The provincial2 Juntas3, when once they had consented to sacrifice their local sovereignty, made no great delay in forwarding their representatives to the chosen meeting-place at Aranjuez. The number of deputies whom they sent to the Supreme4 Central Junta was thirty-five, seventeen provincial Juntas each contributing two, and the Canary Islands one. The Biscayan provinces, still wholly in the possession of the French, had no local body to speak for them, and could not therefore choose deputies. The number thus arrived at was not a very convenient one: thirty-five is too few for a parliament, and too many for an executive government. Moreover proportional representation was not secured; Navarre and the Balearic Islands were given too much weight by having two members each. Andalusia, having eight deputies for its four Juntas of Seville, Jaen, Granada, and Cordova, was over-represented when compared with Galicia, Aragon, and Catalonia, which had each no more than two. The quality of the delegates was very various: among the most notable were the ex-ministers Florida Blanca and Jovellanos, who represented respectively the better sides of the Conservative and the Liberal parties of Spain—if we may use such terms. The former, trained in the school of ‘benevolent despotism’ under Charles III, was a good specimen5 of the eighteenth-century statesman of the old sort—polite, experienced, energetic, a ripe scholar, and an able diplomat6. But he was eighty years old and failing in health, and his return to active politics killed him in a few months. Jovellanos, a somewhat younger man[360], belonged in spirit to the end rather than the middle of the eighteenth century, and was imbued7 with the ideas of liberty and constitutional government which were afloat all over Europe in the early days of the French Revolution. He represented modern liberalism in the shape which it took in Spain. For this reason he had suffered[p. 355] many things at the hands of Godoy, and emerged from a long period of imprisonment8 and obscurity to take his place in the councils of the nation. Unhappily he was to find that his ideas were still those of a minority, and that bureaucracy and obscurantism were deeply rooted in Spain.
Of the other members[361] of the Supreme Junta, the Bailiff Valdez and Francisco Palafox, fresh from his brother’s triumphs at Saragossa, were perhaps the best known. Among the rest we note a considerable number of clergy—two archbishops, a prior, and three canons—but not more than might have been expected in a country where the Church was so powerful. Military men were not so strongly represented, being only five in number, and three of these were militia9 colonels. The rest were mainly local notables—grandees10, marquises, and counts predominated over mere11 commoners. Some of them were blind particularists, and a few—like the disreputable Conde de Tilly—were intriguers with doubtful antecedents. The whole body represented Spain well enough, but Spain with her weaknesses as well as her strong points. It was not a very promising12 instrument with which to achieve the liberation of the Peninsula, or to resist the greatest general in Europe. Considered as a government of national defence, it had far too little military knowledge: a haphazard13 assembly of priests, politicians, and grandees is not adapted for the conduct of a war of independence. Hence came the incredible blindness which led it to refuse to appoint a single commander-in-chief, and the obstinacy14 with which it buried itself in constitutional debates of the most futile15 sort when Napoleon was thundering at the gates of Spain.
The meeting of the Supreme Junta was fixed16 for September 25, but long ere that date came round the military situation was assuming new developments. The first modification17 in the state of affairs was caused by the abortive18 attempt of the Basque provinces to free themselves. The news of Baylen had caused as great a stir in the northern mountains as in the south or the east of Spain. But Biscay, Guipuzcoa, and Alava had considerable French garrisons19, and the retreat of Joseph Bonaparte to the Ebro only increased the number of enemies in their immediate20 neighbourhood. It would have been no less patriotic21 than prudent22 for these provinces to delay their insurrection till it had some chance of proving useful[p. 356] to the general scheme of operations for the expulsion of the French from Spain. If they could have waited till Blake and Casta?os had reached the Ebro, and then have taken arms, they might have raised a most dangerous distraction23 in the rear of the French, and have prevented them from turning all their forces against the regular armies. But it was mad to rise when Blake was still at Astorga, and Casta?os had not yet reached Madrid. It could not have been expected that the local patriots24 should understand this: but grave blame falls on those who ought to have known better. The Duke of Infantado, who was acting25 under Blake, and Colonel Doyle, the English representative at that general’s head quarters, did their best to precipitate26 the outbreak in Biscay. They promised the Biscayan leaders that a division from Asturias should come to their aid, and that English arms and ammunition27 should be poured into their harbours[362]. At the first word of encouragement all Biscay took arms [August 6]: a great mass of insurgents29 collected at Bilbao, and smaller bands appeared along the line of the mountains, even as far as Valcarlos on the very frontier of France. But no external aid came to them: the Asturians—averse to every proposal that came from Galicia—did not move outside their own provincial boundary, and no other Spanish army was within striking distance. Bessières was able, at his leisure, to detach General Merlin with 3,000 men to fall on Bilbao. This brigade proved enough to deal with the main body of the Biscayan insurgents, who after a creditable fight were dispersed31 with heavy loss—1,200 killed, according to the French commander’s dispatch [August 16]. Bilbao was taken and sacked, and English vessels32 bringing—now that it was too late—5,000 stand of arms for the insurgents, narrowly escaped capture in its harbour. All along the line of the Basque hills there was hanging and shooting of the leaders of the abortive rising[363]. The only result of this ill-advised move was that Bessières was warned of the danger in his rear, and kept a vigilant33 eye for the future on the coastland. The Biscayans, as was natural, were much discouraged at the way in which they had been left in the lurch34 by their fellow countrymen, and at the inefficacy of their own unaided efforts. They were loth to rise a second time.
It was not till twenty days had passed since the fall of Bilbao[p. 357] that the first attempts at combined action were made by the Spanish generals. On September 5 there met at Madrid a council of war, composed of Casta?os, Cuesta, the Valencian General Llamas, and the representatives of Blake and Palafox—the Duke of Infantado and Calvo de Rozas, intendant-general of the army of Aragon. These officers met with much suppressed jealousy35 and suspicion of each other. The Duke had his eye on Cuesta, in accordance with the instructions of Blake. Casta?os and Cuesta were at daggers36 drawn37, for the old Captain-General had just proposed a coup38 d’état against the Junta to the Andalusian, and had been repulsed39 with scorn[364]. The representative of the army of Aragon had been charged to see that no one was put above the head of Palafox. When the meeting opened, Cuesta proposed that it should appoint a single general to direct all the forces of Spain. The others demurred40: Cuesta was much their senior in the army-list, and they imagined—probably with truth—that he would claim the post of commander-in-chief for himself, in spite of the memories of Cabezon and Rio Seco. They refused to listen to his arguments, though it was certain that unity41 of command was in every way desirable. Nor was any disposition42 shown to raise Casta?os to supreme authority, though this was the obvious step to take, as he was the only general of Spain who had won a great battle in the open field. But personal and provincial jealousy stood in the way, and Casta?os himself, though not without ambition, was destitute43 of the arts of cajolery, and made no attempt to push his own candidature for the post of commander-in-chief. Perhaps he hoped that the Supreme Junta would do him justice ere long, and refrained for that reason from self-assertion before his colleagues. Nothing, therefore, was settled on September 5, save a plan for common operations against the French[p. 358] on the Ebro. Like all schemes that are formed from a compromise between the views of several men, this was not a very brilliant strategical effort: instead of providing for a bold stroke with the whole Spanish army, at some point on the long line between Burgos and Milagro, it merely brought the insurgent28 forces in half-a-dozen separate columns face to face with the enemy. Blake, with his own army and the Asturians, was to be asked to concentrate near Reynosa, at the sources of the Ebro, and to endeavour to turn Bessières’ flank and penetrate44 into Biscay[365]. He would have 30,000 men, or more, but not a single complete regiment45 of cavalry46. Next to him Cuesta was to operate against the front of Bessières’ corps47, with his ‘Army of Castile,’ eight or nine thousand raw levies48 backed by about 1,000 horse. He undertook to make Burgo de Osma his point of starting. More to the east, Casta?os was to gather at Soria the four divisions of the army of Andalusia, but at present he had only that of La Pe?a in hand: the Junta of Seville was detaining the rest. Still more to the right, Llamas with his 8,000 Valencians and Murcians was to march on Tudela. Lastly Palafox, with the army of Aragon and the Valencian division of Saint March, was to keep north of the Ebro, and turn the left flank of Moncey’s corps by way of Sanguesa: he could bring about 25,000 men into line, but there were not more than five or six regular battalions49 among them; the rest were recent levies. When the army of Estremadura should come up (it was still about Elvas and Badajoz), it was to join Casta?os; and it was hoped that the English forces from Portugal might also be directed on the same point.
But meanwhile only 75,000 men were available in the first line; and this force, spread along the whole front from Reynosa to Sanguesa, and acting on wide external lines, was not likely to make much impression on the French. The numbers of the invaders50 were considerably51 greater than those of the patriot-armies. Jourdan had 70,000 men by September 1, and was being reinforced every day by fresh battalions, though the three corps from Germany were still far off. Before the Spaniards could move he appreciably52 outnumbered them, and he had the inestimable advantage of holding a comparatively short front, and of being able to concentrate on any point with far greater rapidity than was possible to his adversaries53. Even had they thrown all their forces on one single point, the French, always using the ‘interior lines,’ could have[p. 359] got together in a very short time. The only weak point, indeed, in the French position was that Bessières’ vanguard at Burgos was too far forward, and in some peril54 of being enveloped55 between Blake and Cuesta. But this detachment, as we shall see, was ere long drawn back to the Ebro.
Before the campaign began the Spaniards obtained one notable advantage—the removal of Cuesta from command, owing to his own incredible arrogance56 and folly57. It will be remembered that he regarded the Juntas of Leon and Castile as recalcitrant58 subordinates of his own, and had declared all their acts null and void. When they proceeded, like the other Juntas, to elect representatives for the meeting at Aranjuez, he waited till the deputies of Leon were passing near his camp, and then suddenly descended59 upon them. Don Antonio Valdez, the Bailiff of the Maltese Knights60, and the Vizconde de Quintanilla, were arrested by his troopers and shut up in the castle of Segovia. He announced that they should be tried by court-martial, for failing in obedience61 to their Captain-General. This astonishing act of presumption62 drew down on him the wrath63 of the Supreme Junta, which was naturally eager to protect its members from the interference of the military arm. Almost its first act on assembling was to order him to appear at Aranjuez and to suspend him from command. Cuesta would have liked to resist, but knowing that his own army was weak and that Blake and Casta?os were his bitter enemies, he had to yield. He came to Aranjuez, and was superseded65 by General Eguia. Valdez and Quintanilla were immediately released, and took their seats in the Supreme Junta.
The sessions of that body had begun on September 25. Twenty-four members out of the designated thirty-five had assembled on that day, and after a solemn religious ceremony had re-proclaimed Ferdinand VII, and elected Florida Blanca as their President. They then proceeded to nominate a Cabinet, chosen entirely66 from outside their own body. Don Pedro Cevallos was to be Minister of Foreign Affairs: he had served Ferdinand VII in that capacity, but had smirched his reputation by his submission67 to Bonaparte after the treachery at Bayonne. However, his ingenious justification[366][p. 360] of his conduct, and his early desertion of King Joseph, were allowed to serve as an adequate defence. Don Antonio Esca?o was Minister of Marine68, Don Benito Hermida Minister of Justice, Don Francisco de Saavedra Minister of the Interior. The most important place of all, that of Minister of War, was given to an utterly69 unknown person, General Antonio Cornel, instead of to any of the officers who had distinguished70 themselves during the recent campaigns. He was to be aided by a supreme council of war, consisting of six members of the Junta, three of whom were civilians71 without any military knowledge whatever. No intention of appointing a commander-in-chief was shown, and the Minister of War corresponded directly with all the generals in charge of the provincial armies. Nothing could have been more ill judged; from the want of a single hand at the helm all the oncoming operations were doomed72 to inevitable73 failure. The supreme direction was nominally74 entrusted75 to the obscure war-minister and his councillors, really it lay with the generals in the field, who obeyed orders from head quarters only just as much as they chose. Each played his own game, and the result was disaster.
A glance at the subjects which were discussed by the members of the Junta, during its first weeks of session, suffices to show the short-sightedness of their policy, and their utter inability to grasp the situation. They should have remembered that they were a government of national defence, whose main duty was the expulsion of the French from the soil of Spain. But military subjects furnished the smallest portion of their subjects of debate. They published indeed a manifesto76 to the effect that they intended to levy77 an army of 500,000 foot, and 50,000 horse—a much greater force than Spain in her most flourishing days could have raised or maintained. But this paper army was never seen in the field: less than a third of the number were under arms at the moment in December when the Junta had to fly from Aranjuez, before the advancing legions of Napoleon. Nor was it likely that a great army could be raised, equipped, and disciplined, while the central government was devoting the greater part of its attention to futilities. The most cruel comment on its work lies in the fact that its troops were ill furnished, badly armed, and half starved, at the moment when the provinces were doing their best to provide equipment, and every port in Spain was gorged78 with cannon79, muskets80, munitions81, and stores sent from England—a great part[p. 361] of them destined82 to fall into the hands of the French. Partly from want of experience, but still more from want of energy, the Junta failed to use the national enthusiasm and the considerable resources placed at its disposal.
When we look at the main topics of its debates we begin to understand its failures. A good deal of time was spent in voting honorary distinctions to its own members. The President was to be addressed as ‘his highness,’ the Junta as a corporation was ‘its majesty,’ if we may use the ludicrous phrase. Each member became ‘his excellency’ and received the liberal salary of 120,000 reals (￡1,200), besides the right of wearing on his breast a gold plaque83 with an embossed representation of the eastern and western hemispheres. There was a good deal of dispensing84 of places and patronage85 in the army and the civil service among relatives and dependencies of ‘their excellencies,’ but not more perhaps than happens in other countries in war-time when a new government comes in. At least the changes led to the getting rid of a good many of Godoy’s old bureaucrats86. The real fault of the Junta lay in its readiness to fall into factions87, and fight over constitutional questions that should have been relegated88 to times of peace. Among the thirty-five members of the Junta a clear majority were, like their president, Florida Blanca, Spaniards of the old school, whose ideas of government were those of the autocratic sort that had prevailed under Alberoni and Charles III. They looked upon all innovations as tinged89 with the poison of the French Revolution and savouring of Jacobinism and infidelity. On the other hand there was a powerful minority, headed by Jovellanos and including Martin de Garay, the secretary of the Junta, the Marquis of Campo Sagrado, Valdes, Calvo de Rozas, and others, who held more modern views and hoped that the main result of the war would be to make Spain a constitutional monarchy90 of the English type. How far this dream was from realization91 was shown by the fact that among the first measures passed through the Supreme Junta were ordinances92 allowing the Jesuits (expelled long since by Charles III) to return to Spain, recreating the office of Inquisitor-General, and suspending the liberty of the press. Such measures filled the liberal section in the Junta with despair, by showing the narrow and reactionary93 views of the majority. But the greater part of the time spent in session by ‘its majesty’ was wasted on purely94 constitutional questions.[p. 362] Firstly there was a long polemic95 with the Council of Castile, whose hatred96 for the Junta took the form of starting doubts as to the legality of its constitution[367]. It suggested that all constitutional precedents97 were against a body so numerous as thirty-five persons taking charge of the governance of the realm. Former councils of regency had been composed of three or five members only, and there was no legal authority for breaking the rule. The Council suggested that the only way out of the difficulty would be to call the Cortes, and that assembly would at once supersede64 the authority of the Supreme Junta. Instead of arguing with the Council of Castile, the new government would have done well to arrest or disperse30 that effete98 and disloyal body; but it chose instead to indulge in a war of manifestos and proclamations which led to nothing. To find the supreme government consenting to argue about its own legality was not reassuring99 to the nation. Moreover, Jovellanos and his followers100 spent much time in impressing on their colleagues that it was their duty to appoint a regency, and to cut down their own unwieldy numbers, as well as to provide machinery101 for the summoning of the Cortes at some not too distant date. To be reminded that they were no permanent corporation, but a temporary committee dressed in a little brief authority, was most unpleasant to the majority. They discussed from every point of view the question of the regency and the Cortes, but would not yield up their own supremacy102. Indeed they proposed to begin legislation on a very wide basis for the reform of the constitution—business which should rather have been left to the Cortes, and which was particularly inappropriate to the moment when Napoleon was crossing the Pyrenees. The great manifesto of the Junta [October 26] sets forth103 its intentions very clearly. ‘The knowledge and illustration of our ancient and constitutional laws; the changes which altered circumstances render necessary in their re-establishment; the reforms necessary in civil, criminal, and commercial codes; projects for improving public education; a system of regulated economy for the collection and distribution of the public revenue ... are the subjects for the investigation104 of wise and thoughtful men. The Junta will form different committees, each entrusted with a particular department, to whom all writings on matters of government and administration may be addressed. The exertions105 of each contributing to give[p. 363] a just direction to the public mind, the government will be enabled to establish the internal happiness of Spain[368].’ From another official document we learn that ‘among the most grave and urgent objects of the attention of the Central Junta will be the encouragement of agriculture, the arts, commerce, and navigation[369].’
Clearly nothing could be more inappropriate and absurd than that this government of national defence should turn its attention to subjects such as the reform of national education, or the encouragement of the arts. It is equally certain that if it should propose to ‘consider the changes necessary in our ancient laws,’ it would be going beyond its competence106; for such business belonged only to a permanent and properly constituted national assembly, such as the Cortes. This was not the time for constitutional debates, nor was the Central Junta the body that should have started them. All their energies should have been devoted107 to the war. But misled as to the situation by the long quiescence108 of the French army on the Ebro, they turned their minds to every topic that should have been avoided, and neglected the single one that should always have been before their eyes. It was in vain that Calvo de Rozas, the Aragonese deputy, and a few more, tried to keep their colleagues to the point. The majority fell to debating on the subjects on which the despotic and the liberal theories of government clash, and spent themselves on discussions that were as heated as they were futile. Meanwhile the time that should have been turned to account was slipping away, and the army was not being reinforced. A glance at the field-states of the Spanish troops, comparing those of August 1 with those of November 1, sufficiently109 proves this. The provinces which had been recovered by the retreat of the French to the Ebro were not doing their duty. The wide and populous110 regions of Old Castile and Leon had sent 4,600 men to Rio Seco in July: in October they had less than 12,000 under arms[370]. From New Castile there seem to have[p. 364] been raised nothing more than four battalions of Madrid Volunteers, a weak cavalry regiment, and two battalions of Cazadores de Cuenca and Tiradores de Castilla: at any rate no troops but these are to be found recorded in the lists of the armies that fought in October, November, and December, 1808. Even allowing that New Castile may have supplied recruits to its own corps of embodied111 militia serving with the Andalusian army[371], it is clear that, with a population of 1,200,000 souls, it ought to have done much more in raising new regiments112. And this was the district in whose very midst the Junta was sitting! What little was done in Madrid seems to have been mainly the result of private enterprise: the Gazette for October is full of voluntary donations of horses, saddlery, and money, for the equipment of a corps of dragoons for the army of Old Castile, and of similar gifts received by Calvo de Rozas for the army of Aragon. But there are no signs of requisitions by the government for the purpose of raising an army of New Castile, which could certainly have been done. The kingdom with its five provinces ought to have given 40,000 men instead of 4,000: for Asturias, with only 370,000 souls, had raised 13,000: Aragon with 650,000 had placed no less than 32,000 levies in the field: and Estremadura with 420,000 had sent to the front 12,000 men by October, while keeping 10,000 more of undrilled recruits in its dép?ts[372]. New Castile, as we have already had occasion to remark, had 1,200,000 inhabitants, and yet had only added to its original five battalions of militia six more of volunteers, and a single regiment of horse, at the moment when Napoleon’s armies came flooding across the Ebro. The Central Junta’s authority in Andalusia or Galicia was much limited by the survival of the ambitious local Juntas. But in Leon and the two Castiles there was, when once Cuesta had been got out of the way, no rival power[p. 365] in the field. No one was to blame but the central government, if the full resources of those regions were not utilized113 in September, October, and November. The English representatives at Madrid saw all this, and did their best to stir up the Junta. But it was not likely that mere foreigners would succeed, where Casta?os and the other more energetic Spanish officers had failed. Already in October the situation appeared most unpromising: ‘We have made repeated representations,’ wrote Mr. Stuart, the British minister, ‘and I have given in paper after paper, to obtain something like promptitude and vigour114: but though loaded with fair promises in the commencement, we scarcely quit the members of the Junta before their attention is absorbed in petty pursuits and in wrangling115, which impedes116 even the simplest arrangements necessary for the interior government of the country.... In short, we are doing what we can, not what we wish: and I assure you we have infamous117 tools to work with[373].’ Exactly the same impression is produced by a study of the dispatches of Lord William Bentinck, our military representative at Madrid, and of the diary of Sir Charles Vaughan, who carefully attended and followed the debates of the Central Junta at Aranjuez. It was clear to any dispassionate observer that time was being wasted, and that the best was not being done with the available material.
This was all the more inexcusable because the nation was thoroughly118 in earnest, and prepared to make any sacrifices. The voluntary contributions made both by provinces and by individuals were astounding119 when the poverty of Spain is taken into consideration[374]. It was the energy and will to use them on the part of the leaders that was wanting. Moreover, England was pouring in supplies of all sorts: before November 16 she had sent at least 122,000 muskets and other military equipment of all kinds to the value of several hundred thousand pounds. Before the same date she had forwarded 4,725,000 dollars in hard cash[375], and Mr. Frere, the newly appointed minister, brought another million to Corunna.
[p. 366]
Instead of utilizing120 every possible resource the government went on debating about things unessential, as if the war had been ended at Baylen. It would neither conduct the new campaign itself, nor appoint a single commander-in-chief to conduct it in its behalf. With absolute truth Colonel Graham wrote from the head quarters of the Army of the Centre that ‘the miserable121 system established by the Junta was at the bottom of all misfortunes. I pitied poor Casta?os and poor Spain, and came away disgusted to the greatest degree[376].’
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junta
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| n.团体；政务审议会 | |
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provincial
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| adj.省的，地方的；n．外省人，乡下人 | |
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juntas
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| n.以武力政变上台的军阀( junta的名词复数 ) | |
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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specimen
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| n.样本，标本 | |
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diplomat
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| n.外交官，外交家；能交际的人，圆滑的人 | |
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imbued
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| v.使（某人/某事）充满或激起（感情等）( imbue的过去式和过去分词 )；使充满；灌输；激发（强烈感情或品质等） | |
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imprisonment
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| n.关押，监禁，坐牢 | |
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militia
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| n.民兵，民兵组织 | |
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grandees
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| n.贵族，大公，显贵者( grandee的名词复数 ) | |
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mere
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| adj.纯粹的；仅仅，只不过 | |
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promising
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| adj.有希望的，有前途的 | |
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haphazard
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| adj.无计划的，随意的，杂乱无章的 | |
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obstinacy
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| n.顽固；（病痛等）难治 | |
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futile
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| adj.无效的，无用的，无希望的 | |
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fixed
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| adj.固定的，不变的，准备好的；(计算机)固定的 | |
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modification
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| n.修改，改进，缓和，减轻 | |
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abortive
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| adj.不成功的，发育不全的 | |
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garrisons
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| 守备部队，卫戍部队( garrison的名词复数 ) | |
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immediate
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| adj.立即的；直接的，最接近的；紧靠的 | |
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patriotic
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| adj.爱国的，有爱国心的 | |
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prudent
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| adj.谨慎的，有远见的，精打细算的 | |
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distraction
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| n.精神涣散，精神不集中，消遣，娱乐 | |
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patriots
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| 爱国者，爱国主义者( patriot的名词复数 ) | |
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acting
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| n.演戏，行为，假装；adj.代理的，临时的，演出用的 | |
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precipitate
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ammunition
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| n.军火，弹药 | |
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insurgent
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| adj.叛乱的，起事的；n.叛乱分子 | |
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insurgents
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| n.起义，暴动，造反( insurgent的名词复数 ) | |
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disperse
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| vi.使分散；使消失；vt.分散；驱散 | |
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dispersed
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| adj. 被驱散的, 被分散的, 散布的 | |
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vessels
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| n.血管( vessel的名词复数 )；船；容器；（具有特殊品质或接受特殊品质的）人 | |
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33
vigilant
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| adj.警觉的，警戒的，警惕的 | |
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34
lurch
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| n.突然向前或旁边倒；v.蹒跚而行 | |
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35
jealousy
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| n.妒忌，嫉妒，猜忌 | |
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36
daggers
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| 匕首，短剑( dagger的名词复数 ) | |
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37
drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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38
coup
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| n.政变；突然而成功的行动 | |
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39
repulsed
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| v.击退( repulse的过去式和过去分词 )；驳斥；拒绝 | |
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40
demurred
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| v.表示异议，反对( demur的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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41
unity
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| n.团结，联合，统一；和睦，协调 | |
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42
disposition
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| n.性情，性格；意向，倾向；排列，部署 | |
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43
destitute
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| adj.缺乏的；穷困的 | |
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44
penetrate
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| v.透(渗)入；刺入，刺穿；洞察，了解 | |
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45
regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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46
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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47
corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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48
levies
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| （部队）征兵( levy的名词复数 )； 募捐； 被征募的军队 | |
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49
battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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50
invaders
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| 入侵者，侵略者，侵入物( invader的名词复数 ) | |
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51
considerably
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| adv.极大地；相当大地；在很大程度上 | |
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52
appreciably
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| adv.相当大地 | |
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53
adversaries
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| n.对手，敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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54
peril
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| n.(严重的)危险；危险的事物 | |
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55
enveloped
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| v.包围，笼罩，包住( envelop的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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56
arrogance
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| n.傲慢，自大 | |
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57
folly
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| n.愚笨，愚蠢，蠢事，蠢行，傻话 | |
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58
recalcitrant
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| adj.倔强的 | |
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59
descended
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| a.为...后裔的，出身于...的 | |
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60
knights
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| 骑士； （中古时代的）武士( knight的名词复数 )； 骑士； 爵士； （国际象棋中）马 | |
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61
obedience
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| n.服从，顺从 | |
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62
presumption
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| n.推测，可能性，冒昧，放肆，[法律]推定 | |
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63
wrath
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| n.愤怒，愤慨，暴怒 | |
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64
supersede
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| v.替代；充任 | |
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65
superseded
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| [医]被代替的，废弃的 | |
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66
entirely
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| ad.全部地，完整地；完全地，彻底地 | |
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67
submission
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| n.服从，投降；温顺，谦虚；提出 | |
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68
marine
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| adj.海的；海生的；航海的；海事的；n.水兵 | |
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utterly
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| adv.完全地，绝对地 | |
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70
distinguished
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| adj.卓越的，杰出的，著名的 | |
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71
civilians
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| 平民，百姓( civilian的名词复数 )； 老百姓 | |
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72
doomed
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| 命定的 | |
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73
inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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74
nominally
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| 在名义上，表面地； 应名儿 | |
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75
entrusted
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| v.委托，托付( entrust的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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76
manifesto
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| n.宣言，声明 | |
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77
levy
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| n.征收税或其他款项，征收额 | |
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78
gorged
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| v.（用食物把自己）塞饱，填饱( gorge的过去式和过去分词 )；作呕 | |
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79
cannon
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| n.大炮，火炮；飞机上的机关炮 | |
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80
muskets
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| n.火枪，（尤指）滑膛枪( musket的名词复数 ) | |
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81
munitions
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| n.军火，弹药；v.供应…军需品 | |
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82
destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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83
plaque
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| n.饰板，匾，(医)血小板 | |
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84
dispensing
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| v.分配( dispense的现在分词 )；施与；配（药） | |
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85
patronage
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| n.赞助，支援，援助；光顾，捧场 | |
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bureaucrats
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| n.官僚( bureaucrat的名词复数 )；官僚主义；官僚主义者；官僚语言 | |
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87
factions
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| 组织中的小派别，派系( faction的名词复数 ) | |
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88
relegated
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| v.使降级( relegate的过去式和过去分词 )；使降职；转移；把…归类 | |
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89
tinged
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| v.（使）发丁丁声( ting的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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90
monarchy
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| n.君主，最高统治者；君主政体，君主国 | |
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91
realization
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| n.实现；认识到，深刻了解 | |
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92
ordinances
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| n.条例，法令( ordinance的名词复数 ) | |
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93
reactionary
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| n.反动者，反动主义者；adj.反动的，反动主义的，反对改革的 | |
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94
purely
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| adv.纯粹地，完全地 | |
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95
polemic
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| n.争论，论战 | |
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96
hatred
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| n.憎恶，憎恨，仇恨 | |
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97
precedents
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| 引用单元； 范例( precedent的名词复数 )； 先前出现的事例； 前例； 先例 | |
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98
effete
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| adj.无生产力的，虚弱的 | |
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99
reassuring
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| a.使人消除恐惧和疑虑的，使人放心的 | |
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100
followers
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| 追随者( follower的名词复数 )； 用户； 契据的附面； 从动件 | |
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101
machinery
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| n.(总称)机械，机器；机构 | |
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102
supremacy
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| n.至上；至高权力 | |
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103
forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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104
investigation
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| n.调查，调查研究 | |
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105
exertions
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| n.努力( exertion的名词复数 )；费力；（能力、权力等的）运用；行使 | |
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106
competence
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| n.能力，胜任，称职 | |
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107
devoted
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| adj.忠诚的，忠实的，热心的，献身于...的 | |
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108
quiescence
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| n.静止 | |
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109
sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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110
populous
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| adj.人口稠密的，人口众多的 | |
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111
embodied
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| v.表现( embody的过去式和过去分词 )；象征；包括；包含 | |
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112
regiments
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| （军队的）团( regiment的名词复数 )； 大量的人或物 | |
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113
utilized
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| v.利用，使用( utilize的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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114
vigour
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| （=vigor）n.智力，体力，精力 | |
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115
wrangling
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| v.争吵，争论，口角( wrangle的现在分词 ) | |
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116
impedes
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| 阻碍，妨碍，阻止( impede的第三人称单数 ) | |
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117
infamous
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| adj.声名狼藉的，臭名昭著的，邪恶的 | |
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118
thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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119
astounding
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| adj.使人震惊的vt.使震惊，使大吃一惊astound的现在分词) | |
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120
utilizing
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| v.利用，使用( utilize的现在分词 ) | |
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121
miserable
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| adj.悲惨的，痛苦的；可怜的，糟糕的 | |
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