§ 1. The Army of 1808: its Character and Organization.
In dealing1 with the history of the imperial armies in the Peninsula, it is our first duty to point out the enormous difference between the troops who entered Spain in 1807 and 1808, under Dupont, Moncey, and Murat, and the later arrivals who came under Bonaparte’s personal guidance when the first disastrous2 stage of the war was over.
Nothing can show more clearly the contempt which the Emperor entertained, not only for the Spanish government but for the Spanish nation, than the character of the hosts which he first sent forth3 to occupy the Peninsula. After Tilsit he was the master of half a million of the best troops in the world; but he did not consider the subjugation4 of Spain and Portugal a sufficiently5 formidable task to make it necessary to move southward any appreciable6 fraction of the Grand Army. The victors of Jena and Friedland were left in their cantonments on the Rhine, the Elbe, and the Oder, while a new force, mainly composed of elements of inferior fighting value, was sent across the Pyrenees.
This second host was at Napoleon’s disposition7 mainly owing to the fact that during the late war he had been anticipating the conscription. In the winter of 1806-7 he had called out, a year too soon, the men who were due to serve in 1808. In the late autumn of 1807, while his designs in Spain were already in progress, he had summoned forth the conscription of 1809. He had thus under arms two years’ contingents8 of recruits raised before their proper time. The dép?ts were gorged9, and, even after the corps10 which had been depleted11 in Prussia and Poland had been made up to full strength, there was an enormous surplus of men in hand.
To utilize12 this mass of conscripts the Emperor found several ways. Of the men raised in the winter of 1806-7 some thousands had been thrown into temporary organizations, called ‘legions of reserve,[p. 104]’ and used to do garrison13 duty on the Atlantic coast, in order to guard against possible English descents. There were five of these ‘legions’ and two ‘supplementary legions’ in the army sent into Spain: they showed a strength of 16,000 men. None of them had been more than a year under arms, but they were at any rate organized units complete in themselves. They formed the greater part of the infantry14 in the corps of Dupont.
A shade worse in composition were twenty ‘provisional regiments15’ which the Emperor put together for Spain. Each regimental dép?t in the south of France was told to form four companies from its superabundant mass of conscripts. These bodies, of about 560 men each, were united in fours, and each group was called a ‘provisional regiment16.’ The men of each battalion17 knew nothing of those of the others, since they were all drawn18 from separate regiments: there was not a single veteran soldier in the ranks: the officers were almost all either half-pay men called back to service, or young sub-lieutenants who had just received their commissions. These bodies, equally destitute20 of esprit de corps and of instruction, made up nearly 30,000 men of the army of Spain. They constituted nearly the whole of the divisions under Bessières and Moncey, which lay in Northern Spain at the moment of the outbreak of the war.
But there were military units even less trustworthy than the ‘provisional regiments’ which Napoleon transferred to Spain in the spring of 1808. These were the five or six régiments de marche, which were to be found in some of the brigades which crossed the Pyrenees when the state of affairs was already growing dangerous. They were formed of companies, or even smaller bodies, hastily drawn together from such southern dép?ts, as were found to be still in possession of superfluous21 conscripts even after contributing to the ‘provisional regiments.’ They were to be absorbed into the old corps when the pressing need for instant reinforcements for the Peninsula should come to an end. In addition to all these temporary units, Bonaparte was at the same moment making a vast addition to his permanent regular army. Down to the war of 1806-7 the French regiments of infantry had consisted of three battalions22 for the field and a fourth at the dép?t, which kept drafting its men to the front in order to fill up the gaps in the other three. Napoleon had now resolved to raise the establishment to five battalions per regiment, four for field service, while the newly created fifth became the dép?t battalion. When the Peninsular[p. 105] War broke out, a good many regiments had already completed their fourth field-battalion, and several of these new corps are to be found in the rolls of the armies which had entered Spain. The multiplication23 of battalions had been accompanied by a reduction of their individual strength: down to February, 1808, there were nine companies to each unit, and Junot’s corps had battalions of a strength of 1,100 or 1,200 bayonets. But those which came later were six-company battalions, with a strength of 840 bayonets when at their full establishment.
All the troops of which we have hitherto spoken were native Frenchmen. But they did not compose by any means the whole of the infantry which the Emperor dispatched into Spain between October, 1807, and May, 1808. According to his usual custom he employed great numbers of auxiliaries24 from his vassal25 kingdoms: we note intercalated among the French units seven battalions of Swiss, four of Italians, two each of Neapolitans and Portuguese26[76], and one each of Prussians, Westphalians, Hanoverians, and Irish. Altogether there were no less than 14,000 men of foreign infantry dispersed28 among the troops of Junot, Dupont, Bessières, Moncey, and Duhesme. They were not massed, but scattered29 broadcast in single battalions, save the Italians and Neapolitans, who formed a complete division under Lecchi in the army of Catalonia.
The cavalry30 of the army of Spain was quite as heterogeneous31 and ill compacted as the infantry. Just as ‘provisional regiments’ of foot were patched up from the southern dép?ts of France, so were ‘provisional regiments’ of cavalry. The best of them were composed of two, three, or four squadrons, each contributed by the dép?t of a different cavalry regiment. The worst were escadrons de marche, drawn together in a haphazard32 fashion from such of the dép?ts as had a surplus of conscripts even after they had given a full squadron to the ‘provisional regiments.’ There were also a number of foreign cavalry regiments, Italians, Neapolitans, lancers of Berg, and Poles. Of veteran regiments of French cavalry there were actually no more than three, about 1,250 men, among the 12,000 horsemen of the army of Spain.
When we sum up the composition of the 116,000 men who lay south of the Pyrenees on the last day of May, 1808, we find that[p. 106] not a third part of them belonged to the old units of the regular French army. It may be worth while to give the figures:—
Of veterans we have—
Infantry. Cavalry.
(1) A detachment of the Imperial Guard, which was intended to serve as the Emperor’s special escort during his irruption into Spain 3,600 1,750
(2) Twenty-six battalions of infantry of the line and light infantry, being all first, second, or third battalions, and not newly raised fourth battalions 25,800
(3) Three old regiments of cavalry of the line 1,250
(4) Three newly raised fourth battalions of infantry regiments of the line 1,800
This gives a total of regularly organized French troops of the standing33 army of 31,200 3,000
(5) Five legions of reserve, and two ‘supplementary legions of reserve’ 16,000
(6) Fifteen ‘provisional regiments’ from the dép?ts of Southern France [the remaining five had not crossed the frontier on May 31] 31,000
(7) Six régiments de marche of conscripts 3,200
(8) Eighteen battalions of Italian, Swiss, German, and other auxiliaries 14,000
(9) Sixteen ‘provisional regiments’ of cavalry, and a few detached ‘provisional squadrons,’ and escadrons de marche 9,500
(10) Three regiments of foreign cavalry 1,000
This makes a total of troops in temporary organization, or of foreign origin, of 64,200 10,500
Napoleon, then, intended to conquer Spain with a force of about 110,000 men, of which no more than 34,000 sabres and bayonets belonged to his regular army; the rest were conscripts or foreign auxiliaries. But we must also note that the small body of veteran troops was not distributed equally in each of the corps, so as to stiffen34 the preponderating35 mass of conscripts. If we put aside the division of Imperial Guards, we find that of the remaining 25,000 infantry of old organization no less than 17,500 belonged to Junot’s army of Portugal, which was the only one of the corps that had a solid organization. Junot had indeed a very fine force, seventeen old line battalions to two battalions of conscripts and[p. 107] three of foreigners. The rest of the veteran troops were mainly with Duhesme in Catalonia, who had a good division of 5,000 veterans. In the three corps of Dupont, Moncey, and Bessières on the other hand old troops were conspicuous36 by their absence: among the 19,000 infantry of Dupont’s corps, on which (as it chanced) the first stress of the Spanish war was destined37 to fall, there was actually only two battalions (1,700 men) of old troops. In Moncey’s there was not a single veteran unit; in Bessières’, only four battalions. This simple fact goes far to explain why Dupont’s expedition to Andalusia led to the capitulation of Baylen, and why Moncey’s march on Valencia ended in an ignominious38 retreat. Countries cannot be conquered with hordes39 of undrilled conscripts—not even countries in an advanced stage of political decomposition40, such as the Spain of 1808.
§ 2. The Army of 1808-14: its Character and Organization.
Baylen, as we shall see, taught Napoleon his lesson, and the second army which he brought into the Peninsula in the autumn of 1808, to repair his initial disasters, was very differently constituted from the heterogeneous masses which he had at first judged to be sufficient for his task. It was composed of his finest old regiments from the Rhine and Elbe, the flower of the victors of Jena and Friedland. Even when the despot had half a million good troops at his disposition, he could not be in force everywhere, and the transference of 200,000 veterans to Spain left him almost too weak in Central Europe. In the Essling-Wagram campaign of 1809 he found that he was barely strong enough to conquer the Austrians, precisely41 because he had left so many men behind him in the Peninsula. In the Russian campaign of 1812, vast as were the forces that he displayed, they were yet not over numerous for the enterprise, because such an immense proportion of them was composed of unwilling42 allies and disaffected43 subjects. If the masses of Austrians, Prussians, Neapolitans, Portuguese, Westphalians, Bavarians, and so forth had been replaced by half their actual number of old French troops from Spain, the army would have been far more powerful. Still more was this the case in 1813: if the whole of the Peninsular army had been available for service[p. 108] on the Elbe and Oder at the time of Lützen and Bautzen, the effect on the general history of Europe might have been incalculable. Truly, therefore, did the Emperor call the Spanish War ‘the running sore’ which had sapped his strength ever since its commencement.
A word as to the tactical organization of the French army in 1808 is required. The infantry regiments of normal formation consisted, as we have seen, of four field battalions and one dép?t battalion; the last named never, of course, appeared at the front. Each field battalion was composed of six companies of 140 men: its two flank companies, the grenadiers and voltigeurs, were formed of the pick of the corps[77]: into the grenadiers only tall, into the voltigeurs only short men were drafted. Thus a battalion should normally have shown 840 and a regiment 3,360 men in the field. But it was by no means the universal rule to find the whole four battalions of a regiment serving together. In the modern armies of France, Germany, or Russia, a regiment in time of peace lives concentrated in its recruiting district, and can take the field in a compact body. This was not the case in Napoleon’s ever-wandering hosts: the chances of war were always isolating44 single battalions, which, once dropped in a garrison or sent on an expedition, did not easily rejoin their fellows. Many, too, of the new fourth battalions raised in 1807 had never gone forward to Germany to seek the main body of their regiments. Of the corps which were brought down to Spain in the late autumn of 1808 there were more with three battalions than with four concentrated under the regimental eagle. Some had only two present, a few no more than one[78]. But the Emperor disliked to have single isolated45 battalions, and preferred to work them in pairs, if he could not get three or four together. The object of this was that, if one or two battalions got much weakened in a campaign, the men could be fused into a single unit, and the supernumerary officers and sergeants46 sent back[p. 109] to the dép?t, where they would form a new battalion out of the stock of conscripts. But the fresh organization might very likely be hurried, by some sudden chance of war, to Flushing, or Italy, or the Danube, while the eagle and the main body remained in Spain—or vice19 versa.
There was therefore, in consequence of the varying strength of the regiments, no regularity47 or system in the brigading of the French troops in Spain: in one brigade there might be five or six isolated battalions, each belonging to a separate regiment; in another three from one regiment and two from a second; in a third four from one regiment and one from another. Nor was there any fixed48 number of battalions in a brigade: it might vary from three (a very unusual minimum) up to nine—an equally rare maximum. Six was perhaps the most frequent number. A division was composed of two, or less frequently of three, brigades, and might have any number from ten up to sixteen or eighteen battalions—i.e. it varied49, allowing for casual losses, from 6,000 to 10,000 men. This irregularity was part of Napoleon’s system: he laid it down as an axiom that all military units, from a brigade to an army corps, ought to differ in strength among themselves: otherwise the enemy, if he had once discovered how many brigades or divisions were in front of him, could calculate with accuracy the number of troops with which he had to do.
Much confusion is caused, when we deal with Napoleon’s army, by the strange system of numeration which he adopted. The infantry, whether called ‘line regiments’ or ‘light infantry regiments,’ were drilled and organized in the same way. But the Emperor had some odd vagaries50: he often refused to raise again a regiment which had been exterminated51, or taken prisoners en masse. Hence after a few years of his reign27 there were some vacant numbers in the list of infantry corps. The regiments, for example, which were garrisoning52 the colonies at the time of the rupture53 of the Peace of Amiens, fell one after another into the hands of the English as the war went on. They were never replaced, and left gaps in the army list. On the other hand the Emperor sometimes raised regiments with duplicate numbers, a most tiresome54 thing for the military historian of the next age. It is impossible to fathom55 his purpose, unless he was set on confusing his enemies by showing more battalions than the list of existing corps seemed to make possible. Or perhaps he was thinking of the old legions of the[p. 110] Roman Empire, of which there were always several in existence bearing the same number, but distinguished56 by their honorary titles. Those who wish to read the story of one of these duplicate regiments may follow in the history of Nodier the tale of the raising and extermination57 of Colonel Oudet’s celebrated58 ‘9th Bis’ of the line[79].
There is another difficulty caused by a second freak of the Emperor: all regiments ought, as we have said, to have shown four field battalions. But Bonaparte sometimes added one or even two more, to corps which stood high in his favour, or whose dép?ts produced on some occasions a very large surplus of conscripts. Thus we find now and then, in the morning state of a French army corps, a fifth or even a sixth[80] battalion of some regiment. But as a rule these units had not a very long existence: their usual fate was to be sent home, when their numbers ran low from the wear and tear of war, in order to be incorporated in the normal cadres of their corps. On the authority of that good soldier and admirable historian, Foy, we are able to state that on the first of June, 1808, Napoleon had 417 field battalions, over and above the dép?ts, on his army rolls. If the 113 regiments of the line, and the thirty-two light infantry regiments had all been in existence and complete, there should have been 580 field battalions. Clearly then some corps had disappeared and many others had not more than three battalions ready. But the units were always being created, amalgamated59, or dissolved, from week to week, so that it is almost impossible to state the exact force of the whole French army at any given moment. The most important change that was made during the year 1808 was the conversion60 of those of the provisional regiments which escaped Dupont’s disaster into new permanent corps. By combining them in pairs the 114th-120th of the line and the 33rd léger were created[81]. In the succeeding five years more and more corps were raised: the[p. 111] annexation61 of Holland and Northern Germany in 1810-11 ultimately enabled the Emperor to carry the total of his line regiments up to 156 [1813], and of his light infantry regiments up to thirty-six[82].
Of the French cavalry we need not speak at such length. When the Spanish war broke out, Bonaparte was possessed62 of about eighty regiments of horsemen, each taking the field with four squadrons of some 150 to 200 men. There were twelve regiments of cuirassiers, two of carabineers, thirty of dragoons, twenty-six of chasseurs à cheval, ten of hussars, i.e. fourteen regiments of heavy, thirty of medium, and thirty-six of light horse. The cuirassiers were hardly ever seen in Spain—not more than two or three regiments ever served south of the Pyrenees[83]. On the other hand the greater part of the dragoons were employed in the Peninsula—there were in 1809 twenty-five of the thirty regiments of them in the field against the English and Spaniards. More than half of the hussars also served in Spain. To the veteran corps of regulars there were added, at the outset of the war, as will be remembered, a great number of ‘provisional regiments,’ but these gradually disappeared, by being incorporated in the older cadres, or in a few cases by being formed into new permanent units. There was also a mass of Polish, German, and Italian cavalry; but these auxiliaries did not bear such a high proportion to the native French as did the foreign part of the infantry arm. By far the most distinguished of these corps were the Polish lancers, whom the English came to know only too well at Albuera. The Italians were almost exclusively employed on the east coast of Spain, in the army of Catalonia. The Germans—mostly from Westphalia, Berg, and Nassau—were scattered about in single regiments among the cavalry corps of the various armies. They were always mixed with the French horse, and never appeared in brigades (much less in divisions) of their own.
The average strength of a French cavalry regiment during the years 1809-14 was four squadrons of about 150 men each. It was very seldom that a corps showed over 600 men in the ranks:[p. 112] not unfrequently it sank to 450[84]. When it grew still further attenuated63, it was usual to send back the cadres of one or two squadrons, and to complete to full numbers the two or three which kept the field. These figures do not hold good for the raw ‘provisional regiments’ which Bonaparte used during the first year of the war: they sometimes rose to 700 or even 800 strong, when the dép?ts from which they had been drawn chanced to be exceptionally full of recruits[85]. But such large corps are not to be found in the later years of the war. By 1812, when Napoleon, busied in Central Europe, ceased to reinforce his Spanish armies, the average of a cavalry regiment had shrunk to 500 men. In 1813 it was seldom that 400 effective sabres could be mustered64 by any mounted corps.
As to the scientific arms of the French service, the artillery65 and engineers, there is no doubt that throughout the war they deserved very well of their master. Artillery cannot be improvised66 in the manner that is possible with infantry, and the batteries which accompanied Dupont’s and Moncey’s conscripts into Spain in 1808 were veterans. Without them the raw infantry would have fared even worse than it did, during the first year of the struggle. The proportion of guns which the French employed during the wars of the Empire was generally very large in comparison with the size of their armies—one of the many results of the fact that Bonaparte had originally been an artillery officer. He raised, as was remarked, the number of gunners in the French service to a figure as large as that of the whole regular army of Louis XVI at the moment when the Revolution broke out. But in Spain the difficulties of transport and the badness of the roads seem to have combined to keep down the proportion of guns to something very much less than was customary in the more favourable67 terrain68 of Italy or Germany. A large part, too, of the pieces were of very light metal—four- and even three-pounders, which were found easier to transport across the mountains than six- or eight-pounders, though much less effective in the field. In many of the campaigns, therefore, of the Peninsular War the French artillery stood in a proportion to the total number[p. 113] of men present, which was so low that it barely exceeded that customary among the British, who were notoriously more ‘under-gunned’ than any other European army save that of Spain. Junot at Vimiero had twenty-three guns to 13,500 men: Victor at Talavera had eighty guns to about 50,000 men: Masséna in 1810 invaded Portugal with some 70,000 men and 126 guns; at Fuentes d’O?oro he only showed forty-two guns to 40,000 bayonets and sabres[86]. Soult at Albuera had (apparently) forty guns to 24,000 men: in the autumn campaign of 1813 the same marshal had 125 guns to 107,000 men. It will be noted69 that the proportion never rises to two guns per thousand men, and occasionally does not much exceed one gun per thousand[87]. This contrasts remarkably70 with the 350 guns to 120,000 men which Bonaparte took out for the campaign of Waterloo, or even with the 1,372 guns to 600,000 men of the Russian expedition and 1,056 guns to 450,000 men of the ill-compacted army of 1813.
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dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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disastrous
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| adj.灾难性的，造成灾害的；极坏的，很糟的 | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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subjugation
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| n.镇压，平息，征服 | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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appreciable
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| adj.明显的，可见的，可估量的，可觉察的 | |
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disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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contingents
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| （志趣相投、尤指来自同一地方的）一组与会者( contingent的名词复数 )； 代表团； （军队的）分遣队； 小分队 | |
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gorged
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| v.（用食物把自己）塞饱，填饱( gorge的过去式和过去分词 )；作呕 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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depleted
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| adj. 枯竭的, 废弃的 动词deplete的过去式和过去分词 | |
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utilize
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garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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drawn
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vice
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destitute
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superfluous
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| adj.过多的，过剩的，多余的 | |
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battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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multiplication
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| n.增加，增多，倍增；增殖，繁殖；乘法 | |
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auxiliaries
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| n.助动词 ( auxiliary的名词复数 )；辅助工，辅助人员 | |
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vassal
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Portuguese
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| n.葡萄牙人；葡萄牙语 | |
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reign
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dispersed
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scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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heterogeneous
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| adj.庞杂的；异类的 | |
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haphazard
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standing
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stiffen
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preponderating
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conspicuous
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destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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ignominious
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| adj.可鄙的，不光彩的，耻辱的 | |
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hordes
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| n.移动着的一大群( horde的名词复数 )；部落 | |
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decomposition
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| n. 分解, 腐烂, 崩溃 | |
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precisely
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| adv.恰好，正好，精确地，细致地 | |
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unwilling
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| adj.不情愿的 | |
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disaffected
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| adj.（政治上）不满的，叛离的 | |
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isolating
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| adj.孤立的，绝缘的v.使隔离( isolate的现在分词 )；将…剔出（以便看清和单独处理）；使（某物质、细胞等）分离；使离析 | |
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isolated
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| adj.与世隔绝的 | |
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sergeants
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| 警官( sergeant的名词复数 )； （美国警察）警佐； （英国警察）巡佐； 陆军（或空军）中士 | |
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regularity
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| n.规律性，规则性；匀称，整齐 | |
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fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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varied
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| adj.多样的，多变化的 | |
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vagaries
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| n.奇想( vagary的名词复数 )；异想天开；异常行为；难以预测的情况 | |
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exterminated
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| v.消灭，根绝( exterminate的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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garrisoning
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| 卫戍部队守备( garrison的现在分词 )； 派部队驻防 | |
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rupture
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| n.破裂；(关系的)决裂；v.(使)破裂 | |
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tiresome
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| adj.令人疲劳的，令人厌倦的 | |
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fathom
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| v.领悟，彻底了解 | |
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distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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extermination
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| n.消灭，根绝 | |
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celebrated
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| adj.有名的，声誉卓著的 | |
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amalgamated
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| v.（使）（金属）汞齐化( amalgamate的过去式和过去分词 )；（使）合并；联合；结合 | |
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conversion
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| n.转化，转换，转变 | |
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annexation
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| n.吞并，合并 | |
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possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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attenuated
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| v.（使）变细( attenuate的过去式和过去分词 )；（使）变薄；（使）变小；减弱 | |
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mustered
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| v.集合，召集，集结（尤指部队）( muster的过去式和过去分词 )；（自他人处）搜集某事物；聚集；激发 | |
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artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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improvised
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| a.即席而作的,即兴的 | |
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favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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terrain
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| n.地面，地形，地图 | |
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noted
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| adj.著名的，知名的 | |
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remarkably
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| ad.不同寻常地，相当地 | |
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