vt.达到顶点；vi.形成浪尖 | |
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onward
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| adj.向前的，前进的；adv.向前，前进，在先 | |
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retired
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| adj.隐退的，退休的，退役的 | |
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regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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villa
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| n.别墅，城郊小屋 | |
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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notably
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| adv.值得注意地，显著地，尤其地，特别地 | |
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precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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skilful
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| (=skillful)adj.灵巧的，熟练的 | |
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skilfully
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| adv. (美skillfully)熟练地 | |
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remorse
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| n.痛恨，悔恨，自责 | |
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thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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accomplished
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| adj.有才艺的；有造诣的；达到了的 | |
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worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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opportune
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| adj.合适的，适当的 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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hustled
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| 催促（hustle的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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scantily
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| adv.缺乏地；不充足地；吝啬地；狭窄地 | |
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situated
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| adj.坐落在...的，处于某种境地的 | |
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reluctance
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| n.厌恶，讨厌，勉强，不情愿 | |
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justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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unwilling
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| adj.不情愿的 | |
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gallop
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| v./n.(马或骑马等)飞奔；飞速发展 | |
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curiously
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| adv.有求知欲地；好问地；奇特地 | |
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disparaging
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| adj.轻蔑的，毁谤的v.轻视( disparage的现在分词 )；贬低；批评；非难 | |
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juntas
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| n.以武力政变上台的军阀( junta的名词复数 ) | |
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deserted
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| adj.荒芜的，荒废的，无人的，被遗弃的 | |
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50
artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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imposing
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| adj.使人难忘的，壮丽的，堂皇的，雄伟的 | |
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cannon
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| n.大炮，火炮；飞机上的机关炮 | |
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53
perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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honourable
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| adj.可敬的；荣誉的，光荣的 | |
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55
foes
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| 敌人，仇敌( foe的名词复数 ) | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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battered
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| adj.磨损的；v.连续猛击；磨损 | |
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apparently
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| adv.显然地；表面上，似乎 | |
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concealed
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| a.隐藏的，隐蔽的 | |
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chary
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| adj.谨慎的，细心的 | |
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61
astounding
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| adj.使人震惊的vt.使震惊，使大吃一惊astound的现在分词) | |
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62
testimony
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| n.证词；见证，证明 | |
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63
undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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64
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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65
battering
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| n.用坏，损坏v.连续猛击( batter的现在分词 ) | |
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66
inadequacy
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| n.无法胜任，信心不足 | |
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67
insignificant
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| adj.无关紧要的，可忽略的，无意义的 | |
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