On August 1, Madrid had seen the last of the French: yet it was not till the thirteenth that the Spanish troops appeared before the gates of the capital. Even then it was not the victorious2 army of Andalusia which presented itself, but only the Valencian corps3 of Llamas, a mere4 division of 8,000 men, which would not have dared to push forward, had it not known that Joseph Bonaparte and all his train were now far on their way towards the Ebro. During the thirteen days which elapsed between his departure and the arrival of the Valencians there was a curious interregnum in Madrid. It took some time to convince the populace and the local authorities that the hated invaders5 were really gone, and that they were once more their own masters. Nothing reflects the state of public opinion better than the Madrid Gazette: down to August 1, it shows the hand of a French editor; ‘His Majesty’ means King Joseph, and all the foreign intelligence is coloured with French views. On August 2 the foreign influence begins to disappear, and we note a very cautious and tentative proclamation by the old ‘Council of Castile.’ That effete6 body, shorn by the French of most of its prominent members, had repeatedly yielded to the orders of Murat and Savary: it had carried out many decrees of the new executive, yet it had never actually recognized the legality of King Joseph’s accession. Indeed at the last moment it had striven, by feeble methods of evasion7 and delay, to avoid committing itself to this final step. But we may guess that, had there been no Baylen, the Council would finally have made up its mind to ‘swallow the pill’—if we may use once more Murat’s characteristic phrase. However, the flight of Joseph had saved it from being forced to range itself on the side of the traitors8, and its members were able to stay behind in Madrid without fearing for their necks. In their first manifesto9 there is not a word that could have offended Savary, if he had returned the next day. It preaches the necessity of calm, order, and quiet: no one must stir up mobs, compromise the public[p. 343] safety, or vex10 his respectable neighbours[343]. The rest of the paper on this and the two following days is filled up with essays on geography and political economy, lists of servants seeking places, and colourless foreign news many weeks old. Such piteous stuff was not likely to keep the people quiet: on August 4 a mob assembled, broke open the house of Don Luis Viguri (one of Godoy’s old confidants), murdered him, and dragged his body through the streets. Fearing that they too might be considered Afrancesados the Council published a second proclamation of the most abject11 kind. The ‘melancholy instance of insubordination’ of the previous day causes them ‘intolerable sorrow’ and is ‘unlikely to tend to public felicity.’ The loyal and generous citizens ought to wait for the working of the law and its ministers, and not to take the execution of justice into their own hands. The clergy12, the local officials, every employer of labour, every father of a family, are begged to help to maintain peace and order. Then comes a page of notices of new books, and a short paper on the ethics13 of emigration! Of Ferdinand VII or Joseph I, of politics domestic or foreign, there is not a word. Two days later the Council at last makes up its mind, and, after a week of most uncomfortable sitting on the fence, suddenly bursts out into an ‘Address to the honourable14 and generous people of the capital of Spain,’ in the highest strain of patriotism15: ‘Our loved King is in chains, but his loyal subjects have risen in his name. Our gallant16 armies have achieved triumphs over “the invincibles of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena.” All Europe stands surprised at their rapid victories. These fellow citizens of ours, crowned with the laurels17 of success, will soon be with us. Meanwhile the Council must beg the patriotic18 citizens of Madrid to abstain19 from riot and murder, and to turn their energies into more useful channels. Let them prostrate20 themselves before the altar in grateful thanks to God, and make preparations to receive and embrace the oncoming bands of liberators.’ Domestic intelligence becomes for the future a list of French atrocities21, and of (sometimes apocryphal) victories in the remoter corners of Spain[344]. Foreign intelligence is served up with an English rather[p. 344] than a French flavour. The arsenal22 of ‘Volovich[345]’ is shipping23 scores of cannon24 and thousands of muskets25 for the use of the brave Spaniards, the treasures of Great Britain are to be poured into the hands of the insurrectionary Juntas26, and so forth27. All this comes a little late: the good intentions of the Council would have been more clear if they had been expressed on August 2 instead of August 7, when the French were still at Buitrago, rather than when they were far away beyond Aranda de Duero[346].
It is really astonishing to find that the Council made a bid for power, and attempted to assume the pose of a senate of warm-hearted patriots28, after all its base servility to Murat and Savary during the last six months. Its president, Don Arias29 Mon y Velarde, actually had the audacity30 to write a circular-note to the various provincial31 Juntas of Spain, proposing that, as a single central government must obviously be established, they should send representatives to Madrid to concert with the Council on means of defence, and lend it the aid of their influence and authority. That such a discredited32 body should attempt to assume a kind of presidential authority over the local Juntas who had raised and directed the insurrection was absurd. The replies which were returned were of the most uncompromising kind: the Galician Junta taunted33 the Council with having been ‘the most active instrument of the Usurper34.’ Palafox, speaking for Aragon, wrote that it ‘was a corporation which had not done its duty.’ The active and ambitious Junta of Seville wished to accuse the Council before the face of the Spanish people ‘of having subverted35 the fundamental laws of the realm, of having given the enemy every facility for seizing the domination of Spain, of having lost all legal authority and become null and void, and of being suspected of deliberate treason of the most atrocious sort possible.’ The Valencians voted that ‘no public body of any kind ought to enter into correspondence with the Council of Castile, or[p. 345] come to any understanding with it[347].’ All these rebuffs to the Council were well deserved, and it is clear that the provincial Juntas were entirely36 justified37 in their action. But it is to be feared that there lay at the bottom of their hearts not merely honest indignation at the impudent38 proposal that had been laid before them, but a not unnatural39 desire to cling as long as possible to their existing power and authority. In many of the provinces there was shown a most unworthy and unwise reluctance41 to proceed at once to the construction of a single governing body for Spain, even when the proposal was put forward not by a discredited corporation like the Council, but by men of undoubted patriotism.
The credit of starting a serious agitation42 for the erection of a ‘Supreme43 Junta’ must be given to the Murcians, whose councils were guided by the old statesman Florida Blanca, a survivor44 from the days of Charles III. As far back as June 22 they had issued a proclamation setting forth the evils of provincial particularism, and advocating the establishment of a central government. None of the other Juntas ventured openly to oppose this laudable design, and some of them did their best to further it. But there were others who clung to power, and were determined45 to surrender it at as late a date as they could manage. The Junta of Seville was far the worst: that body—as we have had occasion to mention in another place—was largely in the hands of intriguers, and had put forth unjustifiable claims to domination in the whole southern part of the realm, even usurping48 the title of ‘Supreme Junta of Spain and the Indies[348].’ In their desire for self-aggrandizement49 they took most unjustifiable steps: they suppressed Florida Blanca’s Murcian proclamation, lest it might stir up an agitation in Andalusia in behalf of the establishment of a central government[349]. But this was a comparatively venial50 sin: their worst act was to stay the march of Casta?os on Madrid after Baylen. The pretext51 used was that they wished to welcome the victorious general and his army with triumphal entries and feasts of rejoicing—things entirely out of place, so long as the French were still holding the capital of the realm. To his own entire dissatisfaction Casta?os was dragged back to Seville, there to display the captured guns and flags of the French, and to be received with salvos fired by patriotic[p. 346] ladies who had learnt the drill of the artilleryman[350]. But he soon found to his disgust that the Junta was really aiming at the employment of his troops not for national purposes but for their own aggrandizement. They wished to speak with 40,000 men at their back, and were most reluctant to let the army pass the Sierra Morena, lest it should get out of their control. Their most iniquitous52 design was to overawe by armed force their neighbours, the Junta of Granada, who refused to recognize them as a central authority for Andalusia, and had given their assent53 to the Murcian proposal for the prompt formation of a national government. They were actually issuing orders for a division to march against the Granadans, when Casta?os—though a man of mild and conciliatory manners—burst out in wrath54 at the council board. Springing up from his chair and smiting55 the table a resounding56 blow, he exclaimed, ‘Who is the man that dares bid the troops march without my leave? Away with all provincial differences: I am the general of the Spanish nation, I am in command of an honourable army, and we are not going to allow any one to stir up civil war[351].’ Conscious that the regiments57 would follow the victor of Baylen, and refuse obedience58 to mere civilians59, the Junta dropped their suicidal project. But they turned all their energy into devising pretexts60 for delaying the march of the army on Madrid. Their selfishness was undisguised: when Casta?os begged for leave to march on the capital without further delay[352], the Conde de Tilly (the most intriguing61 spirit among all the politicians of Seville) responded with the simple question, ‘And what then will become of us?’ He then moved that the Junta of Andalusia should concern itself with Andalusia and Portugal alone, and not interfere62 in what went on beyond the Sierra Morena. This proposal was a little too strong even for the narrow-minded particularists of the Junta: but though they let Casta?os go, they contrived63 excuses for delaying the march of the greater part of his army. He did not get to Madrid till August 23, more than a month after Baylen, and then brought with him only the single division of La Pe?a, about 7,000 strong. The other three[p. 347] divisions, those of Reding, Jones, and Coupigny, did not cross the Sierra Morena for many weeks after, and some of the troops had not even left Andalusia at the moment when the French resumed offensive operations in October. On various specious64 pretences65 the Junta detained many regiments at Seville and Cadiz, giving out that they were to form the nucleus66 of a new ‘army of reserve,’ which was still a mere skeleton three months after Baylen had been fought. If we compare the Andalusian army-list of November with that of July, we find that only seven new battalions67[353] had joined the army of Casta?os in time to fight on the Ebro. It is true that a new division had been also raised in Granada, and sent to Catalonia under General Reding, but this was due to the energy of the Junta of that small kingdom, which was far more active than that of Seville. Andalusia had 40,000 men under arms in July, and no more than 50,000 at the beginning of November, though the Junta had promised to have at least thirty reserve battalions ready before the end of the autumn, and had received from England enormous stores of muskets and clothing for their equipment.
In the northern parts of Spain there was almost as much confusion, particularism, and selfishness as in the south. The main sources of trouble were the rivalry68 of the Juntas of Asturias and Galicia, and the extravagant69 claims of the aged70 and imbecile Cuesta, in virtue71 of his position as Captain-General of Castile. It will be remembered that in June insurrectionary Juntas had been established at Leon and Valladolid, the former purporting72 to represent the kingdom of Leon, the latter the kingdom of Old Castile. Each had been under the thumb of Cuesta, who looked upon them as nothing more than committees established under his authority for the civil government of the provinces of the Douro. But the disaster of Medina de Rio Seco destroyed both the power and the credit of the Captain-General. Flying before the French, the Juntas took refuge in Galicia, where they settled down at Ponferrada for a few days, and then moved to Lugo, whither the Junta of Galicia came out to meet them. The three bodies, joining in common session, chose as their president Don Antonio Valdes, the Bailiff of the Knights73 of Malta, who was one of the representatives of Castile. They claimed to be recognized as the supreme civil[p. 348] government of Northern Spain, but their position was weakened by two mischances. The Asturian Junta refused to have anything to do with them, and persisted in remaining sovereign within the borders of its own principality. Even more vexatious was the conduct of Cuesta: though he was wandering in the mountains with only three or four thousand raw levies74—the wrecks75 of Rio Seco—he refused to recognize any authority in the three federated Juntas, and pretended to revoke76 by his proclamation any powers vested in those of Castile and Leon. The fact was that he knew that they would lend support to his military rival Blake, and not to himself. He feigned77 to regard the Captains-General and the old Audiencias, or provincial tribunals, as the sole legitimate78 powers left in the kingdom, and to consider the Juntas as irregular assemblies destitute79 of any valid80 authority. In what a scandalous form he translated his theories into action, we shall soon see. Meanwhile he refused to co-operate with the troops of Galicia, and made no attempt to follow the retreating French. All his efforts were directed to increasing the numbers of the mass of raw levies which he called the ‘Army of Castile.’ But from the whole of the provinces over which he claimed authority he had only succeeded in scraping together 12,000 men by the middle of September, though as far as population went they represented nearly a sixth of the people of Spain.
The want of any central executive for directing the armies of the patriots had the most disastrous81 results. By September 1 Casta?os and Llamas had not more than 20,000 men at Madrid. Galluzzo’s army of Estremadura, which ought to have joined them long before, was still employed in its futile82 siege of Elvas. Cuesta was hanging back in Castile, as jealous of Casta?os as he had been of Blake. The only armies which were in touch with the French were Palafox’s troops on the Ebro and the Valencian division of Saint March, which the Junta of Valencia (showing more patriotism than most of their colleagues) had pushed up to Saragossa to aid the Aragonese. Blake, with the powerful army of Galicia, had descended83 to Astorga when Bessières retreated to Burgos. But from Astorga he advanced most cautiously, always clinging to the southern slope of the Cantabrian hills, in order to avoid the plains, where the cavalry84 of the French would have a free hand. It was not till September 10 that he had concentrated his main body at Reynosa, near the sources of the Ebro, where he was at last near enough to the front to be able to commence operations.
[p. 349]
The whole month of August, it is not too much to say, was lost for military purposes because Spain had not succeeded in furnishing itself with a central government or a commander-in-chief. It had been wasted in constitutional debates of the most futile kind. To every one, except to certain of the more selfish members of the Juntas, it was clear that a way must be found out of the existing anarchy85. Three courses seemed possible: one was to appoint a Regent, or a small Council of Regency, and to entrust86 to him (or to them) the conduct of affairs. The second was to summon the Cortes, the old national parliament of Spain. The third was to establish a new sort of central government, by inducing each of the existing Juntas to send deputies, with full powers of representation, to sit together as a ‘Supreme Central Junta’ for the whole realm. The project of appointing a Regent had at first many advocates: it occurred to both Casta?os and Palafox, and each (as it chanced) pitched upon the same individual as most worthy40 of the post[354]. This was the Archduke Charles of Austria, the sole general in Europe who had won a military reputation of the first class while contending with the French. He would have been an excellent choice—if only he could have been secured. But it did not take much reflection to see that if Austria allowed her greatest captain to accept such a post, she would involve herself in instant war with Bonaparte, and if such a war broke out the Archduke would be wanted on the Danube rather than upon the Ebro. There was no other name likely to command general confidence. Some spoke87 of the Cardinal88 Archbishop of Toledo[355], the last prince of the Spanish royal house who remained in the realm. But he was an insignificant89 and incapable90 person, and much discredited by his dallyings with Murat in the days before the insurrection had begun. Clearly he would be no more than a puppet, worked by some astute91 person behind the viceregal throne. Other names suggested were those of the young Dom Pedro of Portugal (son of the Prince-Regent John), and of Prince Leopold, the son of Ferdinand IV of Sicily. The former was a grandson, the latter a nephew of Charles IV. Both therefore were near to the throne, but both were foreigners, young, untried in matters of state, and utterly93 unknown to the Spaniards. Dom Pedro’s claims were not[p. 350] strongly pushed, but the Sicilian court made a strenuous94 attempt to forward those of Prince Leopold. Their ambassador in London tried to enlist95 the support of the English Government for him: but Canning and Castlereagh were anxious to avoid any appearance of dictating96 orders to Spain, and firmly refused to countenance97 the project. Before their reply came to hand, King Ferdinand (or rather that old intriguer47, his spouse98, and her son-in-law the Duke of Orleans) sent the prince to Gibraltar, on a man-of-war which they had obtained from Mr. Drummond, the British minister at Palermo. By lending his aid to the plan this unwise diplomat99 almost succeeded in compromising his government. But most fortunately our representatives in Spain nipped in the bud this intrigue46, which could not have failed to embroil100 them with the Juntas, none of whom had the least love for the Sicilian house. When the Thunderer arrived at Gibraltar [August 9] Sir Hew92 Dalrymple—then just on the eve of starting for Portugal—refused to allow the prince to land, or to distribute the proclamations which he had prepared. These were the work of Leopold’s brother-in-law, Louis Philippe of Orleans, who had accompanied him from Palermo with the design of fishing in troubled waters, a craft of which he was to show himself in later days a past master. If Leopold should become regent, Orleans intended to be the ‘power behind the throne.’ Dalrymple detained the two princes at Gibraltar, and when he was gone Lord Collingwood[356] took the same attitude of hostile neutrality. Tired of detention101, Louis Philippe after a few days sailed for London, in the vain hope of melting the hearts of the British Cabinet. The Sicilian prince lingered some time, protesting against the fashion in which he was treated, and holding secret colloquies102 with deputations which came to him from many quarters in which the Junta of Seville was detested103. But there was no real party in his favour. What benefit could come to Spain from the election of a youth of nineteen, whose very name was unknown to the people, and who could help them neither with men nor with money, neither with the statesmanship that comes from experience, nor with the military capacity that must be developed on the battle-field? After remaining long enough in Spanish waters to lose all his illusions, Prince[p. 351] Leopold returned to his mother in Sicily[357]. There had never been any foundation for a persistent104 rumour105 that he was to be made co-regent along with the Cardinal Archbishop of Toledo and the Conde de Montijo. Not even the least intelligent members of the Juntas would have consented to hand over the rule of Spain to this strange triumvirate—an imbecile, a boy, and a turbulent intriguer. There was about as much chance that another vain project might be carried out—an invitation to General Dumouriez to take command of all the Spanish armies. Yet this plan too was seriously brought forward: the Frenchman would not have been unwilling106, but the Spanish officers, flushed with their recent successes, were not the kind of people to welcome a foreign leader, and one whose last military exploit had been to desert his own army and go over to the enemy.
Much more specious, at first sight, than any project for the establishment of a regency, was the proposal mooted107 in many quarters for the summoning of the Cortes—whose name recalled so many ancient memories, and was connected with the days of constitutional freedom in the Middle Ages. But not only had the Cortes been obscured by the long spell of autocracy108 under the Hapsburg and Bourbon kings, but it was by its very constitution unsuited to represent a nation seeking for a new and vigorous executive. It was full of mediaeval anomalies: for example the Asturias had never been represented in it, but had possessed109 (like Wales in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries) separate governmental machinery110 of its own. This might have been altered without much difficulty, but it was more fatal that the distribution of seats in the lower estates represented an archaic111 survival. Many decayed towns in Castile sent members to the Cortes, while on the other hand the warlike and populous112 province of Galicia had only one single vote. To rearrange the representation on a rational basis would take so long, and cause so much provincial jealousy113, that it was recognized as practically impossible.
There remained therefore only the third plan for creating a supreme government in Spain—that which proposed that the various existing Juntas should each send deputies to some convenient spot, and that the union of these representatives should constitute a central authority for the whole realm. This scheme was not so clearly constitutional as the summoning of the Cortes[p. 352] would have been, nor did it provide for real unity114 of direction in so complete a way as would have been secured by the appointment of a single Regent. But it had the practical advantage of conciliating the various provincial Juntas: though they sacrificed their local sovereignty, they obtained at least the power of nominating their own masters. In each of them the more active and ambitious members hoped that they might secure for themselves the places of delegates to the new supreme assembly. Accordingly the Juntas were induced, one after another, to consent to the scheme. Public opinion ran so strongly in favour of unity, and the existing administrative115 chaos116 was so clearly undesirable117, that it was impossible to protest against the creation of a Supreme Central Junta. Some of the provinces—notably Murcia, Valencia, and Granada—showed a patriotic spirit of self-abnegation and favoured the project from the first. Even Galicia and Seville, where the spirit of particularism was strongest, dared not openly resist the movement. There were malcontents who suggested that a federal constitution was preferable to a centralized one, and that it would suffice for the provinces to bind118 themselves together by treaties of alliance, instead of handing themselves over to a newly created executive. But even in Aragon, where federal union with Castile seemed more attractive to many than complete incorporation119, the obvious necessity for common military action determined the situation[358]. Every province of Spain at last adhered to the project for constructing a Supreme Central Junta. Even the narrow-minded politicians at Seville had to assume an attitude of hearty120 consent. But their reluctance peeped out in the suggestion which they made that the Junta should meet, not at Madrid, but at Ciudad Real or Almagro in La Mancha, places convenient to themselves, but obscure and remote in the eyes of inhabitants of Asturias or Galicia. Their aversion to Madrid was partly caused by its remoteness from their own borders, but much more by jealousy of the Council of Castile, which still hung together and exercised local authority in the capital. Other Juntas showed their aversion for the Council in the same way, and ultimately the place selected for the gathering121 of the new government was the royal residence of Aranjuez, which stands to Madrid much as do Versailles or Windsor to Paris and London. This choice was an[p. 353] obvious mistake: the central government of a country loses in dignity when it does not reside in the national capital. It seems to distrust its own power or its legality, when it exiles itself from its proper abode122. At the best it casts a slur123 on the inhabitants of the capital by refusing to trust itself among them. Madrid, it is true, is not to Spain what Paris is to France, or London to England: it is a comparatively modern place, pitched upon by Philip II as the seat of his court, but destitute of ancient memories. Nevertheless, it was at least infinitely124 superior to Aranjuez as a meeting-place. On geographical125 or strategical grounds they are so close that no advantage accrues126 to one that does not belong to the other. But for political reasons the capital was distinctly preferable to the almost suburban127 palace[359]. If the existence of the Council of Castile so much disturbed the Junta, it would have been quite possible to dissolve that discredited body. No one would have made any serious effort in its favour, even in the city of its abode.
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junta
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| n.团体；政务审议会 | |
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victorious
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| adj.胜利的，得胜的 | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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invaders
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| 入侵者，侵略者，侵入物( invader的名词复数 ) | |
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effete
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| adj.无生产力的，虚弱的 | |
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evasion
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| n.逃避，偷漏(税) | |
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traitors
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| 卖国贼( traitor的名词复数 )； 叛徒； 背叛者； 背信弃义的人 | |
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manifesto
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| n.宣言，声明 | |
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vex
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| vt.使烦恼，使苦恼 | |
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abject
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| adj.极可怜的，卑屈的 | |
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clergy
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| n.[总称]牧师，神职人员 | |
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ethics
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| n.伦理学；伦理观，道德标准 | |
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honourable
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| adj.可敬的；荣誉的，光荣的 | |
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patriotism
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| n.爱国精神，爱国心，爱国主义 | |
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gallant
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| adj.英勇的，豪侠的；(向女人)献殷勤的 | |
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laurels
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| n.桂冠，荣誉 | |
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patriotic
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| adj.爱国的，有爱国心的 | |
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abstain
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| v.自制，戒绝，弃权，避免 | |
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prostrate
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| v.拜倒，平卧，衰竭；adj.拜倒的，平卧的，衰竭的 | |
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atrocities
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| n.邪恶，暴行( atrocity的名词复数 )；滔天大罪 | |
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arsenal
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| n.兵工厂，军械库 | |
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shipping
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cannon
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| n.大炮，火炮；飞机上的机关炮 | |
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muskets
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| n.火枪，（尤指）滑膛枪( musket的名词复数 ) | |
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juntas
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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patriots
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| 爱国者，爱国主义者( patriot的名词复数 ) | |
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arias
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audacity
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| n.大胆，卤莽，无礼 | |
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provincial
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| adj.省的，地方的；n．外省人，乡下人 | |
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discredited
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| 不足信的，不名誉的 | |
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taunted
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| 嘲讽( taunt的过去式和过去分词 )； 嘲弄； 辱骂； 奚落 | |
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usurper
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| n. 篡夺者, 僭取者 | |
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subverted
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| v.颠覆，破坏（政治制度、宗教信仰等）( subvert的过去式和过去分词 )；使（某人）道德败坏或不忠 | |
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entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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37
justified
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| a.正当的，有理的 | |
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38
impudent
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| adj.鲁莽的，卑鄙的，厚颜无耻的 | |
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39
unnatural
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| adj.不自然的；反常的 | |
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40
worthy
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| adj.(of)值得的，配得上的；有价值的 | |
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41
reluctance
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| n.厌恶，讨厌，勉强，不情愿 | |
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42
agitation
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| n.搅动；搅拌；鼓动，煽动 | |
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43
supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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44
survivor
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| n.生存者，残存者，幸存者 | |
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45
determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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46
intrigue
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| vt.激起兴趣，迷住；vi.耍阴谋；n.阴谋，密谋 | |
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47
intriguer
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| 密谋者 | |
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48
usurping
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| 篡夺，霸占( usurp的现在分词 )； 盗用； 篡夺，篡权 | |
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49
aggrandizement
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| n.增大，强化，扩大 | |
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50
venial
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| adj.可宽恕的；轻微的 | |
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51
pretext
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| n.借口，托词 | |
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52
iniquitous
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| adj.不公正的；邪恶的；高得出奇的 | |
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53
assent
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| v.批准，认可；n.批准，认可 | |
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54
wrath
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| n.愤怒，愤慨，暴怒 | |
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55
smiting
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| v.猛打，重击，打击( smite的现在分词 ) | |
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56
resounding
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| adj. 响亮的 | |
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57
regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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58
obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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59
civilians
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| 平民，百姓( civilian的名词复数 )； 老百姓 | |
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60
pretexts
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| n.借口，托辞( pretext的名词复数 ) | |
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61
intriguing
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| adj.有趣的；迷人的v.搞阴谋诡计(intrigue的现在分词)；激起…的好奇心 | |
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62
interfere
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| v.(in)干涉，干预；(with)妨碍，打扰 | |
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contrived
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| adj.不自然的，做作的；虚构的 | |
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specious
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| adj.似是而非的；adv.似是而非地 | |
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65
pretences
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| n.假装( pretence的名词复数 )；作假；自命；自称 | |
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66
nucleus
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| n.核，核心，原子核 | |
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67
battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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68
rivalry
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| n.竞争，竞赛，对抗 | |
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69
extravagant
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| adj.奢侈的；过分的；(言行等)放肆的 | |
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aged
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| adj.年老的，陈年的 | |
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71
virtue
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| n.德行，美德；贞操；优点；功效，效力 | |
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purporting
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| v.声称是…，（装得）像是…的样子( purport的现在分词 ) | |
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73
knights
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| 骑士； （中古时代的）武士( knight的名词复数 )； 骑士； 爵士； （国际象棋中）马 | |
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74
levies
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| （部队）征兵( levy的名词复数 )； 募捐； 被征募的军队 | |
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75
wrecks
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| n.沉船( wreck的名词复数 )；（事故中）遭严重毁坏的汽车（或飞机等）；（身体或精神上）受到严重损伤的人；状况非常糟糕的车辆（或建筑物等）v.毁坏[毁灭]某物( wreck的第三人称单数 )；使（船舶）失事，使遇难，使下沉 | |
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76
revoke
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| v.废除，取消，撤回 | |
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77
feigned
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| a.假装的，不真诚的 | |
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78
legitimate
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| adj.合法的，合理的，合乎逻辑的；v.使合法 | |
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79
destitute
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| adj.缺乏的；穷困的 | |
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80
valid
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| adj.有确实根据的；有效的；正当的，合法的 | |
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81
disastrous
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| adj.灾难性的，造成灾害的；极坏的，很糟的 | |
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82
futile
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| adj.无效的，无用的，无希望的 | |
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83
descended
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| a.为...后裔的，出身于...的 | |
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84
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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85
anarchy
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| n.无政府状态；社会秩序混乱，无秩序 | |
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86
entrust
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| v.信赖，信托，交托 | |
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87
spoke
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| n.（车轮的）辐条；轮辐；破坏某人的计划；阻挠某人的行动 v.讲，谈（speak的过去式）；说；演说；从某种观点来说 | |
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88
cardinal
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| n.(天主教的)红衣主教；adj.首要的，基本的 | |
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89
insignificant
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| adj.无关紧要的，可忽略的，无意义的 | |
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90
incapable
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| adj.无能力的，不能做某事的 | |
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91
astute
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| adj.机敏的，精明的 | |
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92
hew
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| v.砍；伐；削 | |
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93
utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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94
strenuous
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| adj.奋发的，使劲的；紧张的；热烈的，狂热的 | |
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95
enlist
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| vt.谋取(支持等)，赢得；征募；vi.入伍 | |
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dictating
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| v.大声讲或读( dictate的现在分词 )；口授；支配；摆布 | |
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97
countenance
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| n.脸色，面容；面部表情；vt.支持，赞同 | |
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98
spouse
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| n.配偶(指夫或妻) | |
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99
diplomat
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| n.外交官，外交家；能交际的人，圆滑的人 | |
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100
embroil
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| vt.拖累；牵连；使复杂 | |
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101
detention
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| n.滞留，停留；拘留，扣留；(教育)留下 | |
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102
colloquies
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| n.谈话，对话( colloquy的名词复数 ) | |
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103
detested
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| v.憎恶，嫌恶，痛恨( detest的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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104
persistent
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| adj.坚持不懈的，执意的；持续的 | |
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105
rumour
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| n.谣言，谣传，传闻 | |
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106
unwilling
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| adj.不情愿的 | |
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107
mooted
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| adj.未决定的，有争议的，有疑问的v.提出…供讨论( moot的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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108
autocracy
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| n.独裁政治，独裁政府 | |
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109
possessed
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| adj.疯狂的；拥有的，占有的 | |
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110
machinery
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| n.(总称)机械，机器；机构 | |
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111
archaic
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| adj.(语言、词汇等)古代的，已不通用的 | |
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112
populous
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| adj.人口稠密的，人口众多的 | |
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113
jealousy
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| n.妒忌，嫉妒，猜忌 | |
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114
unity
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| n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调 | |
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115
administrative
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| adj.行政的，管理的 | |
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116
chaos
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| n.混乱，无秩序 | |
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117
undesirable
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| adj.不受欢迎的，不良的，不合意的，讨厌的；n.不受欢迎的人，不良分子 | |
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118
bind
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| vt.捆，包扎；装订；约束；使凝固；vi.变硬 | |
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119
incorporation
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| n.设立，合并，法人组织 | |
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120
hearty
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| adj.热情友好的；衷心的；尽情的，纵情的 | |
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121
gathering
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| n.集会，聚会，聚集 | |
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122
abode
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| n.住处，住所 | |
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123
slur
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| v.含糊地说；诋毁；连唱；n.诋毁；含糊的发音 | |
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124
infinitely
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| adv.无限地，无穷地 | |
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125
geographical
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| adj.地理的；地区(性)的 | |
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126
accrues
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| v.增加( accrue的第三人称单数 )；（通过自然增长）产生；获得；（使钱款、债务）积累 | |
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127
suburban
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| adj.城郊的，在郊区的 | |
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