By the middle of October the French and Spanish armies were in presence of each other along the whole line of the Ebro, and it seemed certain that one or other of them must at last take the offensive. Both were still in expectation of reinforcements, but those which the Spaniards could expect to receive within the next few weeks were comparatively unimportant, while their adversaries1 knew that more than 100,000 men from Germany were due at Bayonne in the last days of October. Clearly it was for Casta?os and his colleagues to make a move now or never. The wasted months of August and September could not be recalled, but there was still time to attack Bessières, Ney, and Moncey, before the arrival of the Emperor and the three veteran corps2 from the Elbe.
Matters lay thus when the Spanish generals resolved on a perfectly3 new and wildly impracticable scheme. Casta?os had come to the conclusion—a thoroughly4 sound one—that his 34,000 men were too few to make a frontal attack on the French on the line between Miranda and Calahorra. He left Madrid on October 13, deeply chagrined5 to find that the Central Junta6 had no intention of making him commander-in-chief. Instead of being able to issue orders to the other generals, he must meet them on equal terms and endeavour to cajole them into adopting a common plan of operations. Accordingly he rode to Saragossa to visit Palafox, and after long and not very friendly converse7 drew out a new plan. The Army of the Centre was to shift itself down the Ebro, leaving the troops of Pignatelli (the ‘Army of Castile’) and of Grimarest (the 2nd Andalusian division) to ‘contain’ Ney and Bessières. The rest were to concentrate at Tudela, where they were to be joined by as many battalions9 of the Aragonese levies10 at Saragossa as could take the field. With some 25,000 or 30,000 men at the highest estimate, Casta?os and Palafox were to fall upon Moncey’s flank at the bridge of Caparrosa. Meanwhile O’Neille and Saint March,[p. 392] with the advanced divisions of the army of Aragon, were to break up from Sanguesa, march round Pampeluna by the foot-hills of the Pyrenees, and place themselves across the road to France. Moncey was thus to be surrounded, and a second Baylen was to ensue! Indeed, if Blake could be persuaded to push forward once more to Bilbao, and thence into Guipuzcoa, the whole army of King Joseph (as it was hoped) might be cut off and made prisoners. Eighty thousand men, according to this strange scheme, starting from bases 200 miles apart, were to surround 65,000 French in a most difficult mountain country. Meanwhile the enormous gap between Blake’s right and Casta?os’ left was to remain wholly unguarded, for the army of Estremadura was still in the far distance; while nothing was to be left opposite Bessières and Ney save Pignatelli’s disorderly ‘Army of Castile,’ and Grimarest’s 6,000 Andalusians.
But before the scheme for the cutting off of Moncey had even begun to be carried out, Casta?os and Palafox had a rude awakening11. They were themselves attacked by the army which they were so confidently proposing to surround. King Joseph, emboldened12 by the long delay of his adversaries in advancing, had several times discussed with Jourdan, Bessières, and Ney schemes for taking the offensive. Indeed he had sketched13 out in September no less than five separate plans for bringing the enemy to an action, and it is probable that he might have tried one of them if he had been allowed a free hand[414]. Napoleon, however, having determined14 to come to Spain in person, put an embargo15 on any comprehensive scheme for an advance on Madrid, and restricted his brother to minor16 operations.
But there was nothing in the Emperor’s instructions which forbade a blow on a small scale, if the Spaniards should grow too daring. There was now a good excuse for such a move, for both Pignatelli and Grimarest had been trespassing17 beyond the Ebro. They seem to have moved forward quite contrary to the intentions of Casta?os, who at this moment was proposing to refuse battle with his left and centre, and to draw the bulk of his army southward to Tudela. But his two divisional generals pushed so far forward, that they at last drew upon themselves most undesired[p. 393] attentions from the French marshals. Pignatelli had thrown troops across the Ebro to Viana: Grimarest had pushed detachments still further forward into Navarre, to Mendavia, Sesma, and Lerin. Joseph and Jourdan resolved to drive back these outlying posts, and to find out what was behind them. About 25,000 men were put in movement against the 16,000 Spaniards who had so rashly crossed the river. Moncey marched against Grimarest [Oct. 25-6] with two divisions: Ney with a similar force fell upon Pignatelli, while Bessières sent a division down the southern bank of the Ebro by Haro and Briones, to threaten the line of retreat of the army of Castile across the bridge of Logro?o.
Against such forces the Spaniards could do nothing: on the twenty-fifth Ney marched on Viana, and drove in Pignatelli’s advanced guard. On the following day he opened a fierce cannonade upon Logro?o from across the river, while at the same time Bonnet18’s division, sent by Bessières, marched upon the town from the hither side of the Ebro. Pignatelli was a craven, and his Castilian levies proved to be the worst of all the material which the Spaniards had brought to the front. General and army vanished in the night, without even stopping to blow up the great bridge, though they had mined it and laid the train in due form. Ney’s officers crossing at dawn found all prepared, except the sappers who should have applied19 the match[415]! Neither Ney nor Bonnet got in touch with the flying horde20: but in sheer panic Pignatelli abandoned his guns by the roadside, and did not stop till he had joined Casta?os at Cintruenigo, near Tudela. His hurried retreat was wholly unnecessary, for the French did not move beyond Logro?o, and Casta?os was able to send out next morning a brigade which picked up the deserted21 guns and brought them in without molestation22. Rightly indignant, the Commander-in-chief removed Pignatelli from his post, and distributed his demoralized battalions among the divisions of Grimarest, La Pe?a, and Llamas[416], leaving in separate existence only a single brigade of six battalions under Cartaojal, which mainly consisted of the few regular battalions that had been lent to Pignatelli to[p. 394] stiffen23 his raw levies. Thus the ‘Army of Castile’ ceased to exist[417].
On the same day that the Castilians were routed by Ney, the 2nd Andalusian division was severely24 handled by Moncey. When that Marshal advanced against Lerin and Sesma with the divisions of Morlot and Maurice Mathieu, Grimarest withdrew beyond the Ebro, abandoning by some oversight25 his vanguard. This force, commanded by a resolute26 officer, Colonel Cruz-Murgeon, was enveloped27 at Lerin by the division of Morlot[418]. The colonel shut himself up in the mediaeval castle of that town, and defended himself for two days, in hopes that he might be succoured. But his chief had fled beyond the river, and could not be induced to return by any appeals. On October 27 Cruz-Murgeon had to surrender, after two-thirds of his troops had been killed or wounded. Their obstinate28 defence was the more creditable because they were all new levies, consisting of a single Andalusian battalion8 (Tiradores de Cadiz) and a few Catalan volunteers. Marshal Moncey then occupied Lodosa and its bridge, but made no attempt to follow Grimarest, who was able to rejoin his chief without further loss.
Casta?os was greatly disturbed by the vigorous offensive movement of Ney and Moncey. Seeing the French so strong and so confident, he was struck with sudden qualms29 as to the advisability of the movement on Caparrosa and Pampeluna, which he and Palafox had agreed to carry out. He proposed to his colleague that they should drop their plan for surrounding Moncey, and attempt no more than an attack on his flanks at Caparrosa and Sanguesa. Meanwhile he concentrated the greater part of his army at Calahorra and Tudela [Oct. 29]. The initiative had passed to the French, and if Ney and Moncey did not seize the opportunity for an advance against the Army of the Centre, it was merely because they knew that Napoleon was now close at hand—he reached Bayonne four days later—and would not wish them to attempt anything decisive without his orders.
Meanwhile there arrived from Madrid a deputation from the Supreme31 Junta, consisting of Francisco Palafox (the younger[p. 395] brother of the Captain-General), of Coupigny, Reding’s colleague at the victory of Baylen, and the intriguing32 Conde de Montijo. The Junta were indignant that Casta?os had not made bricks without straw. Though they had not given him any appreciable33 reinforcements, they had expected him to attack the French and win a great victory beyond the Ebro. Conscious that the deputies came to him in no friendly spirit, Casta?os nevertheless received them with all respect, and laid before them the difficulties of his situation. Joseph Palafox came up from Saragossa to join the conference, and after a long and stormy meeting—this was the conference which so disgusted Colonel Graham[419]—it was decided34 to resume offensive operations [November 5]. The idea was a mad one, for six days before the council of war was held two French army corps, those of Victor and Lefebvre, had crossed the Bidassoa and entered Spain. There were now 110,000 instead of 65,000 enemies in front of the Spanish armies. Moreover, and this was still more important, Napoleon himself had reached Bayonne on November 3.
Nevertheless it was resolved once more to push forward and fall upon Moncey. Casta?os was to leave one division at Calahorra, and to bring the rest of his army over the Ebro to attack the bridge of Caparrosa: O’Neille and Saint March were to come down from Sanguesa to co-operate with him: Joseph Palafox was to bring up the Aragonese reserves from Saragossa. The only sign of prudence35 that appeared was that the council of war agreed not to commence the attack on Moncey till they had learnt how Blake and the army of Galicia were faring in Biscay. For that general had, as they knew, commenced some days before his second advance on Bilbao. Since the armies on the Central Ebro hung back, it was in the distant region on the coast that the first important collision between the Spaniards and the French reinforcements from Germany was to take place. For a fortnight more there was comparative quiet in front of Tudela and Caparrosa. Meanwhile Casta?os, prostrated36 by an attack of the gout[420], took to his bed, and the Army of the Centre was abandoned for a few days to the tender mercies of the deputation from Madrid.
There is a strange contrast when we turn from the study of the[p. 396] rash and inconsiderate plans of the Spanish generals to mark the movements of Napoleon. The Emperor had left Erfurt on October 14: on the nineteenth he had reached Paris, where he stayed for ten days, busied not only with the ‘logistics’ of moving the columns of the ‘Grand Army’ across France, but with all manner of administrative37 work. He had also to arrange the details of the conscription: though he had raised in 1807 the enormous mass of new levies of which we had to speak in an earlier chapter, he now asked for 140,000 men more[421]. Of these, 80,000 were to be drawn38 from the classes of 1806-9, which had already contributed so heavily to the army. The balance was to be taken from the class of 1810, whose members were still fifteen months below the legal age. From these multitudes of young soldiers every regiment39 of the army of Spain was to be brought up to full strength, but the majority were destined40 to reinforce the depleted41 armies of Germany and Italy, which had been thinned of veterans for the Peninsular War.
On October 25 Bonaparte presided at the opening of the Legislative42 Assembly, and made a characteristic harangue43 to its members. He painted the situation of the Empire in the most roseate colours. ‘The sight of this great French family, once torn apart by differences of opinion and domestic hatreds44, but now so tranquil45, prosperous, and united, had sensibly touched his soul. To be happy himself he only required the assurance that France also was happy. Law, finance, the Church, every branch of the state, seemed in the most flourishing condition. The Empire was strong in its alliances with Russia, the Confederation of the Rhine, Denmark, Switzerland, and Naples. Great Britain, it was true, had landed some troops in the Peninsula, and stirred up insurrections there. But this was a blessing46 in disguise. The Providence47 which had so constantly protected the arms of France, had deigned48 to strike the English ministry49 with blindness, and to induce them to present an army on the Continent where it was doomed50 to inevitable51 destruction. In a few days the Emperor would place himself at the head of his troops, and, with the aid of God, would crown in Madrid the true King of Spain, and plant his eagles on the forts of Lisbon[422].’
[p. 397]
Four days later Bonaparte quitted Paris, and passing hastily through Orleans and Bordeaux reached Bayonne at three o’clock in the morning of November 3. The corps of Victor and Lefebvre, with two divisions of dragoons, were several days ahead of him, and had already crossed the Bidassoa. The Imperial Guard and the divisions destined for Ney[423], as well as a great mass of cavalry52, were just converging53 on the frontier. Mortier’s corps was not very far off: Junot’s army from Portugal had already landed at Quiberon and Rochefort, and was being directed on Bordeaux. All the machinery54 for the great blow was now ready.
Napoleon profoundly despised the Spanish army and the Spanish generals. His correspondence is full of contemptuous allusions55 to them: ‘ever since he served at Toulon he knew them for the worst troops in Europe.’ ‘Nothing could be so bad as the Spaniards—they are mere30 rabble—6,000 French can beat 20,000 of them.’ ‘The whole Spanish army could not turn 15,000 good troops out of a position that had been properly occupied[424].’ Nevertheless he had determined to run no risks: the second Peninsular campaign must not end like the first, in a fiasco and a humiliating retreat. It was for this reason that the Emperor had massed more than 250,000 good troops against the tumultuary levies of the Junta—a force which, in his private opinion, was far more than enough to sweep the whole of his adversaries into the sea before the year 1808 should have run out. Any expedition in which he himself took part must, for the sake of his prestige, be conducted from beginning to end in a series of spectacular triumphs. It was better to use a larger army than was absolutely necessary, in order to make his blows sufficiently56 heavy, and to get the Spanish business over as rapidly as possible. If the whole Peninsula were overrun in a few months, and resistance had been completely beaten down ere the winter was over, there would be no chance of that intervention57 on the part of Austria which was the only danger on the political horizon[425].
[p. 398]
Napoleon, therefore, drew out his plans not merely for a triumphant58 advance on Madrid, but for the complete annihilation of the Spanish armies on the Ebro and in Biscay. From a careful study of the dispatches of his lieutenants59, he had realized the existence of the great gap in the direction of Burgos between the armies of Blake and of Casta?os. His plan of campaign, stated shortly, was to burst in through this gap, so as to separate the Spanish armies on his left and right, and then to wheel troops outwards60 in both directions so as to surround and annihilate61 them. Both Blake and Palafox were, at this moment, playing the game that he most desired. The further that the former pressed onward62 into Biscay, the nearer that the latter drew to the roots of the Pyrenees, the more did they expose themselves to being encompassed63 by great masses of troops breaking out from Burgos and Logro?o to fall upon their flank and rear. When the Emperor drew up his scheme he knew that Blake was in front of Zornoza, and that the bulk of the army of Aragon was at Sanguesa. Meanwhile the French advanced divisions were in possession of Miranda, Logro?o, and Lodosa, the three chief passages over the Upper Ebro. A glance at the map is sufficient to show that the moment that the Emperor and his reserves reached Vittoria the Spanish armies were in the most perilous64 position. It would suffice to order a march on Burgos on the one hand and on Tudela on the other, and then the troops of Aragon and Galicia would not merely be cut off from any possible retreat on Madrid, but run grave danger of annihilation. A further advance of the French would probably thrust the one against the Pyrenees, and roll the other into the Bay of Biscay.
For this reason it was the Emperor’s wish that his lieutenants should refrain from attacking Blake and Palafox till he himself was ready to march on Burgos. For any premature65 advance against the Spaniards might force them to retreat from their dangerous advanced positions, and fall back the one on Reynosa the other on Saragossa, where they would be much less exposed.
The distribution of the ‘Grand Army’ was to be as follows. Lefebvre with the 4th Corps was to present himself in front of[p. 399] Blake between Durango and Zornoza, and to hold him fast without pressing him. Moncey with the 3rd Corps, in a similar way, was to ‘contain’ Palafox and Casta?os from his posts at Lodosa, Caparrosa, and Tafalla. Meanwhile Victor, with the newly arrived 1st Corps, was to endeavour to get into Blake’s rear, by the road Vittoria—Murguia—Ordu?a. The main body of the army, consisting of the troops of Bessières and Ney, King Joseph’s reserve, the Imperial Guard, and four divisions of cavalry, was to march on Burgos. Napoleon knew that there was no large body of Spaniards in that place: he expected to find there Pignatelli’s ‘Army of Castile,’ but this force (as we have seen) had ceased to exist, having been drafted with ignominy into the ranks of the army of Andalusia[426]. As a matter of fact Burgos was now occupied by a new force from the second line—the long-expected army of Estremadura, some 12,000 strong, which had at last come up from Madrid and taken its place at the front. But Napoleon’s reasoning still held good: any Spanish army that might chance to be at Burgos must be overwhelmed by the enormous mass of troops that was about to be hurled66 upon it. The moment that it was disposed of, Ney with the 6th Corps was to wheel to the east, and march by Aranda and Soria, so as to place himself between Casta?os and Palafox and Madrid. Then he would turn their flank at Tarazona and Tudela, and—in conjunction with Moncey—drive them northward67 against the Pyrenees. In a similar way, upon the other flank, the 2nd Corps was to wheel to the north-west and march from Burgos on Reynosa, there to intercept68 Blake, if he had not already been cut off by Victor’s shorter turning movement. Meanwhile the Emperor with the rest of his army, followed by the new reserves (Mortier’s corps and other troops) which were due from France, would march straight from Burgos on Madrid, force the defiles69 of the Somosierra and Guadarrama, and seize the Spanish capital. He was well aware that there would be no serious hostile force in front of him, since the armies of Blake, Palafox, and Casta?os were all provided for. He does not seem to have known of the army of Estremadura, or to have had any idea that the English forces from[p. 400] Portugal might conceivably be on their way to cover Madrid. There is no mention of Sir John Moore and his host in the imperial dispatches till December 5.
All being ready, Bonaparte rode out of Bayonne on November 4, having stayed there only thirty-six hours. Before leaving he had received one vexatious piece of news: Lefebvre, in direct disobedience to his orders, had attacked Blake on October 31, and forced him back beyond Bilbao. This made the plan for the cutting off of the army of Galicia a little more difficult, since the Spaniards were now forty miles further back, and not nearly so much exposed as they had been hitherto. But it was still not impossible that Victor might succeed in circumventing70 them, and forcing them into the Bay of Biscay.
It is impossible to withhold71 our admiration72 from the Emperor’s simple yet all-embracing plan of operations. It is true that the campaign was made more easy by the fact that he was dealing73 with raw and undisciplined armies and inexpert generals. It is also clear that he rightly reckoned on having two men in the field against every one whom the Spaniards could produce. But the excellence74 of a scheme is not to be judged merely by the difficulties in its way; and military genius can be displayed in dealing with an easy as well as with a dangerous problem. Half a dozen other plans for conducting the invasion of Spain might have been drawn up, but it is impossible to see that any better one could have been constructed. In its main lines it was carried out with complete success: the armies of the Junta were scattered75 to the winds, and Madrid fell almost without a blow.
It was only when the capital had been occupied, and the troops of Blake and Belvedere, of Casta?os and Palafox were flying devious76 over half the provinces of Spain, that the difficulties of the Peninsular War began to develop themselves. Napoleon had never before had any experience of the character of guerilla warfare77, or the kind of resistance that can be offered by a proud and revengeful nation which has made up its mind never to submit to the conqueror78. In his complete ignorance of Spain and the Spaniards, he imagined that he had a very simple campaign to conduct. The subjugation79 of the Peninsula was to him an ordinary military problem, like the invasion of Lombardy or of Prussia, and he went forth80 in cheerful confidence to ‘plant the eagles of France on the forts of Lisbon,’ and to ‘drive the Britannic[p. 401] leopard81 from the soil of the Peninsula, which it defiles by its presence.’ But the last chapter of this story was to be told not at Lisbon but at Toulouse: and ‘the Beneficent Providence which had deigned to strike the British ministry with such blindness that they had been induced to send an army to the Continent[427],’ had other designs than Bonaparte supposed.
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adversaries
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| n.对手，敌手( adversary的名词复数 ) | |
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corps
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| n.(通信等兵种的)部队；(同类作的)一组 | |
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perfectly
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| adv.完美地，无可非议地，彻底地 | |
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thoroughly
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| adv.完全地，彻底地，十足地 | |
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chagrined
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| adj.懊恼的，苦恼的v.使懊恼，使懊丧，使悔恨( chagrin的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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junta
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| n.团体；政务审议会 | |
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converse
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| vi.谈话，谈天，闲聊；adv.相反的，相反 | |
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battalion
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| n.营；部队；大队(的人) | |
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battalions
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| n.（陆军的）一营（大约有一千兵士）( battalion的名词复数 )；协同作战的部队；军队；（组织在一起工作的）队伍 | |
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levies
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| （部队）征兵( levy的名词复数 )； 募捐； 被征募的军队 | |
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awakening
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emboldened
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| v.鼓励，使有胆量( embolden的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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sketched
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| v.草拟（sketch的过去式与过去分词形式） | |
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determined
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| adj.坚定的；有决心的 | |
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embargo
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minor
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trespassing
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| [法]非法入侵 | |
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bonnet
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applied
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horde
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deserted
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molestation
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| n.骚扰，干扰，调戏；折磨 | |
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stiffen
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severely
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oversight
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resolute
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enveloped
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obstinate
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qualms
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mere
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supreme
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| adj.极度的，最重要的；至高的，最高的 | |
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intriguing
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| adj.有趣的；迷人的v.搞阴谋诡计(intrigue的现在分词)；激起…的好奇心 | |
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appreciable
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| adj.明显的，可见的，可估量的，可觉察的 | |
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decided
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| adj.决定了的，坚决的；明显的，明确的 | |
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prudence
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prostrated
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| v.使俯伏，使拜倒( prostrate的过去式和过去分词 )；（指疾病、天气等）使某人无能为力 | |
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administrative
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| adj.行政的，管理的 | |
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drawn
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| v.拖，拉，拔出；adj.憔悴的，紧张的 | |
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regiment
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| n.团，多数，管理；v.组织，编成团，统制 | |
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destined
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| adj.命中注定的；(for)以…为目的地的 | |
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depleted
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| adj. 枯竭的, 废弃的 动词deplete的过去式和过去分词 | |
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legislative
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| n.立法机构，立法权；adj.立法的，有立法权的 | |
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harangue
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| n.慷慨冗长的训话，言辞激烈的讲话 | |
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hatreds
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| n.仇恨，憎恶( hatred的名词复数 )；厌恶的事 | |
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tranquil
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| adj. 安静的, 宁静的, 稳定的, 不变的 | |
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blessing
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| n.祈神赐福；祷告；祝福，祝愿 | |
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providence
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| n.深谋远虑，天道，天意；远见；节约；上帝 | |
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deigned
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| v.屈尊，俯就( deign的过去式和过去分词 ) | |
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ministry
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| n.(政府的)部；牧师 | |
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doomed
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| 命定的 | |
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inevitable
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| adj.不可避免的，必然发生的 | |
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52
cavalry
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| n.骑兵；轻装甲部队 | |
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53
converging
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| adj.收敛[缩]的，会聚的，趋同的v.（线条、运动的物体等）会于一点( converge的现在分词 )；（趋于）相似或相同；人或车辆汇集；聚集 | |
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54
machinery
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| n.(总称)机械，机器；机构 | |
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allusions
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| 暗指，间接提到( allusion的名词复数 ) | |
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sufficiently
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| adv.足够地，充分地 | |
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intervention
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| n.介入，干涉，干预 | |
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triumphant
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| adj.胜利的，成功的；狂欢的，喜悦的 | |
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lieutenants
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| n.陆军中尉( lieutenant的名词复数 )；副职官员；空军；仅低于…官阶的官员 | |
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outwards
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| adj.外面的，公开的，向外的；adv.向外；n.外形 | |
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annihilate
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| v.使无效；毁灭；取消 | |
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onward
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| adj.向前的，前进的；adv.向前，前进，在先 | |
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encompassed
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| v.围绕( encompass的过去式和过去分词 )；包围；包含；包括 | |
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perilous
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| adj.危险的，冒险的 | |
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premature
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| adj.比预期时间早的；不成熟的，仓促的 | |
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hurled
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| v.猛投，用力掷( hurl的过去式和过去分词 )；大声叫骂 | |
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northward
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| adv.向北；n.北方的地区 | |
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intercept
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| vt.拦截，截住，截击 | |
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defiles
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| v.玷污( defile的第三人称单数 )；污染；弄脏；纵列行进 | |
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circumventing
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| v.设法克服或避免（某事物），回避( circumvent的现在分词 )；绕过，绕行，绕道旅行 | |
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withhold
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| v.拒绝，不给；使停止，阻挡 | |
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admiration
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| n.钦佩，赞美，羡慕 | |
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dealing
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| n.经商方法，待人态度 | |
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excellence
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| n.优秀，杰出，(pl.)优点，美德 | |
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scattered
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| adj.分散的，稀疏的；散步的；疏疏落落的 | |
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devious
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| adj.不坦率的，狡猾的；迂回的，曲折的 | |
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warfare
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| n.战争(状态)；斗争；冲突 | |
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conqueror
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| n.征服者，胜利者 | |
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subjugation
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| n.镇压，平息，征服 | |
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forth
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| adv.向前；向外，往外 | |
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leopard
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| n.豹 | |
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