When the English student begins to investigate the Peninsular War in detail, he finds that, as regards the Spanish armies and their behaviour, he starts with a strong hostile prejudice. The Duke of Wellington in his dispatches, and still more in his private letters and his table-talk, was always enlarging on the folly1 and arrogance2 of the Spanish generals with whom he had to co-operate, and on the untrustworthiness of their troops. Napier, the one military classic whom most Englishmen have read, is still more emphatic3 and far more impressive, since he writes in a very judicial4 style, and with the most elaborate apparatus5 of references and authorities. When the reader begins to work through the infinite number of Peninsular diaries of British officers and men (for there are a very considerable number of writers from among the rank and file) the impression left upon him is much the same. It must be confessed that for the most part they had a very poor opinion of our allies.
Before allowing ourselves to be carried away by the almost unanimous verdict of our own countrymen, it is only fair to examine the state and character of the Spanish army when the war broke out. Only when we know its difficulties can we judge with fairness of its conduct, or decide upon its merits and shortcomings.
The armed force which served under the banners of Charles IV in the spring of 1808 consisted of 131,000 men, of whom 101,000 were regulars and 30,000 embodied6 militia7. The latter had been under arms since 1804, and composed the greater part of the garrisons8 of the seaports10 of Spain, all of which had to be protected against possible descents of English expeditions[71].
Of the 101,000 men of the regular army, however, not all were available for the defence of the country. While the war with Russia was still in progress, Bonaparte had requested the Spanish government to furnish him with a strong division for use in the North [March, 1807], and in consequence the Marquis of La Romana[p. 90] had been sent to the Baltic with 15,000 men, the picked regiments11 of the army. There remained therefore only 86,000 regulars within the kingdom. A very cursory13 glance down the Spanish army-list of 1808 is sufficient to show that this force was far from being in a satisfactory condition for either offensive or defensive14 operations.
It is well worth while to look at the details of its composition. The infantry15 consisted of three sorts of troops—the Royal Guard, the line regiments, and the foreign corps16 in Spanish pay. For Spain, more than any other European state, had kept up the old seventeenth-century fashion of hiring foreign mercenaries on a large scale. Even in the Royal Guard half the infantry were composed of ‘Walloon Guards,’ a survival from the day when the Netherlands had been part of the broad dominions17 of the Hapsburg kings. The men of these three battalions19 were no longer mainly Walloons, for Belgium had been a group of French departments for the last thirteen years. There were Germans and other foreigners of all sorts in the ranks, as well as a large number of native Spaniards. There were also six regiments of Swiss mercenaries—over 10,000 bayonets—and in these the men in the ranks did really come from Switzerland and Germany, though there was a sprinkling among them of strangers from all lands who had ‘left their country for their country’s good.’ There were also one Neapolitan and three Irish regiments. These latter were survivals from the days of the ‘Penal Laws,’ when young Irishmen left their homes by thousands every year to take service with France or Spain, in the hope of getting some day a shot at the hated redcoats. The regiments bore the names of Hibernia, Irlanda, and Ultonia (i.e. Ulster). They were very much under their proper establishment, for of late years Irish recruits had begun to run short, even after the ’98: they now took service in France and not in Spain. The three Irish corps in 1808 had only 1,900 men under arms, instead of the 5,000 which they should have produced; and of those the large majority were not real Irish, but waifs of all nationalities. Of late native Spaniards had been drafted in, to keep the regiments from dying out. On the other hand we shall find that not only the foreign regiments but the whole Spanish army was still full of officers of Irish name and blood, the sons and grandsons of the original emigrants20 of two generations back. An astounding21 proportion of the officers who rose to some note during the war bore Irish names, and were hereditary22 soldiers of fortune, who[p. 91] justified23 their existence by the unwavering courage which they always showed, in a time when obstinate24 perseverance25 was the main military virtue26. We need only mention Blake, the two O’Donnells, Lacy, Sarsfield, O’Neill, O’Daly, Mahony, O’Donahue. If none of them showed much strategical skill, yet their constant readiness to fight, which no series of defeats could tame, contrasts very well with the spiritless behaviour of a good many of the Spanish generals. No officer of Irish blood was ever found among the cowards, and hardly one among the traitors[72].
The ten foreign corps furnished altogether about 13,000 men to the Spanish regular army. The rest of the infantry was composed of thirty-five regiments of troops of the line, of three battalions each, and twelve single-battalion18 regiments of light infantry. They were theoretically territorial27, like our own infantry of to-day, and mostly bore local names derived28 from the provinces—Asturias, Toledo, Estremadura, and so forth29. All the light infantry corps belonged to the old kingdoms of Aragon and Navarre, which were therefore scantily30 represented in the nomenclature of the ordinary line regiments. There were altogether 147 battalions of Spanish infantry, excluding the foreign troops, and if all of these had been up to the proper establishment of 840 men, the total would have amounted to 98,000 bayonets. But the state of disorganization was such that as a matter of fact there were only 58,000 under arms. The regiments which Napoleon had requisitioned for service in the North had been more or less brought up to a war-footing, and each showed on an average 2,000 men in the ranks. But many of the corps in the interior of Spain displayed the most lamentable31 figures: e.g. the three battalions of the regiment12 of Estremadura had only 770 men between them, Cordova 793, and Navarre 822—showing 250 men to the battalion instead of the proper 840. Theoretically there should have been no difficulty in keeping them up to their proper strength, as machinery32 for recruiting them had been duly provided. Voluntary enlistment33 was the first resource: but when that did not suffice to keep the ranks full, there was a kind of limited conscription called the Quinta[73] to fall back upon. This consisted in balloting34 for men in the regimental district, under certain rules which allowed an enormous number of exemptions—e.g. all skilled artisans and all[p. 92] middle-class townsfolk were free from the burden—so that the agricultural labourers had to supply practically the whole contingent35. Substitutes were allowed, if by any means the conscript could afford to pay for them. The conscription therefore should have kept the regiments up to their proper strength, and if many of them had only a third of their complement36 under arms, it was merely due to the general demoralization of the times. Under Godoy’s administration money was always wanting, more especially since Napoleon had begun to levy37 his monthly tribute of 6,000,000 francs from the Spanish monarchy38, and the gaps in the ranks probably represented enforced economy as well as corrupt39 administration.
The 30,000 embodied militia, which formed the remainder of the Spanish infantry, had been under arms since 1804, doing garrison9 duty; they seem in many respects to have been equal to the line battalions in efficiency. They bore names derived from the towns in whose districts they had been raised—Badajoz, Lugo, Alcazar, and so forth. Their officering was also strictly40 local, all ranks being drawn41 from the leading families of their districts, and seems to have been quite as efficient as that of the line. Moreover their ranks were, on the average, much fuller than those of the regular regiments—only two battalions in the total of forty-three showed less than 550 bayonets on parade.
It is when we turn to the cavalry42 that we come to the weakest part of the Spanish army. There were twelve regiments of heavy and twelve of light horse, each with a nominal43 establishment of 700 sabres, which should have given 16,800 men for the whole force. There were only about 15,000 officers and troopers embodied, but this was a small defect. A more real weakness lay in the fact that there were only 9,000 horses for the 15,000 men. It is difficult for even a wealthy government, like our own, to keep its cavalry properly horsed, and that of Charles IV was naturally unable to cope with this tiresome44 military problem. The chargers were not only too few, but generally of bad quality, especially those of the heavy cavalry: of those which were to be found in the regimental stables a very large proportion were not fit for service. When the five regiments which Napoleon demanded for the expedition to Denmark had been provided with 540 horses each and sent off, the mounts of the rest of the army were in such a deplorable state that some corps had not the power to horse one-third of their[p. 93] troopers: e.g. in June, 1808, the Queen’s Regiment, No. 2 of the heavy cavalry, had 202 horses for 668 men; the 12th Regiment had 259 horses for 667 men; the 1st Chasseurs—more extraordinary still—only 185 horses for 577 men. It resulted from this penury45 of horses that when Napoleon made a second demand for Spanish cavalry, asking for a division of 2,000 sabres to aid Junot in invading Portugal, that force had to be made up by putting together the mounted men of no less than ten regiments, each contributing two or at the most three squadrons and leaving the rest of its men dismounted at the dép?t.
Even if the cavalry had all been properly mounted, they would have been far too few in proportion to the other arms, only 15,000 out of a total force of 130,000—one in eight; whereas in the time of the Napoleonic wars one in six, or even one in five, was considered the proper complement. In the Waterloo campaign the French had the enormous number of 21,000 cavalry to 83,000 infantry—one to four. What with original paucity46, and with want of remounts, the Spaniards took the field in 1808, when the insurrection began, with a ridiculously small number of horsemen. At Medina de Rio Seco they had only 750 horsemen to 22,000 foot-soldiers, at Baylen only 1,200 to 16,000. Later in the war they succeeded in filling up the ranks of the old cavalry regiments, and in raising many new ones. But the gain in number was not in the least accompanied by a gain in efficiency. For the whole six years of the struggle the mounted arm was the weakest point of their hosts. Again and again it disgraced itself by allowing itself to be beaten by half its own numbers, or by absconding47 early in the fight and abandoning its infantry. It acquired, and merited, a detestable reputation, and it is hard to find half a dozen engagements in which it behaved even reasonably well[74]. When Wellington was made generalissimo of the Spanish armies in 1813 he would not bring it up to the front at all, and though he took 40,000 Spaniards over the Pyrenees, there was not a horseman among them. It is hard to account for the thorough worthlessness of these squadrons, even when we make allowance for all the difficulties of the time: Spain was notoriously deficient48 in decent cavalry officers when the war began. The horses were inferior to the French, and the equipment bad. From early disasters the troopers[p. 94] contracted a demoralization which they could never shake off. But granting all this, it is still impossible to explain the consistent misbehaviour of these evasive squadrons. The officers, no doubt, had a harder task in organizing their new levies49 than those of the infantry and artillery50, but it is curious that they should never have succeeded in learning their business even after four or five years of war.
The artillery of the Spanish army, on the other hand, earned on the whole a good reputation. This was not the result of proper preparation. When the struggle began it consisted of thirty-four batteries of field artillery, six of horse, and twenty-one garrison batteries (compa?ias fijas), with a total of 6,500 men. Forty batteries—that is to say 240 guns or somewhat less, for in some cases there seem to have been only four instead of six pieces in the battery—was according to the standard of 1808 a mediocre51 allowance to an army of 130,000 men, only about two-thirds of what it should have been[75]. But this was not the worst. Deducting52 four fully-horsed batteries, which had been taken off by Napoleon to Denmark, there remained in Spain four horse and thirty-two field batteries. These were practically unable to move, for they were almost entirely53 destitute54 of horses. For the 216 guns and their caissons there were only in hand 400 draught55 animals! When the war began, the artillery had to requisition, and more or less train, 3,000 horses or mules56 before they could move from their barracks! I do not know any fact that illustrates57 better the state of Spanish administration under the rule of Godoy. The raising of the great insurrectionary armies in the summer of 1808 ought to have led to an enormous increase to the artillery arm, but the trained men were so few that the greatest difficulty was found in organizing new batteries. Something was done by turning the marine58 artillery of the fleet into land troops, and there were a few hundreds of the militia who had been trained to work guns. But the officers necessary for the training and officering of new batteries were so scarce, that for many months no fresh forces of the artillery arm could take the field. In the autumn of 1808, at the time of the battles of Espinosa and Tudela, if we carefully add up the[p. 95] number of guns brought into action by the five armies of Galicia, Estremadura, Aragon, the ‘Centre’ (i.e. Andalusia and Castile), and Catalonia, we do not find a piece more than the 240 which existed at the outbreak of the war. That is to say, the Spaniards had raised 100,000 new levies of infantry, without any corresponding extension of the artillery arm. During the campaign the conduct of the corps seems on the whole to have been very good, compared with that of the other arms. This was to be expected, as they were old soldiers to a much greater extent than either the infantry or the cavalry. They seem to have attained59 a fair skill with their weapons, and to have stuck to them very well. We often hear of gunners cut down or bayonetted over their pieces, seldom of a general bolt to the rear. For this very reason the personnel of the batteries suffered terribly: every defeat meant the capture of some dozens of guns, and the cutting up of the men who served them. It was as much as the government could do to keep up a moderate number of batteries, by supplying new guns and amalgamating60 the remnants of those which had been at the front. Each batch61 of lost battles in 1808-10 entailed62 the loss and consequent reconstruction63 of the artillery. If, in spite of this, we seldom hear complaints as to its conduct, it must be taken as a high compliment to the arm. But as long as Spanish generals persisted in fighting pitched battles, and getting their armies dispersed64, a solid proportion of artillery to infantry could never be established. Its average strength may be guessed from the fact that at Albuera the best army that Spain then possessed65 put in line 16,300 men with only fourteen guns, less than one gun per thousand men—while Napoleon (as we have already noted) believed that five per thousand was the ideal, and often managed in actual fact to have three. In the latter years of the war the pieces were almost always drawn by mules, yoked66 tandem-fashion, and not ridden by drivers but goaded67 by men walking at their side—the slowest and most unsatisfactory form of traction68 that can be imagined. Hence came, in great part, their inability to man?uvre.
Of engineers Spain in 1808 had 169 officers dispersed over the kingdom. The corps had no proper rank and file. But there was a regiment of sappers, 1,000 strong, which was officered from the engineers. There was no army service corps, no military train, no organized commissariat of any kind. When moving about[p. 96] a Spanish army depended either on contractors69 who undertook to provide horses and wagons70 driven by civilians71, or more frequently on the casual sweeping72 in by requisition of all the mules, oxen, and carts of the unhappy district in which it was operating. In this respect, as in so many others, Spain was still in the Middle Ages. The fact that there was no permanent arrangement for providing for the food of the army is enough in itself to account for many of its disasters. If, like the British, the Spaniards had possessed money to pay for what they took, things might have worked somewhat better. Or if, like the French, they had possessed an organized military train, and no scruples73, they might have contrived74 to get along at the cost of utterly75 ruining the country-side. But as things stood, depending on incapable76 civil commissaries and the unwilling77 contributions of the local authorities, they were generally on the edge of starvation. Sometimes they got over the edge, and then the army, in spite of the proverbial frugality78 of the Spanish soldier, simply dispersed. It is fair to the men to say that they generally straggled back to the front sooner or later, when they had succeeded in filling their stomachs, and got incorporated in their own or some other regiment. It is said that by the end of the war there were soldiers who had, in their fashion, served in as many as ten different corps during the six years of the struggle.
Summing up the faults of the Spanish army, its depleted79 battalions, its small and incompetent80 cavalry force, its insufficient81 proportion of artillery, its utter want of commissariat, we find that its main source of weakness was that while the wars of the French Revolution had induced all the other states of Europe to overhaul82 their military organization and learn something from the methods of the French, Spain was still, so far as its army was concerned, in the middle of the eighteenth century. The national temperament83, with its eternal relegation84 of all troublesome reforms to the morrow, was no doubt largely to blame. But Godoy, the all-powerful favourite who had also been commander-in-chief for the last seven years, must take the main responsibility. If he had chosen, he possessed the power to change everything; and in some ways he had peddled85 a good deal with details, changing the uniforms, and increasing the number of battalions in each regiment. But to make the army efficient he had done very little: the fact was that the commander-in-chief was quite ignorant of[p. 97] the military needs and tendencies of the day: all his knowledge of the army was gained while carpet-soldiering in the ranks of the royal bodyguard86. It was natural that the kind of officers who commended themselves to his haughty87 and ignorant mind should be those who were most ready to do him homage88, to wink89 at his peculations, to condone91 his jobs, and to refrain from worrying him for the money needed for reforms and repairs. Promotion92 was wholly arbitrary, and was entirely in the favourite’s hands. Those who were prepared to bow down to him prospered93: those who showed any backbone94 or ventured on remonstrances95 were shelved. After a few years of this system it was natural that all ranks of the army became demoralized, since not merit but the talents of the courtier and the flatterer were the sure road to prosperity. Hence it came to pass that when the insurrection began, the level of military ability, patriotism96, and integrity among the higher ranks of the army was very low. There were a few worthy97 men like Casta?os and La Romana in offices of trust, but a much greater proportion of Godoy’s protégés. One cannot condone the shocking way in which, during the first days of the war, the populace and the rank and file of the army united to murder so many officers in high place, like Filanghieri, the Captain-General of Galicia, Torre del Fresno, the Captain-General of Estremadura, and Solano, who commanded at Cadiz. But the explanation of the atrocities98 is simple: the multitude were resenting the results of the long administration of Godoy’s creatures, and fell upon such of them as refused to throw in their lot immediately with the insurrection. The murdered men were (rightly or wrongly) suspected either of an intention to submit to Joseph Bonaparte, or of a design to hang back, wait on the times, and make their decision only when it should become obvious which paid better, patriotism or servility. The people had considerable justification99 in the fact that a very large proportion of Godoy’s protégés, especially of those at Madrid, did swear homage to the intruder in order to keep their places and pensions. They were the base of the miserable100 party of Afrancesados which brought so much disgrace on Spain. The misguided cosmopolitan101 liberals who joined them were much the smaller half of the traitor-faction.
Godoy and his clique102, therefore, must take the main responsibility for the state of decay and corruption103 in which the Spanish army[p. 98] was found in 1808. What more could be expected when for so many years an idle, venal104, dissolute, ostentatious upstart had been permitted to control the administration of military affairs, and to settle all promotions105 to rank and office? ‘Like master like man’ is always a true proverb, and the officers who begged or bought responsible positions from Godoy naturally followed their patron’s example in spreading jobs and peculation90 downwards106. The undrilled and half-clothed soldiery, the unhorsed squadrons, the empty arsenals107, the idle and ignorant subalterns, were all, in the end, the result of Godoy’s long domination. But we do not wish to absolve108 from its share of blame the purblind109 nation which tolerated him for so long. In another country he would have gone the way of Gaveston or Mortimer long before.
When this was the state of the Spanish armies, it is no wonder that the British observer, whether officer or soldier, could never get over his prejudice against them. It was not merely because a Spanish army was generally in rags and on the verge110 of starvation that he despised it. These were accidents of war which every one had experienced in his own person: a British battalion was often tattered111 and hungry. The Spanish government was notoriously poor, its old regiments had been refilled again and again with raw conscripts, its new levies had never had a fair start. Hence came the things which disgusted the average Peninsular diarist of British origin—the shambling indiscipline, the voluntary dirt, the unmilitary habits of the Spanish troops. He could not get over his dislike for men who kept their arms in a filthy112, rusty113 condition, who travelled not in orderly column of route but like a flock of sheep straggling along a high road, who obeyed their officers only when they pleased. And for the officers themselves the English observer had an even greater contempt: continually we come across observations to the effect that the faults of the rank and file might be condoned—after all they were only half-trained peasants—but that the officers were the source and fount of evil from their laziness, their arrogance, their ignorance, and their refusal to learn from experience. Here is a typical passage from the Earl of Munster’s Reminiscences:—
‘We should not have been dissatisfied with our allies, malgré their appearance and their rags, if we had felt any reason to confide114 in them. The men might be “capable of all that men[p. 99] dare,” but the appearance of their officers at once bespoke115 their not being fit to lead them in the attempt. They not only did not look like soldiers, but even not like gentlemen, and it was difficult from their mean and abject116 appearance, particularly among the infantry, to guess what class of society they could have been taken from. Few troops will behave well if those to whom they should look up are undeserving respect. Besides their general inefficiency117 we found their moral feeling different from what we expected. Far from evincing devotion or even common courage in their country’s cause, they were very often guilty, individually and collectively, of disgraceful cowardice118. We hourly regretted that the revolution had not occasioned a more complete bouleversement of society, so as to bring forward fresh and vigorous talent from all classes. Very few of the regular military showed themselves worthy of command. Indeed, with the exception of a few self-made soldiers among the Guerillas, who had risen from among the farmers and peasantry, it would be hard to point out a Spanish officer whose opinion on the most trivial military subject was worth being asked. We saw old besotted generals whose armies were formed on obsolete119 principles of the ancien régime of a decrepit120 government. To this was added blind pride and vanity. No proofs of inferiority could open their eyes, and they rushed from one error and misfortune to another, benefiting by no experience, and disdaining121 to seek aid and improvement’ [pp. 194-5].
A voice from the ranks, Sergeant122 Surtees of the Rifle Brigade, gives the same idea in different words.
‘Most of the Spanish officers appeared to be utterly unfit and unable to command their men. They had all the pride, arrogance, and self-sufficiency of the best officers in the world, with the very least of all pretension123 to have a high opinion of themselves. It is true they were not all alike, but the majority were the most haughty, and at the same time the most contemptible124 creatures in the shape of officers that ever I beheld’ [p. 109].
As a matter of fact the class of officers in Spain was filled up in three different ways. One-third of them were, by custom, drawn from the ranks. In an army raised by conscription from all strata125 of society excellent officers can be procured126 in this way. But in one mainly consisting of the least admirable part of the surplus[p. 100] population, forced by want or hatred127 of work into enlisting128, it was hard to get even good sergeants129. And the sergeants made still worse sub-lieutenants, when the colonel was forced to promote some of them. No wonder that the English observer thought that there were ‘Spanish officers who did not look like gentlemen.’ This class were seldom or never allowed to rise above the grade of captain. The remaining two-thirds of the officers received their commissions from the war office: in the cavalry they were supposed to show proofs of noble descent, but this was not required in the infantry. There was a large sprinkling, however, of men of family, and for them the best places and the higher ranks were generally reserved—a thing feasible because all promotion was arbitrary, neither seniority nor merit being necessarily considered. The rest were drawn from all classes of society: for the last fifteen years any toady130 of Godoy could beg or buy as many commissions for his protégés as he pleased. But a large, and not the worst, part of the body of officers was composed of the descendants of soldiers of fortune—Irishmen were most numerous, but there were also French and Italians—who had always been seen in great numbers in the Spanish army. They held most of the upper-middle grades in the regiments, for the promoted sergeants were kept down to the rank of captain, while the nobles got rapid promotion and soon rose to be colonels and generals. On the whole we cannot doubt that there was a mass of bad officers in the Spanish army: the ignorant fellows who had risen from the ranks, the too-rapidly promoted scions131 of the noblesse, and the nominees132 of Godoy’s hangers-on, were none of them very promising133 material with which to conduct a war à outrance for the existence of the realm.
In 1808 there was but one small military college for the training of infantry and cavalry officers. Five existed in 1790, but Godoy cut them down to one at Zamora, and only allowed sixty cadets there at a time, so that five-sixths of the young men who got commissions went straight to their battalions, there to pick up (if they chose) the rudiments134 of their military education. From want of some common teaching the drill and organization of the regiments were in a condition of chaos135. Every colonel did what he chose in the way of manual exercise and man?uvres. A French officer says that in 1807 he saw a Spanish brigade at a review, in which, when the brigadier gave the order ‘Ready, present, fire!’ the different[p. 101] battalions carried it out in three different times and with wholly distinct details of execution.
Not only was the Spanish army indifferently officered, but even of such officers as it possessed there were not enough. In the old line regiments there should have been seventy to each corps, i.e. 2,450 to the 105 battalions of that arm. But Godoy had allowed the numbers to sink to 1,520. When the insurrection broke out, the vacant places had to be filled, and many regiments received at the same moment twenty or thirty subalterns taken from civil life and completely destitute of military training. Similarly the militia ought to have had 1,800 officers, and only possessed 1,200 when the war began. The vacancies136 were filled, but with raw and often indifferent material.
Such were the officers with whom the British army had to co-operate. There is no disguising the fact that from the first the allies could not get on together. In the earlier years of the war there were some incidents that happened while the troops of the two nations lay together, which our countrymen could never forgive or forget. We need only mention the midnight panic in Cuesta’s army on the eve of Talavera, when 10,000 men ran away without having had a shot fired at them, and the cowardly behaviour of La Pe?a in 1811, when he refused to aid Graham at the bloody137 little battle of Barossa.
The strictures of Wellington, Napier, and the rest were undoubtedly138 well deserved; and yet it is easy to be too hard on the Spaniards. It chanced that our countrymen did not get a fair opportunity of observing their allies under favourable139 conditions; of the old regular army that fought at Baylen or Zornoza they never got a glimpse. It had been practically destroyed before we came upon the field. La Romana’s starving hordes140, and Cuesta’s evasive and demoralized battalions were the samples from which the whole Spanish army was judged. In the Talavera campaign, the first in which English and Spanish troops stood side by side, there can be no doubt that the latter (with few exceptions) behaved in their very worst style. They often did much better; but few Englishmen had the chance of watching a defence like that of Saragossa or Gerona. Very few observers from our side saw anything of the heroically obstinate resistance of the Catalonian miqueletes and somatenes. Chance threw in our way Cuesta and La Pe?a and Imaz as types of Peninsular generals, and from them the rest[p. 102] were judged. No one supposes that the Spaniards as a nation are destitute of all military qualities. They made good soldiers enough in the past, and may do so in the future: but when, after centuries of intellectual and political torpor141, they were called upon to fight for their national existence, they were just emerging from subjection to one of the most worthless adventurers and one of the most idiotic142 kings whom history has known. Charles IV and Godoy account for an extraordinary amount of the decrepitude143 of the monarchy and the demoralization of its army.
It is more just to admire the constancy with which a nation so handicapped persisted in the hopeless struggle, than to condemn144 it for the incapacity of its generals, the ignorance of its officers, the unsteadiness of its raw levies. If Spain had been a first-rate military power, there would have been comparatively little merit in the six years’ struggle which she waged against Bonaparte. When we consider her weakness and her disorganization, we find ourselves more inclined to wonder at her persistence145 than to sneer146 at her mishaps147.
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folly
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| n.愚笨，愚蠢，蠢事，蠢行，傻话 | |
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arrogance
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| n.傲慢，自大 | |
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emphatic
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| adj.强调的，着重的；无可置疑的，明显的 | |
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judicial
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| adj.司法的，法庭的，审判的，明断的，公正的 | |
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apparatus
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| n.装置，器械；器具，设备 | |
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embodied
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| v.表现( embody的过去式和过去分词 )；象征；包括；包含 | |
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militia
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| n.民兵，民兵组织 | |
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garrisons
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| 守备部队，卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
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garrison
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| n.卫戍部队；驻地，卫戍区；vt.派(兵)驻防 | |
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seaports
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| n.海港( seaport的名词复数 ) | |
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regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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cursory
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| adj.粗略的；草率的；匆促的 | |
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14
defensive
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| adj.防御的；防卫的；防守的 | |
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15
infantry
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| n.[总称]步兵(部队) | |
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16
corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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17
dominions
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| 统治权( dominion的名词复数 )； 领土； 疆土； 版图 | |
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18
battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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19
battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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emigrants
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| n.（从本国移往他国的）移民( emigrant的名词复数 ) | |
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21
astounding
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| adj.使人震惊的vt.使震惊，使大吃一惊astound的现在分词) | |
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22
hereditary
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| adj.遗传的，遗传性的，可继承的，世袭的 | |
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23
justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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24
obstinate
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| adj.顽固的，倔强的，不易屈服的，较难治愈的 | |
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25
perseverance
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| n.坚持不懈，不屈不挠 | |
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26
virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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27
territorial
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| adj.领土的，领地的 | |
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28
derived
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| vi.起源；由来；衍生；导出v.得到( derive的过去式和过去分词 )；（从…中）得到获得；源于；（从…中）提取 | |
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29
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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30
scantily
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| adv.缺乏地；不充足地；吝啬地；狭窄地 | |
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31
lamentable
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| adj.令人惋惜的，悔恨的 | |
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32
machinery
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| n.(总称)机械，机器；机构 | |
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33
enlistment
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| n.应征入伍，获得，取得 | |
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34
balloting
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| v.（使）投票表决( ballot的现在分词 ) | |
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35
contingent
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| adj.视条件而定的；n.一组，代表团，分遣队 | |
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36
complement
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| n.补足物，船上的定员；补语；vt.补充，补足 | |
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37
levy
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| n.征收税或其他款项，征收额 | |
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38
monarchy
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| n.君主，最高统治者；君主政体，君主国 | |
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39
corrupt
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| v.贿赂，收买；adj.腐败的，贪污的 | |
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40
strictly
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| adv.严厉地，严格地；严密地 | |
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41
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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42
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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43
nominal
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| adj.名义上的；(金额、租金)微不足道的 | |
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44
tiresome
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| adj.令人疲劳的，令人厌倦的 | |
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45
penury
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| n.贫穷，拮据 | |
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46
paucity
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| n.小量，缺乏 | |
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47
absconding
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| v.（尤指逃避逮捕）潜逃，逃跑( abscond的现在分词 ) | |
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48
deficient
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| adj.不足的，不充份的，有缺陷的 | |
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49
levies
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| （部队）征兵( levy的名词复数 )； 募捐； 被征募的军队 | |
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50
artillery
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| n.(军)火炮，大炮；炮兵(部队) | |
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51
mediocre
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| adj.平常的，普通的 | |
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52
deducting
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| v.扣除，减去( deduct的现在分词 ) | |
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53
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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54
destitute
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| adj.缺乏的；穷困的 | |
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55
draught
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| n.拉，牵引，拖；一网（饮，吸，阵)；顿服药量，通风；v.起草，设计 | |
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56
mules
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| 骡( mule的名词复数 )； 拖鞋； 顽固的人； 越境运毒者 | |
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57
illustrates
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| 给…加插图( illustrate的第三人称单数 )； 说明； 表明； （用示例、图画等）说明 | |
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58
marine
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| adj.海的；海生的；航海的；海事的；n.水兵 | |
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59
attained
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| （通常经过努力）实现( attain的过去式和过去分词 )； 达到； 获得； 达到（某年龄、水平、状况） | |
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60
amalgamating
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| v.（使）（金属）汞齐化( amalgamate的现在分词 )；（使）合并；联合；结合 | |
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61
batch
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| n.一批(组，群)；一批生产量 | |
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62
entailed
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| 使…成为必要( entail的过去式和过去分词 )； 需要； 限定继承； 使必需 | |
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63
reconstruction
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| n.重建，再现，复原 | |
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64
dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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65
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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66
yoked
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| 结合（yoke的过去式形式） | |
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67
goaded
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| v.刺激( goad的过去式和过去分词 )；激励；（用尖棒）驱赶；驱使（或怂恿、刺激）某人 | |
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68
traction
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| n.牵引；附着摩擦力 | |
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69
contractors
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| n.（建筑、监造中的）承包人( contractor的名词复数 ) | |
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70
wagons
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| n.四轮的运货马车( wagon的名词复数 )；铁路货车；小手推车 | |
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71
civilians
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| 平民，百姓( civilian的名词复数 )； 老百姓 | |
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72
sweeping
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| adj.范围广大的，一扫无遗的 | |
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73
scruples
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| n.良心上的不安( scruple的名词复数 )；顾虑，顾忌v.感到于心不安，有顾忌( scruple的第三人称单数 ) | |
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74
contrived
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| adj.不自然的，做作的；虚构的 | |
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75
utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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76
incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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77
unwilling
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| adj.不情愿的 | |
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78
frugality
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| n.节约，节俭 | |
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79
depleted
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| adj. 枯竭的, 废弃的 动词deplete的过去式和过去分词 | |
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80
incompetent
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| adj.无能力的，不能胜任的 | |
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81
insufficient
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| adj.(for，of)不足的，不够的 | |
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82
overhaul
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| v./n.大修，仔细检查 | |
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83
temperament
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| n.气质，性格，性情 | |
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84
relegation
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| n.驱逐，贬黜；降级 | |
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85
peddled
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| （沿街）叫卖( peddle的过去式和过去分词 )； 兜售； 宣传； 散播 | |
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86
bodyguard
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| n.护卫，保镖 | |
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87
haughty
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| adj.傲慢的，高傲的 | |
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88
homage
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| n.尊敬，敬意，崇敬 | |
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89
wink
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| n.眨眼，使眼色，瞬间；v.眨眼，使眼色，闪烁 | |
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90
peculation
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| n.侵吞公款[公物] | |
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91
condone
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| v.宽恕；原谅 | |
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92
promotion
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| n.提升，晋级；促销，宣传 | |
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93
prospered
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| 成功，兴旺( prosper的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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94
backbone
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| n.脊骨，脊柱，骨干；刚毅，骨气 | |
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95
remonstrances
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| n.抱怨，抗议( remonstrance的名词复数 ) | |
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96
patriotism
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| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
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97
worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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98
atrocities
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| n.邪恶，暴行( atrocity的名词复数 )；滔天大罪 | |
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99
justification
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| n.正当的理由；辩解的理由 | |
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100
miserable
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| adj.悲惨的，痛苦的；可怜的，糟糕的 | |
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101
cosmopolitan
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| adj.世界性的，全世界的，四海为家的，全球的 | |
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102
clique
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| n.朋党派系，小集团 | |
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103
corruption
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| n.腐败，堕落，贪污 | |
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104
venal
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| adj.唯利是图的，贪脏枉法的 | |
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105
promotions
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| 促进( promotion的名词复数 )； 提升； 推广； 宣传 | |
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106
downwards
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| adj./adv.向下的（地），下行的（地） | |
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107
arsenals
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| n.兵工厂，军火库( arsenal的名词复数 )；任何事物的集成 | |
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108
absolve
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| v.赦免，解除（责任等） | |
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109
purblind
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| adj.半盲的；愚笨的 | |
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110
verge
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| n.边，边缘；v.接近，濒临 | |
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111
tattered
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| adj.破旧的，衣衫破的 | |
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112
filthy
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| adj.卑劣的；恶劣的，肮脏的 | |
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113
rusty
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| adj.生锈的；锈色的；荒废了的 | |
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114
confide
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| v.向某人吐露秘密 | |
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115
bespoke
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| adj.（产品）订做的；专做订货的v.预定( bespeak的过去式 )；订（货）；证明；预先请求 | |
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116
abject
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| adj.极可怜的，卑屈的 | |
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117
inefficiency
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| n.无效率，无能；无效率事例 | |
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118
cowardice
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| n.胆小，怯懦 | |
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119
obsolete
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| adj.已废弃的，过时的 | |
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120
decrepit
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| adj.衰老的，破旧的 | |
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121
disdaining
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| 鄙视( disdain的现在分词 )； 不屑于做，不愿意做 | |
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122
sergeant
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| n.警官，中士 | |
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123
pretension
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| n.要求；自命，自称；自负 | |
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124
contemptible
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| adj.可鄙的，可轻视的，卑劣的 | |
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125
strata
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| n.地层（复数）；社会阶层 | |
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126
procured
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| v.（努力）取得， （设法）获得( procure的过去式和过去分词 )；拉皮条 | |
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127
hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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128
enlisting
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| v.（使）入伍， （使）参军( enlist的现在分词 )；获得（帮助或支持） | |
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129
sergeants
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| 警官( sergeant的名词复数 )； （美国警察）警佐； （英国警察）巡佐； 陆军（或空军）中士 | |
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130
toady
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| v.奉承；n.谄媚者，马屁精 | |
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131
scions
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| n.接穗，幼枝( scion的名词复数 )；（尤指富家）子孙 | |
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132
nominees
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| n.被提名者，被任命者( nominee的名词复数 ) | |
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133
promising
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| adj.有希望的，有前途的 | |
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134
rudiments
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| n.基础知识，入门 | |
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135
chaos
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| n.混乱，无秩序 | |
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136
vacancies
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| n.空房间( vacancy的名词复数 )；空虚；空白；空缺 | |
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137
bloody
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| adj.非常的的；流血的；残忍的；adv.很；vt.血染 | |
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138
undoubtedly
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| adv.确实地，无疑地 | |
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139
favourable
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| adj.赞成的，称赞的，有利的，良好的，顺利的 | |
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140
hordes
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| n.移动着的一大群( horde的名词复数 )；部落 | |
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141
torpor
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| n.迟钝；麻木；（动物的）冬眠 | |
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142
idiotic
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| adj.白痴的 | |
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143
decrepitude
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| n.衰老；破旧 | |
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144
condemn
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| vt.谴责，指责；宣判(罪犯)，判刑 | |
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145
persistence
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| n.坚持，持续，存留 | |
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146
sneer
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| v.轻蔑；嘲笑；n.嘲笑，讥讽的言语 | |
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147
mishaps
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| n.轻微的事故，小的意外( mishap的名词复数 ) | |
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